

This translation of Book 2 Distinctions 4 to 44 of the *Ordinatio* (aka *Opus Oxoniense*) of Blessed John Duns Scotus is complete. These distinctions fill volume eight of the Vatican critical edition of the Latin text edited by the Scotus Commission in Rome and published by Quarrachi.

Scotus' Latin is tight and not seldom elliptical, exploiting to the full the grammatical resources of the language to make his meaning clear (especially the backward references of his pronouns). In English this ellipsis must, for the sake of intelligibility, often be translated with a fuller repetition of words and phrases than Scotus himself gives. The possibility of mistake thus arises if the wrong word or phrase is chosen for repetition. The only check to remove error is to ensure that the resulting English makes the sense intended by Scotus. Whether this sense has always been captured in the translation that follows must be judged by the reader. In addition there are passages where not only the argumentation but the grammar too is obscure, and I cannot vouch for the success of my attempts to penetrate the obscurity. So, for these and the like reasons, comments and notice of errors from readers are most welcome.

Peter L.P. Simpson
February, 2014

The translation is now being revised and reformatted, to tidy up some looseness of translation, supply some omissions, and help reduce file size.

NB: The interpolated texts, added at various points in some of the questions, are of texts inserted in the *Ordinatio* by earlier editors from equivalent passages in other surviving commentaries on the *Sentences* by Scotus. The Vatican editors placed these in footnotes or an appendix and they are translated here for the convenience of the reader.

July, 2023

THE ORDINATIO OF BLESSED JOHN DUNS SCOTUS

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In its place is here translated the same question in the *Lectura*.

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Fourth and Fifth Distinctions

Question One

Whether between the Creation and Blessedness of the Good Angel there was any Interval

1. About the fourth distinction,¹ where the Master treats of what sort angels were created ('perfect or imperfect, blessed or wretched'), I ask^a whether^b between the creation and blessedness of the good angel there was any delaying interval.²

a. [*Interpolation*]: whether the good angels were blessed in the first instant of creation and the bad angels wretched (*and then the text of q.1 follows*). Again I ask...

b. [*Interpolation*]: "After this must be seen" etc. [cf. *Additiones Magnae*, II d.4 q.un] About the fourth distinction, wherein the Master shows what sort of angels were created as to their non-natural conditions (which are happiness and misery), one thing is asked, whether namely between the creation and blessedness of the good angel there was any interval, or – under another term – whether the good angels were blessed in the first instant of their creation and the bad wretched (*and the text of the question follows*). Second the same question is asked, under another term, whether namely...

2. That not:

Because without interval he had natural blessedness, – therefore also supernatural blessedness.

3. Proof of the antecedent: for at once did the created angel have the species (which was spoken of in *Ord.* II d.3 nn.324-331) wherein the object of natural beatitude was present, and the power [for it] – and consequently he could, not impeded, use it in considering the divine essence under that idea (for he was not impeded); and also, that species was moving over all the others, in considering the divine essence. But in understanding in that way the divine essence, and loving it, there was natural beatitude.

4. Proof of the consequence, because a natural cause is not more perfect for producing its effect than a supernatural cause for producing its effect; but the natural cause immediately had its effect, namely natural blessedness; therefore God – who is a supernatural cause – at once produced his effect, namely supernatural blessedness.

5. Further, Augustine *City of God* 12.9 n.2 says: "[God] at the same time creating nature and lavishing grace;" therefore at once did the created angel have grace. But he had at the same time grace and blessedness, – proof: because there was in the bad at the same time guilt and punishment (otherwise their guilt would be remediable).

6. On the contrary:

Augustine *On Genesis* 1.3 n.2: "The angel was first made unformed, secondly light:" therefore etc.

Question Two

Whether the Angel merited Blessedness before receiving it

¹ Cf. Scotus *Rep.* II A d.4 single question; for questions 1 and 2, Scotus *Lectura* II d.4-5 qq.1-2.

² The Latin word here is *mora*, which means delay or any interval of time between things.

7. And because the solution of this question depends on the following question, therefore I ask – about the fifth distinction^a – whether the angel merited blessedness first before he received it.

a. [Interpolation] About the fifth distinction, where the Master deals with the conversion of the good angels and the aversion of the bad angels, the question is principally two things; the first has regard to the conversion of the good, and it is...

8. That he did not:

Because something is only merited by services paid to man; but he does not merit something that is expected, because “hope that is deferred afflicts the soul” (*Proverbs* 13.12); therefore that which he merits he already has. But this would not be unless the blessedness that he has he merited for obedience.

9. Further, a greater reward requires a greater merit, according to reason; but the angels have a greater glory than many elect men; therefore a greater merit is required in them. But a man is a wayfarer for a long time, and he has many meritorious and many difficult works; therefore the reward of angels requires those; but there was not so great an interval before their blessedness, – therefore etc.

10. To the opposite is Augustine *On Rebuke and Grace*: “the saints, who have stood firm, merited to receive the reward of that life;” wherefore, if they merited to receive it before they received it, then first etc.³ (look there).

I. To the Second Question

A. The Opinion that Peter Lombard holds

11. In this second question [n.7] the Master is not held to, who at the end of the fifth distinction approves rather the opinion that says, “they were blessed before they merited it, and beatitude itself they did not merit.” But he says that “they merit it now by services paid to the elect” (as a soldier merits a horse who is going to soldier well with it).

12. For this opinion is not held to:

First, because if man had not been to be created, then the angel would not have had blessedness: for he would not have had, when all merit was removed, the intrinsic act by which he might merit – through which act he could merit beatitude; which seems unacceptable, because one angel does not depend on another in meriting, and much less on man.^a

a. [Interpolation] Likewise, an intrinsic act is meritorious with the extrinsic act removed; therefore they [the angels] were able to merit through that.

13. Further by this, that someone will use well what is received, he does not merit to receive it: for then a man could merit grace, because it is foreseen by God giving it that he will use it well, – and then grace would not be grace because it would be from merits (though not posited in fact, yet foreseen). Therefore, the angel did not merit beatitude if he only had it because of good use foreseen by him in doing service concerning the elect.

³ Sc.: “then first they did merit.” If the condition of receiving is merit, then if no meriting, no receiving; but the good angels did receive; therefore they merited.

14. Further, then the state of blessedness would not be of itself certain; for although in fact the world were to end, and from this the number of services was to be made finite (which was paid by certain angels to the elect) – yet the world could last longer, remaining for a thousand years or however long; but not because of this would the state of beatitude be less certain, but – on this position – the certitude of merit would not be as great as the reward would be; therefore this reward ‘certain of itself’ will not necessarily correspond to the merit, ‘which is not certain’, from the fact that the reward is of itself certain.

B. The Common Opinion and Scotus’ Opinion

15. Therefore it is held that the angels held that the angels merited their beatitude, and before they received it.

16. The first is made clear, because every nature attains its perfection through its proper operation; but the perfection and end of any rational creature is beatitude, which is natural to God alone. Now every “such operation, leading to the end, is either maker of the end, namely when the end does not exceed the virtue of the one operating (as medication in respect of health), – or is meritorious of the end, when namely the end exceeds the virtue ‘of the one operating because of the end’, and then the end is expected from the gift of another; but ultimate beatitude exceeds both angelic and human nature; both man therefore and angel merits his beatitude,”⁴ – and so the first is plain.

17. The second [n.15] is made clear thus: the same thing cannot be from perfect and imperfect grace; but merit is from imperfect grace, reward from perfect grace.

18. But this reason [n.17] does not seem cogent, because it is possible for some soul to have as much grace on the way as it will have in the fatherland, although now it not be able to have as perfect a use of it as it will have in the fatherland; hence the same habit will remain, and it could remain equal, but not the same act.

19. Therefore I make the second [n.15] clear in another way, because the will does not at the same time will mutably and immutably, or fixedly (such that then it could not will the opposite) and not fixedly (such that for the ‘then’, insofar as it is eliciting the act, it could be willing the opposite); but when it is being rewarded it is willing immutably, that is, insofar as it is considered as eliciting the act (and consequently, as it is naturally prior to the act, it is operating for it), – but when it is meriting, it does not thus immutably will, but as eliciting contingently does it seem to elicit it.

20. For this too are congruences adduced, because the disposition must precede that for which it is, and the way the term; but merit is the disposition and the way in respect of beatitude; wherefore etc.

C. To the Principal Arguments

21. To the arguments of this question.

To the first [n.8], it is conceded that they [angels] merit some accidental beatitude; indeed ‘services’ are as it were certain works redounding from perfection of beatitude – just as is of acts ‘generated and proceeding from a perfect, generated habit’, which [acts] generate no perfection (nor do they intensify the habit because it is not

⁴ Cf. Aquinas *ST Ia q.62 a.4.*

intensifiable), but they only proceed from the full perfection of the habit; so here. And in the way in which they merit accidental beatitude, I concede that they do not have it when they are meriting; nor is there from this any ‘affliction’, because they have essential beatitude, which they will most of all.

22. To the second [n.9] I say that the greatest merit of the angels was in willing the ultimate end by intrinsic motion – when the bad had been turned away from that end, by being proud, as will be plain in distinction 4 [n.46]. But for great reward is a multitude of merits not required, but much more is one intense merit required than a hundred thousand weak ones: and so in them there was a most intense movement of merit for the little interval whereby they were meriting, so much so perhaps that no man – according to common law – could have as intense an act of merit as they had.

II. To the First Question

23. To the first question (of the fourth distinction) [n.1], which depends on the solution of this [n.7, 11-20], two things need to be seen: first, how many intervals must be posited for the angels – second, what are those intervals.

A. How Many Intervals must be Posited concerning Angels

1. The Possibility of Several Intervals

24. To the first [n.23] it can be said in many ways.

For two intervals can be posited: one namely in which they are in the term – and another single one preceding, in which they are on the way. And thus does a certain doctor [Aquinas, *ST* Ia q.63 a.5 ad 4] posit that they were created together in grace, in the first instant, and therein all merited; in the second instant these merited and not those who set up an obstacle, such that if they had not set it up, they would have been rewarded like the others.

25. There can however be three intervals posited, and this in many ways:

In one way, that in the first interval they were all in their natural state, in the second the bad in sin and the just in merit, in the third the bad in punishment and the good in grace and reward. And this seems the way of the Master [Lombard], who seems to say that the bad demerited grace being applied to them when it was being applied to the good, as if they had already sinned in the second interval before – in the third – grace was applied to the good; and then, in the third interval, the good had in duration at once grace and glory.

26. In another way by positing three intervals such that in the first all were in their pure natural state, in the second the good in grace and merit, the bad in demerit – and in the third these and those in the term.

27. In a third way by positing three intervals so that all in the first interval were created in grace and merited, in the second only the good stood in merit and the bad fell, in the third these and those were in the term.

28. In another way can four intervals be posited, and this in two ways:

In one way, that in the first interval they were in their natural state, in the second the bad sinned, in the third grace was applied to the good and they merited, in the fourth the good were rewarded and the bad in like manner condemned.

29. In another way, that in the first interval all were in their natural state, in the second all in grace, in the third the good stood (and merited) in grace and the bad failed, in the fourth these and those in the term.

2. What Should be Thought

30. For inquiring then about these ways [nn.24-29], six probable propositions must be supposed.

Of which the first is: 'those meriting up to the now of reward, are in that now rewarded'. This is proved, because in that 'now' they are not on the way, because that 'now' is the now of reward; therefore in that 'now' none can demerit, because that cannot be impeded without the reward being rendered to them for merit for the whole duration of merit contracted up to that 'now'.

31. There is a confirmation. For a man, existing for his whole life in merit, cannot in the instant of death demerit, nor put in place an obstacle so that he not be rewarded; for he has merited so that then impeccability be given him, so that then he cannot put an obstacle in place. And therefore, about those who merit for the whole interval of the way, it cannot be said that this one, in the instant of remuneration, put in place an obstacle and that one not: for this seems to posit that the instant of reward is not the term, but that then he is on the way (or at least that he who can put in place an obstacle is on the way), and it seems irrational to posit an obstacle.

And from this at once is the first opinion rejected – because there cannot only be two intervals posited, as it posits [n.24].

32. The second proposition is this, that 'merit preceded reward in duration'; which is proved from the proof of the preceding question [nn.12-20]. And from this is the first way rejected of positing three intervals [Lombard, n.25].

33. The third proposition is this, that 'the whole interval of the way prefixed for all angels whatever was equal'; for this is likely, because just as the whole interval prefixed for man is up to the instant of death, so also for these and those would an equal interval be prefixed for existing on the way.

34. And from these [nn.30, 32, 33] follows a fourth, that 'when the good finally merited, then in the same instant the bad demerited'; for if they did not demerit, either therefore they then merited, and consequently they would have been rewarded along with the good, from the first proposition; or they would then have been in the term – against the second proposition, because then the good were on the way; or then they would have been in their pure natural state, and so they would still in the following interval have been on the way (when however the good were in the term), which is against the third proposition.

35. The fifth proposition is that 'all were created uniform'.

36. From these propositions it follows that it is necessary to posit at least three intervals: one namely in which all are in the term, and another in which the good finally merit and the bad demerit, and a third in which all are created uniform (from the fifth proposition); and then, if it be posited that all would have been created in grace, the last way is held of positing three intervals [n.40]. There can also probably be posited four intervals, according to those who posit four intervals [nn.28-29, 40].

37. But for inquiring further about their disposition in these intervals, a sixth proposition seems probable, that ‘any angel at all will at some time have been in grace’, whether in the instant of creation or afterwards; for although it not be necessary – as will perhaps be said elsewhere [*Ord.* 4 d.1 p.4 q.1 nn.4-5, d.16 q.2 n.4] – that for this that someone sin, that he will first have had grace, yet it is fitting that they will have been not only not unjust (because they received the natural liberty through which they were able to preserve natural justice), but that they will have received gratuitous justice, according to Anselm *Fall of the Devil* 14-16, 18.

38. Likewise, it seems that this sixth proposition is proved from another, a seventh, namely that ‘God does not make separation between these and those before they separate themselves through their acts’ – because, according to Augustine *On Genesis* 11.17 (look there; and it is put in distinction 4 of this book II [sc. of Lombard], ‘Why these were separated and not those’, look there): “For God is not an avenger first before someone is a sinner.” Therefore, up to the instant of merit and demerit they were all uniform.

39. And if then grace was first being applied to the good, it seems too that it must have been applied to the others, for before that instant they did not demerit; so why then did grace not have to be applied to them, as also to the others who merited? But if they had then demerited it, therefore they had it before, because grace and guilt are not at the same time.

40. Therefore if this sixth proposition be conceded, that ‘any [angel] at all sinning will at some time have been in grace’, it follows necessarily that those three intervals (if they be posited) will be these: because the first will be of all in grace, and the second will be of these (the good) in merit and of those (the bad) in demerit, and the third will be of these and those in the term. Or if it be said that they were at some time in their pure natural state, it is necessary then to posit four intervals, – so that all in the first interval were in their pure natural state, in the second all were in grace and the good merited and the bad demerited, in the third the good persevered in good and the bad in bad, and in the fourth these and those in the term. And this last way about four intervals saves more states in them, and saves more affirmative authorities – which plurality, if it not be pleasing (because it does not have evident necessity), then it is probable to posit at least the three intervals before assigned [here n.40].

B. What those Intervals were

41. About the second article, namely what were those intervals [n.23]?

Although some posit that they were diverse instants of discrete time, yet, from *Ord.* II d.2 nn.153-167, it appears that on account of nothing in angels is it necessary to posit discrete time, but diverse ‘nows’ of the *aevum*.

42. But what did those ‘nows’ of the *aevum* correspond to in our continuous time?

I say that the final interval, namely of existing in the term, corresponds to the whole time after the first instant of the beatitude of the good and the damnation of the bad. The first interval however, in which they were uniform, can be posited to have coexisted with our instant, or with a part of our time. And according to this in consequence must it be posited about the second interval: for if the first interval coexists

with time and the last instant of it, then the second interval did not have any first instant in our time corresponding to it [n.44].

43. And although it seems to some that it was necessary for the angel to have first sinned in an instant (or with an instant) of our time, and to others it seems that it must necessarily be that he sinned with our time: the first indeed have for themselves that between privative opposites about a subject it is not naturally fit for there to be a middle, and when a subject is indivisible there is no cause of succession from term to term (neither on the part of the terms, nor on the part of the movable), the second have for themselves that ‘no created virtue acts in an instant, because then a greater virtue would act in less than in an instant’ [*Ord.II* d.2 nn.287, 505], – however neither reason is conclusive. About the first it will be clear in *Ord.III* d.3 q.1 nn.11-13, 9-10, where reply will be made to that reason by maintaining that the soul of the blessed Virgin could precisely have been in sin for an instant and afterwards have been clean; nor is the second conclusive, rather a response was given to it before [*Ord.II* d.2 nn.505-506].

44. In each way it could have been both that the first interval of innocence was coexisting with time and not with the ultimate instant of it, and then the second interval had the first instant of time coexisting with it – or that the first interval was coexisting with time and the last instant of it (or one instant only of time), and then that the second interval did not have any first interval corresponding to it, just as neither is it possible to grant a first change in continuous motion, from *Physics* 6.5.236a7-b18.

45. But of what sort was the second interval in itself – was it instantaneous or indivisible?

It seems that not, for two reasons:

First, because the bad angels sinned with many sins, of diverse species, and did not have all their acts at once [*Ord.II* d.7 n.18 below]; therefore they had one after another, – and thus, in the whole interval, in which they had those acts, they were on the way (otherwise the later acts would not have been demerits for them, but as it were punishments of them existing in the term).

46. Second, because to the good angels is for their great merit ascribed that they overcame the battle of temptation, *Revelation* 12.7-8, “A great battle was waged in heaven; Michael and his angels battling with the dragon, and the dragon was fighting and his angels etc.” For if there were precisely one instant in which the bad demerited and the good merited, in it there would not have been this battle nor victory over temptation, and so this victory would not be ascribed to them for their praise and excelling merit. – The assumption is proved, because if there had only been one instant, the bad would have sinned and the good would have merited at the same time; but in that instant of nature in which the bad sinned, their sin did not tempt the good; for it did not tempt them save later in nature than it was committed by the bad. The good then overcame temptation after the bad sinned, and so that very fact proves that the interval of demerit of the bad was not indivisible; and from this follows that neither was the interval of the merit of the good [sc. indivisible] (because they were equals, from the fifth proposition [n.35]), and the second way [here, n.46] proves this specifically of the interval of merit of the good.

C. To the Principal Arguments

47. To the principal arguments [nn.2-5].

To the first [n.2] I say that the consequence is not valid.

48. To the proof of the consequence [n.4] I say that God could have given them beatitude in the instant of creation, if he had wished, but it was more glorious to have it from merit – and thus did his wisdom dispose. But this merit could not have been – on the supposition of the divine liberty, which created them all equal – unless in at least two intervals preceding the beatitude [nn.40, 36].

49. To the other [n.5]: although the likeness may be denied of grace and glory to guilt and punishment, I say nevertheless that they were not at the same time bad with demerit culpably and damned, because they were not at the same time on the way and in the term (as neither were the good); and although they be now in guilt, yet they are not now demeriting – as are wayfarers in eliciting an act which to elicit is imputed to them for demerit.

D. To the Reason for the Opinion Positing Two Intervals only

50. To the reason which is relied on for the opinion that posits two intervals only, namely ‘that they [angels] understand non-discursively and thus acquire their perfection’ [Aquinas, *ST Ia q.62 a.5c.*] – I reply:

If therefrom they would at once have been blessed after one act, it would follow that the bad – who according to the same [Aquinas, n.24] merited in the first instant – would have been blessed and never have sinned; therefore that assumption [sc. of Aquinas] is false of the natural perfection of angels (as was touched on in *Ord.II d.3 [p.2] nn.315, 325*), and much more false of the supernatural perfection that they acquire meritoriously. For that is according to the acceptation of the rewarder, whose law it is that “he who perseveres to the end will be saved” – and he who falls will be condemned (*Matthew 10.22, 24.13*); and therefore, if at any time they merited and did not persevere for the whole interval deputed for the way, they did not sufficiently merit eternal beatitude.

Sixth Distinction Question One

Whether the Bad Angel could have Desired Equality with God

1. About the sixth distinction I ask whether the bad angel could have desired equality with God.^a

a. [*Interpolation*; cf. *Lectura II d.6 q.1, Rep.IIA d.6 q.1*] About the second principal, namely the turning away of the bad, two things are asked: the first is whether the bad angel could have desired equality with God; the second is whether the first sin of the angel formally would have been pride. About the first it is argued...

2. That not:

The intellect in understanding the highest truth does not err, therefore neither does the will sin in loving the supreme good: therefore it would not sin by desiring equality

with God; therefore the angel in the first act of sinning could not have desired equality with God.

3. To the opposite is the Master [Lombard] in the text.

I. To the Question

A. The Opinion of Others

4. Here it is said [e.g. Aquinas, *ST Ia q.63 a.3 q.1 a.2*, et al.] that he could not have desired that equality.

5. For which there seem to be four reasons:

First, because he did not sin from passion (it is plain), nor from ignorance (because punishment does not precede guilt) – therefore from choice; but “choice is not of impossibles” *Ethics* 3.4.1111b20-23; now for an angel to be equal to God is impossible – therefore about that he did not sin.

6. Second, because ‘for an angel to be equal to God’ includes a contradiction; therefore it does not involve any idea of being; therefore in no way is it contained under the first object of the will – therefore it is not in any way willable.

7. Third. The will can will nothing save what is pre-understood; therefore that an angel is equal to God is pre-understood or pre-shown by the intellect: either then by an erring intellect, and then punishment is before guilt; or by a non-erring intellect – and this is impossible because a ‘non-erring’ intellect cannot show that which includes a contradiction.

8. Fourth,^a because that an angel is equal to God includes that he is not angel, because an angel cannot be an angel unless he be inferior to God; but no one can desire himself not to be, from Augustine *On Free Choice* 6-8 nn.63-84; therefore no inferior to God can desire the equality of God.

a. [*Interpolation*] and it seems to be Anselm’s reason, *Fall of the Devil* ch.4 [Vatican editors: *nothing such is found in Anselm, or Aquinas*]

B. Scotus’ own Opinion

9. Because, however, these reasons are not cogent, it can be replied in another way to the question [n.1], because the angel could have desired equality with God.

10. Which is made persuasive:

First thus, because the will has a double act, act of loving with love of friendship and act of coveting something for the one loved, – and according to each act it has the whole of being for object, such that just as someone can love any being whatever with love of friendship, so he can covet any being whatever for himself as loved; therefore an angel could have loved himself with love of friendship, could also have coveted for himself any covetable good whatever, – and so, since equality with God is a certain good covetable in itself, the angel could have coveted that good for himself.

11. Further, if equality with God were possible for an angel, the angel could covet it for himself (it is plain); but this sort of impossibility does not prevent an angel from being able to will it, because “will can be of impossibles” according to the Philosopher *Ethics* 3.4.1111b22-23 and Damascene *Orthodox Faith* 36.

12. There is also proved, because the damned hate God (because from *Psalm* 73.23, “the pride of those who hate you ascends always”); and the hater wills the hated not to be, according to the Philosopher *Rhetoric* 2.4.1382a15; therefore they want God not to be. But this is in itself altogether impossible and impossible; therefore the impossibility of this appetible does not prohibit its being able to be desired by a sinning will.

13. This is also confirmed, because a sinning will could have willed God not to be and could also – with this – have willed that degree and that eminence of God to be in another; therefore it could have willed it to be in itself just as in another, and so it could have willed the eminence of God for itself.

C. To the Arguments for the Opinion of Others

14. To the arguments of the first opinion [nn.5-8].

To the first [n.5] it can be said that choice is taken equivocally: in one way for an act of will consequent to full apprehension of the intellect, in which way someone is said to sin from choice, when there is not passion perturbing the intellect, nor ignorance; in another way choice is taken for an act of will consequent to the conclusion of a practical syllogism, which choice is only an efficacious volition of the object, which is for investigating the means through which the object can be attained. In the first way choice is of impossibles, as the Philosopher says *Ethics* 3 [n.11] that “will is of impossibles” – not only an erring will, but a will ‘with full apprehension of the intellect presupposed’. In the second way choice is not of impossibles, because no one syllogizes in practical way about impossibles; for a practical syllogism concludes from the end that which is for the end, so that through ‘this which is for the end’ the end may be reached – and such discursive reasoning is never had on account of the ‘impossible’.

15. Or it could more plainly be said that choice is ‘what precisely states full acceptation’ or ‘efficacious willing consequent to a practical syllogism’. In the first way it can be of anything for which perfect knowledge of the object is presupposed. In the second way it cannot be of anything save for the ‘to be’ of which the will operates as much as it can, because it wills nothing efficaciously save that for which it disposes means through which it can be deduced; and such ‘efficacious volition’ is never of anything impossible: for no one deliberates about impossibles, nor gives prescriptions to the practical intellect for seeking means to it – and in this way has to be understood the Philosopher’s remark “choice is not of impossibles” [n.5]. In this way the angels did not sin from choice, that is, from an efficacious volition through which they willed to strive to attain their purpose, by attacking and pilfering his eminence for themselves; they were however able to sin from choice, that is, from a non-pilfering but a perfect volition of that equality.

[16.⁵ Through this distinction must reply be made to the question [n.1] that an angel by efficacious volition could not have desired equality with God, because the object is not shown as possible; he is able to, however, by simple volition (which is in respect of impossibles), wherein there can also be merit and demerit – and through this do the second arguments conclude [sc. for Scotus’ opinion, nn.9-13.]

⁵ This paragraph, according to the Vatican editors, is found in some mss. It is taken from the *Additiones Magnae* compiled by William of Alnwick and is not in the ancient originals.

17. To the second [sc. for the first opinion, n.6] I say that, just as there is a double intellection, absolute and comparative (the absolute indeed is only of some simple object, contained under the object of the intellect, – the comparative or collative intellection can be for anything, and this whether the comparison is ‘possible’ or ‘impossible’; for the intellect does not only compose possible propositions but also impossible ones), – so there is some absolute volition, and it is only of some simple object contained under the first willable; some volition is comparative, and it can compare any simple willable to any other, even if in that comparison there be included a contradiction. But speaking of the first volition, this propositional complex [sc. ‘an angel being equal to God’] is not willable, because it is not something ‘simple’ including in itself the idea of first object, but is only a certain relation of a simple object to an object – each ‘simple object’ of which is per se willable, for both that which it wills and that for which it wills it is per se willable. When, therefore, it says that ‘this whole does not include the idea of first object’ [n.6], it is false speaking of the parts of the whole; for each part – namely the ‘what’ and the ‘for what’ in itself – includes per se the object of the will, and this suffices for the will to will one part in order to another.^a

a. [*Interpolation*] just as for this, that the intellect compose any simple whatever with any simple whatever, it suffices that each simple can be per se apprehended by the intellect.

18. To the third [n.7] I say that simple understanding can apprehend equality with God without error; and such simple apprehension suffices for this, that appetite desire ‘the thing apprehended’ for another – just as the intellect apprehending white and apprehending a raven can will whiteness to be in the raven. Now equality with God can be apprehended without error because it is in someone without error; for the Son of God is equal to the Father and he can be apprehended. Or if nothing were equal, still equality could be apprehended absolutely; nor in that simple apprehension is there error or falsity, and yet that simple apprehension suffices for volition of that simple for anything whatever understood or loved.

19. Now if you argue ‘by what understanding is this shown, by an erring or a non-erring one?’ [n.7] – I say that by a ‘non-erring’ but simple one, whose it is not to err nor tell truth (for these are conditions of the intellect combining and dividing); and it is not necessary for the intellect to apprehend beforehand [n.7] (to compare this with this or divide this from that), but it suffices for the will to compare this to that, because the will is a collative power like the intellect, – and consequently it can in some way compare the simples shown it, just as the intellect can.

20. To the fourth [n.8] it could be said that the will could as a consequence will ‘itself not to be’, because whoever is ‘sinning mortally’ wills something wherein he does not will to be under God; and in this – as a consequence – he wills ‘himself not to be’, because he cannot be unless he be under God.

21. To the form, however, of the argument it can be said that it is not necessary that he will the consequent if he will the antecedent, when the consequent is not of the per se understanding of the antecedent, – just as the example posited that someone can desire episcopacy not wanting priesthood [*Ord.I d.1 n.47*]. And the reason is this, because just as on ‘knowing the antecedent’ does not follow knowing the consequent unless the

consequence of this from that be known,⁶ – thus from ‘the willing of the antecedent’ does not follow the willing of the consequent unless there be ‘a willing of this consequence’; for if the consequent is not known (or there not be a ‘willing of the consequence’) it is not necessary – because of willing the antecedent – to will the consequent. And now, in the matter at hand, the consequent is not of the per se understanding of the antecedent [sc. ‘the angel wills himself to be equal to God, therefore he wills himself not to be’]; nor, if it were, would that per se relation [sc. of consequent to antecedent] be known or willed, – and therefore it is not necessary to will the consequent.

22. To that of Anselm *On Likenesses*,⁷ it is said that someone cannot in ordered way will to be Peter, because the will is not ordered in willing something and refusing what necessarily follows on it (whether as intrinsic or not), but about a ‘non-ordered’ will it is not necessary.^a

a. [Interpolated note; cf. William of Ware, *Sent.* II d.6 q.2]: Note, according to Anselm, *Fall of the Devil* 6, that he [the angel] desired something that he would be going to have if he had stood, and thus not equality first, although – as a consequence – he would after other sins have desired it directly or indirectly.

II. To the Principal Argument

23. To the principal argument [n.2] I say that an intellect understanding supreme truth about some non-supreme truth errs, as by understanding that a stone is the supreme truth; it does however not err by understanding a stone in itself by simple intellection, or by a collative intellection understanding it with that to which it belongs. So the will, willing the first good by simple volition with complaisance, does not err, – nor by willing it for someone for whom that good is fitting; but that good does not fit save him [God] alone; and so by willing that for anyone other than himself [God], as by collative volition, it errs.

Question Two

Whether the First Sin of the Angel was Formally Pride

24. Second I ask whether the first sin of the angel will have been formally pride.

25. That so:

Augustine *City of God* 14.13 n.1, “The beginning of the evil will, what could it have been if not pride?” and he proves it through the verse of Scripture, *Ecclesiastes* 10.15, “The beginning of every sin is pride.” Again, in the same short chapter, “That the vice of elation was most of all damned in the devil, we are taught by Sacred Letters.”

26. Further in *I John* 2.16, “Everything that is in the world is the concupiscence of the flesh etc. [and the concupiscence of the eyes and the pride of life.]” But they did not

⁶ An example from *Rep.* II A d.6 q.1: “The intellect can know the antecedent and not know the consequent, as that every mule is sterile, and yet not that this one is, because it does not know the consequence.”

⁷ Rather Alexander of Canterbury *On St. Anselm’s Likenesses* ch.64: “If you will also have wished to be equal to Peter in glory, you will be; ‘in glory’ I say, because you cannot will that you be Peter in person; for if you were to will this, you would will yourself to be nothing – which you will not be able to will.” Scotus here responds to an authority he did not cite above earlier; it is found, however, in *Rep* II B d.6 q.1.

sin by concupiscence of the eyes, nor by concupiscence of the flesh, – therefore by the pride of life.

27. Further, it is argued by way of division, because they could not have first sinned by any refusing, and consequently not first by anger nor by avarice and this sort of thing [sc. the rest of the seven capital sins, n.73]; and the antecedent is proved, because every refusing presupposes some willing. Nor did they sin by any ‘inordinate willing’ about temporal goods, nor by sin of the flesh, because such things are not objects of appetite for them. Therefore, by division, with the others excluded [sc. the other seven], it follows that they sinned with the sin of pride [sc. the one of the seven still left].

28. It is plain also through that of *Psalm 73.23* [n.12], “the pride of those who hate you etc.,” but they did not sin except by a single sin (because otherwise their sin would have been remediable [nn.77-78]), because they did not sin by several sins at once, because the will cannot have two perfect acts at the same time, as neither can the intellect; therefore if they sinned by several sins, they sinned by one after another, – and so in the second instant they could have repented (and therefore they sinned after the first instant [n.78]), which is commonly held as unacceptable, because it is commonly held [e.g. Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, Aquinas, Richard of Middleton] that their sin was irremediable.

29. To the opposite:

Their sin was the greatest, because irremediable. But pride is not the greatest sin – which is plain, because its opposite, namely humility, is not the greatest good: both because humility can be unformed, charity not (therefore humility is less ‘good’); and because, speaking of the moral virtues, humility is a certain temperance, – and all temperance is a less perfect virtue than friendship, which is the most perfect virtue under justice (*Ethics 5.3* 1129b29-30, 8.1.1155a1-2, 8.4.1156b7-10). Therefore etc.

30. Further, pride is placed in the irascible power; but no act of the irascible can be first, because the irascible is fighter on behalf of the concupiscible, – and therefore the passions of the irascible arise from the passions of the concupiscible.

31. Further, pride seems to be an appetite for excellence (because according to Augustine *City of God* 14.13 n.1, “What is pride but appetite for perverse eminence?”), – and excellence is in respect of others whom it excels; but he [the angel] was not first desiring something in order to others, but he was first desiring something in himself before desiring it in order to another thing: just as nothing is to a second save what is first to itself, so no one desires something in order to another save because he was first desiring it for himself, – and consequently he was first desiring that [sc. eminence] for himself.

32. Further, the inferior demons do not seem to want a dominion disagreeable to them – nor even to have consented to the dominion of Lucifer, because it seems probable that they more desired to be under God than under Lucifer; therefore their first sin was not pride.

I. To the Question

33. In this question the affirmative part is commonly held, because of the argument by division for the first part [n.27]. But for seeing the truth of the question, it

must first be seen what was the malice in the first angel sinning, – and second, to what class of sin that malice belonged.

A. What the Malice was in the First Angel Sinning

1. Of Ordered and Disordered Acts of Will

34. About the first it is necessary to see first about the order of acts of will. And about this I say that there is in common a double act of will, namely to will and to will-not; for ‘to will-not’ is a positive act of will whereby it flees the disagreeable or whereby it recoils from a disagreeable object; and ‘to will’ is an act whereby it accepts some agreeable object. And there is – further – a double ‘to will’, which can be called the to-will of friendship and the to-will of concupiscence, so that it be said that the ‘to will of friendship’ is of the object for which I will a good, and the ‘to will of concupiscence’ is of the object that I will for some loved other.

35. And of these acts [sc. to will, to will-not] the order is plain, because every willing-not presupposes some willing: for I flee from nothing unless because it cannot stand with something that I accept as agreeable; and this does Anselm say, *Fall of the Devil* 3, positing the example of a miser, coin, and bread.⁸ And of these two willings [sc. of friendship, of concupiscence] the order is plain, because concupiscence presupposes the willing of friendship: for since the ‘beloved’ – with respect to the thing coveted – is as it were the end for whom I will the good (for because of the beloved I covet for him the good that I will for him), and since the end has the first idea of thing willed, – it is plain that the willing of friendship precedes the willing of concupiscence.

36. And from this, proved, there follows further that there is a like process in disordered acts of will; for no willing-not is the first disordered act of the will, because a willing-not could not be had save in virtue of some willing, – and if the willing were ordered (accepting an object with its due circumstances), the willing-not that would consequently be had would likewise be ordered;⁹ in the same way, if the willing of friendship were ordered, the willing of concupiscence consequent to that would be ordered, – for if I love in ordered way that for which I love the good, I will in ordered way what I covet for that for which I will the good.

a. [*Interpolation*] for if I love in ordered way, I hate in ordered way what is harmful to the loved.

2. On the First Disordering of the ‘Willing of Friendship’

37. It follows, therefore, that the simply first disordered act of the will was ‘first willing of friendship’ in respect of that for which it willed the good. Now this object was not God, because it could not have loved God inordinately – intensively – from

⁸ Anselm, *op.cit.*: “For a miser, when he wants to hold onto his money and prefers bread, which he cannot have unless he give money – he first wants to give, that is to give up the money, before he does not want to keep it. For he does not for this reason want to give it because he does not want to keep it; but for this reason does he not want to keep it, because in order that he have bread he necessarily has to give. For even before he has it, he wants to have it and hold it, – and when he has it, in no way does he not want to keep it, as long as he does not have need to give it up...Therefore not wanting to keep is not always prior to wanting to give up, but sometimes wanting to give up is prior.”

friendship, for God is so lovable that, from the mere idea of himself as he is object, he gives the complete idea of goodness to a perfectly intense act. Nor is it likely that it would have loved too intensely anything other than itself with act of friendship: both because natural inclination is more inclined to itself than to any other created thing thus needing to be loved, – and because it does not seem that it will thus have understood as itself anything created other than itself – and because friendship is founded on unity (*Ethics* 8.71158a10-13), and also the features of friendship toward another proceed from the features of friendship toward oneself (*Ethics* 9.8.1168b1-10). Therefore the first inordinate act was an act of friendship with respect to itself.

38. And this is what Augustine says *City of God* 14.28, “Two loves have made two cities; the love of God up to contempt of self the city of God, and the love of self up to contempt of God the city of the devil.” The first root, then, of the ‘city of the devil’ was inordinate love of friendship, which ‘root’ germinated up to contempt of God – wherein this malice was consummated.

Thus is it plain about the simply first disorder, which was simply in the first inordinate willing.

3. On the First Disorder of ‘Willing of Concupiscence’

39. Now it remains to see about the first disorder of the ‘willing of concupiscence’.

a) On the Concupiscence of Beatitude

40. [It is proved that the angel first coveted beatitude immoderately for himself] – And it seems there that it must be said that he first coveted beatitude immoderately for himself. Which is proved:

First as follows, for the first inordinate ‘coveting’ did not proceed from affection for justice, as neither did any sin proceed; therefore from affection for advantage, because “every elicited act of the will is either elicited according to affection for justice or advantage,” according to Anselm (*Fall of the Devil* 4). The greatest advantage is most greatly desired by a will not following the rule of justice, and so first, because nothing else regulates a will not right save an inordinate and immoderate appetite for the greatest good of advantage; but the greatest advantage is perfect beatitude; therefore etc. And this reason is had from Anselm *ibid*.

41. This is proved secondly, because the first sin in ‘coveting’ was some willing; for nothing flees from itself – that is, so that something not touch it – save because it covets the opposite for itself. Either then he [the angel] coveted it with love of the honorable, or with love of the useful, or with love of the delightful (because there is only this triple love by which something is loved): not with love of the honorable, because then he would not have sinned; nor with love of the useful, because that is not the first love (for from the fact the useful is useful with respect to something, none first desires the useful, but that for which it is useful). First then he sinned by loving something excessively as the supreme delightful; and the supreme delightful is the honorable good and the beatitude whence it is such; therefore etc. – And this reason can be taken from the

Philosopher *Ethics* 8.2.1155b18-21, from the common distinction of the good: useful, delightful, and honorable.

42. Third this is made persuasive as follows, because every appetitive power, consequent in its act to an act of the apprehensive power, desires first the delightful most agreeable to its cognitive power, – or delight in the desirable, because in such desirable is it most at rest; this is plain of appetite consequent to the apprehension of taste or hearing or touch, – because anything of the sort desires the most perfect object of the apprehensive power whose act it pursues in desiring. Therefore a will, separated from all sense appetite, first altogether desires that which is most agreeable to the intellect, whose agreeableness that desiring follows, – or it first desires delight in such object, and consequently beatitude, including object and act and consequent delight.

43. Fourth it is made persuasive thus: that is first desired by a will not ruled by justice which – if it were alone – would alone be desired, and nothing else without it. Such is delight; for no excellence nor anything else at all – if it were sad – would be desired, but delight or something such would be desired.

44. As concerns then this second stage [sc. the love of concupiscence, after that of friendship, nn35-36], namely as to the sin of the angel, it seems that first they coveted beatitude:

Because just as the first sin of visual appetite would be in desiring the most beautiful visible for its cognitive power (and in which it would be most perfectly delighted and at rest), so the first desirable of the will conjoined to sense appetite – when it does not follow justice nor the rule of reason – seems to be something supremely delightful to the sense appetite to which the will is most conformed in acting. And therefore in men, according to the diversity of complexions,⁹ there is dominion of sense appetites: if indeed any cognitive power has its proper appetite, and according to the diversity of complexions there is a diversity of dominion in diverse cognitive powers and in their appetitive powers, then in anyone at all – I say – the will, according to the predominance of sense appetite, is most inclined to the act of it; and therefore certain people, following their first inclination without the rule of justice, are first inclined to luxury, certain first to pride, and certain otherwise.

45. A will therefore separated from all sense appetite, and consequently inclined to nothing because of inclination of sense appetite, it – deserted by justice – follows the absolute inclination of the will whence it is will; and that seems to be to the maximum agreeable to the will or to the appetitive power, which also is the greatest perfection of the intellect or of the cognitive power, – for what the cognitive is most perfected in, in that is the appetitive most perfected corresponding to that cognitive. There was then an immoderate¹⁰ concupiscence for beatitude, because beatitude is the object of the will.

46. [Contrary reasons] – And if it be argued against this:

First, because according to Augustine, *On the Trinity* 13.5 n.8, “beatitude is desired by all;” but what is uniformly in everyone seems to be natural; therefore beatitude is naturally desired. But natural appetite is always right, because from God; therefore also

⁹ The Vatican editors cite Avicenna, Canon of Medicine I fen 1 doct.3 c: “Complexion is a quality that comes from the mutual action and passion of the contrary qualities found in the elements...: for since they mutually act and are acted on in their powers [heat, coldness, wetness, dryness], there arises, in the sum of the powers, a quality similar in the totality of them, which is complexion.

¹⁰ The mss. have ‘immediate’ but the Vatican editors think that an error for ‘immoderate’.

the will consonant with it is right, because what is consonant with the right is right; therefore in desiring beatitude no one sins.

47. Further, no intellect errs about principles (*Metaphysics* 2.1.993b4-5), – therefore neither the will about the end. The consequence is proved through the likeness of the Philosopher in *Ethics* 7.9.1151a16-17 and *Physics* 2.9.200a15-16: “as the principle is in speculables, so is the end in doables.”

48. Further, third: the good had affection for the advantageous just as did the bad; but according to Anselm *On Concord* 3.13, the will “cannot not will things advantageous;” therefore the good will advantage just as do the bad. Therefore, all equally sinned if they sinned from affection for advantage; therefore etc.

49. [Solution to these reasons] – To see the solution for these reasons, I distinguish what can be understood by these affections for justice and for advantage about which Anselm speaks, *Fall of the Devil* 4 [n.40].

Justice can be understood as infused (which is called gratuitous), or acquired (which is called moral), or innate (which is the liberty itself of the will). For if it were understood – according to that fiction of Anselm in *Fall of the Devil* – that there was an angel having affection for advantage and not for justice (that is, having intellective appetite merely as such appetite and not as free), such an angel would not be able not to will advantage, or even not supremely to will such things; nor would this be imputed to him for sin, because that appetite would be disposed to his cognitive power as now the seeing appetite is to sight, in necessarily following the show of the cognitive power and inclination to the best shown by such power, because it would not have whereby to refrain to itself. That affection for justice, therefore, which is ‘the first moderator of affection for advantage’ both as to this, that it is not necessary that the will actually desire that to which the affection for advantage inclines, and as to this, that it is not necessary that it supremely desire it (as concerns that namely to which the affection for advantage inclines), that affection – I say – for justice is the liberty innate to the will, because it is the first moderator of such affection.

50. And although Anselm frequently speak of an act of the justice not only which is acquired but which is infused (because he says that it is lost through mortal sin, which is only true of infused justice), yet by distinguishing, from the nature of the thing, the first two ideas of these ideas [sc.: affection for advantage and for justice; intellective appetite and free appetite], insofar as the one inclines the will supremely to advantage and the other as it were moderates it lest in eliciting an act it have to follow its inclination, – nothing other are these [two affections] than the same will insofar as it is intellective appetite and insofar as it is free; because, as was said [n.49], insofar as it is merely intellective appetite it would be supremely inclined actually to the best intelligible (as about the best visible and sight), insofar however as it is free, it can refrain itself in eliciting an act so that it not follow that inclination – neither as to the substance of the act nor as to the intensity – to which the power is naturally inclined.

51. Now some power, if it had been appetitive precisely [sc. and not also free], following in its own act the inclination of it as the visive appetite follows the inclination of sight and sight, although – I say – it could not but desire the intelligible (just as neither can the visive appetite desire but the visible), yet it could not then sin, because it would not be in its power to desire anything other, or in other way, than the cognitive would show and incline it to. The very same power, now made free (because it is nothing other

than that one thing includes virtually several ideas of perfection, which it would not include if it were without the idea of freedom), it – I say – can through its liberty moderate itself in willing, both¹¹ as to this which is to will what the affection for advantage inclines it to, and although it incline supremely to willing advantage; and from the fact it can be moderated, it is bound to be moderated according to the rule of justice, which is received from a superior will. According to this, then, it is plain that a free will is not bound in every way to will beatitude (which will, if it were only intellective appetite, without liberty, would will it), but it is bound – in eliciting an act – to moderate the appetite whence it is intellective appetite, which is to moderate the ‘affection for advantage’, lest namely it will immoderately.

52. Now the will – being able to moderate itself – can immoderately will the beatitude that befits it in three ways: either as to intensity, namely by willing it with greater effort than befits it; or as to acceleration, namely by willing it more quickly for itself than befits it; or as to cause, namely by willing it for itself otherwise than befits it, namely without merits; – or perhaps in other ways, about all of which it is not necessary to be concerned here.

53. Therefore in some one of these way it is probable that his will went to excess: either namely by more desiring beatitude for himself insofar as it is good for himself than by loving that good in itself, namely by more desiring that good (as beatific object) to be his own good ‘as good for himself’ than by desiring it to be in another (as ‘in his God’), – and in this there is supreme perversity of will, which is ‘using what should be enjoyed and enjoying what should be used’ according to Augustine *86 Questions* q.30; or in a second way he could have desired to have it at once, although however God wanted him to have it after some little while on the way; or in a third way, by desiring it to be had from natural powers (not having it by grace), although however God wanted it to be had from merits.

54. Therefore free will ought to have moderated affection as to these circumstances, which right reason had to show: because beatitude also should have been less desired for itself than for God, and should have been desired for the time for which God willed it, and from the merits for which God willed it should be desired. Therefore, if in any of these ways it was following the affection of advantage, not moderating it through justice (that is through infused [justice], if it had it, or acquired, or innate or natural, which is freedom itself), it sinned.

55. Hereby therefore to the arguments:

To the first [n.46]. Natural will is not of itself immoderate but only inclines by way of nature, – and in this there is not immoderation, because it inclines as it has received to be inclined, nor is there anything else in its power;¹² but in the power of the will, as it is free in elicited act, there is only being inclined, or less inclined.

56. When therefore it takes that ‘the will is natural in respect of beatitude’ [n.46] I concede it – but not actually immoderate in elicited act: for the ‘inclination of natural appetite’ is not any elicited act but is as if first perfection – and this is not immoderate, as

¹¹ The Vatican editors say the ‘and’ or ‘et’ here, together with the ‘and’ or ‘et’ before ‘although it incline...’, should be read as ‘sive...sive’, that is as ‘or...or’. *Eligat qui vult*.

¹² The Vatican editors note that this reply is rather to an argument not posited earlier. It and its reply are thus expressed in *Rep.* II A d.6 q.2: “But if it be said that they were immoderately desiring beatitude – it is argued to the contrary, because natural powers incline most to that which is desired by natural appetite; therefore not immoderately, because natural appetite is right – and it is most vehement, because according to the utmost of power.”

neither the nature whose it is. Yet it is so inclined by affection for advantage to its object that – if it had of itself an elicited act – it could not moderate it without supremely eliciting it as much as it could be elicited; but the will as having only natural affection for advantage is not cause of any elicited act, but only as free, and so ‘as eliciting an act’ it has whence it may moderate passion.

57. When therefore it is taken that ‘the will, consonant with natural will, is always right (because that too [natural will] is always right)’ [n.46] I respond and say that it is consonant with itself in eliciting an act as it would elicit it if it were acting from itself alone; but it is not right, because it has another rule in acting which it would have if it were acting from itself alone: for it is bound to follow the superior will, from which – in moderating that natural inclination – the moderating or not moderating is in its power, because in its power is not to act supremely on what it has power for.

58. To the second [n.47] I say, through the same point, that it is not in the power of the intellect to moderate its assent to truths which it apprehends, for to the extent is shown to it the truth of the principles from the terms, or of conclusions from the principles, to that extent it must assent, because of lack of liberty. But the will is able – in itself and in inferior powers – to moderate so that inclination not altogether dominate in eliciting the act, or at least so that the act not be elicited: for it can turn the intellect away so that it not speculate the sort of speculative objects about which it would be inclined, and is bound to turn it away if speculation of them be a sin materially for the intellect or formally for the will; thus – on the other side – the will, with respect to the ultimate end, is bound to moderate its inclination for it, lest it will immoderately, namely in a way other than it should will, and lest it will it for itself in a way other than it is in itself.

59. In another way it can be said that, just as an act of the intellect ‘in considering a principle in itself’ cannot be false, so neither can an act of will ‘in loving the end in itself’ be bad – and this act is an act of friendship, not an act of concupiscence; yet, just as an act of intellect could be false in attributing the truth of the first cause to some created principle which that truth does not fit, – so an act of the will can be bad in coveting the goodness of the ultimate end for something else than the ultimate end, in the way in which it does not fit something else.

60. To the third [n.48] I say that in the good there was natural inclination for beatitude as much as there was in the bad – and a greater, if they had better natural powers, because this inclination is according to the perfection of natural powers; however the good, in eliciting the act, were not using the will according to its imperfect idea, namely as far as it is an intellective appetite only, by acting namely in the sort of way they would desire to act with intellective appetite – but they were using the will according to its perfect idea (which is liberty), by acting according to the will in the way in which it is fitting to act freely insofar as it does what is free: and this was according to the rule of the determining superior will, and this justly.

61. And when it is said ‘he cannot not will things advantageous’ [n.48], I reply: the good neither could nor wanted to refuse beatitude for themselves, even by coveting it for themselves, – but they did not will well-being in itself more for themselves than for God, but less, because the ‘to will’ they were able to moderate through liberty.

62. And if you object ‘therefore in no way were they desiring well beatitude for themselves, but they were only moderating well the desiring it’, – I reply that to have a perfect act of desiring good for oneself, so that thereby the object may more be loved in

itself, this is from affection for justice, because whence I love something in itself thence do I will something in itself. And so were the good able to desire beatitude, so that – having it – they would more perfectly love the supreme good: and this act of coveting beatitude would be meritorious, because it does not use what is to be enjoyed but enjoys it, because the good that I covet for myself I covet for this, that I may the more love that good in itself.

b) On the Concupiscence of Excellence

63. Having seen, then, about the first thing inordinately coveted [nn.40-62], it can be posited that he [the angel] inordinately coveted further another good for himself, namely excellence in respect of others. Either he had a disordered refusal, by namely refusing the opposites of the things he coveted: namely by not willing beatitude to be in himself less than in God in himself (or than God is), or by refusing to wait for beatitude until the end of the way; or by refusing to have it from merits but from himself [nn.52-54] and, as a result, refusing to be subject to God, – and finally not wanting God to be, wherein, as in supreme evil, his malice seems consummated [n.38]; for just as no act is formally better than to love God, so neither is any act formally worse than to hate God.

B. To what Class of Sin the Malice in the First Angel Sinning belonged.

64. As to the second article [n.33], it remains to see about immoderate love of friendship, what sort of sin it is [nn.37-38]; and about immoderate concupiscence of beatitude is [nn.40-62], which he coveted for himself according to one of the three modes expressed [n.53]; and about the consequent disordered refusing, and this whichever of the aforesaid kinds [n.63] the inordinate refusal was.

65. As to the first [n.64] it is said that it was pride.

And it seems to be the intention of Augustine *City of God* 14.13 n.1, where he means that presumption is ‘pleasing oneself too much’ – and therefore are ‘the proud’ in Scripture called ‘self-pleasers’; therefore, since this immoderate love of self is immoderate being pleased with oneself, it was properly pride, and so presumption.

66. But this seems doubtful, because if pride be properly an immoderate appetite for one’s own excellence, and being immoderately pleased with oneself does not properly seem to be an immoderate appetite for excellence – how then pride?

67. Again, secondly: the presumptuous seems to prefer himself to others, either in goods which he truly has or in those which he reckons himself to have of himself, – but immoderate love of oneself does not seem to be this sort of preferring of oneself, because it seems to be of the same idea in malice to love oneself immoderately with love of friendship and someone else (as a neighbor); but by loving another immoderately no one is called presumptuous, but rather luxurious; therefore neither by thus loving himself.^a

a. [Interpolation; cf. *Rep.* II A d.6 q.2] Again, he did not sin first in desiring excellence in respect of others (as a sort of master), because the good for himself and to himself is precedent, – nor by desiring excellence in the opinion of others, because then he would have desired a false excellence. Therefore, he said [sc. Scotus] that his first sin was not pride properly speaking but, because of the delight which it imported, it seems rather to be reduced

to luxury [n.71] – just as the sin whereby someone inordinately delights in speculation of a geometrical conclusion is reduced to luxury.

68. To these [nn.66-67] I say that someone loving some good immoderately wants it immoderately to be a great good, rather the greatest good; and therefore immoderately – because without this, that he will something to be present by which he may increase – wills it to be more in itself than it is. And when he is unable to attain it so that it in itself may be more and greater than it is (because this is impossible), he wills as a consequence that it is the greatest as it can be the greatest, and this either in comparison or in opinion: in comparison, so that namely it may excel the goods of others, – in opinion, so that namely others think his good to be greatest. And therefore the will of being preeminent or dominant above all others follows that ‘to will’ by which someone wills immoderately his own good.

69. I say therefore to the first argument [n.66] that he who presumes (as presumption is the first species of pride [n.66]) does not will his own good to excel the goods of others according to some superiority, nor even does he will it to excel in fame (as it is about him who desires praise), but he wills it to be great in itself, and so great that – without the addition of anything else – he wills it to be greater than all others that he does not thus will. In this way it can be conceded that immoderate love of oneself – which is ‘the root of the city of the devil’ [n.38] – is presumption, because anyone loving himself immoderately wills himself to be as good as could be proportioned to the act by which he loves himself; and in this way can Augustine be expounded in *City of God* [n.65], and well, that ‘he who pleases himself immoderately’ is proud (and this in the first species of pride), and this not by desiring the excellence that is a certain relation, but by desiring the excellence, that is ‘greatness in itself’, from which greatness follows his excellence as to others.

70. To the second [n.67] I say that presumption is not a sin of the intellect, as if the intellect of the presumptuous person were to judge or show itself to be as great as it is not, – but it is a sin of the will immoderately desiring its own good to be as great as it is not, and from this follows the blinding of the intellect. But when is added that also ‘the immoderate willing of oneself does not seem to be pride, as neither the immoderate willing of a neighbor’ [n.67] – seek the response [n.74, also n.69].

71. But as to the disorder of the willing of concupiscence [n.64], it seems that that appetite for beatitude will not properly have been pride – not, to be sure, as to the first species of it: it is plain, because presumption (according to what was expounded in the preceding article [n.69]), if it belonged to the first inordinate willing of friendship, does not belong to any willing of concupiscence. And if it have to be reduced to something, it seems more to agree with the sin of luxury: for although luxury properly is in acts of the flesh, yet everything delightful – immoderately desired insofar as delightful – can be called luxury, if it is not a the excellence coveted (of which sort this ‘appetition of beatitude’ was not).

72. As to the disorder of the third act, namely refusal [n.64], it is plain enough that any at all of those inordinate refusings was avarice or envy.

73. And if it be objected about the disordered coveting [n.71] that ‘it was not the sin of luxury, therefore it was properly some other sin, – and it does not seem, by division, that it will have been other than pride [n.27] (and the division is proved by that famous and common division of mortal sins into seven)’ – I reply:

Whether mortal sins be distinguished by bad habits, opposite to the good (of which sort are the seven good habits, namely the four moral [courage, temperance, justice, prudence, *Wisdom* 8.7] and the three theological [faith, hope, charity, *I Corinthians* 13.13]), or – which appears more – by good acts (of which sort are acts of the ten commandments [*Exodus* 20.1-17]), whether this or that way, that sevenfold division of capital sins would not be sufficient, because in the first way there ought to be seven capital sins other than these¹³ (if infidelity and despair are properly opposite to those seven listed [the cardinal and theological virtues] and are not contained under any of them [the capital sins]), but in the second way there would have to be ten capital sins according to transgression of the Decalogue. This division [sc. of capital sins], then, should not be held to be sufficient in all evil acts, although these are not roots first (nor perhaps principal sins), but perhaps very common to other sins, as occasions of sinning.

II. To the Principal Arguments

74. To the principal arguments [nn.25-28].

To the first [n.25¹⁴] I say that Augustine is speaking of the simply first sin, which was an inordinate willing of friendship – and that was presumption; and I concede that that presumption was the simply first sin, but not as it is the first species of pride, the way it is properly taken [n.69].

75. To the second, about the division from *John* (“Everything which is in the world is the concupiscence of the flesh and the concupiscence of the eyes and the pride of life” [n.26]), it is plain from this that he premises, “Everything which is in the world,” that is ‘the levying of the men living in the world’, – such that the sins by which men commonly sin are contained under that triple. But it is not necessary that the first sin of the angel, a spiritual one (whereby the angels originally sinned), be contained under this carnal sin; rather, that sin of concupiscence, at the second stage [n.44], if it should be reduced, should rather be reduced to the concupiscence of the eyes: for just as in us immoderate appetites for any visible beauty regard the concupiscence of the eyes, so also in them [the angels] immoderate appetite for anything delightful ought to regard concupiscence of the eyes.

76. To the third [n.27], it is plain that that division by seven, about the seven capital sins [n.73], is not sufficient – comparing to the act of concupiscence – save by a certain reduction; and thus can it be conceded that it [the angels’ sin] is reduced to luxury as an inordinate appetite for the delightful, as the delightful of concupiscence or of the eyes.

77. To the fourth [n.28] I say that it was not one single sin alone, because there were many sins, as was said in d.4-5 n.45.

78. And when it is said that ‘the first sin of the angel was irremediable’ [n.28], I say that when he sinned with the second sin he was still on the way, – and consequently, when he sinned with the second sin, he could have repented of the first sin and have, further, received pardon and mercy, and thus the first sin of itself was not irremediable;

¹³ Other than the usual seven (pride, avarice or greed, envy, wrath, lust, gluttony, and sloth or acedia), which, in the first way, would have to be the opposites of the four cardinal virtues (therefore: imprudence, injustice, intemperance, cowardice), and of the three theological virtues (therefore: infidelity, despair, hatred).

¹⁴ No response is made to the second part of this first argument.

however, from when in that sin he reached the term while in that first sin, all his sins became irremediable; for every sin of any sinner, perduring to the term, is irremediable (and how this irremediability be only from the law of God having grace for none when he will have been in the term, will be stated in the following distinction [d.7 nn.51-54, 56, 60]). I deny, therefore, what is assumed there [n.28], that there was only one sin: hence the malice of the demon began from immoderate love of himself, which was not the greatest sin – and it was consummated in hatred of God, which is the greatest sin, because from this followed that he could not have what he willed with God remaining; and therefore from inordinate appetite was he first able to will God not to be, and so to hate.^a

a. [*Interpolation*] But there is here a doubt, whether namely anyone could desire God not to be, – because, just as nothing can be the object of volition save under the idea of good, so neither of nolition save under the idea of bad; but in God no idea of bad is apprehended by an angel. Nor can it be said that because of justice he could be hated, because in his justice is not apprehended any idea of bad, just as neither in himself: for although in his effect there appear some idea of bad, yet not in himself; and if this be true, then it must be said that hatred is not in respect of God in himself, nor in respect of his justice, but as to the effect appropriated to the perfection of justice. And hereby it can be said to the verse of the *Psalms* “the pride of those who hate you etc.” [n.28], not as to him in himself but in wanting his justice not to be avenging – and thus they do not will his justice as to its avenging effect. And if this be true, then it must be said that their hatred of God is not the greatest sin [n.78], because it does not regard God in himself, but is against him in comparison to the effect; likewise, it then follows that ‘to love God’ does not have an act directly contrary, but only contrary to love of the effect.

III. To the Arguments for the Opposite

79. To the first argument for the opposite [n.29] I say that the first sin was not the greatest; for just as in goods there is process from the more good to the less good (as from love of the end to love of the things that are for the end), so – conversely – in bads there is process from the lesser bad to the greater bad, according to Augustine *City of God* 14.28 [n.46], “love of self as far as contempt of God.”

80. The other two arguments, namely about the passion of the irascible in respect of the concupiscible, and about appetite for one’s own excellence (speaking of excellence as it states a comparison of the one excelling to others [nn.30-31]), can be conceded, because – as to the act of concupiscence – he [the angel] did not first covet excellence, which is a passion of the irascible or the concupiscible, but beatitude most perfect; however if we speak of the first inordinate willing of friendship, it can be said that it was not an act nor a passion of the irascible, but of the concupiscible: for if it belongs to the concupiscible to covet the good for the beloved, it belongs to it to love also the good loved for whom it covets that good.

81. To the verse from *1 Timothy* 6.10, “the root of all evils is greed” etc.¹⁵

¹⁵ Vatican editors: Scotus here responds to an argument not given above but contained in *Lectura* II d.6 n.21: “Besides ‘the root of all evils is cupidity’,” where however there is no particular response given but only the general one that the answer to objections is plain from what has been said. The fourth argument in the *Ordinatio* [n.32 supra] is not responded to by Scotus.

Seventh Distinction

Single Question

Whether a Bad Angel necessarily Wills badly

1. About the seventh distinction I ask whether the bad angel necessarily wills badly.^a

a. [*Interpolation*] About this seventh distinction, where the Master deals with the confirmation of the good and the obstinacy of the bad, there is one question, namely whether...

2. That he does not:

James 2.19: “The demons believe and they tremble;” but these, as it seems, are good acts; therefore etc.

3. Further, the image [of God] remains in them, according to *Psalms* 38.7, “In the image man passes etc.,” in this then they have capacity for God and partake of him (for in this is the image of God in the soul, “wherefore it has capacity for God and can be partaker of him,” according to Augustine *On the Trinity* 14.8 n.11); but they cannot grasp God nor be partakers of him save by a good act; therefore there can be good acts in them.

4. Further, Dionysius *Divine Names* 4, “in the demons their natural abilities remain whole,” therefore their free choice is whole; but “‘to be able to sin’ is not freedom nor part of freedom,” according to Anselm *On Free Choice* ch.1;^a therefore they have freedom of choice for that for which it is per se, which is ‘to will well’; therefore they can will well.

a. [*Interpolation*] ‘Free choice is the power of keeping rectitude for its own sake’, Anselm *On Free Choice* 3.

5. Further, no intellect is so averse from the first principle but that it can think something true, because the first principles are true for every intellect from the terms; therefore no will is so averse from the ultimate end but that it can will the ultimate end. The consequence is plain from the similitude of the Philosopher, *Physics* 2.9.200a15-16, *Ethics* 7.9.1151a16-17, “As the principle in matters of speculation, so the end is in matters moral.” – The consequence is also proved in another way, because “everyone bad is ignorant” (*Ethics* 3.2.1110b28-30); so there is not malice in the will without error in the intellect. Therefore, where the intellect cannot be blinded about some intelligible object, there neither will the will be able to be wrong about the same as desirable or lovable.

6. Further, if they necessarily will badly, and they are always in act of willing (because they do not have any impediment), – therefore, they always will badly and so they increase their malice to infinity; but if, from the law of divine justice, to increase of guilt corresponds increase of punishment, then their punishment would grow infinitely; therefore, they will never be in the term. There follows also something else unacceptable, that by parity of reason charity could be increased in the good if malice in these could be

increased, and so it follows that the good would never be in the term of beatitude just as neither the bad in the term of malice; therefore etc.

7. Further, “nothing violent is perpetual” (*De Caelo* 1.2.269b6-10), because it is contrary to the inclination of that in which it is, – and therefore, if it be left to itself, it returns to the opposite of that (just as water, if it be left to itself, returns to coldness); but malice is contrary to nature, according to Damascene; therefore it is not perpetual. It is not therefore necessarily in the will.

8. To the opposite:

In *Psalms* 73.23, “The pride of those who hate you rises up always;” but this cannot be understood as to intensity, because thus there would not be any evil intensively than which there would not be a greater evil; therefore it must be understood extensively, and so they always sin.

I. To the Question

A. The Opinions of Others

9. Here is posited a double cause for the continuation of malice in them.

First thus: appetite is proportioned to its apprehensive [power], by which it is moved as a movable is moved by a mover; now an angel apprehends immovably, non-discursively, because through intellect, – man movably, discursively through reason, wherein he has a way of discoursing to either opposite. The will therefore of an angel adheres immovably after the first complete apprehension, the will also of man – according to a volition following reason – adheres movably. And therefore, although the will of an angel, before it had fixed itself by complete volition, would have been movable to opposites (otherwise it could not have indifferently sinned or merited), yet after the first choice it immovably adhered to that which it chose: and thus radically – from immobility of cognitive [power] – he became good impeccable and bad impenitent.

10. Another way is posited thus, that the more perfect the will the more perfectly it immerses itself in the thing willable. Separated from body, of which sort the angelic [will] is, it is altogether perfectly free, – but our will, conjoined to a corruptible body, has a diminished liberty; and therefore, although our will has liberty, yet the former has it maximally, which is altogether separate from body. Our will too, “existing in an incorruptible body,” immovably immerses itself in the object so that it cannot rebound from it.

11. Now the manner is assigned from *Proverbs* 18.5, “The sinner, since he has come into the depth, contemns.” When therefore the will is perfectly free in a preceding perfect choice, it runs efficaciously into the thing willed, placing there the end; and coming to the obstacle of conscience, it does not stop but in contempt thrusts itself into it and is blunted back, so that it neither wills nor can will to withdraw itself: as iron, if driven into bone, is hammered back, – nor can it be withdrawn, either by the same force by which it is driven in or by a greater.

B. Rejection of the Opinions together

12. Against the conclusion, in which these two opinions come together [sc. perfect choice, and going against conscience], seems to be the authority of Augustine

[rather Fulgentius] *On the Faith to Peter* n.34 where he speaks as follows, “If it were possible that human nature, after having turned from God and lost goodness of will, could have had it again from itself, – much more possibly would angelic nature have this, which nature, the less it is burdened by the weight of an earthly body, the more it would be endowed with this faculty etc.” – The argument then is as follows: if human will could return of itself to justice, much more angelic will; therefore the angelic will, neither because of the immobility of its cognitive power (of which sort the cognitive power of our will is not), nor because of its full liberty (from the fact it is separate from body), is incapable of returning to justice after it has sinned; on the contrary – according to him [Augustine/Fulgentius], it is more capable than ours.

13. Further, against this common conclusion I argue:

First as follows: not only is the will of a damned angel obstinate, but also the will of a damned man (and it is necessary to assign a common cause for both, according to what Augustine [Fulgentius] seems to say *op.cit.* a little after the cited passage [n.12], where he maintains that there is one common cause why God will together judge human spirits and damned angels – and he seems to maintain the same in *City of God* 21.11, 23); but neither of those causes [nn.9-11] can be posited as cause of the obstinacy of a damned man; therefore neither any of an angel.

14. Proof of the assumption [sc. the minor premise, n.13]: because the conjoined soul does not have a cognitive power that immovably apprehends, like an angel, according to the first way [n.9] – nor even does it have liberty of the sort to immerse itself in an object immovably, according to the second [n.10].^a Therefore it is necessary to assign a cause for this obstinacy in the soul, when it is separated: either then it is obstinate before any elicited act (and consequently neither of the aforesaid causes [n.12] is the cause of its obstinacy, because, before it will anything according to act of an immovably apprehending intellect or from the full liberty it has when separate, it was obstinate before) – or it was obstinate through some act that it elicits when separate (which, according to the first way, follows the immovable apprehension of the intellect separated, or full liberty according to the second); but this second seems to be unacceptable, because when separated it does not demerit, but only through acts that it had on the way does it receive what it merited or demerited; so it has no act preceding the obstinacy by which it be rendered obstinate.^b

a. [Interpolation] according to perfect liberty, according to the second way; therefore it cannot spring back – which is false.

b. [Interpolation; cf. n.25, *Rep.*II A d.7 qq.103] Or thus: the sinning soul is obstinate in the instant of separation, because it is in the term, – and not by an act which it then elicits, because in the same instant in which it is separated the whole composite is corrupted, and in that instant it does not understand; nor through an act preceding that instant is it obstinate, because then it was a wayfarer; therefore etc. Or thus: if the will of man, because of this, that it has an immovable apprehension, renders itself obstinate, either this is while it is in the body or while it is outside the body; not while it is in the body because then it does not have an immovable apprehension (since it is a wayfarer), – nor in the second way, because in the instant of separation the soul is obstinate and damned (and then it does not have apprehension, because that is the instant of corruption); therefore etc.

15. And it could be confirmed of Lazarus, for whom when dead his intellect had the apprehension of a separated soul and his will had full liberty (because separated); and

yet from neither of these did he will immovably, because then he would have been impeccable if good (and then God would have done him a prejudice when he resurrected him, because then he would have made him peccable from impeccable), or obstinate if bad – each of these are false (because he is still wayfarer), unless it be imagined that God miraculously suspended him from an operation of the sort that follows the separated soul (in as much as he predestined that he will be resurrected), but this does not seem probable, because he is said to have narrated the many things that he had seen.¹⁶

16. Further, second: a total cause does not cause differently unless, according as cause, it is differently disposed, and this when there is not posited any diversity on the part of the passive subject or on the part of any extrinsic impediments; but the will as prior naturally to its act, not as existing actually under act, is cause of its act (which is manifest from this, that it is a free cause of its act, which freedom is not its save as it is prior to its act, – because as it is under act it has the act as natural form; it is also plain that as something is under an effect as its form, it is posterior, just as the composite is posterior to its form, *Metaphysics* 7.3.1029a5-7); the will therefore is not differently disposed in eliciting an act unless it be differently disposed insofar as it is prior to act. But by this, that it is posited to have an act inherent in it [nn.9-11], it is not differently disposed insofar as it is naturally prior to act, because although it be differently disposed insofar as it is under act, namely for some accident, – yet not as to its nature, according to which it is the sort of first act which is the will; therefore, as it is understood under any act whatever, it will not be differently disposed in eliciting any act whatever: therefore through no act (or habit) which will have been able to be posited in it separated, that cannot be posited in it conjoined [sc. with the body], will it be eliciting a good or a bad act in an opposite way to the way in which it was eliciting before, and so if before it acted contingently, by nothing such – posited in it – will it elicit necessarily.^a

a. [*Interpolation*] Or thus: the will is not cause of its volition save as naturally prior to it, so if it is not differently disposed as it is prior to it naturally, it is not differently disposed as cause of it; but as it is prior naturally it is not differently disposed by this, that it is under act of willing, because thus is it disposed in first act; therefore by that act it is not differently disposed in causing, – therefore, through the act under which it is placed, it does not become ‘impeccable’ and ‘impenitent’ [n.9]. It is onfirm: a cause that in itself is uniformly disposed to several effects, – by the fact it causes one, is not differently disposed in respect of another, as is plain of heat with respect to several heatings; but the will is cause in respect of several volitions; therefore, by the fact it elicits one, it is not differently disposed to eliciting another. Therefore if it was eliciting the first freely, such that it was in respect of it not impeccable, neither will it through that be impeccable in respect of another. – It is confirmed second: the will of an angel in respect of the act that is posited the cause of obstinacy [nn.9=11] is disposed contingently (and only ‘necessarily’ by necessity in a certain respect), because it is cause of it as naturally prior to it, – and as such it contingently elicits; but such an act does not more necessitate the will in respect of another than in respect of itself; therefore etc. [cf. *Rep.* II A d.7 qq.1-3].

¹⁶ Vatican editors: Scotus seems to be referring to stories that appeared in the 11th or 12th centuries, found in an ancient manuscript from Perugia. They were printed in Italian by S. Razzi OP in 1613 (reprinted in Orvieto in 1859) under the title of *Vita e laudi di s. Maria Maddalena, di s. Marta e di s. Lazzaro vescovo e martire (Life and Praises of St. Mary Magdalene, St. Martha, and St. Lazarus bishop and martyr)*. It can be downloaded from: https://www.google.com/books/edition/Vita_E_Laudi_Di_Santa_Maria_Maddalena_Di/qyVSAACAAJ?hl=en

17. And the reason [n.16] is confirmed,¹⁷ because no second cause can be cause for a principal cause of acting in an opposite way to that which belongs to the principal agent from its own causality: for thus would the principal cause not be principal, because it would be determined by the second cause to a mode of acting opposite to its own proper mode of acting; therefore since the will is principal cause of its own act (because whatever be posited in the will with respect to its act either will not be the cause of thus eliciting the act, – or if it is the cause, it is a second cause in respect of the will, and not principal cause), it follows that the will is determined by nothing else to acting.

18. Further, as was said in *Ord.* II d.4-5 nn.45-46 and d.6 n.77, both the good angel and the bad had time, so that they were not wayfarers only for an instant; but the bad angel had several sins ordered, – namely from act of loving himself he elicited an act of loving supreme advantage, and from that an act of excellence (whereby he willed to have that advantage not under the rule of the superior will but against it), and finally an act of hating God (who resisted him in appetite for that [d.6 nn.37-40, 51-54, 63, 78]), and he did not have all those acts distinctly at once; therefore, when he was demeriting in the second sin, he was still on the way, and yet he had already sinned with the first sin from the first choice. Therefore, not any sort of immovable apprehension or any first sin, or full immersion in the object, made him impenitent: for whenever by one of those sins he sinned on the way, it was not the same as the preceding sin.

C. Rejection of the First Opinion in Particular

19. Further, against the first way [n.9] it is argued specifically.

First, because it supposes something false, namely that the intellect is a sufficient mover – as will be made clear in II d.25 [lacking in *Ordinatio*, but found in *Lectura* II d.25 n.69].

20. Second, this false thing is repugnant to the statements of those in this position in two ways. First, because when the intellect of the angels was right in apprehending (for punishment did not precede guilt), it was therefore moving the will to desire something rightly; nor could it otherwise move, because the intellect moves by way of nature, and consequently it can only move according to the mode of cognition that it has; therefore it moves the will to willing rightly. Therefore the will was never able to sin. – Second, that false thing contradicts their position, because if from the idea of mover and movable there be such proportion, the will not only will be immovable after the first choice of the will, but in the first itself or before the first, – because their intellect, just as it immovably shows something after the first choice of the will, so also before it; and if it [the intellect], when immovably apprehending, move the appetite immovably, therefore in the first act it will move immovably, and consequently not only after the first act.

21. Further, from that way it seems to follow that since, according to them, the angel was created in grace [d.4-5 n.24] and thus had some act in grace (because it is not likely that in the first instant he was idle, for he was not impeded – and if he had then been idle he would have sinned perhaps by sin of omission), nor did he sin together with grace (as is plain), – therefore at some time according to grace he had a good and full choice, because following perfect apprehension of the intellect, because there is, according to them, only such apprehension in them [the angels], and this immovable and

¹⁷ An interpolation here adds ‘thirdly’.

not discursive [n.9]. Therefore, any angel in that first good choice confirmed himself and was made impeccable.

22. Further, the difference of will of man and angel [n.9] is not valid, because although the angel understand non-discursively what – according to them – man understands discursively, yet the intellect of man does not movably adhere to that which it reaches discursively; for it so holds with certitude (that is without doubting) the conclusion it discursively reaches as the angel holds it by seeing it in the principle non-discursively; therefore this immobility of the human intellect (that is, certitude) would have an equally immovable will just as that other [immovability] posited in the angel. That also all discursive reasoning is denied of the angels does not seem probable – just as is proved above [*Ord.*I, Prol. nn.208-209, II d.1 nn.312-314].

D. Rejection of the Second Opinion in Particular

23. Against the second way [nn.10-11] it is argued in particular:

Because just as a natural agent is not lord of its act, so neither of its mode of acting, – and by the opposite, just as a free agent is lord of its action so too of its mode of acting, and consequently it is in its power to act intensely or weakly; therefore it is not necessary that from this that the will is perfectly free, that with supreme effort it immerse itself in the object, rather it more lords over itself since it tends with whatever effort to the object, and so is freely borne to whatever object and could also of its absolute liberty not be thus borne to it. This is also confirmed, because not all the bad angels seem to have sinned from supreme effort, just as neither all the good to have merited from supreme effort – or at least it was possible [for them] not to elicit an act according to the whole ability of their nature.

24. Further, by the same principle does a thing tend (or is moved) to the term and rest in the term; therefore if the will – perfectly free – tends of its perfect liberty to an object, of the same liberty does it rest in the object: therefore from the full liberty of tending to an object from the sort of liberty with which the bad angels sinned, the resting of the will in it does not necessarily follow, but only a voluntary and contingent resting, just as it contingently tends to it.

25. Further, as was touched on in the first common way against both ways [n.14], it cannot be said that the will of the separated soul renders itself obstinate by any act that it is then eliciting, because naturally before it as separate elicit some act it is obstinate, because it is in the term; therefore by some act that it was eliciting in the body does it render itself obstinate, dashing then against conscience: but this is false, both because it was wayfarer, – and because someone can from lesser effort sin with the sin because of which he is damned, if penance not follow, than another sins (or himself) with the same sin which is destroyed through penance.

26. Further, against his example about sharp iron, by thrusting it into bone [n.11]. Although that example and the whole position seem similar to the position and saying of that Hesiod, *Metaphysics* 3.4.1000a9-19, that “they were made immortals who tasted nectar and manna [ambrosia]” (whom there the Philosopher derides ‘because such people have despised our intellect’, like the Hesiodians; for– according to the Philosopher there – what is being said by such hyperbolic or metaphorical talk cannot be understood, nor is it the manner of a philosopher or a scientist to speak so), – yet, by taking the example to the extent it can be to the purpose, deduction can be made to the opposite. For why is

sharp [iron], thrust into a hard body, unable to be extracted by the cause or power that thrust it in? – the reason is because the parts of the body into which it was thrust come more together, and so the thing thrust in is more compressed than at the beginning when it was being thrust in; but if the motive power is increased, by that increase which the motive power adds – if the thing impaled remain equally straight in its nature – it can now be extracted. Therefore since the will, when thrusting into anything, remains straight in its natural powers (even though it have curvature, that is, a certain deformity, as if an inherent privation), and since that in which it immerses itself does not have a greater power of enclosing it when it immerses itself (because in the object there is no such coming together), it follows that the active will can retract itself.

II. Scotus' own Response

27. For the solution of this question [n.1] two things need to be seen: first namely about degrees of goodness and malice, – second what goodness there could be in the volition of a damned angel or whether any malice is necessarily in it.

A. On the Degrees of Goodness and Malice

28. About the first I say that over and above the natural goodness of volition that belongs to it insofar as it is a positive being, which also belongs to any positive being according to the degree of its entity (more and more, less and less), – besides that, there is a triple moral goodness, disposed according to degree: of which the first is called goodness from genus, the second can be called virtuous goodness or from circumstance, and third is meritorious goodness or gratuitous goodness or goodness from divine acceptance in order to reward.

29. Now the first belongs to volition from this, that it is about an object befitting such act according to the dictate of right reason, and not only because befitting the act naturally (as the sun vision). And this is the first moral goodness, which can therefore be called 'of genus' because it is as it were material in respect of every further good in the genus of morals: for an act about an object is as it were formable by any other moral circumstance whatever, and so as it were potential; not altogether outside the genus of morals (as was the act itself in genus of nature), but in the genus of morals because it already has something of that genus, namely an object befitting an act.

30. The second goodness belongs to volition from this, that it is elicited by the will with all the circumstances dictated by right reason to need to belong to it in eliciting it: for the good is from 'a complete cause' (according to Dionysius *Divine Names* 4), – and this is as it were the good in the species of morals, because it now has all the moral differences, contracting the good in genus.

31. The third goodness belongs to an act from this, that on the presupposition of the double goodness already stated, it [the act] is elicited in conformity with the principle of meriting (which is charity or grace), or according to the inclination of charity.

32. An example of the first goodness: to give alms. An example of the second: to give alms from one's own [property] to a pauper who needs it, and in a place in which it can better belong to him [the pauper], and love of love of God. An example of the third: to do this work not only from natural inclination, as could have happened in the state of

innocence (or perhaps could still now could be done by a sinner if, still being sinner and not penitent, he were moved by natural piety towards his neighbor), but from charity, wherefrom he who does it is friend of God, insofar as God has regard to his works.

33. Now this triple goodness is so ordered that the first is presupposed to the second and not conversely, and the second to the third and not conversely.

34. To this triple goodness is opposed a triple malice: the first indeed is malice of genus, when namely an act, which only has natural goodness (from which it have to be constituted in the genus of morals), has malice because it concerns an unfitting object (for example if 'to hate' concerns God); the second is malice from some circumstance disordering the act, although the act concern an object that— according to right reason — fits the act; the third is malice in demerit.

35. Now any of these malices can be taken as contrary to, or privative of, its goodness; and as taken privatively it only takes away the goodness, — but as contrarily it posits something beyond that lack, repugnant to such goodness. And this distinction is apparent from Boethius *On Aristotle's Categories* 3 ch. 'On quality', about justice.

36. But malice of genus, taken contrarily and privatively are convertible, — and so, just as between privation and immediate habit there is no middle, so good in genus and bad in genus are immediate contraries; the reason is because an act cannot be without concerning an object, and that necessarily is fitting or unfitting to the act: and so necessarily an act good in genus, from a fitting object, — or an act bad in genus, from an unfitting object.

37. Malice taken privatively in the second way and contrarily are not convertible. For any act can lack a circumstance required for perfection of virtuous act and yet not be elicited with a repugnant circumstance, which would render the act vicious: for example, if he give alms to a pauper not from the circumstance of the end (because he does not consider it), nor according to other circumstances requisite for a virtuous act; this act however is not good or virtuous morally — nor yet bad contrarily, because it is not ordered to an undue end, as he would do who were to give alms to a pauper because of vainglory or because of some other undue end.

38. But malice in the third way, contrarily and privatively taken, do not convert — because an act can be bad privatively (such that it not be elicited from grace), and yet it would not be de-meritorious: which is plain from the second member [n.37], because an act which is good simply in genus of morals is not meritorious and yet not every such act is de-meritorious; and thus both in the second member and here, an 'indifferent act' seems to be posited, — which, although it be bad privatively, yet not contrarily (because indifferent), and about this indifference it will be spoken elsewhere [d.41 nn.6-14]. Likewise, not only because of neutrality of act in the second can an act be neutral in the third way (that is, neither good nor bad, taking these contrarily), but because of the disposition him who is operating; for example, if in the state of innocence — without grace — someone had rightly acted, that act would have been perfectly good in the second way and not good in the third way, because it did not have the principle of meriting nor was it bad contrarily.

39. Perhaps however in this [present] state [of life] there is not any act neutral between good and bad taken in the third way, save in one case, namely when the act is good from its circumstance, to which, however, charity does not incline. And the reason is because now anyone at all either is in grace or in sin. If in grace, and he has an act

good in the second way, therefore grace inclines to that and thus it is meritorious; if he has an act bad in the second way, it is plain that he is de-meritorious (for always a prior malice brings in a second, not conversely, – and the second the third, not conversely). But if he is bad, and he has an act bad in the second way, he sins in that act; if he is bad and has an act good in the second way, he is not good in the third way nor bad in the third way: therefore neither, as concerns good and bad as they are contraries in the third way, and not however is he neither, speaking of the second way.

B. On Goodness and Malice in the Bad Angel

40. About the second [n.27] I say that the bad angel's being able to have a good volition can be understood of this triple goodness.

1. On Goodness from Genus

41. And about the first, which is from genus, there is no doubt but that he could have (and has) many volitions concerning an object agreeable to such act (as in loving himself, hating punishment, and thus of many others).

2. On Goodness 'Meritoriously'

42. But about the other two modes of goodness, namely virtuously and meritoriously, there is difficulty.

And first it is necessary to see about goodness 'meritoriously'.

Where I say that he cannot have a volition good in this way, understanding it in the sense of composition, because it does not stand together that he be bad and that he have a volition good in this way, just as neither can the white be black in the sense of composition, because then the same thing would at the same time be white and black. But in the sense of division it can be denied there [sc. of a bad angel] either in logical potency or real potency; if real, either that which states the idea of principle, – or that which is a difference of being, which states order to act [cf. *Ord.I* d.20 nn.11-12].

a) On Real Potency which is a Principle

43. About real potency therefore, it is necessary to see how he does not have 'the potency that is a principle' for thus willing.

This principle either is understood to be passive, – and he has that, because his will is something receptive of any right volition: for what is of itself receptive of any right volition, as long as in itself it remains, is not non-receptive; but that will was at some time receptive of good volition (because before damnation he could have merited and have been blessed), nor now has it lost its natural powers; therefore now it is thus receptive.

44. About the active principle of right volition: either we can speak of the whole principle of volition or of a partial principle. The will indeed is a partial active principle, as has been touched on *Ord.I* d.17 [nn.32, 151-153], and will be touched on below in d.25 [not in *Ord.*; see *Lectura* II d.25 n.69]; and he has it complete (according to Dionysius,

[n.4]) and the same that he had in the state of innocence; and consequently it is not true to deny the potency of him, that is the partial active principle of meritorious volition. But this is not the whole, because the will alone does not suffice for meritorious willing, but grace is required as cooperating principle; nor is this will a ‘partial principle’ principal or sufficient for putting another partial principle in being: for although a will using grace already had be principal agent in respect of an act, yet with grace not had it is not sufficient for putting grace into being, because it cannot be put into being save by God alone creating.

45. And so an angel does not have the total active principle for acting, nor is he a partial active principle in whose power it is to produce the remaining partial active principle in being, and to remove the impediments to its use and its principle for eliciting the act and effect common to them. An example of this would be if someone having sight were in darkness: although then he would have the partial principle for the act of seeing (and the principal principle for seeing when light and visual power run together), yet he does not have then the total principle nor the principal principle sufficient for positing that which is required for the effect of these two partial principles, nor even could he move away impediments; and therefore although he have visual power (to the extent he has a principle diminished with respect to vision), yet it would not be in his power to see. Thus I say that it would not be in the power of an angel to will meritoriously, because it is not in his power to have grace nor – by consequence – to use grace, nor even to use his will with this grace to elicit his act; but all these negatives are true, because it is not in his power to have a form that he may use nor to move away impediments.

46.¹⁸ But here there is a doubt, because what has been said about the active principle, although it be true in comparison to the principal effect (which is to act meritoriously from the grace by which he may meritoriously will [nn.44-45]), it remains doubtful about the dispositive principle – or active for disposition – in respect of the principal agent: namely whether he who has will as principal active principle can dispose himself for grace.

And if so, it seems that it is in his power to will well just as it is in the power of a wayfaring sinner: for a bad wayfaring sinner no longer has power save to dispose himself, and then the grace is given to him by God by which he afterwards acts well.

47. Now whether the wayfarer can have some motion of attrition from his pure natural powers, general influence existing, or some special operation is required, about this in *Ord.IV* [d.14 q.2 n.4]; but on the supposition that he can, someone would deny this dispositive power of a damned angel, and would say that it can belong to a wayfaring sinner.

But to this does the authority of Augustine above alleged [rather, Fulgentius: *On the Faith to Peter*; n.12] seem an obstacle, which more concedes to a fallen angel the power of returning to good from his pure natural powers than to a fallen man; therefore, if man the wayfarer can from his pure natural powers have this dispositive power, much more an angel.

48. According to this, then, as concerns all the members about potency as it is a principle [nn.43-45], it does not seem that ‘being able meritoriously to will’ must be denied of angels save because they do not have the total principle of meriting, nor the

¹⁸ The paragraph numberings in the Vatican edition get confused here: paragraph numbers 46 and 47 are missing, and paragraph number 48 is used twice. I have made changes as seems best.

principal partial principle in respect of good volition nor in respect of the special grace which is required for good volition. Nor yet can he [an angel] in the same way will well in which a wayfaring sinner can [n.46], as will be said later [nn.54-56].

b) On Real Potency which is a Difference of Being

49. But if it be understood of the potency that is a difference of being, namely which is ordered to act [n.42] – then it can be conceded [sc. that a bad angel can have a meritoriously good will] of remote potency, namely which follows the idea of potency passive and active (although secondarily and in diminished fashion); it cannot however be conceded of proximate potency, because that does not issue in act save with all impediments removed (so that what has it at once could issue in act), which sort is not from the passive potency that an angel has, nor from that partial cause which is the will: for one partial cause is lacking, which is required for acting [sc. grace].

c) On Logical Potency

50. If it be understood of logical potency, which states the manner of composition formed by the intellect [n.42], – in this way the impossibility can be in the composition either from the intrinsic repugnance of the terms with themselves, or from the extrinsic [repugnance] to what is required for this, that the extremes be united. An example of the first: ‘man is irrational’. An example of the second: if the eye were in darkness, and it were impossible for the opaque [obstacle] – causing the darkness – to be moved away, it would be impossible to see; not indeed from the intrinsic repugnance of the terms (which is the eyes and ‘to see’), but from the repugnance of something extrinsic to both of the extremes, namely of that opaque [obstacle] to ‘to see’.

51. Applying this therefore to the matter at hand, I say that there is not here [sc. in the proposition ‘a bad angel cannot have a volition meritoriously good’] an impossibility from an intrinsic repugnance of the terms or extremes; rather in the subject there is not a repugnance intrinsic to the predicate. If there be then any impossibility, it will be from the repugnance of something extrinsic to the union of the extremes: and that [something] extrinsic cannot be but the active cause, which is required for this, that the extremes be united; such a cause, in respect of the union of grace to some subject, is not of a nature to be any other save God alone; therefore, it will only be impossible for the [bad] angels to will well or to have grace because it is impossible that God gives them grace [or: impossible for them that God gives grace].

52. Now a double impossibility ‘on the part of God’ is assigned, on the part of absolute power and of ordained power [*Ord.I* d.44 nn.3-11].

Absolute power is in respect of whatever does not include a contradiction. And it is plain that thus it is not impossible for God to give grace to that nature: for since that nature is capable of grace (as was touched on above in the material about passive potency [n.43]), it follows that there is no contradiction in this that ‘grace actually informs that nature’.

53. The ordained power of God, as was touched on in book one, is that which is conform in its acting to the rules predetermined by divine wisdom (or rather, by divine will [*Ord.I* d.44 nn.3, 6-7, 1 d.3 n.187]), – and, as concerns beatifying or punishing the

rational creature, there are rules of ordained justice. These rules are collected from Scripture, among which is the authority of *Ecclesiastes* 11.13, “Wherever the wood falls, there will it be” (that is, in the love of whatever the rational creature has remained, in that it will remain).

54. And from such rules of Scripture (for example *Isaiah* 66.24, “their fire will not be extinguished, and their worm will not die,” and from that of *Matthew* 25.46, “these will go into eternal punishment, but the just into eternal life”), Augustine concludes, *City of God* 21.23, that it is certain God will never give them grace. According to this then it would be impossible for them to will well, because it is impossible for God, of his ordained power, to give them grace.

55. But against this it is argued because then it seems in the same way to be impossible of the wayfaring sinner who however will finally not repent – for God has not pre-ordained to give him grace; and if the impossibility be only on this part because of such order, it does not seem more impossible for the demon to repent than for such a wayfarer to repent.

I reply: the ordained power of God does not regard particular divine acts (about which there are not universal laws), but regards universal laws or rules of doable things; of such sort is the law about the damned, – of which sort there is not a law about the bad while they are on the way, although they may finally remain bad. An example of this: if someone had established that every murderer was to be killed, it would not be possible by ordained power – according to the order already in place – to save this murderer; if however he himself were able to kill the other not on account of any such universal law, he could save him (or not kill him) even by ordained power. Thus a wayfarer who will not be saved can be saved, because against this there is not any universal law already laid down of the sort that is against the salvation of the damned.

56. If it be objected against this that ‘just as law is about the universal so also is judgment conform to law about the universal, and that judgment follows from the law (therefore a reason whereby it is not possible to go against law is an equal reason whereby not against judgment also of the law); but this wayfarer, if he will be damned, will be so according to a judgment consonant with the law; therefore etc.’, – I reply: the law is about him who is bad in the term, and therefore when that law is applied to someone in particular (for instance to this or that one already judged, because in the term), the judgment is no more revoked than the law; but about this bad [person] still existing on the way there is not judgment through any law, just as neither does that law universally extend itself to the wayfarer.

57. Another doubt is if this obstinacy of bad will be from God or from the bad will itself? For if it be from the will, it seems that it could of itself spring back from it, just as it was of itself able to will the bad: for the power by which it moves itself to something is the same by which it rests in it, and it can equally draw itself back from it and move to another more inclining thing, of which sort is the object of it. But if the obstinacy be posited by God, therefore this malice will be from God, and so God is cause of sin, which seems unacceptable.

58. About this.

Although Augustine [Fulgentius] may seem to say, *On the Faith to Peter* ch.34 that God has ordained that the aversion of the will into evil always remain, and [although] obstinacy be a sign of bad will, – yet because an act, while it remains, has a cause as it

were continually (because the ‘to be’ of it is as it were in being continually caused), just as God cannot be the cause of bad ‘insofar as bad’ in the first eliciting of it, so neither in its continued being, which is ‘to be continually elicited’; therefore the will alone will be cause, but from God is the punishment of fire which is the evil punishing. This obstinacy too, as it states the malice of sin in the will, can be said to be from God, not indeed positively willing it, but deserting and refusing to give grace: for just as he gives grace to him to whom he disposes to give grace, so he does not give grace to him whom he forsakes (that is, in respect of the giving grace that he has the ‘to refuse’ of).

59. When, therefore, it is argued that if this [obstinacy] is from the will alone, therefore the will alone can spring back to the opposite (namely from the object to which it inordinately inclined itself [n.57]), – I reply: I say that for springing back meritoriously there is required another principle than the will, namely grace, which a bad angel cannot have of himself, – and God, according to the fact he deserted him, has disposed not to give it to him. But if you argue that at least he [a bad angel] have a ‘circumstanced willing’ about that which he inordinately willed, although that willing not be meritorious for him, – this belongs to what follows, namely about moral goodness [n.75; cf. also nn.28, 30, 39].

60. From what has been said, therefore, it seems there is not a negation of power, that is, of active principle, unless ‘active principle’ be taken whole or principal [n.44]. Nor [a negation] of the power which is order for act, save of proximate [power; n.49]. Nor [denial] of logical power save extrinsically [n.51], on whose part there is not an impossibility for uniting the extreme terms, speaking of his [God’s] absolute power [n.52], but of his ordained power, as is collected from Scripture (as was said before from Augustine [n.54]), that God has not disposed to unite those extremes, and that there not be another cause of their permanence in bad save divine dereliction [n.58], – or that he has disposed not to give them grace, since they are in the term [n.59], in which way he has not made disposition about bad wayfarers [nn.55-56].

61. It seems too that this is proved by the authorities of the saints, – first from Damascene ch.18, “What the fall is for angels, this for men is death;” second from Augustine *City of God* 21.11, 23, “In the Scriptures nothing is more certain than the sentence of Scripture.”

3. On Goodness of Virtue or from Circumstance

62. It remains now to see about moral goodness and the malice opposed to it [nn.30, 34, 37, 40].

63. Where it is said that they [bad angels] cannot have a morally good volition, because they deform every [volition] by some inordinate circumstance, referring it inordinately to love of self.

64. Likewise: habit in them is perfectly bad, in the term, and so most perfectly inclines them.

65. Never therefore do they will well, because of the first [n.63], – but always do they will badly, because of the second [n.64], namely because of their vehement inclination to bad.

66. To the first of these Augustine is adduced *On the Psalms*, 118.11 n.5, “Lead me, Lord, in the way of your commandments.”¹⁹

67. Against the first [n.63].

They have their natural powers complete (according to Damascene [n.4]), therefore in them there is a natural inclination to good; therefore, according to that inclination they can conformably will something, because their power – as it is considered merely in its nature – can elicit some act consonant to natural inclination; therefore, they can have an act not bad, because it is not contrary to their nature.

68. Further, they have ‘their worm’ [n.54], which is remorse for their sins; and this remorse is some displeasure, which ‘displeasure’ is not an act morally bad, because although it can be deformed by disordered circumstance, yet – resting on this which is ‘a not wanting to have sinned’ – it does not seem to be formally moral malice.

69. Further, if they do not want punishment insofar as it is injurious to nature, standing only on this (without any circumstance), it does not seem an act morally bad, – because just as he [the bad angel] can love his own nature ‘not badly’ morally, so he can hate what is contrary to it [n.41].

70. Against the second [n.64] I argue in three ways [nn.70-72].

First because it seems that the will from its own liberty would be able not to will and to have no act. Which is proved, because according to Augustine *Retractions* 1.22 n.4, “nothing is as in the power of the will as the will itself,” – which is not understood of the will as to its first being (because, as to its first being, non-will is more in its power than will), but it is understood as to operating. Therefore, the will is more in his [an angel’s] power as far as concerns operation than any inferior power; but the will can suspend any inferior power from all act – therefore also itself; therefore it does not necessarily will bad.

71. Further, second: what is also adduced about habit [n.64] is rejected in two ways.

First, because every habit inclines to some act in the same species; therefore this habit, which is posited the cause of sinning, either inclines only to act of being proud or only to act of hating. And to whichever act it is posited to incline, it seems probable that he [a bad angel] could sometimes not have that act, because he can have another distinctly and with his whole effort, and he cannot at the same time have two perfect acts; therefore there is no one act that necessarily is perpetual from vehement inclination to it, and consequently neither in general is a bad act necessarily present from the habit.

72. Further, second: a habit is not the idea of acting for a power in a way opposite to the way proper to the power itself, – which is proved as it is above first proved against the two opinions, in the argument about the priority of a cause insofar as it is cause, when the second cause does not determine the mode of acting of the first cause but conversely [n.17]. Therefore, if a non-habituated will is able non-necessarily to will this thing (and this from the liberty in it), an habituated will may non-necessarily will it. – And then what the Philosopher says *Ethics* 7.8.1150a21-22, that ‘the bad man is impenitent’, needs

¹⁹ “But because this too [each keeping the precepts of love] is of less avail through someone’s own strength, if he is not helped by him who commands that he do what he bids: ‘lead me,’ says the psalmist [*Psalms* 118.35], ‘in the way of your commandments, because I have willed it’: too little for me is my will, Lord, save where I have willed you yourself to lead me.”

to be expounded: that he is ‘penitent with difficulty’, because no act can be so intense in the will that it altogether takes away the power of it for the opposite.

73. As to this article then [n.62], it seems it can be said that they [bad angels] do not necessarily have any bad act, neither speaking of some determinate act or an indeterminate or vague one.

74. And about the determinate it seems sufficiently plain, because if he has so great a determinate habit, it inclines to a certain act, one in species, – and it is plain [sc. from n.71] that he can have some other act in species than that one, and for that time not have another, and by parity of reasoning not have any other at all for which there is not such an inclining habit. If also he has several habits inclining to acts diverse in species, yet some habit does not incline most strongly; and he is able not to have an act of that ‘non-maximally inclining’ habit; therefore he is able not to have an act of any other habit whatever.

75. About indeterminate or vague act, the same is proved: either, if he can suspend himself from all volition, as one reason proceeded [n.70] (which, however, assumes a doubt, because it does not seem he could suspend himself from every act or volition), or because sometimes he can have a volition not bad with the malice contrary to moral goodness, although he not have a [volition] good with complete moral goodness (which is from all the circumstances [nn.68, 37, 30]). Although neither in this does there appear an impossibility but that he could have [an act] completely good morally [n.67], at least this seems probable, that his act ‘good in genus’ he can have, that is, by stopping there, not deforming it by circumstances contrary to the circumstances of a good volition [n.169]; or if he have that act circumstanced with certain goods and disordered with certain bads, yet it is not necessary that he be always bad: for it seems a wonder to deny natural power in that excellent nature, where there does not appear anything on account of which it should be denied. It is however probable that according to this power they do not issue into act, because of the vehement malice according to which it is more probable that they act than according to the natural power according to which they could [issue] into acts in some way opposite.

III. To the Principal Arguments

76. To the first principal argument [n.2] it is said that, although they believe, the act however of believing in them is bad, because they hate the thing believed. – But against this: an act of intellect, as it precedes an act of will, does not have deformity from the act of will following, but in that prior act they can conceive something true, and this both a speculable (as that ‘God is triune’) and a doable (as that ‘God is to be loved’).

77. It can therefore be said to that argument [n.2] that it proves a truth, namely that they have some act good with diminished moral goodness, because namely it is not bad with the contrary malice, to wit not having any circumstance contrary to due circumstance, although it do lack some circumstance due; for he does not believe on account of the end on account of which it should be believed, and the circumstance of the end is necessary for moral goodness.

78. To the second [n.3] I say that ‘to be able’ to be a participant sounds like a remote potency, speaking of potency for act [n.49], – or speaking of a potency that is a principle, it sounds like a partial, diminished, active or passive principle.

79. To the third [n.4] I concede that in them there is free choice.

80. And when you argue that ‘to be able to sin is not part of free choice’ (according to Anselm [n.4]), – I say that it is one thing to speak of being able to sin and another of power for sin; for the first states order to deformed act, the second states the idea of a principle whereby a deformed act can be elicited.

81. Now the first order is not free choice absolutely, nor anything of it, nor is any ‘order to act’ some active principle or part of it.

82. In the second way I say that that by which ‘he is able to sin’ includes two things, of which one is ‘to be able’ and the other ‘to fail’. And that by which he is capable of that is his ‘to be able’, which ‘to be able’ is per se liberty of choice and power, – but the other one is not his whereby it is free choice but whereby it is such, namely defective:²⁰ so that, just as in general free choice is whereby someone can will (and this taking the ‘in general’ as Anselm takes it, as it belongs to God and the blessed²¹), so ‘this’ free choice – which is able to sin, namely created (namely of the wayfarer) – is that by which one can will defectively. However, as to something it can be posited dissimilar, because for ‘absolutely to will’ the whole positive entity of free will (and it alone) is principle, – but for deformity in act, nothing positive in free choice is principle first.

83. And then to the form of the argument [n.4] I say that, given that there be freedom of choice there [n.79], it only follows that it is the power by which he is capable of a positive act, which act is from the power whence it is positive – and consequently, whence there is free choice for it, it is not a sin; however from a defect accompanying the act there can be sin.

84. The whole argument however can be conceded [n.4], namely that they have the power of not sinning, because they have a power that is not formally sin, – although they do not have a power of not sinning, that is, ‘not to be in sin’. In the way a sinner is said to be in sin after the act has passed which he committed,^a and ‘deprived of grace’ he remains guilty (namely up to penitence for the sin committed), in this way they are not able of themselves not to sin, that is, not be in sin; nor is it necessary that free choice is a power for not sinning, that, is for not being in sin.

a. Which will be spoken of in *Ord.IV* [d.14 q.1 nn.3-7].

85. And if you argue according to Anselm that ‘free choice is a power of keeping rectitude for its own sake’, therefore from it can he who has it keep rightness and so not be in sin – I reply that someone can keep it by free choice when it is present (not otherwise), and in this way does Anselm expound it.

86. To the other [the sixth, n.7] I say that in merely natural agents, with all impediments ceasing, there is a return to the natural disposition, no violent action preventing it; and the reason is because the intrinsic principle is necessary in respect of

²⁰ Anselm, *On Free Choice* ch.2: “Now he sinned through his free choice which was free; but not through this whereby it was free, that is, through the power by which he was able not to sin... but through the power which he had of sinning.”

²¹ *Ibid.* ch.1: “Freedom of choice I do not think to be a power of sinning and not sinning. Indeed, if this were its definition, neither God nor the angels who cannot sin would have free choice... Although the free choice of men differ from the free choice of God and of the good angels, yet the definition of this freedom in both according to this name should be the same. For although animal differ from animal, whether substantially or accidentally, the definition however according to the name of ‘animal’ is the same for all animals.”

natural goodness (as far as is from itself), and therefore it always causes it unless it be overcome by something dominating it. Now in this way the will is not cause in respect of goodness in its act, but it only has a certain natural ‘as it were passive’ inclination to goodness in act, which although it could give to the act, yet it is not inclined to giving it by natural necessity, as a heavy object is to going downwards.

87. In another way it can be said that sin is against nature, that is, against the act that is of a nature to be elicited in agreement and in conformity with natural inclination; but from this it is not necessary that it be contrary to the will in itself, just as it is not necessary that ‘what is contrary to an effect or an accident’ is contrary to the cause or the subject, especially when this sort of cause is not a natural cause of the effect but a free one.

88. To the other [the fourth, n.5] – about likeness [of intellect and will] – I say that although it conclude against those who say the intellect is a sufficient mover of the will [nn.9, 19], because it would be necessary for them to say that the intellect of the first angel [sc. Lucifer] rightly conceives no practical principle (because if it were rightly to conceive, it would move the will in conformity with itself, and so rightly), yet I believe this [sc. ‘that the intellect of the first angel conceives rightly no practical principle’] to be false, because just as the first principles of speculation are true from the terms, so also the first principles of action, – and consequently the intellect, which can conceive the quiddity of the terms of the first practical principle and combine them, has a sufficient motive and mover ‘by way of nature’ for assenting to that principle; therefore by the will, whose act is posterior, it cannot be impeded – or at any rate not borne to the opposite.

89. And how this be true which is said in *Ethics* 3 [n.5, *Ethics* 3.2.1110b28-30], “everyone bad is ignorant”, it has to be treated of elsewhere [*Ord.* III d.36 nn.11-14].

90. It can however be said to the argument [n.88] that ‘likeness’ is worth nothing, because the intellect can be compelled to assenting such that it cannot be so blind but that – in apprehending some terms from the evidence of the terms – it can conceive the truth of the complex [proposition] composed of them. But the will is not compelled by the goodness of the object; therefore, it can be so averse that, however great a good is shown it, it does not move itself to loving it, at least in ordered way.

91. To the other [the fifth, n.6] I say that with a habit existing perfect or at its highest (as much as it can be perfected in such subject, or according to the limit prefixed for it by divine wisdom), all following acts increase nothing but would only proceed from the habit already generated. In the way acts of a good angel do not increase the habit of his charity, neither effectively nor meritoriously (because he is in the term either according to the nature of the habit, or according to the capacity of the subject, or at least according to the term prefixed for him by God), but all those acts proceed from the fullness of a habit thus perfect, – similarly in the matter at hand, the perfection of that habit [sc. of a bad angel] is in the term according to the rule of divine wisdom, which does not permit them to increase in malice in intensity, and so subsequent acts are only disposed as effects of a bad habit and not as agent causes.

92. Through the same to that about punishment [n.6], because just as substantial reward is determinate in the first instant in which any angel is blessed (nor from then does it increase, because the good acts that follow are not meritorious, though they be good), so also in a damned angel in the first instant of his damnation is determined to a certain punishment, which does not increase in intensity. Nor yet will his bad acts which

he elicits be unpunished, just as neither will the good acts of the good angel be unremunerated; those good acts, indeed, of the good angel are included in the first act, because they proceed from the perfection of the beatific act, – but as to the accidental reward that they can have, any act at all is a reward for him; so too these bad acts, which the damned [angel] elicits, are included in the first punishment determined with certainty for him, – and any act, just as it can have an accidental and a proper punishment, has itself for punishment (“you have commanded, Lord,” says Augustine *Confessions* 1.12 n.19, “and so it is, that every sinner is a punishment to himself”). For the most powerful and greatest punishment is privation of the greatest good, of which sort formally is the malice of guilt in an evil act turning away from God. Therefore, their punishment increases infinitely in extension, just as also their malice – and neither in intensity.

93. And if you object that a demeritorious act is a second evil, therefore a proper punishment corresponds to it – I reply: although it can be conceded that it is a guilt, yet not properly demeritorious (because it is not elicited by a wayfarer, whose alone it is to merit and demerit), and it can more properly be called an act damnatory or of one damned; just as, on the other side, the act of the blessed, although it be acceptable to God, is however not properly meritorious, but rather beatific or an act of one blessed, or proceeding from beatitude.

Eighth Distinction

Single Question

Whether an Angel can assume a Body in which he may Exercise Works of Life

1. About the eighth distinction I ask whether^a an angel can assume a body in which he may exercise the works of life.

a. About this eighth distinction, in which the Master deals with the power of angels in comparison to the mortal creature, one question is asked, namely whether...”

2. That not:

Because, if he do, therefore he has a greater unity with a body assumed than not assumed, because ‘to assume’ is ‘to take to oneself’; but this does not seem possible, because he cannot be the form of that body (it is plain, because he is a ‘separate form’ naturally), nor can it be assumed by him in unity of supposit in the way the Word assumed our nature; therefore there will only be unity as of mover to movable. But such unity can be his with a body non-assumed (as to the heaven which he moves); therefore etc.

3. Further, second, if he were to assume a body, either he would assume an elemental body, – which does not appear, because that body does not have the accidents of body, as color and the sort of qualities that are apparent. Or a mixed body, which it does not seem: first because he does not seem to have a power active for mixing elements according to the mixture of such body, because since the form of a mixed body is a substantial form, the devil could transmute matter to a substantial form immediately, – which is false, because neither by natural action (because he is naturally not determined

by the Creator for such action), nor artificially (because according to the Philosopher, *Meteorology* 4.3.380b16-24, “art does not follow nature in perfection of effect,” and this does the gloss say on *Exodus* 7.12, “And the rod of Aaron devoured, etc.”); second because, with the whole of nature acting, a mixed body cannot be generated as perfect as is the human body. Nor does he assume a celestial body, – it is plain, because that does not receive foreign impressions, nor consequently vital operations.

4. Further, third: if he can in an assumed body exercise the operations of life, then there is there something alive. The consequent is false, because a body is not alive save through a vital form informing it; and there is not such there. The consequence is proved, because vital operations are of a composite (*On the Soul* 1.1.403a5-7, *On Sense and Sensed Object* 1.436a6-11), – because a form separate from matter cannot transmute matter, according to the Commentator [Averroes] on *Metaphysics* 7 com.28; in these acts of life, at least in acts of the vegetative [soul], there is transmutation; therefore etc.

5. To the opposite:

Genesis 18.1-19, about the three angels appearing to Abraham; and *Tobit*, through the whole of it, about Raphael; and *Judges* 13.2-23, about the angel appearing to Manoah and his wife.

I. To the Question

6. In this question, as they touch on three arguments, three things need to be seen [nn.2-4].

A. What it is for an Angel to assume a Body

7. First, what it is for an angel to assume a body.

This indeed is not to inform a body, nor to unite it hypostatically to himself, but only to be intrinsic mover of the body and to be there definitively, which is another way of being there than by operation, as is plain above about the location of an angel [*Ord.* II d.2 nn.310, 246], and also – because it is proved that God is everywhere ‘because he operates everywhere’ – that if it were the same mode of being in something, it would be a begging [of the question] and the argument would be from the same to the same.²² And according to this he is said ‘to assume’, for he then assumes – that is ‘takes to himself’ – when he uses it as instrument for exercising operations proper to himself; nor is this assumption is not said to happen when an assumed body is moved with progressive motion, because such motion fits the end because of which such body is assumed.²³

B. What Sort of Body an Angel Assumes

8. Second I say that he does not assume a celestial body [n.3]. Nor an elemental body in which he may appear, because in an elemental [body] he does not visibly appear, nor is an elemental body susceptible of those accidents in which he does appear [n.3]. But

²² Translator: that is, if ‘definitively there’ and ‘operation’ meant the same, the argument ‘an angel is definitively there because he operates there’ would reduce to ‘an angel operates there because he operates there’.

²³ Translator: that is, an angel who, for example, moves a heavenly body is not said to assume the heavenly body he moves, for the heavenly body’s motion is the proper end of that body.

he can assume mixed bodies – already generated by nature – as the cadaver of a dead man or a stone or something such.

9. However, when he assumes some body which does not seem first caused or formed by natural causes, but as it were then formed, and suddenly – the operation being complete – to disappear (as it was about Raphael and the angel appearing to Manoah [*Tobit* 12.21, *Judges* 13.20-21]), then it seems probable that it is a mixed body, because of those accidents that appear in the body; but not mixed with full mixture: both because such a mixed body could not be by generation so suddenly formed, – and because it would not be of a nature to be generated save according to a determinate process of nature, which sort is not according to nature there (to wit, if he appear in the body of a man not first generated by nature, that body would not be of a nature or fitted to be generated save in a mother). Nor can it be said that an angel may at once induce that form in matter, because he cannot induce a natural form, – but he is only able to bring active and passive elements suitably together and draw them near to celestial bodies in a suitable place, so that a particular form may be induced of the sort that is of a nature to be induced by such particular agents. Therefore the body, which is thus as it were suddenly formed and dissolved, is mixed with imperfect mixture (of the sort that can be induced as it were suddenly by natural agents, the elements being brought close together), so that such body is made more like an impression which is imperfectly mixed; and a sign of this is from corruption because, when such a body disappears, there does not remain anything of the sort of body into which that assumed body would naturally be immediately resolvable if it had been perfectly mixed (for the body of a man, if it were perfectly mixed, would only be of a nature to return to a cadaver), but it is resolved at once into the elements, just as from them it was able to be immediately generated because of their imperfect mixture.

C. What Works of Life in an Assumed Body an Angel can Exercise

10. About the third [n.6] I say that he can cause all local motion in an assumed body, – and so the motion that seems to be progressive, the motion too that would be of inhaling and exhaling, the motion of eyelids and hands and the like. And the reason is because there is not any imperfect body in the universe but that it have in its active virtue some ‘where’; it is plain of the ‘heavy’ in respect of the center; therefore much more does an angel have this in respect of a body.

11. But of natural operations that consist in doing and undergoing, of which sort of operations are the sense operations, – over those an angel has no power, because they are only of a nature to be received in a composite of organic body (at any rate one perfectly mixed) and of soul insofar as it has perfective power; neither of which is there, neither also such mixture nor perfecting soul, – and therefore simply in such composite there is no sensation. The operations too that truly consist in true acting, of which sort are the vegetative operations, do not belong to that composite, because either those operations are of a nature to be of an animated composite (of the sort that is not there), or of a nature to be of a body perfectly mixed (for example, if flesh were to generate flesh [sc. by nutrition]); and neither is there.

12. Now as to the knowing which the angel seems to have about particular facts, by hearing or seeing, it is nothing other than intellection; and he can express that

intellection by forming words and moving the tongue locally. As to the vegetative acts too that appear, – if we are speaking of true nutrition, nothing there is nourished; but if we speak of the eating that precedes nutrition, that is only the division of food through the local motion of the jaws and the drawing of it into the stomach by local motion (and then can take place exhaling and resolving into humors and elements), – and these local movements can be done about the body by the active virtue of an angel.

13. And as was said about the nutritive [power], so must it be said about the augmentative, because there is no nutrition there or growth; there can however be juxtaposition there, if he wish suddenly to appose elements – which can be imperfectly mixed for such imperfect mixture – to his [assumed] body, so that it may seem to grow.

14. And if you say, ‘if eating is not an operation of life, then the argument, for proving the true resurrection of Christ, about his eating with his disciples [*Luke* 24.41-42, *Acts* 10.40] is not valid, which is against the saints’, I reply:

For proving his resurrection there are many other arguments in the Gospel, more efficacious than this, – and so, along with the others, it does well prove it, even if not by itself alone. Or I say that Christ’s eating was a true eating, ordered to true nutrition, because it is not unacceptable for me that a glorious body could convert a non-glorious body into itself, just as it can be together with a non-glorious body. Nor because of this is it corruptible ‘because it can convert something else into itself’: for God could make a glorious body in the smallest quantity and grow it through eating, and yet not anything would be corrupted of what was nourished or grown. But in the sort of bodies assumed [by angels] there is no nutrition or improvement but only addition or apposition.

15. But as to the generative [power], it must be said that that happens by virtue of semen, deposited by a father into a woman, in which is preserved the virtue of the father, as is commonly said. If he [sc. a bad angel] can receive that semen from another – by being succubus – and keep it in its natural quality (agreeable to its natural generation) until he transfer it, he himself does nothing there save that he first receives (in that assumed body) what is moved locally by depositing, and afterwards he moves it locally into some part of which he is incubus; and if that semen, before it be received in the womb, not lose its natural quality, generation can happen through it just as if it were immediately transferred by the first depositor into the same womb. And in this way is it attributed, not indeed to a good angel (because far be it that he mix himself up in such vile things), but to a demon, whom it befits to generate like this – because first the same as succubus and afterwards the same as incubus receives the semen transfused first by the depositor and then transfuses it into the mother.

II. To the Principal Arguments

16. To the first principal argument [n.2] I say that the heaven is not said to be ‘assumed’ because for no special assumption or form, and especially that in which an angel intend to appear visibly to us, does he assume the heaven for himself; likewise, the one who moves the heaven moves it perpetually and so does not temporarily assume a body. This ‘assumption’ is appropriated to a body that is moved for a time, and moved for the sake of some effect that is going to appear visibly to men.

17. To the second [n.3] I say that it already appears from what has been said [n.9], that he assumes a body imperfectly mixed, – which indeed he does not produce into being

by his own power, but he only unites mixable things with each other and in respect of the heaven, in the sort of proportion in which ‘by virtue of the heaven and mixable things’ such form can be induced.

18. To the third [n.4], it is plain [nn.10-12] that no act of the vegetative or cognitive power belongs properly to an angel in a body, or even to the body, but only acts of the motive power; not indeed acts of the organic motive power, of which sort is the motive power of an animate body (because the act of it is of the composite, just as also acts of the cognitive and vegetative [powers]), but of a higher motive power whereby an angel can move a body from place to place that does not disproportionately exceed his motive power.

Ninth Distinction

Question One

Whether a Superior Angel can illumine an Inferior Angel

1. About the ninth distinction, where the Master [Lombard] treats of the orders of angels, where it pertains to the superior angels to illumine the inferior, I ask^a first whether a superior angel can illumine an inferior.

a. [*Interpolation*] About the ninth distinction, where the Master deals with the distinction of orders, of gifts, of the offices of angels, and of the inferior from the superior by illumination, and this in the multitude of blessed angels, it is asked...

2. That not:

To ‘illumine’ is either to cause light or to intensify a light caused. And neither does any angel have power for. The first not, because to cause light in another angel is only possible through creation (and an angel cannot create, as Damascene says, *On the Orthodox Faith*, ch.17); the second not, because ‘by the same thing is a habit caused and intensified’ according to the Philosopher *Ethics* 2.2.1104a27-28.

3. Further, second: all change is between opposites – therefore everything that is illumined was first dark; but in the blessed angels there is not any darkness; therefore etc.

4. Further, third: a superior angel is a superior light in respect of an inferior; but in bodies a greater light darkens a lesser light or at any rate impedes its effect (as is plain, because by day the stars are not seen in the presence of the sun); therefore, by similarity in the matter at hand, a superior angel will impede an inferior from operation, – therefore he will not perfect him by illumining him.

5. On the contrary:

Damascene, *Orthodox Faith*, chs.17, 18 [“It is manifest that those who are eminent pass on to the inferior illumination and knowledge.”]

Question Two

Whether one Angel can intellectually speak to Another

6. Next to this I ask about the locution of angels (because it is like the preceding²⁴), namely whether one angel can intellectually speak to another.

7. That not:

The essence of an angel is more intimate to him than his intellection, and yet, notwithstanding that intimacy, one angel sees the essence of another; therefore in vain does speaking happen about this which was manifest before speaking; therefore etc.

8. Further, second: if an angel can speak, he can as speak to one distant as to one present (because this also belongs to men, in whom there is more imperfect power). But the consequent is false for two reasons: first because then it would be necessary that first he first changed the medium and afterwards the angel (for to any action on the extreme is action on the medium prior); but this is unacceptable, because neither by the intellectual is anything generated in a bodily medium, nor further by a bodily medium can anything be generated in the angel; – second because it would then be necessary for him to speak to all angels equally present, and first necessary to speak to a nearer angel than to one more distant (in the same straight line), each of which seems unacceptable: for it seems that he can speak to each one of them without [speaking] to another.

9. Further, third: an angel does not understand save through innate species; but any angel has those about anything intelligible to him; therefore any angel has any intelligible present to him in the way in which it can be present to him. Therefore speaking is superfluous.

10. Proof of the first proposition [the major, n.9], in many ways:

Because if they could understand through acquired species, they therefore would have an agent intellect through which the intelligible in potency would become in them the intelligible in act; but this is false, because since their object is of itself actually intelligible, it is not necessary that it be made from intelligible in potency to intelligible in act. Likewise, there does not seem to be in them a possible intellect, – therefore neither an agent intellect; the antecedent is proved because their intellect is not sometimes in act, sometimes in potency to first act.

11. Second: ‘as angels are disposed to being, so to operating’ [n.20 infra]; but angels do not depend in being on a body, therefore not in operating either; therefore they do not receive any species from a body. The reason is confirmed, because for this reason does the soul in understanding depend on the body, because it is united to the body, and in this is the reason for its union with the body, that it receives its perfection from the body.

12. Third, because from extreme to extreme there is no transition save through the middle; but imaginable being is the middle between sensible being and actually intelligible being; therefore, since an angel cannot have anything in imaginable being (because he does not have a phantasm), neither can anything of sensible being go across to intelligible being in an angel. Wherefore etc.

13. Fourth, because as the celestial bodies to other bodies, so the angelic intellect to other intellects; but those bodies have perfection co-created with them and do not acquire it through motion; therefore, by similitude, those [angelic] intellects have their perfections co-created with them.

14. Fifth, because if they can have acquired species, then the object outside would act for generation of that species, – and it is necessary to posit that the intellect of an

²⁴ ‘Like’ because (as the Vatican editors note) illumination in angels is a certain locution [n.84 infra].

angel also co-acts, otherwise the possible intellect of an angel would be cheaper than our intellect; therefore these two will act together for the generation of the acquired species of some object, the intellect namely and the object [cf. nn.486-494]. But this is false, because agents diverse in genus cannot produce the same effect; and such are these; therefore etc. Proof of the major [sc. agents diverse in genus cannot produce the same effect], because either they are required insofar as diverse in genus, or not: if so, then there corresponds to them in the effect some proportional diversity (and so the effect will not be simple and homogeneous, but heterogeneous); if not, then – without such distinction – there could be a power so intense that one of the co-agents would suffice for producing such action. This is proved, because where a distinction happens in two movers, the power in one can be so intensified that it can supply the place of both [cf. *Ord.I d.3 n.497*]; therefore the bodily object could be so intensified in its action that it alone could generate the species in the angel's intellect. But this is false, both because 'the agent is more excellent than the patient' according to Augustine *On Genesis* 12.16 n.33, "now no body is more excellent than the spirit, therefore no body acts on a spirit," according to him; and also because this [sc. that a bodily object alone could generate a species in an angel's intellect] does not seem it can more truly be understood of the agent in its proper virtue than of the agent in virtue of another, – therefore the body does not act on the angelic intellect by its own virtue, but by virtue of the angel's intellect. Not then will these two be two partial causes of which neither acts by the virtue of the other [*Ord.I d.3 nn.495-98*].

15. Further [i.e. sixth], the like is known by its like, – therefore a singular would generate a singular species in the angel's intellect; therefore the intellect, assimilated through that species, would know the singular through its [the singular's] own idea, which is absurd; therefore etc.

16. The opposite does Damascene maintain, as above (look for it) [n.5].

I. To the Second Question

A. The Opinion of Henry of Ghent

17. About these questions it is first necessary to see about the speaking of angels [cf. n.6].

18. And, setting many opinions aside, one opinion [Henry of Ghent] needs to be recited, where four things need to be seen:

First namely how, when speaking, he knows that about which he speaks (which is posited to be the singular, according to that opinion); second, how the thing known by one could escape another; third, how it may be plain to him [the other] when, speaking to him, he expresses it; and fourth, about illumination.

1. How the Angel speaking knows the Singular

19. As to the first, it is said that an angel knows the singular, not first nor through any proper idea, but through a 'universal' co-created with his intellect.

20. Which is proved in four ways:

First, because [Henry, *Quodl.* V q.15] “‘as each thing is disposed to being, so to knowledge’ (*Metaphysics* 2.1.993b30-31); but the form of a singular adds nothing beyond the universal save negation; therefore not in knowledge either.”

21. Second, because “if he did not know the singular under the idea of its universal, although there is not another intrinsic idea by which it may be known (because neither the angel’s essence nor habit; for first the ‘habit’ is in respect of the universal), it would follow that the singular would be presented to the angel’s intellect for moving it ‘as first and per se object of it’ under the idea of singularity; which is false, because what are per se objects and not first do not move save through the idea of them that are per se and first objects, according to which fact size and figure do not move sight save together with color.” But the singular is not the first object of the intellect, because “nothing is the first object of the intellect save the universal.”^a

a. [*Interpolation*] The first consequence is plain, because there is not another intrinsic idea by which the singular is known: because neither the angel’s essence, – nor the habit, because the habit is first in respect of the universal.

22. Third, thus: “Every cognitive power must in apprehending be determined proportionally to that which it has to apprehend. Therefore the intellect, understanding the singular, is determined proportionally to the determination of that singular, – and this, either is determinate of its nature or determinable by the species that it receives (as through the species of the singular). And [if in the first way] then that intellect would be more determinate than our intellect;” rather in both ways follows the determination or determinability of the angelic intellect “more than of our sense,” because our sense is neither of its nature limited or determined nor determinable by the species that it receives (“for the species of the singular is not received in sense first but in the organ”). It is further deduced, because such determination to a singular object would be a certain limitation and impediment “to intellection of the universal, just as it impedes it in sense,” – and much more here than in sense, because it does not receive the species of the singular.

23. Fourth, because “just as, through apprehension of universals from without, the habit of science is generated in our intellect, – so in the intellect of an angel, if it first knew singulars, there could be an acquired habit of science besides the science of its own universals, which is against the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 7.10.1035b33-6a8 where he maintains that the scientific habit of universals and of singulars is not different.”

24. As to this first article [n.18], the mode of knowing a singular from an angel speaking is set down to be this:

“The intellect of an angel apprehends a form, according to the idea of a universal, by its own habit, – but after a supposit has being in reality or in revelation, it at once apprehends the form in it under the idea of a universal first and per se, by the same apprehension by which it apprehends it [the form] before it [the form] will have been participated in by that [supposit]; and it is accidental to the angelic intellect that it apprehend it [the form] in that [the supposit], just as it is accidental to the essence of the thing that there be in that [the supposit] something under it. First then and per se it knows the singular form under the idea of a universal (that is, under an indeterminate, confused, and undesignated idea), but because the very same form – as it is in the thing itself – is determinate and designated, the intellect secondarily understands this designation. And

there is the same knowledge of the universal and the singular, with only a respect added and a negation whereby it is understood as designated in this’.” “for they [sc. knowledges] do not differ on the part of the thing known nor on the part of the act of knowing, but only in the manner of knowing without designation and with designation, of which one adds to the other only the idea of negation, as has been said” [n.20].

25. From this it is plain how “the angelic intellect – as if according to a protended line – understands the singular.”

First, indeed, “the essence in the habit does not move under the idea of an object but under the idea of something inherent – but it terminates the act of understanding under the idea of the known and not of anything inherent;” and so from the object [sc. known] to the habit “there is properly no circumflexion,” but as it were a line protended from point to point. “Next, from the object known in the universal, the intellect proceeds to the universal in the supposit, under the idea of universal, and finally from the same [object], known in the supposit under the idea of a universal, to knowing the same under the idea of the singular,” so that there is as it were a straight line from the object in the habit (as from the first point) to the singular (as to the last point) through two intermediate points.

2. How Knowledge of a Singular can Escape another Angel

26. From this also appears the second [n.18], namely how the intellection of this angel about a singular can be concealed from another angel:

For – according to this position – by the old same apprehension by which he was previously apprehending a quiddity set before him in a habit absolutely, he will comprehend it now “in whatever it will have been (whether existing or revealed [24]), because in nothing can it be concealed from him, but he only conceives now under a new respect what was conceived before.” An example: “if in everyone there were one intellect in number, it would from anyone’s phantasm abstract the universal, – after it had once abstracted it, and understood it in that from which it abstracted it, if (with that understanding in place) it begins to understand it in another, it would not perceive a new universal with a new understanding, but only the old one (which it had first perceived under the old respect) would it now perceive under a new respect, as in this phantasm.”

27. So it is about the angelic intellect, that not by innovating anything under the universal concept but by renewing the concept, – conceiving many times the universal in diverse particulars – this singular is conceived and that. And, because this one sees the singular (which before he did not see) without any newness of concept, therefore “although another see the universal forms in this one (which are ideas of knowing particulars), yet by them he does not see the particulars, whether existent or revealed, that this one sees;” or at any rate, if he could see existent [particulars] through his own habit and through the universals shining forth in it, yet not revealed ones. Nor even can he see the singulars – which this one sees – because this one sees them without any newness of concept.

28. Briefly then, as to this article:

Therefore is the singular – understood by one – posited to be hid from another, because although the intellect of the first (and the universal, which is the idea of understanding for the first) be plain to it, yet to the second the concept of the first is not

plain as it is about the singular, because by the fact that the first is using a universal form for conceiving the singular, nothing is innovated in the intellect of the first. And if the singular not be existent, the second cannot see it – even with it known – through his own habit, nor through the habit of the first; but if it be existent and he can see it through his own habit, – yet he cannot see the acts of the first because of the singular known or not-known. And therefore, locution is necessary either because of the singular known, which is hidden (as when it is a non-existing revealed singular), – or because the act of knowing is hidden from the second angel, and this whether about a singular revealed or naturally known.

3. How Knowledge of a Singular is Manifested to Another Angel

29. About the third [n.18] it is said that “just as we cannot express signate singulars known by us in speaking to another save by giving expression to vague singulars (with whatever properties and accidents they are designated), so neither can one angel by speaking make it manifest to another under the same signation under which it was revealed to him, but he forms for the other a new concept – really different – about a vague singular (which concept indeed the other angelic intellect sees in the intellect of this angel, as if he were reading in a book), by which the intellect of the angel seeing is changed to perceiving it not only as it is something in itself, but as it is something of the speaker, as in our speech. Whence too the other “forms a like vague concept, in his intellect, about that particular under the idea of a universal, – and by this he is said to ‘hear’, because in an angel ‘to see’ and ‘to hear’ do not differ; and because that second concept is not ordered save to indicating a hidden concept of the mind, therefore he is not properly said ‘to understand’ but ‘to speak’, even though it be in itself a sort of understanding.”

4. How One Angel illumines Another

30. About the fourth article [n.18] it is said that in four ways can it be understood that a superior angel illumines an inferior, namely: either by infusing light, or offering what is luminous, or removing an obstacle, or doing something by which, when done, light is caused in what is receptive. In the first way the sun illumines the medium; in the second way someone carrying a candle illumines a house by night; in the third way someone opening a window by day; in the fourth way someone curing an eye – which infirm before was not capable of light and now is capable – is said to illumine the eye.

31. Now in the first way it is said that only God illumines; and this whether by causing natural light, or by impressing created supernatural light (of grace or glory) or uncreated, whether as reason for seeing or as the object seen (and this whether temporarily, as in the enraptured, – or permanently, as in the blessed). In the second way one angel illumines another about a truth perfective of the intellect, speaking to him in the way before stated [n.29]. In the third way also he illumines, as is proved through Augustine on that verse of the Psalm, ‘Give me understanding’ [*On the Psalms*, psalm 118, sermon 18 n.4]: “An angel,” he says, “can do something in a man’s mind so that it be capable of God, in the way anyone is said to illumine a house who makes open a window.” In a fourth way too can an angel illumine, as is proved through Augustine *ibid.*:

“God,” he says, “made the angel such that he can do something such whence the human mind would be helped to grasp the light of God.”

32. And this is also proved through reason, because “all things are ordered” and “connected with each other” (according to the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 12.10.1075a16 and Dionysius *Divine Names* ch.7); and this order is attended not only according to essences but also according to operations. From this it is argued: “An inferior angel, through the natural influence of a superior angel on him, is reducible to a state natural and of ultimate natural perfection; and his ultimate perfection is through his best work (or in his best work), and the ultimate and most perfect work of an angel is to understand something as a divine work, above the common course of understanding by the light of natural intellect; therefore through the influence of a superior angel the inferior is reduced from potency to act, so that he may be illumined as to such knowledge.”

B. Rejection of the Opinion

33. Against these, and first against the first article [nn.19-25].

If ‘as each thing is disposed to being, so to knowledge’ (n.20, *Metaphysics* 2.1.993b30-31), and the singular adds some entity beyond the entity of the universal (from *Ord.*II d.3 nn.147, 168-70, 187-88, 192, 197), then the universal known is not the perfect total idea for knowing the singular according to the total knowability of the singular, – which is against him who holds this opinion [nn.24-25].

34. Further: where plurality entails greater perfection, numerical infinity will entail infinite perfection. And so is it in representative ideas, that ‘to be able to represent several things’ entails greater perfection (for it entails that this one idea includes the perfection of two proper ideas, representative ideas, I say); to be able therefore to represent infinites distinctly entails that the representing idea is infinitely perfect [*Ord.*II d.3 nn.367-68, 1 d.2 n.127, d.3 n.352].

35. Further, the representing idea, uniform in itself and in the intellect, does not represent anything in a two-formed way; indeed, neither the divine ideas – because they are naturally representing ideas – are able to represent to the divine intellect any diversity in objects unless they necessarily naturally represent it, as was touched on in *Ord.*I d.39 on future contingents [not in *Ord.*; see *Lectura* I d.39 n.21]. Therefore this single idea (which is posited [by Henry, nn.19, 24]) either will represent opposites at the same time, pertaining to the existence of things, and this naturally (and then it will always represent opposites, – and thus the angel will understand opposites and so nothing), – or it will represent one of them determinately, and so never the other. If therefore he [an angel] will at some time have a certain and determinate knowledge of one opposite – as to existence – through that idea, never will he through the same idea have a determinate and certain knowledge of the other opposite.

36. Further, fourth, it is argued especially:

An angel cannot, by this habit, know a revealed singular. – For it is posited [by Henry] that the singular is not known through a universal shining forth in the habit save because the universal is participated by the singular [n.24]. On this supposition I argue as follows: the singular is first naturally known in revelation before the habit is the reason of knowing it; therefore the singular is first naturally known distinctly before the habit is the reason of knowing it; therefore the habit is not the reason of the first distinct knowing of

the singular – and so the intended proposition [sc. as set down at the beginning of this paragraph].

37. Proof of the antecedent [n.36], because, from their statements, a universal that shines forth in the habit is not the idea of knowing the singular save through this, that the ‘universal’ is in the singular which either exists in itself or in revelation [n.24]; therefore the singular first naturally has ‘to be’ such or such – and so the universal in it (abstracted from it) – before the habit is the idea of knowing the singular.

Proof of the first consequence [n.36]: ‘to be’ in revelation is nothing but ‘to be’ in act, known by him to whom the revelation is made. For it is not ‘to be’ in the intellect of the revealer, because this is eternal and perpetual; nor is ‘to be’ in any existence other than from the knowledge of him to whom the revelation is made, because then – by this that it would be in such ‘to be’ – it would become naturally known to anyone else, just as this opinion posits that about anything existing can anyone through his habit, have distinct knowledge of anything existent [nn.27-28].

38. Further, from this position it follows that any existing singular will at once be naturally known to any other angel [nn.27-28], and so local distance will not impede the intellection of an angel, which is denied by many [including Scotus, *Ord.* II d.2 n.205] and seems to be against Augustine in his book *On Care for the Dead* ch.14 n.17.²⁵

39. Further, his reasons, by which he proves that the singular cannot be understood by an angel [nn.20-23] seem to proceed from this, that it is ‘a mark of imperfection in an intellect’ to know the singular; but this is false, because then the divine intellect would not know the singular. The reasons too are not conclusive, nor is the conclusion to be conceded unless necessary reasons be brought in; for it is probable that just as some common sense can sense every sensible, that thus can some created intellect understand every per se intelligible – of which sort is the singular.

40. Against the second article [nn.26-28] it is argued thus:

He himself rejects species in beatitude, by this that one blessed would naturally see it naturally in the intellect of another blessed, and consequently he would naturally see the object that the species represents. Thus let it be argued in the matter at hand: if the habit is the reason for naturally knowing singulars, since one angel would see it naturally in another, the object that this angel knows through this habit will not be able to be hidden from him.

41. Further, when two intelligibles are compared to the same intellect not bound to the power of imagination, the one more actual and more perfect – not exceeding the natural faculty of that nature – is more intelligible by that intellect; but for him [Henry], a vague concept, formed in the intellect of the angel speaking, is intelligible by another angel by its natural power [n.29]; therefore much more is that determinate concept [intelligible] which this vague concept expresses (because the ‘determinate’ is more perfect and more intelligible; and the intellect of any angel has any caused concept for non-exceeding intelligible, nor is it bound to a phantasm, as is plain; wherefore etc.).

42. Further, third: either there is one act of understanding of all singulars or different ones. If the same – and it is naturally of all [singulars] (for it is of them insofar as it precedes the act of will of him understanding, because through an action of understanding preceding every commanded intellection and volition) – therefore that act

²⁵ Here Augustine says, about *Luke* 16.19-31, that Abraham, because of distance in place, did not know that the rich man had five brothers but had to learn it from Lazarus.

cannot be of one singular without being of another singular; just as neither can any natural cause, as far as concerns itself, be of one effect (to which it is naturally ordered) and not of another, – and if by one action it is of all effects universally, necessarily it is of all of them together. If therefore this act cannot be of all of them together, it cannot – insofar as natural – be one and the same for all of them, because then (insofar as such) it could be of all of them together. – If there are different acts [sc. of understanding all singulars], therefore one [angel], seeing this and that act to be different in the intellect of the angel [speaking], can distinctly see which object this act is of and which that is of; and thus it will not be hidden from him what singular this [other] is considering because of identity of non-varied act in this [other], for it will be different acts.

43. Against the third article [n.29]:

First: it follows that in the intellect of the angel speaking there are two concepts about the same thing, one vague signifying and the other determinate signified [sc. which is unacceptable]; for it is then determinate when it is reason for generating the vague signifying one.^a

a. [*Interpolation*] Hence if there were in the one hearing conditions determinate of the singular just as in the one speaking, he would express that singular to himself determinately; and so it is of an angel, because the habit he [Henry] posits is in the one just as in the other.

44. Further, it seems superfluous to posit this vague concept. For we express a determinate singular, known to us, through a vague singular, because we know we cannot cause a concept in the intellect of him to whom we speak and we know that the universal conditions of a vague particular are known to him: if we could make a distinct concept about that of which we were speaking, the determinate singular known to us would not be expressed through a vague particular; therefore since an angel can immediately make a distinct concept of a distinct singular known to himself in the intellect of the other (as will be plain in the solution [nn.49-52, 65]), in vain does he [Henry] posit a vague indeterminate concept.

45. Against the fourth article [nn.30-32]:

First: it does not seem that that disposition for a purely supernatural form could be caused by an angel, because although for a form immediately producible by God (yet as cooperating with the common course of nature) some natural cause could make disposition (as of the organic body in respect of the intellective soul) – for a form however altogether supernatural (that is, not with the common course of nature cooperating), it seems unacceptable that ‘a natural agent produces an immediate disposition’.

46. Further, the reason adduced for that article [n.32] would prove that the superior angel would make the inferior angel see something revealed in the Word [nn.86-87]; for this is the ultimate perfection of the intellect, to understand the Word, much more than to understand some revealed truth beyond the common course of natural intellection.

47. Further, against this whole opinion there are two difficulties:

First, how the [angel] speaking does not speak to just any. For if ‘to speak’ is precisely ‘to express a concept’ (which is seen in him as in a book [n.29]), and this ‘expressed’ can be seen by just any equally, – therefore he who expresses it speaks equally to just any.

48. There is another, how this one speaks to that one, in whom he causes nothing but only in himself [n.29]; for there seems no reason why the other understands now more than before, if nothing other happens in him. And especially does this seem absurd in illumination [n.31], for it is clear that the first angel is illumined by God immediately and God in illumining does nothing in himself, but the first thing he makes is in the intellect or the angel illumined; therefore thus is it likely in others, inferiors, who illumine, that he who illumines does not cause anything in himself by the fact he is illumining, but the first thing caused is in the illumined.

C. Scotus' own Response

1. On an Angel's Mode of Speaking

49. To this question therefore 'about speaking' [n.6] I first reply that an angel speaks to an angel by causing in him immediately a concept of the object of which he is talking.

For which I posit two reasons.

a) First Reason

50. The first reason is as follows: everyone speaking intellectually would cause immediately in him to whom he is speaking a concept of that of which he is speaking, if he could; an angel can do this in respect of another angel; therefore etc.

51. Proof of the major, because someone speaking principally intends to express his concept to the intellect to which he is speaking; but any natural agent at all would at once induce – if it could – that which it principally intends.

52. Proof of the minor: that which is sufficiently in first act in respect of some effect can cause that effect in a receptive that is proportioned and nearby; but an angel, having actual knowledge of some object – which let be *a*, – is sufficiently in first act for causing actual intellection of the *a*; therefore he can cause that effect in any intellect at all receptive of that effect. Now the intellect of another angel, not conceiving *a* distinctly, is receptive; therefore in this intellect he can cause knowledge of the object. – Proof of the major, because the first extremes of the proportion 'of active and passive' are the most universal (abstracted from any active at all and any passive at all), because this proportion is present 'in the particulars under each extreme' through a common idea, and therefore in the extremes. Proof of the minor: an angel in himself has the act of knowing *a* and the species (whichever be posited necessary for knowledge), and through that which he has he can put his understanding in second act by causing in himself the intellection of *a* as an effect; it follows therefore that in the intellect, passive, of another (which is of the same nature as his own intellect), he can cause this.

53. An instance against this reason [n.50], because it does not seem conclusive save about angel and angel absolutely taken, – because if they be distant from each other, the distance will be an impediment because of which one cannot act on the other: for the distant cannot act on the distant unless it first act on the medium; but the medium is not receptive of the speaking of the angel nor auditive of the angel speaking; therefore etc.

54. This is confirmed by the Philosopher, *On the Soul* 2.7.419a15-20, where he maintains that if there were a vacuum nothing would be seen, because the visible species

could not reach the eye;²⁶ hence the Philosopher maintains *Physics* 7.2.243a3-6 that ‘mover and moved are simultaneous’, and this when speaking of the immediate thing moved, which must first be moved by a mover before the mediate thing moved is moved.

55. To exclude these [objections] I show first that a distant angel can cause a concept in a distant angel: for if there were no priority of nature of action on the medium to action on the term, action on the term would not depend on action on the medium (it is plain from the idea of natural priority, because a sufficient cause of two things – neither of which is prior naturally to the other – can cause either without the other); but in the matter at hand there is no such priority; therefore an angel can act on a distant term by doing nothing on the medium.

56. Proof of the minor. Action on the medium does not naturally precede action on the term save from a double cause: either because it is of the same nature on the medium and the term, and then it is naturally first received in the medium, just as the nearer passive thing is naturally affected first before the more remote passive thing; or if it is of another idea the agent has two active forms (or a same one that includes virtually two active forms), one of which is naturally prior to the other, – and according to the form which is first active, it is of a nature to act on the medium, and according to the other on the term. An example of the first is as when the sun illumines parts of the medium [e.g. the air]; an example of the second is as when the sun generates a mineral in the bowels of the earth [cf. *Ord.*I d.37 n.4] or a worm in the ground and it illumines the interposed medium. – Therefore, with each of these causes excluded (namely that neither is the medium receptive of the same action on the term, nor does the agent have another active form really or virtually by which it is of a nature to act on the medium with an action of another nature than action on the term), in no way does action on the medium precede natural action on the term. And so it is in the matter at hand: for the corporeal medium, which is between distant angels, is neither of a nature to receive an action of the same nature as a distant hearing angel, – nor another of a different nature prior to it, because the speaking angel has a form neither virtually nor formally active of an action prior to that which is the speaking.

57. This last [n.56] is confirmed in three ways:

First, by positing one impossibility, namely that God were not everywhere according to his essence: he would yet be omnipotent (according to what was said above in *Ord.*I d.37 nn.7-8), and he could immediately cause anything anywhere (where however he would not be present by essence); nor yet would he act on the medium by an action of the same idea nor of another, because the ‘caused’ would be immediately from him.

58. Second: if this impossible position, manifest by an impossible idea, not be admitted, – the thing proposed is sufficiently got, because the sun immediately causes a worm (or another generable and corruptible substance), and yet with an action of that idea (namely ‘of generation’) it does not act on the medium; nor with an action of another idea, unless because the sun has another active form (namely a quality [sc. light]) whereby it is of a nature to act first in some way before through its substantial form, just as alteration precedes generation.

²⁶ A vacuum is by hypothesis completely empty and so would contain altogether nothing for seeing to be mediated through: – which holds true still in modern physics, since if there are no light waves or quanta in the medium there will be nothing for the eye to be affected by so as to see.

59. Third: if this is not conceded, it is plain that every natural generator generates a natural body (not a surface merely) and yet is not immediately present save according to surface, and on the surface of the thing generated it acts; therefore a generator acts where it is not present, either by essence or by mathematical contact: it is yet there by virtual contact and this suffices for acting, just as if it were present by essence or mathematically. And that it act first on the medium between it and that to which it is in this way present is not required absolutely for it to act on it, but because the medium has a capacity for an action of the same idea as the term.

60. After these three, a more apt example for the purpose is about the act of knowing, because the intuitive knowledge of sight does not come to be of the same idea in the medium as that which is in the organ [Vatican editors, sc.: because then the medium itself would see; *Ord.I* d.3 nn.471-472, *Rep. IIA* d.9 q.3], – and if an action of another idea happen in the organ than in the medium, vision occurs for sight insofar as it is an effect of the visible, by the fact that the visible thing is of a nature to generate both the species [sc. in the medium] and vision [sc. in the organ] as two ordered effects. Therefore, this remote receptive thing [sc. the organ as receptive of vision] receives something of which nothing of the same idea is received in the medium; but a received thing of another nature is received in the medium, and this happens because [the thing received in the medium] is not the cause of the thing received in the term, but is as if it were an effect prior to that, when comparing them to the same cause.

61. Hereby is it plain to the instance from *On the Soul* [n.54], that ‘something would not be seen unless there were a medium’; not that it is of the per se idea of visible color to cause something in the medium so that it may be seen, but because ‘visible’ species and vision are ordered effects of the same object (as of color), such that the species is first of a nature to be generated before vision (as first act before second act), and the species is first in a nearer medium or organ than in a more distant medium or organ, just as also universally a form of the same idea is caused first in the nearer than the remoter [*Ord.I* d.3 nn.239, 254-55, 388-90, 473, 504-505, 2 d.3 n.295].

62. And through the same it is clear to that from the *Physics* [n.54]: for the agent is immediate to the passive proximate thing, and this by an immediacy corresponding to mathematical contact, when the medium is receptive of an action of the same idea (or of another, in respect of which the agent has the form [n.56]), – or by an immediacy corresponding to virtual touch, because so is the agent present to the mathematically distant (for causing an effect in it) just as if it were present to it according to its essence [n.59]; and in this way ‘to be present by essence’ is thus not that its power is there but that by its power it can cause an effect as if it were there, although neither it nor its power be there.

63. But against this it is objected, because then²⁷ local distance will not impede the speaking of an angel: for if a distant angel may immediately cause illumination in another distant [angel], causing nothing in the medium, that medium will be for it – in its action – as if it were non-distant; for it is just as if, as concerns the action of it, they were immediate. Therefore it will so be that local distance will not impede the speaking of an angel.

²⁷ Vatican editors: sc. ‘because if one angel could speak to another at a distance, by doing nothing in the medium, then etc.’

64. I reply: between agent and patient there can be a mathematical medium in three ways.

NB. No further response to this objection is given in the *Ordinatio*. The following response however is found in *Lectura II d.9 nn.60-63*:²⁸

n.60. Hence I say that the medium can be disposed in three ways: In one way the medium can be compared to the agent as if not a medium, and then it is only compared to an agent that equally acts on everything distant, and this is God alone. Hence if God were in one point of the heaven, he would still be able to act on anything distant, although he not act on the medium.

n.61. Another is a natural medium, which not only impedes the action of an agent on what is distant, but receives an action of like idea. And in this way is the medium compared to the action of an agent bodily.

n.62. And there is a medium disposed in a third way to the agent, which participates something of each extreme, for it agrees with the first that it does not receive action from the agent, and from the other extreme it takes that it impedes action because of its distance. And in this way is the medium compared to the speaking of an angel for, by the very fact that an angel is of finite and limited virtue, he cannot act on the distant under every distance, but requires a determinate distance, just as sight seeing color on a wall at a certain distance (if the color is very distant, the seeing virtue, from the limitation of its virtue, would not see it, because it requires a determinate distance).

n.63. Hence I say that an angel requires a distance proportioned to seeing and speaking for the purpose that he may speak to another; therefore one angel speaks to another by causing an immediate concept, of that of which he speaks, in the other angel (to whom he is speaking) proportionally distant from the speaking angel.

b) Second Reason

65. Second principally, to the solution [n.49] I argue thus: an inferior angel knows himself intuitively through the essence (as is plain above, *Ord.II d.3 nn.269-71*), therefore a superior too knows the inferior through the essence intuitively (proof of the consequence, because every object knowable by an inferior can be knowable by a superior equally perfectly or more perfectly; but no abstractive knowledge of any object is more perfect than intuitive knowledge, because abstractive knowledge through a species can be about a thing not existent and not in its presence in itself, and so he does not most perfectly know or attain it [n.98, 2 d.3 nn.318-323, 392]); and it is not necessary that angels be immediate to themselves locally for the purpose that a superior intuitively know an inferior; therefore, given that they are distant locally, the superior will intuitively know the inferior. But this knowledge is not through any species or habit that could be present in a thing not existent; therefore it comes about in an angel intuiting that intuitive knowledge, and yet the essence known generates in the medium nothing of the same idea – or of another idea – , because the medium is not capable of intellection nor of a species purely intelligible [nn.56, 60-61]; therefore by similarity, if in an angel be posited something actually intelligible, of a nature to generate some knowledge (although not intuitive) in a passive or receptive intellect, that ‘intelligible in act’ can generate actual knowledge in the intellect of a distant angel, generating nothing in the medium.^a

²⁸ Latin text at: http://www.logicmuseum.com/wiki/Authors/Duns_Scotus/Lectura/Lectura_II/D9

a. [*Interpolation*] (in place of ‘in the intellect...medium’) ...[can generate] his knowledge; but the intellect of a distant angel is receptive of such knowledge; therefore that intelligible in act, existing in the intellect of an angel, can cause actual knowledge of itself in the intellect of a distant angel.

2. Further Clarification of the Question

66. Now for further clarification of the thing proposed [n.49] there remain two things to be seen: first, what is generated in the intellect of the hearing angel by the speaking angel, – second, how an angel can speak to one and not another if they be equally present.

a) What is caused in the Intellect of the Hearing Angel

67. About the first [n.66] I say that then he [the speaking angel] can cause the act only (so that not the species), and can cause at the same time the act and the species, and can cause only the species.

68. Proof of the first [n.67]: speaking can be about something habitually known to the one hearing, because just as we can speak imperfectly about that which we would perfectly know by communicating our concepts to others (although we would know that others know those same [concepts]²⁹), so it seems possible that speaking there is about what is habitually known to both; but then a species is not generated by the speaking angel other than that which is had [sc. by the hearing angel] (because then there would be two [species] in the same [angel] in respect of the same object), – nor even is the one already possessed intensified, because let us posit that the most perfect one be pre-had.

69. Likewise, the speakings – for the most part – are about propositions [lit.: complexes] pertaining to the actual existence of things; now such propositions are not evident from the terms; therefore, although someone may have the species of the extremes, not for this reason is his intellect capable of some propositional intellection (or knowledge) about those extremes, which namely is determinately of one side of a contradiction (as about the thing’s existence or non-existence). Some act of knowing such proposition can therefore be then caused without causation of any species.

70. I prove the second [n.67], because if the angel hearing does not have the species of the singular about which the speaking [angel] is speaking, his intellect is receptive both of the species and of the act and lacks both, – and the intellect of the angel speaking is in first act, sufficient for the generation of both: which is plain of the species, because an intelligible species can generate an intelligible species of the same idea, just as also the species of a sensible thing in the medium can generate a sensible species of the same idea; likewise about the act it is plain, because the species that is in the speaker the principle of knowing that of which it is can also be the idea of generating actual intellection of the same object in another intellect capable of it.

71. The third [n.67] I prove, because a lesser active virtue cannot impede a greater virtue from its action; therefore if the superior consider something in its proper genus, to wit *a*, the inferior – wanting to speak to him about *b* – will not be able to prevent his

²⁹ The Latin is ambiguous and could also be translated as: “we would know that those same others know”

actual intellection; therefore he will not then cause actual intellection of the *b*, because there cannot be two in him. But he [the inferior angel] will cause something, as far as he will be able, because he wants to communicate his concept to the other as far as he can; therefore he will cause a species of *b*, if it not be pre-had in the intellect of the superior.

72. From the same major also as before [sc. that a lesser virtue cannot hinder a greater virtue from its action, n.71] and from this minor that namely that ‘a superior and an inferior cannot together speak to the same [angel]’, it follows that the superior will make him to be actually understanding that about which he himself is speaking; and the inferior not, but he will only make something compossible with that intellection, namely the species of that about which he himself wants to speak.

73. In these two cases [nn.71-72] the speaking [angel] so can generate a species that he can then generate no act; given too that there is no impediment on the part of the hearing [angel] to prevent him being able to receive both (both the species and the act), the speaker – from the fact he will have wanted to cause (as will be said later [n.177]) – can cause one and not the other (namely the first, not causing the second), from the fact they are not always necessarily concomitant.

74. And in this last member [n.67, 71-73] the speaker speaks and yet the hearer does not hear perfectly, because a hearing is some intellection of the intelligible that is expressed by the one speaking: it is like as if a man were to speak to a man distracted by study, in whose ear would be received the species of sound, and yet he would not hear (that is, he would not conceive it distinctly under the idea of sign) nor would he have an understanding of the thing ‘expressed’, but only would this species of sound generate in memory or imagination some species remaining, and he would be able later – returning from distraction – to consider that of which it were the sign; and so the speaking preceding would be an occasion for him of that understanding, although nothing before would he have distinctly heard through it. But in the other two first members [nn.67-70], in which actual intellection is expressed by the speaker when he says something, he does hear.

75. But what sort of act of understanding is this act which is called ‘hearing’?

I reply:

In four ways can an angel understand *a* (besides vision of it in the Word [*Ord.II* d.3 nn.328-330]), namely intuitively in itself,³⁰ and intuitively in the intellect of another angel knowing it, and abstractively through an habitual species (co-created or acquired): and none of these intellections is hearing, because none is per se expressed by the one understanding qua understanding, – rather this is accidental to him, that he is understanding an object (for he would remain the same if he were not understanding); and in all these, if some intellect be causing, it is the intellect of the one who understands (not of the other), and the object concurs there with the intellect as with partial cause, as was said in *Ord.I* d.3 [nn.486-94]. In the fourth way he [the angel hearing] can know *a* in this way, that the intellection come to be in him through the other [the angel speaking] ‘expressing’ it, and that the intellect of this one [the angel hearing] have no causality in respect of the act but is passive only; and this sole knowing is hearing, and it is expressed by the one understanding insofar as understanding.

³⁰ Vatican editors: that is, in *a* itself, namely ‘in its proper existence’ (according to the *Lectura*) or ‘in its proper genus’ (according to the *Reportatio*)

76. The difference is plain, then, of hearing from that triple knowing (which can commonly be called ‘seeing’ [n.75 init.]), because in hearing the intellect of the hearer and whatever is in it is only passive, so that if it has an habitual species of the thing heard, that species also does not act for hearing; whatever also is there present does nothing for it [hearing], for if the same singular were intuitively present to him that is present to the speaker, that – as present to the hearer – would not generate hearing but would only generate in him vision. Therefore, only the intellect of the speaker or what things are in it as it, or present to him as him, are active in respect of hearing; and this not [in respect of hearing] as proximate effect, for these ‘present to the speaker’ first cause actual intellection in the speaker before the hearing in the hearer.

77. And from this is plain how the will of the speaker makes for the speaking, because just as it [the will] after the first intellection makes for the union of memory and intelligence for any second act being had in the angel in which the will is, so can it make for the posterior [act] being had in the angel hearing: for if the prior effect, without which the posterior is not caused, is in the power of any, [then] if the prior not be, neither will the posterior be.

78. From this also is something else apparent, how namely actual intellection in him speaking is not the idea of acting for him insofar as he speaks, but something pertaining to the memory of him speaking, – because in ordered effects as if of the same idea, one of which is of a nature to be generated by an equivocal cause, it is not necessary that the prior is cause of the posterior but that each be caused by the same equivocal cause; and this specially is [so] in the matter at hand, because actual intellection does not so have the idea of parent as memory does (hence the Father in divine reality generates not by intelligence [sc. but by memory, *Ord.I* d.2 nn.221, 291]).

79. Apparent too, third, is what the order of hearing is to the intellection that is ‘vision’ [n.76]. For although on the vision in Michael – whether of the object or of the intellection of the object – the speaking of Gabriel can follow about the same thing, yet the angel [Gabriel] then does not cause knowledge of anything not first known [sc. by Michael]. Nor then is [Gabriel’s] speaking as necessary as when it precedes each of those visions [in Michael: of the object and of the intellection of the object]; for when Gabriel knows something in its proper genus or revealed, which Michael does not know in particular [cf. d.10 n.6 infra.], he can cause a concept in his [Michael’s] intellect which may properly be called hearing, – by which, when caused, can Michael convert himself to seeing Gabriel’s intellect, and therein will be seen the intellection that Gabriel has, and in that intellection too will in some way be seen the object of that intellection; and if that object cannot be seen further (neither in itself nor in the Word), this [sc. Gabriel’s intellection] is the ultimate perfection that Michael can have of this known thing, namely to see it in Gabriel’s intellect. Thus, therefore, insofar as hearing is ordered to having knowledge of some unknown, it precedes all vision, both of the thing in itself and of the thing in the intellect of the other who sees, and also of the thing through habitual species, – which triple vision was said to be distinct from hearing [n.75].

80. Hearing is also said to differ from all vision as to certitude, – which difference can perhaps be concluded from the idea of ordered effects, of which the posterior [sc. hearing] is more imperfect etc.³¹

³¹ The Vatican editors quote from *Rep* IIA d.9 q.1-2: “And there is a difference in certitude, because certitude is greater when something is caused by itself than when it is caused by another, because certitude when something is heard from

b) How an Angel speaks to One and not to Another

81. About the second principal, namely how an angel can speak to one and not to another [n.66], I say that just as it is in the power of an angel – as to first intellection – to use this species in memory or that for actual intellection of this or that, so, if he were to have several intelligences, it would be in his power that the knowledge would be generated in this intelligence or in that; for a passive thing natural for undergoing is not more determined to undergoing than is an active thing natural for acting. Just as then the active thing which is of itself subject to the will can of itself act and not act (because of its [the will's] command to act and not to act), so can the active thing be determined to acting on this passive thing and not on that; and just as determination would be made for intelligences intrinsic to the angel, if there were several [intelligences], so could determination be made for this intellect or that extrinsic one, which – as to this – are passives of the same idea as that intrinsic passive on which the intrinsic active would act by command of the will.

82. Indeed from this follows a corollary, that there are as many speakings as there are hearers, – because however many be present (or one is nearer, another remoter), just as memory would not generate [sc. actual intellection] in the intelligence of Michael save by command of his will, so it [memory] does not generate in the intellect of one and not of another [hearer] save by determination of the will of the one speaking.

83. But then there is a doubt, how many he could speak to at once, because a natural agent cannot have however many adequate effects at the same time, – and so one [act of] generation does not suffice for this, that many hear, because one [act of] generation is of one intellection in one [angel], which he alone hears.³²

II. To the First Question

84. To the other question, about illumination [n.1], I say that illumination in an angel is a sort of speaking of truth perfective in second being; for just as not every intellection is simply the perfection of the angelic intellect, but the vision of the Word [is], and not the vision of quiddities (whether through habitual species or intuitively), so not every knowledge of singulars – other than vision of the Word and knowledge of quiddities – equally perfects the angelic intellect quasi-secondarily; but vision of a revealed truth perfects in second being, not so however knowledge of a singular in its genus.³³

another is no greater than is the believability of him speaking; but one's own vision is greater, just as I believe more when I see a man in church than if someone tell me this... For vision is caused first in the seer before speaking in the speaker, so that hearing follows vision, – not as an effect its cause but they are as two ordered effects, one of which is more immediate to the cause (as vision is)." They also quote from *Lectura* II d.9 n.81: "But when [one angel] hears from another angel and gets from him knowledge of some proposition (because he is not speaking about a simple concept but about some true proposition), then he does not have evident knowledge but believes the angel speaking causing that knowledge, because [the angel speaking] has precisely that act and conception about some proposition (as that the Son of God is incarnate); however he [sc. the hearing angel] has the certitude of believability, because he knows that he who is speaking is truthful – and this is only knowledge of faith."

³² Vatican editors: No response to this doubt is found in the *Ordinatio*, or the *Reportatio* or *Lectura*.

³³ See footnote to n.75 *supra*.

85. I say then that a superior angel, to whom according to the common course some particular is first revealed, causes in an inferior a certain concept – about this thing revealed – which is called ‘hearing’; and this ‘to cause’, which is a sort of spiritual ‘to speak’, is ‘to illumine’. It also seems probable that the illumining angel causes something in the illumined and not in himself, because God himself – illumining the first angel – causes nothing in himself but in the angel illumined [n.48].

86. But there is a doubt, whether an illumining superior can make an inferior see something in the Word [n.46] – and whether an inferior angel can illumine a superior (it seems that yes, if it be first revealed to him).

87. To the first it seems that just as knowledge of the Word is purely supernatural, such that it is not subject to the causality of any created cause, so neither too the vision of anything in the Word. However a superior, illumining an inferior in the way aforesaid [n.85], can dispositively act so that he see in the Word;³⁴ for the hearing makes disposition so that the hearer turn himself to the intellect of the speaker and there see what the speaker is speaking of (and this vision is in some way more perfect than the hearing); and disposes this further so that an angel, who is seeing in an angel, see the same in the Word, because if what he sees there [sc. in the angel] as in an imperfect mirror he desires to see in a perfect mirror, he will see rejoicing, and then he is perfectly illumined (perfectly indeed by the Word, and dispositively by the superior angel).

88. To the second doubt [n.86] I say that God, of his absolute power, could reveal something to an inferior angel that would not be revealed or known to a superior, and then the inferior could in some way speak to the superior about what the superior would not know, – and that speaking would in some way be illumination; he could not however have as much efficient power over the intellect of a superior as a superior over the intellect of an inferior, and therefore he could not necessarily make the superior hear (just as conversely), because if the superior were considering something in its proper genus, the inferior would not make him hear simply [n.71] (but the superior simply can make an inferior hear, and can impede his understanding some intelligible). In fact, however, it is likely that God distributes his illuminations in ordered fashion (just as he distributes the angels in their orders), first to the superior indeed, then to the inferior.

III. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question

89. To the principal arguments.

To the first [n.2] I say that an angel can cause that hearing, that is, perfect vision in second being. And when you say ‘therefore he will create’, it does not follow, as will be plain in the question on seminal reasons;³⁵ for creation is an action with not any cause concurring of any genus save only the first efficient and first end, and no such is the action of a creature.

90. To the second [n.3] I say that vision of the Word is the most perfect perfection, and therefore the intellect – having it – is said to be perfectly luminous (or

³⁴ Vatican editors cite *Lectura* II d.9 n.91: “hence [a superior angel] does not effectively thus illumine [an inferior angel] in respect of the Word, for seeing the Word or anything in the Word, but only dispositively, causing in the aforesaid way some intellection in him.”

³⁵ Not in the *Ordinatio*. Cf. *Lectura* II d.9 n.92, d.18 nn.66, 70-72: “And when it is argued that ‘he would then create’, to this it will be plain in the question ‘About seminal reasons’, that an angel does not create light, although nothing of it pre-exist.”

illuminated), however much it not have the knowledge which, in respect of that [sc. vision of the Word], is said to be as if darkness to light; and therefore neither is the lack of any other intellection in him who has that [sc. the vision of the Word] said to make the intellect dark. It can however be conceded that just as they [the blessed angels] are in potency to something that is light, so are they in potency to something that is dark.

91. To the third, which is taken from corporeal light [n.4], – it is, as to something, false; for the sun does not prevent the other stars multiplying their rays to the surface of the earth; which is plain because someone being in a deep well would at midday see the stars³⁶ (for the rays would not reach his eyes if they did not first reach the surface of the illuminated medium [sc. the air]). However, the sun itself impedes the lesser luminaries from any action (namely from that which they would have concerning sight), because they cannot be seen in the presence of the sun; and the reason is, because an excellent present visible acts on sight excellently, so that it actuate it according to its total capacity (and perhaps in some way it affects it with pain), according to Alhazen (Ibn al-Haytham), *Optica* 1.5 n.32. But as to this, “it is not alike about intellectual light in respect of the intellect (as is plain from the Philosopher *On the Soul* 3.4.429a29-b4), for after excelling intelligibles we do not less understand others but more, but after excelling sensibles we less sense others,” because the power or organ is weakened.

IV. To the Principal Arguments of the Second Question

92. To the arguments of the second question.

To the first [n.7]. Although some say that ‘an angel is able by an act of his will to hide his intellection and not to hide it’ (and this ‘not to hide’ is to speak), however why something actually intelligible would be present to a passive intellect and not be able to affect it is not seen; nor is a greater reason seen why he could through his will more hide his intellection than his essence. Why too can the other angel, from whom he wills to hide his intellection, not see that volition? If it be posited to be hidden then [it is hidden] through another volition, and so ad infinitum. – And therefore if it be conceded that the knowledge of this angel is open to another, just as is his essence, yet the speaking – by which this knowledge (or thing known) is expressed – can be not because of this, that without such expression it could not be seen, but because without expression it would not be known by that knowledge which is hearing; and also, frequently, without previous hearing there would not be vision of this cognition.

93. And if you say that then at any rate it could be in vain to speak wherefrom that could be manifest (of which he wishes to speak) without speaking [n.7], I say that although an angel would first see the intellection of another angel before he would have hearing from him, yet hearing would not be in vain, because it would be ‘a per se perfection’ communicated to the angel (by the other angel) liberally; and for this most of all is there speaking among intellectual beings, so that they may liberally and freely communicate to themselves their concepts in turn. But if the knowledge of this one is seen in this one, he does not liberally communicate his concept to another; for this one is disposed in that seeing as non-understanding and non-willing, because the knowledge is naturally visible (and what is naturally active – and motive to vision of itself – would act in like manner if it were not in someone understanding or willing). Likewise too hearing,

³⁶ Vatican editors refer to Pliny *Natural History* 2.14 and Roger Bacon *Multiplication of Species* 2.2.

when it precedes, excites to vision of the intellection of the angel speaking, – so that, though the vision could be without excitation, it is however not without it.

94. This also is confirmed, that ‘speaking is not posited in vain’ [n.93], because the angels are conceded to speak to God, and yet they cannot make anything more manifest to him than before, nor even manifest in another way than before (which however is possible in an angel), but [they can] only of their liberality will ‘this to be patent to God’ (they desire everything as much as they could, so that if they could cause a concept in him they would cause it [n.71]), – and this is ‘to speak to God’. More necessary therefore is ‘this speaking’ [sc. of angel to angel].

95. To the second argument [n.8] it is plain from what has been said how one angel can speak to another distant angel, doing nothing in the medium [nn.55-60] – and how to one and not another, whether to a nearer or a more distant [nn.81-82].

96. To the third [n.9] I say that although it be most true that God has communicated to the angel the species of all quiddities, yet if those species were not communicated (or co-created), it would not be unacceptable for an angel to acquire them, because that which is of perfection in an inferior intellect is not to be denied in a superior and more perfect intellect: but it is of perfection in our intellect that it have something whereby it can actively acquire species of all quiddities, so that although ‘to be able to receive such species’ be of imperfection, yet ‘actively to be able to acquire them’ is of perfection (supplying imperfection), of which sort are commonly are all the perfections of creatures.

97. Likewise too, given that God has co-created the species of quiddities, it is yet not necessary to say that he has co-created the species of all singulars intelligible by an angel: for it is not likely that it would be possible for some singular to come to be of which an angel could not have distinct knowledge, – and yet if the world were to last to infinity (as is possible), there would be infinite singulars, any at all of which an angel could distinctly know and yet he would not have at the same infinite co-created species; therefore he could acquire *de novo* the species of any.

98. Given too that God will have co-created species as much of singulars as of future quiddities for the intellect of an angel, yet it cannot have through them all the knowledge possible for it, – because not intuitive knowledge: for that cannot be had through the species of an object which [species] can remain with the object absent; for this is contrary to the idea of intuitive knowledge, that it be of a thing not actually and in its presence existent (*Ord.* II d.3 nn.318-323). Therefore that assumed proposition is denied, that ‘an angel can know nothing save through innate species’ [n.9].

99. And given – fourth – that it were true [sc. that an angel only knows through innate species], still speaking could be about propositions, of whose simple terms he has innate species, because those species of simple terms would not be sufficient cause of knowing a proposition ‘of contingent truth’ about the terms, because a contingent proposition is not known to be true from the terms [n.69, d.11 n.15].

100. To the proofs which are adduced, that he [an angel] cannot have acquired species [nn.10-15], – I reply:

To the first [n.10], that he has an agent and a possible intellect.

101. And when this is rejected about the agent intellect [n.10], I say that its first (that is, adequate) object is not his essence, but the whole of being, comprehending under itself intelligible and sensible species. Now although his essence is actually intelligible,

not however a singular sensible, speaking of ‘intelligible’ by the sort of abstractive intellection that the universal is known by.

102. When too it is rejected about the possible intellect, that it is not in potency to first act [n.10], – I say that even if a surface were created under whiteness, it would no less be of itself receptive of whiteness, because a receptive potency need not precede in duration, but only in nature, the act for which it is in potency. So the intellect of an angel, although it were created under all the species of intelligibles, would yet truly be possible and of itself in potency to first act, even if it never preceded it in duration; neither in us too would the possible [intellect] be denied in us if it had been created under intelligible species, because simultaneity of duration does not take away the idea of passive.

103. In the same way too on the other part [sc. the agent intellect]. Given that an angel would not need to abstract any species (if he had all such co-created), no less would he have the power of abstracting, because active potency – which is of perfection in an inferior nature – ought not to be denied of a superior nature [n.96], although the superior cause [sc. God, by co-creating species] prevented the action of the inferior of that active power; just as the agent intellect would not be denied in us (so that our agent [intellect] could not have any act of abstracting), not by reason of itself, but because it would be prevented by another superior agent producing the effect that could be produced by it [our agent intellect].

104. To the second [n.11]. If it is argued uniformly, I concede the whole; for an angel is without a body that may be part of it or an organ of it in operating, – and so conclude that it does not depend on a body as on a part or organ about which it operate. But it does not follow that it not depend on a body as object: for every passive intellect that cannot have in itself the whole perfection of the object depends on the object about which it operates, and proportionally according to the proportion of the object.

105. And when it is said about the union of the soul [n.11], I say that it is not only united so that it may operate about the body as object, but it is united so that the whole composite may be of which it is a part, – so that the whole thing operating has the body not only for object but for part of the thing operating; not so however an angel.

106. To the third [n.12] I say that it would prove that God could not understand the singular, because he could not have an object in that middle being, namely in the imaginable; therefore I say that a middle, which is a middle for an inferior agent, is not a middle for another more perfect agent. And as was said in the questions ‘About the motion of an angel’ [*Ord.*II d.2 nn.428-31, 515], although succession in the middle be possible, there is not however an actual succession save by comparing to a limited power, – for which that middle is what is of itself a middle between extremes, nor can it make the movable at the same time under the middle and the term, nor at once under the term as if there were no middle; but it is otherwise of infinite power [cf. *Ord.*II d.2 nn.428-431, 515]. Likewise, if it were necessary that an imperfect heat proceed through many degrees up to degree *a*, – all those degrees would for perfect heat be non-intermediate degrees, because it would at once begin from the *a* [sc. ‘from the ultimate degree’, as is said in *Lectura* II d.9 n.102]; so I say that a more perfect agent intellect can at once from a sensible object cause an intelligible species (in which a thing has being as intelligible in act), but a more imperfect virtue can require imaginable being as a middle disposition to intelligible being.

107. In another way can it be replied by saying that imaginable being is not a middle in the matter at hand, but an extreme, – because the two extremes are these: ‘non-intelligible in act’ and ‘intelligible in act’. And though this extreme which is ‘non-intelligible in act’ could have many extremes (to wit sensible being, imaginable being, etc.), yet it is accidental in which of these that extreme [sc. the non-intelligible in act] may be, because all these have that extreme; and from that extreme, as in one of these, can some virtue act for the other extreme [sc. the intelligible in act] – but another requires that extreme [sc. non-intelligible in act] as in another supposit for this, that it may act in the other extreme [sc. intelligible in act].^a

a. [*Interpolation*] [in place of “in which of these that extreme...” to the end of n.207] that this extreme is in something in which it may have all these extremes: for some power can act from this extreme immediately on another, some power however cannot.

108. To the fourth [n.13] I say that that congruence about the celestial bodies is not conclusive: for if those qualities [sc. those that constitute the perfection of celestial bodies] had not been co-created with the celestial body, nothing has been given it whence it could acquire those qualities, – and thus it would always be non-perfect in comparison to itself and to every natural cause, because no natural cause can produce those qualities in that body; and universally every perfection that nature cannot supply God immediately supplies. But not so in the matter at hand, because an angel has whence he may act (with other natural features cooperating) and is able to acquire such perfection – namely the species of all things – granted that they had not been co-created with him; for the intellect could from its natural virtue have intellection of any object whatever, from which as from partial causes, that is by the action of his intellect and the object, he can have the species of the quiddity of any object whatever, and afterwards use that species for abstractive intellection.

109. And when it is afterwards argued that ‘then the object would act on the intellection of the angel’ [n.14] – I concede that it is true, along with the intellect of the angel.

110. And when it is taken that ‘two things of diverse genus cannot be cause of one effect’ [n.14], – I say that this is universally false: for an essential order is not of individuals of the same species (it is plain from Avicenna, *Metaphysics* 6 ch.3); for individuals of the same species are not mutually ordered, therefore neither is such order essential [*Ord.*II d.3 nn.13, 15]. Neither too is the order of individuals of diverse most specific species essential; for such are contraries and middles [sc. ‘white’ and ‘black’ and ‘grey’; cf. *Ord.*I d.7 n.23, II d.2 n.512], which are not essentially ordered for causing the same thing. Therefore all diverse efficient causes, essentially ordered, are diverse in genus.

111. And when the division is proved that ‘either they are required insofar as they are other in genus, or insofar as they are the same in genus’ etc. [n.14], – I say that each member can be granted, because of the argument that is made against him [sc. against the proponent of this division, whose argument now follows, nn.111-112].

For if it be said that they are required insofar as they are other in genus, then it does not follow but that the effect is homogeneous: for the most simple effect can be caused by essentially ordered causes that differ in genus, from what has been said [n.110]; and this is plain of heat, which is generated by the celestial body and by fire or

by substance and quality, the first two of which [sc. celestial body and fire] differ in physical genus, and the other two [sc. substance and quality] differ in predicamental genus [sc. in category], – and yet the effect is simple, not composed of things diverse in genus. Or thus: this is universally false, that effects ordered in the cause require two natures in the effect, one of which is caused by the superior and the other by the inferior; for then they would not be effects ‘ordered’ in respect of one nor in respect of the other [cause], for ‘this’ would be immediately caused by the one and ‘this’ immediately by the other.

112. But if the other member be granted [n.111], that they are not required insofar as they are other in genus – it does not follow that then could only one be intensified which would suffice for acting: for some perfection of causality is required in the two (although it need not be that they are diverse in genus), which perfection would not be able to be in one however much intense of them, and so not the effects of them either.

113. But not caring about consequences [n.267] (which are not valid for the truth), I say that they [agents diverse in genus] are not per se required insofar as they are diverse in genus with absolute diversity. However two causalities are well required for intellection (of which one causality is on the part of the intellect and the other on the part of the object), but sometimes these two causalities can come together in one nature, as when the intellect understands itself: for one causality is common to the whole entity (that namely which is on the part of the object), while the other is determined to a determinate nature (namely intellectual), and so in intellectual nature this common causality comes together with the special one; not therefore are they [these causalities] required per se for causing, insofar as different in genus by ‘absolute diversity’. And I concede (not because of the argument [supra, n.113] in itself) that, according to truth, each causality can come together in the same thing: for where the entity is that the causality of the object follows and the entity that the causality of the intellect follows, the same thing can be the total cause – according to the same causality – in respect of intellection [n.75, 2 d.3 n.70, 1 d.3 nn.486-494].

114. But still it is objected that although things diverse in genus can cause the same thing, yet not so diverse in genus as the intelligible and sensible; or at any rate, they cannot so cause without at least one acting in virtue of the other, – and thus either the object would act in virtue of the intellect or conversely, and they will not be two causes acting for the effect equally.

115. I reply that if it be argued from the idea of diversity in genus and applied to the intelligible and the sensible [n.114], as if it more here conclude than in other things, then there is a departing from the middle [term]. Hence it is argued because here there is not a greater diversity of genus than in other things: for more diverse are substance and accident (which are diverse most general genera) than sensible and intelligible substance (which are of the same most general genus); for substance and accident can be agent causes in respect of the same effect (as of simple heat [n.111]).

116. And in the matter at hand too I say that for that action which is consequent to every being, it is necessary that the sensible operate just as also the intelligible (for the sensible is a certain being); but that sort of action is for affecting the intellect, and therefore that difference of genus, which it has to the intelligible, is accident to the sensible insofar as the sensible happens to affect the intellect, because that does not belong to it [the sensible] precisely insofar as it is non-intelligible but would belong to it

if it were intelligible. Nor can anything so differ in genus from the intelligible as if it be in a disparate genus, because any being whatever, to whatever extent sensible, is yet intelligible: for whatever an inferior virtue per se and first has power for, this does a superior virtue have per se and first power for.

117. When therefore it is said that those things ‘diverse in genus, as are the sensible and the intelligible, cannot cause the same thing nor come together for the same action’ [n.114], – it is false of the action in which the sensible is a certain intelligible.

118. And when you add ‘one cause acts in virtue of the other’ [n.114], I say that *a* acting in virtue of *b* can be understood in two ways: either that *a* receive a form from the *b* by which it may act, or that – with the habit formed – it receive the action from it. Now in the second way, the efficient cause does not act in virtue of another, for fire – having the active form by which it acts – does not receive the action of heating from the sun or a special motion for heating. Therefore it is only said there that the inferior acts in virtue of the superior agent, because it in some way takes that form from the superior, – just as ordered natural agents have their forms in ordered way, so that an element receives its form in some way from the celestial body as superior agent.

119. In the matter at hand [sc. the sensible and intelligible as cause in respect of the same effect] neither first act nor second does one partial cause take from the other; and therefore in neither way [n.118] – in the matter at hand – is one cause said to cause in virtue of the other. Nor even is this of the idea of ordered agent causes, that namely one act in virtue of the other, but it suffices that one act more principally than the other [1 d.3 nn.559-560, 496].

120. To Augustine *On Genesis 12* [n.14] response was made in *Ord.I* d.3 nn.506-507. For there he proves that body cannot be the total cause of any action on spirit, which I concede. It can however be partial cause, because what is acted on can exceed in nobility a partial agent cause: for that proposition from *On Genesis 12* [sc. the agent is more excellent than the patient, n.14], as was said elsewhere [*Ord.I* d.3 nn.506-507], depends on these [propositions], ‘the agent (or cause) is more excellent than the effect’ and ‘the effect as act is more excellent than the receptive of act as potency’, – of which the first is not true save of the total agent, nor the second save of perfection simply; therefore neither that inferred about the active compared to the passive [sc. the agent is more excellent than the patient] will be true speaking of partial agent, – and it is not necessary, since that ‘to act’ is in virtue of partial agent.

121. To the last [n.15], when it is argued that ‘the like is known by its like’, – in an angel it does not conclude the unacceptable, because an angel can have cognition both abstractive and intuitive of a singular, according to its proper idea: for a perfection is not to be denied of that intellect, for denying which there is not had a manifest reason; but it is of perfection in an intellect ‘to be able to know the singular distinctly’, otherwise it would not belong to the divine intellect.

122. But if it is argued about our intellect that ‘the phantasm in us – which is of the singular object – generates the intelligible species, therefore it reduces the intellect to act in respect of the singular’, I say that in the inference there is a fallacy of the consequent. For a likeness does not prove every likeness (or, it does not include [every likeness]): a phantasm indeed does generate a species like itself (and representative of the object) with natural likeness, but not with likeness of determination or indetermination, – for this [natural] likeness can be taken away by reason of the co-causing agent intellect,

which can attribute to the effect a greater indetermination than it could have had from the phantasm alone, so that the likeness is of nature represented, whether the phantasm be partial or total cause; but to the likeness of determination and indetermination it is not altogether similar, there being a greater agent concurrent able bestow a greater indetermination.

V. To the Arguments for Henry's Opinion

123. To the arguments for the first opinion recited, which have been set down for the first article [nn.18-23], – I reply:

To the first [n.20] it is plain that the minor is false, and it was rejected in the question 'On individuation' [*Ord.*II d.3 nn.46, 48-56].

124. To the second [n.21] I say it equivocates about 'first' and 'per se' object.

For in one way that object is called 'first' which has per se the idea of moving a power, – and 'per se' that which does not have of itself that it move [a power] but only moves together with another [cf. *Lectura* II d.9 n.115]; and in this way does the Philosopher speak in *On the Soul* 2.6.418a8-21 about the sensible 'first', of which sort is the proper sensible, – and of the sensible 'per se', of which sort is the common sensible. In another way, sometimes is 'first object' called adequate object, and this [adequate] to power or act, – and what is contained under the first adequate [object] of the power is called 'per se object of the power', and when included in the first object adequate to the act it is called 'per se object of the act'.

125. Although therefore an object 'per se and not first' (in the way in which Aristotle speaks of it in *On the Soul* [n.124]) not be able to move save in virtue of the first object (or along with the first object [nn.21, 124]), – speaking however of an 'object per se', not adequate to the power but contained under the adequate object, that can move a power under its proper idea as well, insofar as it adds something beyond first object.³⁷

126. Now when is taken that 'the universal is the first object of the angelic intellect' [n.21], it is false of the first adequate object, speaking of the universal insofar as it is 'universal'; because although that to which universality is accident, as being, is in this way first object, yet it is equally saved in the singular as in the universal, – and so it under its idea *qua* universal is not adequate object such that universality be included in adequate.

127. Similarly: the universal is not 'first' in the way in which the Philosopher speaks in *On the Soul* [n.124], and the singular [is not] 'per se' in the way in which the sensible is common in respect of the senses, because the singular includes the same moving idea that the universal includes; and yet the argument would not proceed without equivocation save by glossing, or taking the major about this, in the first way.³⁸

128. To the third [n.22] I say that proportionality does not always include similitude, but very many times dissimilitude rather; for four is double to two (and is proportional to it according to double proportion), and three is to two in proportion of

³⁷ Vatican editors add, referring to *Lectura* II d.9 n.116: 'whiteness can move the visual power not only under the common idea of color but also under the proper idea, insofar as whiteness adds something beyond color'.

³⁸ Vatican editors: There is equivocation if the first object adequate to the power is understood as including both the singular and the universal; equivocation however can be avoided by glossing or by speaking thus: 'the first object adequate of itself is neither singular nor universal, and *qua* such it moves first the intellect of the angel'.

whole and a half [sesquialterate], and agent is proportional to passive (because this in act and that in potency), and matter proportional to form, – and yet in all these dissimilitude is more required than similitude. Thus do I say in the matter at hand, that the power must be proportioned to the object; but not assimilated to it, because neither if the object is indeterminate (namely infinite) must the power be infinite, because a finite intellect knows finitely the infinite as infinite, – nor must the power be determinate if the object be determinate, for an infinite intellect infinitely knows the finite as finite.

129. When therefore it is taken that ‘the power must be determinate because the object is determinate’ [n.22], – if it is understood that it must thus be of a determinate object (and this in a proportionate determinate object), it is true; and in then – in the minor – when it is taken that ‘the intellect of an angel cannot thus be determinate’ (that is, does not have a proportion to an object thus determinate),³⁹ it is false.

130. And when you ask ‘by what is [the intellect] thus determinate, either of its own nature or through a species? [n.22]’ – I say that in neither way, for without a species it can know the singular as singular ‘by intuitive knowledge’, and through a species it can know the singular as singular ‘by abstractive knowledge’ [cf. *Ord.* II d.3 n.394].

131. And when it is concluded against the first member ‘that then the intellect of an angel would be more determinate than our intellect’ [n.22], and against the second that ‘because then it would be more determinable than our senses’ [*ibid.*], – I say that this determination is not intrinsic to the power (neither of itself nor through a species), but is for a determinate object, and in this way the divine intellect is for a determinate singular; and it is not unacceptable that a more perfect intellect is determinate and determinable in respect of an object, in which way a more imperfect intellect is not determinate or determinable in respect of the same.

132. But if it is concluded ‘therefore it is more limited, as if this determination introduce imperfection’ [n.22], – I deny that consequence, because this determination is not of limitation but of perfection: for altogether is the intellect determinate to knowing an object altogether most determinately [supply: ‘and this is of determination’. Vatican editors].

133. And if it is objected that ‘more passive will the angelic intellect be than ours, because [acted on] by more objects’, I reply (see...⁴⁰).^a

a. [*Interpolation*] and I say that although the reception of intellection be a certain imperfection (since it is a certain undergoing), yet it is in some sort of perfection, because in a cognitive power – not knowing actually of itself any things – it is of perfection to be able to know them; and therefore a power that can know more things (even through reception) is more perfect than a cognitive power that cannot know so many – as is plain, because our intellect is more perfect than another sensitive power, because it can know more things. Hence generally in cognitive powers lacking cognitions of some objects, it is of greater

³⁹ Vatican editors: Not taken above in n.22 above but rather in the parallel argument in the *Lectura* II d.9 n.24, where is found, “But this is false, because nothing has a determination proportioned to this object, from its nature.”

⁴⁰ Vatican editors cite from Scotus *Metaphysics* 7 q.15 nn.28-29: “Every actual entity is an idea of acting immediately on an intellect that has the capacity, not for any action at all immediately but from such entity; thus the intellect of an angel [is capable of action] from any entity [actual both quidditative and individual], – ours not now [sc. for this state], from an individual entity... And then the angelic [intellect] can [be moved by any entity at all] because more perfect [than ours], – nor is ‘able to be acted on by many’ more imperfect when it cannot be perfected save by being acted on; just as a ‘transparent’ is not less perfect than is illuminable by anything at all luminous than what [is so] only by the sun.”

perfection to be able to know more things, and consequently to be able to be acted on by more objects, – although in the divine intellect (which actually knows everything) it be impossible to know any things *de novo*, as to be acted on by some object or to receive knowledge of it.

134. To the fourth [n.23] I say either that ‘habit’ cannot be in an angelic intellect, taking habit for the quality following act (by which it is distinguished from first act, by which a thing is present under the idea of actually intelligible), and this if that intellect were supremely of itself habituated; or if that intellect had the capacity and such habit is not co-created with it, then I concede that it could in itself generate such a habit from acts, as was said in distinction 3 (to the similar argument about the generation of a habit in the angelic intellect [*Ord.II* d.3 nn.360, 401-402]).

135. And when it is adduced from Aristotle, who maintains that ‘the habit of universals is not other than of singulars’ [n.23], I say (as was said in the last question ‘On individuation’ [*Ord.II* d.3 n.193]) that a singular does not have proper properties that are knowable of it, and so neither is there properly science of it; and so neither any habit, speaking of that habit whereby ‘singular knowables’ are present to the intellect, – which with the Philosopher are called ‘proper knowables’, namely containing demonstrated properties of them as of subjects.⁴¹ However a habit that is a facility – left behind from acts – for considering [things] can well be different about a singular than about a universal: for an intellect, distinctly cognitive of the ‘singular’, can frequently consider a ‘this’ and not frequently consider nature in the universal, – and in it would come to be a quality giving ability for like acts of considering a ‘this’, but not universally inclining to considering nature in the universal; if therefore there be another habit consequent to acts, which namely is a quality giving ability for considering in respect of an object more singular than universal, it is yet not a different scientific habit in the way in which the Philosopher speaks there [n.23] of sciential habit.

Tenth Distinction

Single Question

Whether all Angels are Sent

1. About the tenth distinction, where the Master enquires about the mission of the angels, I ask^a whether all angels are sent.

a. [*Interpolation*] “Here must be investigated etc.” About this tenth distinction, in which the Master asks about the ministry of angels by comparison to God by whom they are sent, one thing is asked.

2. That not:

Daniel 7.10, “Thousands upon thousands ministered to him, and ten hundreds of thousands assisted him;” therefore etc.

⁴¹ Scotus *Exposition on the XII books of Aristotle’s Metaphysics*, 11 s.3 ch.2 n.60: “And what is the proper (namely, subject) according to the science, that alone does each of the sciences consider, namely by demonstrating the proper properties of the proper subject.”

3. On the contrary:

Hebrews 1.14, “Are they not all administrators of the spirit...?”

I. To the Question

4. I reply:

The authority of the Apostle [n.3] must be absolutely conceded.

5. But a distinction must be made about inward and outward mission. For according to common process and order, the superior mysteries of God are revealed to the superior before to the inferior: and so the superior are sent to the inferior (speaking and illumining them) interiorly, – and others, the inferior, are sent exteriorly for announcing to men or fulfilling things revealed, and thus not all are commonly sent outwardly; and thus can all the authorities be expounded saying that they are sent outwardly.

6. It seems however that the supreme angels (or some of the supreme) are sometimes sent outwardly:

For the incarnation of the Word many angels did not know before the time of the incarnation or passion of Christ, as is plain from *Isaiah* 63.1 (where it is asked in the person of the inferior angels): “Who is this who cometh from Edom, with dyed vestments, etc.” and from *Psalms* 23.8, “Who is this king of glory?” (and he [sc. a superior angel] replies, “The Lord strong and mighty etc.”). It appears also through the Apostle *Ephesians* 3.8-10, “so that it may be known to Principalities and Powers through the Church etc.” where Jerome’s gloss says that “the angelic dignities did not know” the aforesaid “mystery of the Incarnation in its purity until the passion of Christ had been completed and the preaching of the Apostles had been spread among the nations,” – which however up to then “was not hidden” from the greater [angels] according to Augustine’s Gloss. Now it is clear that it was not hidden from the angel sent to the blessed Virgin to announce this; therefore he to whom this was laid open was from the superiors, – and not from the lowest, from whom that sacred mystery was hidden.

II. To the Principal Argument for Each Side

7. From this it is evident to that from *Daniel* [n.2]; for the distinction is of those commonly assisting and those commonly ministering.

8. Now the authority of the Apostle [n.3] must be conceded to the letter, but indistinctly about inward and outward mission.

Eleventh Distinction

Single Question

Whether a Guardian Angel can effectively cause Something in the Intellect of the Man Guarded

1. About the eleventh distinction, where the Master treats of the guarding of men by the good angels, I ask^a whether a guardian angel can effectively cause something in the intellect of the man guarded.

a. [Interpolation] About this eleventh distinction, in which the Master treats of the ministry of angels by comparison to the men guarded by them, one question is asked.

2. That yes:

Because otherwise he [the angel] would guard in vain if he could not direct him in human acts (and rule [him] insofar as he is a man), which are his as concerns intellect and will; nor could he [the angel] otherwise do anything about him as far as he is rational, because not about will or intellect.

3. Further, an angel can effectively cause something in the intellect of another angel (as was said in *Ord.II* d.9 nn.50, 67-69), therefore also in the intellect of a man. – Proof of the consequence, because an active thing that can cause something in a more excellent passive thing can also cause something in a less excellent passive thing. And because every agent having first act can cause second act in anything receptive (for through this has been proved the thing proposed in *Ord.II* d.9 n.52); now an angel is knowing in act, and our intellect is in potency to second act, therefore etc.

4. Further, a sensible object can do something immediately on our intellect, as is plain about the phantasm [cf. Aristotle, *On the Soul* 3.7.431a14-15], wherefore etc. [sc. a phantasm can do the same]. Therefore much more what is actually intelligible, of which sort is what is in the intellect of an angel.

5. On the contrary:

Augustine's gloss ["He alone gives understanding"] on *Psalms* 118.73 ["Your hands have made and molded me; give me understanding and I will learn your commands"].^a

a. [Interpolation] *Matthew* 18.10 "Their angels in heaven always see the face of my Father who is in heaven" states 'Men are not to be despised, because angels are sent for their guardians, therefore...' *Psalms* 90.11: "To his angels he has given command," the gloss says that 'men are not to be despised, because angels are sent for their guardians'.

I. To the Question

A. The Opinion of Avicenna

6. Here there is the opinion of Avicenna *On the Soul* p.5 ch.6.⁴² Seek it.^{a b}

⁴² Avicenna: "Either we will say that the 'intelligible forms' are things per se existing, each of which is a species and a thing per se existing, but the intellect sometimes looks at them and sometimes turns away from them and later turns back to them... Or from the agent principle there flows into the soul form after form according to the request of the soul, – from which principle later, when it turns away, the emanation ceases; which if so it were, it would be necessary at every hour to learn again as at the first. We will say, therefore, that the last part of this division is true..., and so 'to learn' is nothing but to inquire after the perfect aptitude of joining oneself to the agent intelligence, until understanding comes to be from it... For when what coheres with the sought-for understanding passes 'into the mind of him who learns', and the soul turns itself to look at it (now this looking at is conversion of the soul to the principle giving understanding), the soul is wont to be conjoined with the intelligence and the virtue of simple understanding flows therefrom, which the flow of ordering follows; but if it is turned away from the first [principle], the forms come to be in potency, but in proximate potency... For when Plato is said to be 'knowing intelligibles', here the sense is: so that, when he wishes, he will recall the forms to his mind; of which too the sense is: so that, when he wishes, he can be

a. [Interpolation; cf. *Additiones Magnae* II d.11, *Rep.*II B d.11 q.1] that the superior intelligence is cause of the inferior as to being and as to knowledge, and so by descending from the supreme intelligence; and at last a certain separate intelligence, superior to the intellectual soul, causes in it intellectual knowledge (or an intelligible species), and thus the soul understands through actual intellectual conversion to that intelligence.

b. [Interpolation, cf. *Rep.*IA d.3 nn.131-132, 137] that the species of things flow from the separate intelligence for having natural knowledge of men, so that – according to him – it is natural for our intellect to be turned to the separate intelligence for this, that it may understand (which whether it is true is plain from [*Reportatio* IA] d.3 nn.139, 153-155).

7. Against the opinion of Avicenna it is argued [Aquinas *ST* Ia q.84 a4] that then [sc. if the soul had to turn to the separate intelligence to have intelligible species of things] the soul would in vain be united to the body, because on account of no perfection of the united soul: for not on account of the perfection of it in itself, because form is not for the sake of matter but conversely (*Physics* 2.9.200a24-34); nor on account of its perfection in operating, because not united it could have [intelligible species] from the intelligence, just as united.

8. This reason [of Aquinas, n.7] seems at fault, because it seems to conclude that in vain would a blessed soul be united to the body: because not on account of any perfection necessary for its operation, because it has an operation in which it receives nothing, nor will it receive, from the body.

9. Besides, according to some of them [sc. followers of Aquinas], the soul understands insofar as it is above the body, – therefore it does not belong to it to understand insofar as it is united to the body; therefore neither is it united per se because of any perfection, insofar as may be necessary because of an operation of it, as because of ‘to understand’.

10. In another way is the stated position [sc. of Avicenna, n.6] rejected:

First because all our knowledge arises from the senses (*Posterior Analytics* 2.19.100a3-8), and with a sense lacking the science is lacking that is according to that sense (*Posterior Analytics* 1.18.81a38-b9, *Metaphysics* 1.9.993a7-8, *Physics* 2.1.193a7-9): for a man born blind cannot have a determinate knowledge of colors. But all this would be false if those intelligible species were impressed on the soul by the intelligence.

11. Further, if no habitual knowledge would remain, the act of understanding not remaining [sc. according to Avicenna], it would follow that the intellect would always equally be in essential potency to understanding. For although from acts would some facility be generated for turning the intellect to understanding, yet because a form would never be had by which it could understand (which would be first act making it [the intellect] to be in accidental potency), but it would always be *de novo* necessary to receive such form whereby it could operate, – always in an intellect not understanding would there be an essential potency for the act of understanding (because in the potency to that form which is the principle of intellection), although an intellect having the acquired habit (consequent to act) could more easily acquire that form than another not

joined to the agent intelligence, so that the thing understood is formed in him by it... For this way of ‘understanding in potency’ is the virtue which acquires for the soul to understand when it wishes – because, when it wishes, it will be joined to the intelligence, from which flows into it the understood form, which form is understanding most truly attained.”

having it. Hence, although one passive be more disposed to undergoing it than another, yet each is in essential potency before it receive the form; just as, if a piece of wood (when it were not heating) would not be hot, and one [piece of wood] were dry and another damp, – although the dry piece would be easily receptive of heat, and the damp with more difficulty, yet each (when it were not heating) would be in essential potency for heating. So here.

B. Scotus' own Opinion

12. To the question therefore I respond: first that an angel cannot effectively cause anything in the intellect of the man guarded; second what he can do.

1. An Angel cannot effectively cause anything in the Intellect of the Man Guarded

13. About the first I say that no actual intellection nor intelligible species can an angel cause in our intellect as total cause. Now the reason is not from any impotency on the part of the angel (because he is sufficiently in first act and can cause second act in another angel [n.3; d.9 n.52]), but the reason is from our intellect, which for this state is a passive determinate to an active determinate, as to the phantasm and the agent intellect; and therefore it is impeded so that it cannot immediately receive an effect from any intelligible in act without a phantasm, because 'phantasms are for this present state disposed to our intellect as sensibles to the senses' [cf. n.4], – namely as to this, that as the sense is not first affected save by a sensible from outside, so neither is our intellect affected by a first effect save by a phantasm. Now whence this be was touched on earlier in *Ord.I d.3* [n.187], namely from the order of powers, – which order is not merely from the nature of man whence he is man, because then there would not be another order in beatitude; either therefore from guilt, or from this [present] state because of something pertaining to guilt (of which let the cause be sought for [*Ord.I d.3 nn.187, II d.3 nn.289-90, Lectura II d.11 nn.15-16*]).

14. Now from this follows a certain corollary, namely that an angel cannot take any intellect in rapture to intellectual vision, and that any rapture – done by the power of the devil – is precisely to imagining something intensely: and so their raptures are rather madnesses than raptures, because intense imagination makes the mind so distracted from every other thought of any other actual intellection at all that it seems it [the mind] is intellectually seeing; and there perhaps accompanies that intense imagination of some thing an intellection of that imaginable, but there is no intellection there of anything merely intelligible not imaginable. Thus too every rapture to which a man can dispose himself in this life, by custom, is not to any vision intellectual but imaginative (and an intellection concomitant with that imaginative one), although however (perhaps) such quietening in man from everything extrinsic by such vision sometimes disposes so that God catch a mind so tranquil up to intellectual vision.

2. What an Angel can do in the Intellect of the Man whose Guardian he is

15. About the second, what namely an angel can do in the intellect [n.12].

Because of the statements of the saints (especially of Dionysius *Celestial Hierarchy* 4 saying that ‘revelations are made to men through the angels’), it is manifest that an angel can teach a man just as a man does (but more perfectly), because man teaches by proposing certain signs known to the hearer, which when proposed, the hearer is occupied as much as possible only about them, and thus is united in himself (which sort of ‘union’ is not in him who is devising a science, because ‘he who is finding’ a science’ is distracted about many things). Likewise, from those signs he puts together in ordered fashion with each other the simple concepts (as speaker and teacher put them together), conjoining complex concepts in ordered fashion (as are the signs of ordered conjunction with the speaker), and from such signs he perceives the truth of the complexes [sc. propositions] from their terms, and the relation of complex to complex, from which he has his own truth and so learns; which truth or complex he would not learn through himself, nor have without any teacher, although he had the species of all the non-complexes [terms]: for not having the concepts of many in-complexes he knows how he may compose them and in whatsoever way, – and not the complexes, in whatever way ordered to them [the incomplexes, terms]; and if he were to do this, he could from the terms quickly conceive the truth of many complexes, from which complexes the truth of other complexes, – and thus do the clever learn, finding things out by themselves; but to the slower must be proposed by another some known signs so that they may learn through teaching [cf. Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a.1 qq.5, 6].

16. And in this way it is certain that an angel can teach: either by using signs instituted at will [sc. conventional signs], and this in an assumed body (or in something else [e.g. in the air]); or by using natural signs, namely things themselves, applying those present to the senses, by which the senses may in ordered way be affected, and from them may phantasms in ordered way be generated, and thus further from them may intelligible species in ordered way be abstracted.

17. A doubt however would be whether an angel could more quickly use natural signs than he himself (or a man) could use conventionally instituted ones. – For it would seem a wonder if he could more quickly affect sight with many sensible or visible signs – from which species would be abstracted necessary for one great argumentation – than he (or a man) could use those conventionally instituted signs, representing those objects.

18. But about the other affirmatives [sc. other than the one just explained, nn.15-17], namely what an angel could do or cause concerning the imaginative power of man, – whether he could effectively cause a new phantasm (as by offering a new thing imaginable) or transpose phantasms already had, is doubtful.

19. It is however commonly conceded that he could not cause a new phantasm without a natural cause in the middle, to wit an object, of a nature to cause such phantasm.

20. About the transference too of a phantasm from the organ of one [man] to the organ of another, there seems a doubt whether he could transfer a spirit or humor⁴³ – informed with a phantasm in an organ of Socrates – to an organ of Plato while the same phantasm remains (for he cannot otherwise transfer a phantasm unless he transfer the subject of it.⁴⁴

⁴³ Vatican editors refer to Richard of Middleton *Sent.* II d.8 princ.2 q.3c for discussion of organ, spirits, humors, etc.

⁴⁴ Vatican editors: because an accident, as a phantasm, cannot be transferred without its subject, as the spirit or humor, *Rep.* II A d.11 q.1.

21. And perhaps it would be said that, with the humor transferred from the organ of Socrates, the phantasm would not remain in it, because it [the phantasm] would not be in the same proportion to its cause, by which it was generated. – But this reason is not conclusive, because a particular sense in respect of a phantasm is only a cause in its coming to be and not in its having come to be.

22. If also such a transfer were to come to be, with Socrates remaining informed by the phantasm, he to whose organ the transfer was made might be denied to be able to use such phantasm, because no one's imagination is of a nature to use a phantasm save one generated by a sensible [object] present to his own senses. – But neither is this reason cogent, because if God were to impress on a man born blind the phantasm of a color, he could use it when awake for imagining colors; for what is not a cause of a form in being but only in coming to be does not seem to be a necessary cause of the form as to the second act of it.

23. So to neither of these two doubts does there seem to be a necessary reason for one side or for the other [nn.21-22; cf. n.26].

24. In a third way, about the transference of phantasms in the same man, it is said that he [an angel] can make local motion of humors and spirits, on which motion follows the transposition of phantasms and the ordered affecting of the possible intellect by them. – But this seems difficult for understanding: for not just any phantasm has spirit or humor for subject, because there could be so many phantasms at the same time in the imaginative power that subjects proper to them could not be assigned; nor too does any motion of spirit or humor seem to make any phantasm move more than before, unless it do something about that phantasm through alteration.

25. Finally fourth is this conceded, that he [an angel] can move away an impediment around the power of imagination: to wit, if the impediment to ordered affecting by phantasms was the perturbation of spirits or humors, an angel can settle it and, with it settled, they [phantasms] will occur in ordered fashion.

26. It can also be said that – besides the way in which he can teach through sensible signs more excellently than a man can [nn.15-16], and besides whatever way [there is] concerning the power of imagination [nn.18-25] (where there is not any way very certain save the last 'about removal of an impediment' [n.25]) – that he could carry something out concerning the possible intellect: not indeed by immediately causing as total cause an intelligible species but as partial cause, co-acting through his agent intellect with the agent intellect of the man, so that those two agent intellects (of angel namely and man), which are of the same idea, could with the phantasm operate more effectively than the sole agent intellect of the man, and thus produce a intelligible species more perfect and more perfectly representing the quiddity.

II. To the Principal Arguments

27. To the arguments.

To the first [n.2] I say that he does not in vain guard man, because about his intellect – by teaching through sensible signs – he can do something more efficaciously than [can] a man [n.15-16], and perhaps by doing something about his imagination [n.25], and perhaps about the possible intellect (according to the final way [n.26]). Given too that none of these could be, still would the guardianship of angels not be in vain,

because they guard us from many assaults of the demons, according to what Jerome [rather Hilary, *Tractate on Psalms* ps.134 n.17] says in his homily (on *Matthew* 18.10, “Their angels always see, etc.”), “For neither could the life^a of mortals be safe etc.” look there.^b ⁴⁵

a. [Interpolation, in place of ‘the life of...be safe’] human infirmity [sc. be safe], among so many and so great snares of the enemy unless it were fortified by the aid of the angels.

b. [Interpolation] among so many assaults unless it were fortified by the guarding of the holy angels.

28. To the second [n.3]: the consequence is not valid, because this passive inferior [sc. our possible intellect, n.13] is not able for this present state to be affected by that agent [sc. an angel], and this because the passive [inferior] is impeded for this present state from receiving anything such; hence this impotency is not from defect of an angel’s active power, or by impotency of our intellect’s passive power, absolutely, but from the impediment of it for this present state.

29. And by this is it plain to each proof of the consequence [n.3]: for the active can act on the passive when there is no impediment to reception of such form toward which such agent acts, – but while there is an impediment, it cannot act by proximate power, although it can by remote power.

30. And if you say ‘then God cannot for this present state act immediately on the intellect without a phantasm’ – I say that the consequence is not valid, because that ‘impediment’ for this present state is an order among the inferior powers [n.13]: but this order is under the causality of God, and the causality of any creature, – and so for any created agent (which presupposes this order) there is an impediment, but not for God, who is above this order.

31. To the final one [n.4], it is plain that sensibles can alter the intellect for this present state but not purely intelligibles; and not because they are not active, nor because our intellect is not passive in respect of them absolutely, but because it is for this present state impeded from being acted on by or receiving from such things immediately. But with such impediment removed, then it will receive, as it is in beatitude: for then will an angel speak to a blessed man and a blessed man to another blessed man, as it was said before that ‘angel speaks to angel intellectually’ [n.13, d.9 nn.49-52]; for then, according to the promise of the Savior (*Matthew* 22.30), we will be “like the angels of God in heaven”.

32. And from this is plain why the teacher cannot cause science in the disciple: because not on account of defect of active virtue in the science of the one teaching, but because of the capacity of the disciple’s intellect for this present state, – for which he has an impediment prevented lest he be thus affected, because for this present state he is determined to phantasms as to the things affecting him, as is plain from what has been said [nn.31, 28, 13].^a

⁴⁵ Hilary, *Tractate on Psalms*, psalm 134 n.17: “For there are angels of the little ones who behold God every day. These spirits therefore are sent out for the salvation of the human race. For neither would our infirmity withstand, unless angels had been given for guard, so many and so great wickednesses of celestial spirits... God then produces them [sc. the good angels] come from his storehouse, bestowing in them aid to human infirmity, so that these divine protections may preserve us in the salvation to be inherited by us against the worldly powers of this darkness.”

a. [Vatican editors: *For distinction 12, which, besides other questions, is lacking in the Ordinatio, the following interpolated question is annexed:*] Whether matter can be without form, that is, if it is repugnant to it to exist in fact without form. Here Avicenna replies *Metaphysics* 2 ch.3 [“We will say now that this corporeal matter cannot be in fact despoiled of form.”] – for which he has some reasons. The first seems to be that what is untermiated cannot be without term; second, either it would be in place, and this either divisibly, and so a quantum, – or indivisibly, and thus it would be a point; or it would not be in place, and then it would be an intelligence; the third reason which he intimates is that form is for itself the cause of being in fact, and not conversely. Look for it. – For this opinion [sc. of Avicenna] there are reasons of the moderns [identity unknown], who hold this, of which the ‘Achilles’ is: because if it can be without form, then for the same reason without privation, which is more separable or only so (because it is other than matter). Which they prove in many ways through the problems about same and diverse, *Topics* 7.1-2.151b28-153a5. The falsity of the consequent is plain, because thus it would be deprived [sc. not have form] and not deprived [sc. not have privation], and would lack [sc. lack form] and not lack [sc. not lack privation]. Against this opinion are the reasons of Scotus [*Reportatio* IIA d.12 q.2] and others (look for them) [e.g. William of Ware, *Sent.* II d.12 q.5; Thomas of Bailly, *Quodl.* I q.5c].

The Twelfth Distinction (on matter and form in corruptible things) is lacking in the *Ordinatio*. The translation given here is of the same distinction in the *Lectura*.⁴⁶

Twelfth Distinction

Single Question

Whether in Generable and Corruptible Substance there is any Positive Entity distinct from Form which is Said to be Matter

1. About the twelfth distinction it is asked whether in generable and corruptible substance there is any positive entity, distinct from form, which may be said to be matter.

2. It seems that not: *Metaphysics* 7: “Matter is neither a what, nor a what sort, nor a how much, nor any of those by which being is determined;” therefore it is nothing distinct from form.

3. If it be said that it is not in act any of these but in potency, on the contrary: either it is in potency matter or form or the composite. Not the two last because, if they are posited in being, the impossible happens, namely that it be the form or composite; therefore it is not in potency these. But if it be matter in potency, then it is not yet matter; therefore it is nothing, as before.

⁴⁶ The Vatican Editors point out that the absence of the twelfth distinction was supplied in various ways by different editors, who excerpted passages from Scotus’ other works on the *Sentences*, namely the *Reportationes*, the *Lectura* and the *Additiones Magnae* (compiled by William of Alnwick). It is supplied here from the equivalent question in the *Lectura*, the Latin text of which is available online at:

http://www.logicmuseum.com/wiki/Authors/Duns_Scotus/Lectura/Lectura_II/D12

4. Further, the Philosopher in *Physics* 5 proves that generation is not motion. And he argues, “because that which is moved is, what is being generated is not”; therefore etc. (he is speaking of the subject of generation, which is generated subjectively [i.e. so as to be a subject]). If this reason be good, it is necessary that in the way in which ‘to be’ is affirmed in the major, it be denied in the minor; but in the major ‘to be’ in potency is affirmed, because “motion is the act of a being in potency according as it is in potency;” therefore in the minor is that ‘to be’ denied; therefore matter is not ‘a being in potency’.

5. Again, if it were an entity other than form, it would be per se intelligible without form, which is against the Philosopher, *Physics* I.

6. Further, if it is some positive entity, either then it is pure act, or composite of act and potency, or only potency. If it be only in potency a being, therefore it is not yet a being; therefore it is nothing. Neither of the preceding can be, both because then matter would be per se knowable and not by analogy to form (which is against the Philosopher, *Physics* I), and because there would be some being inferior to it, which is pure potential, which is against Augustine, *Confessions*, because it is “next to nothing.”

7. Again, in particular it is argued that it is not first, namely act, because ‘in the foundation of nature there is nothing distinct’, but ‘act distinguishes’. Again, ‘act and form convert’; but matter is not form; therefore it is not act.

8. Again, in particular it is not the second, namely the composite: first because it is a principle, and principle means to be simple; second because if it were composite, then the act of it would be proportionate to its power, and so since its power is infinite in respect of infinite forms, its act would be unlimited and infinite; third because ‘it is first act without all potency’, therefore similarly it will be first potency without all act.

9. On the contrary: according to the Philosopher, *Metaphysics* 5 chapter ‘On causes’, “matter is the thing from which something comes to be existent in it,” and such is some positive entity, other than form, because form cannot be that from which a thing comes to be (because form is the term of making, and that from which something comes to be precedes).

I. To the Question

10. About this question three things come together that need to be made clear: (1) first that matter is, (2) second what sort of ‘to be’ it has and what sort of being it is, and (3) third that it is really diverse from form.

A. That Matter is

11. The first is shown through the reason of the Philosopher, which is more efficacious than others (although certain condemn it). His reason is formed thus: every natural agent requires a passive subject on which the agent acts (this is plain to sense); that passive subject, on which the agent acts, is transmuted from opposite to opposite; this opposite does not become that opposite, so that nothing common remains to each (as whiteness does not become blackness); just as therefore in accidental change what transmutes something moves it from opposite to opposite, with the same thing remaining under each of the opposites, so it is necessary in generation that the thing generating transmute something from form to form, with the same thing remaining under each; that

is said to be matter. This is the reason of the Philosopher, *Physics* 1, *On Generation* 1, *Metaphysics* 12 ch.1 and elsewhere many times.

12. To this reason it is said by certain that a natural agent acts on something passive to be corrupted, and it presupposes the passive to be corrupted which it acts on; but in the instant of corruption it does not presuppose it, but then the whole is turned into the whole, from *On Generation* 1.

13. On the contrary: what is to be corrupted is naturally first before the thing generated comes to be, and prior in originating and carrying out; therefore if in this instant nothing of the thing to be corrupted remains in which the generating generates, it will presuppose nothing for its action; and since that action is its most perfect action, it follows that by its most perfect action the generating will generate from nothing, which is against the accepted proposition that 'every natural agent presupposes something passive on which to act'.

14. To this it is said that 'something is produced from nothing' can be understood in two ways: either as about the term and from a beginning, or as about a part and from a subject. In the first way it is not true that the generating generates from nothing, but something to be corrupted is required; and therefore it generates from something from a beginning or in the term from which. But in the second way it is true that the generating generates from nothing, because nothing of the corrupted remains in the generated. But God in each way produces from nothing.

15. On the contrary: an agent that has in its power the whole of the effect can no less produce when everything else is removed by whose positing its power is more weakened than strengthened; but for you the generating has in its active virtue the whole effect, because it presupposes nothing of it in the instant of generation; therefore the generating can produce the generated with everything else removed by whose positing its virtue is more weakened than strengthened. But through action on corrupting the contrary its active virtue is weakened and not strengthened; therefore a natural agent, with every passive thing removed, can produce the effect.

16. The reason is confirmed: every natural agent, potent for some total effect, will of necessity make it not impeded, from *Metaphysics* 9 ch.4, just as it also of necessity produces the form, if it is not impeded; but a natural agent, as fire, has in its virtue the whole of the effect, from the givens; therefore not impeded it will thus produce the whole effect. But it is not impeded by any agent, nor by the absence of any contrary thing acted on (but rather it is weakened by its presence); therefore in the absence of water and of any contrary agent whatever it will produce fire, and so from altogether nothing.

17. Further, there are other reasons for proving the aforesaid conclusion. If there were not matter, remaining the same under each of the contraries, no passive generation would be natural, because if there not matter, then no appetite has preceded for the term generated nor would there be there anything that would be inclined to the term generated, for the form to be corrupted does not have the desire, because then it would desire its own corruption.

18. Again, there would be no generation, because generation is from a non-subject into a subject, from privation into form, just as corruption the contrary, and there are two changes having four distinct terms, because the term 'from which' of corruption is form and the term 'from which' of generation is privation of the form to be induced in anything naturally apt, and so of the terms 'to which'; but if there were not matter, there

would not be any privation that could be the term ‘from which’ in generation, because privation is only in a subject naturally apt for having, and between disparate forms there cannot be per se generation, because it is from a non-subject into a subject; and so there would be no substantial change, because every change is of something ‘differently disposed now than before’; but if nothing of corrupted fire remains, nothing of fire is differently disposed now than before.

19. Further thus: any substance is corruptible through something intrinsic to it, from *Metaphysics* 7 ch.5; but no substance is corruptible by this, that it is a simple form; therefore etc. This is not but matter, as the Philosopher says there: “Matter is that by which a thing can be and not be.” Or in this way: if there not matter in a composite but only form, anything at all created would intrinsically be equally incorruptible. For an act only and simple is not naturally corruptible nor inclined to corruption: for the form of air strives to preserve itself, nor is it in any natural aptitude of itself for not being, as it seems; if therefore air were only form, as you say, and any created thing at all, so that no being would have in itself diverse principles (potential and actual), it follows that anything at all is equally incorruptible intrinsically, air not more having to be corruptible than the heaven.

20. If you say that air is corruptible and the heaven not because ‘air has a contrary and the heaven not’, on the contrary: this is nothing to the purpose, because a contrary does not make it that air has an intrinsic principle of its own corruption; if therefore air did not have matter, it is intrinsically as equally incorruptible as the heaven. Whence it is first necessary to give an intrinsic cause of corruption before it have a corrupting contrary. And this seems to be the reason of the Philosopher, *Metaphysics* 7 ch.5, that “everything generable has matter: for it is possible that it is and is not;” but that by which something is such intrinsically is matter.

21. Again, in material causes there is an essential order just as in efficient causes (from *Metaphysics* 2); therefore it is possible to grant a first potential at which there is a stand in material causes: it is therefore possible to grant a first receptive. But a first receptive is only for first act, which is substantial [act]; but the same thing does not receive itself; therefore the first composite will be composite of receptive and received.

22. Further, Augustine *Confessions* 11 proves that there is matter, giving the same reason as the Philosopher, because ‘it is necessary that something remain under each of the terms of change’; whence he proves that there is matter, through change (and therefore does the Commentator say that change gives knowledge of matter).

23. They think that matter is not another absolute reality than form, but that form is the intrinsic term of matter (and not extrinsic), in the way that a terminated quantity is called a term intrinsic to a non-terminated [quantity], and thus is a terminated quantity said to be composed of the non-terminated and its term.

24. But on the contrary thus: the composite is truly caused by the four causes; but nothing is the natural cause of a thing save what has an absolute reality; therefore if matter is another cause besides form, it is necessary that it have reality.

25. Again, substance is per se divided into simple substance and composite; but it cannot be really composite unless it have a thing other than form.

26. Again, Augustine *Confessions* 12: “You have made, Lord, two things etc.,” and that ‘nearly nothing’ is matter, because form is not nearly nothing.

27. Again, if form were a term intrinsic to matter, generables and corruptibles would not be distinguished in species; but these grades are essentially the same as a third, namely matter, nor is it of another idea according to them; it is therefore a thing other than matter that remains always the same.

28. You will say, how then is there ‘transmutation of whole into whole’? – whence *Metaphysics* 7: “whiteness is not generated but white wood,” which is ‘a whole in a certain respect’; but the composite of substance is a per se whole, therefore the composite there is per se generated and the whole is per se corrupted, and therefore per se there is transmutation of a whole simply into a whole.

B. What sort of ‘To be’ Matter has

29. Secondly, it is necessary to see what sort of entity it has. And I say that it has the sort of entity that the conditions express which we have of it. For matter is said to be a principle per se (from *Physics* 1), and also a per se cause (from *Physics* 2); it is said also to be per se part of the thing generated (from *Metaphysics* 5, because it is ‘from what comes to be something existent in it’); it is also the subject of change (*Physics* 5), for “just as transmutation in place makes [us] know place, so transmutation in substance makes [us] know matter;” it is also something remaining under each of the terms of change and of generation in potency to form; and it is added, according to theologians, that it is something that is term of creation.

30. And from these it is plain what sort of ‘being in potency’ matter is, and in what way matter is said to be being in potency. For something is said to be in potency in two ways: in one way because it is the term of potency, or for which there is potency, and this is said to be in potency objectively (just as Antichrist is now said to be in potency, and likewise a whiteness that is to be generated); in another way something is said to be in potency as a subject of potency or in which is potency, and thus something is said to be in potency subjectively, because it is in potency to something else, by which however it is not yet perfected (as a surface to be whitened).

31. Those who say that matter is being in potency in the first way say that it is simply non-being, and they do not seem in any way to save the intention of Aristotle.

32. Whence matter is not being in potency in that way, as is plain from the aforesaid conditions that are had from the Philosopher: For that which is ‘cause of being’ and ‘principle of being’ (I mean in act) cannot be potentially being in the first way, so that it be the term of power, as Antichrist is in potency being.

33. How too can matter be ‘a real part of being in act’, if it is only potency for being? Because that which is term of potency is not a real part of being in act while it is thus in potency.

34. Again, how can it be a subject of actual change if it is thus being in potency? For it will not be a subject of change then, but a term; however matter is posited the subject of change.

35. Again, how would matter be ‘one under diverse forms succeeding to each other’ if it were thus in potency? For such potency is numbered according to the number of acts (from *Physics* 3), but matter is one in respect of opposite forms.

36. Again, if it were thus being in potency, it could not be ‘term of creation’, because what terms creation is really and not in potency.

37. It is therefore being in potency in a second way, as some positive being, which is of a nature to receive act and is a being in potency for all acts that it can receive. And so it is more a being in potency than a subject of an accident, because having less in itself of actuality and capable of greater actuality.

38. And if you ask whether it should be called act or not, I say that I do not wish to dispute about the name. For if it be called act from 'to act', thus is it not act. But I say that matter is some true reality, which with the reality of form makes a one. Whence if act and potency be taken insofar as they divide being, thus is act said to be all that which has its entity outside its cause, and thus matter, since it is a principle and cause of a thing, is called being in act; but if potency be taken as it is a principle distinct from informing act, thus is matter said to be potency (and so does the Philosopher speak of act in *Metaphysics* 7 and 8): for thus is act distinguished from that which receives act, and so matter is not act, because it is a principle receptive of act; and such must be denuded of all act.

39. Against this it is argued through reasons fundamental to the other opinion: If matter have a proper entity and not be merely in potency, then matter is posited to be the sort of subject that the ancients posited it to be, namely being in act; just as therefore they could not save generation, so, by positing matter to be something positive and not merely being in potency, generation is not saved.

40. Further, in other genera it is like this, that that which is potential of any genus, is not any entity of that genus (just as, what is in potency for the form of the genus of quantity is not of the genus of quantity, nor too is what is in potency to the form of color of the genus of quality, but is a surface); therefore, similarly, what is in potency to form, namely to substantial forms, will not be anything positive of that genus, but merely potency.

41. Further, if matter were some positive entity, the composite would congregate in itself several entities, and so the composite would not be one.

42. I reply, according to the aforesaid, that if matter have the aforesaid conditions, as is held by the Philosopher, and also that it is ingenerable and incorruptible, it is not only being in potency, so that it be the term of potency (as the soul of Antichrist) and so is in potency to receiving its proper being from the agent, but it is a receptive potency and some entity in which is founded the idea of receptive power in respect of another (as in a surface with respect to whiteness); and the more it is receptive of more actuality, the more it is more a potential being, and therefore it is not as perfect a being as that which is a subject of accidental forms, because its act is more perfect; and by how much the more something is capable of more entity and actuality, by so much is it more imperfect in itself and possessing lesser entity, just as on the contrary the more something is more perfect, the more it is capable of lesser actuality (as is plain of separate substances). Whence unless matter were some entity, generation would not be change, because change is not where nothing is subject.

43. To the first of these, then, it must be said that it is not necessary to posit, according to this way, that generation does not differ from alteration, as the ancients held, who posited that some body in act, having natural form (as air or water or some intermediate between these) is the subject of generation and is the whole substance of a natural thing, as substance in artificial things; for if it were so, then change of that substance to a natural form would only be change to an act in a certain respect, which

would give it only being in a certain respect; but matter is not such a being positive for form and act, but is a positive being giving being simply.

44. To the second it must be said that if it be posited that potency for the form of any accidental genus is in that genus intrinsically, then it must be said that the potential principle of any genus is something positive, just as also the potential principle of the genus of substance. But if it is posited that that which is in potency to a form of the genus of accident does not pertain intrinsically to that genus (as if the receptive potency proper of color is a surface), then it must be said that the potential of a posterior genus is something actual of the prior genus; and since there is no process to infinity, it is necessary to stand at the genus of substance, and the potential principle of that genus is something positive of that genus, having positive entity.

45. To the third, when it is argued that if matter had proper entity, the composite would not be per se one, it is said by some that matter has a triple being: one being it has if it were separate from form, which would be given it by a supernatural agent; it has another quidditative being “whereby it is a certain capacity for forms’, about which it is plain in *Metaphysics* 12: “First matter is one in substance, many in aptitude;” third, proper to it and most certain, communicated to it by form, “whereby it is the support of the composite.”

46. They say, therefore, that if matter were to remain in the composite according to that being which would be communicated to it (if it were separate) by the supernatural agent, it would not make a one per se with the form, nor then would the composite be per se one, just as neither does matter in an artificial thing make a one per se with artificial form; but it does not have that being in the composite (although it could have it, if it were separate, through the action of the supernatural agent), but it has in the composite only its quidditative being and the being communicated to it by form; and therefore the composite is per se one, having only one actual being. And thus is to be understood that in *On the Soul* II: “It is not necessary to ask if soul and body are one, just as neither wax and figure;” where the Commentator: “Something congregated is not called one, save because of a unity existing in form.”

47. But this does not seem true, because no new act comes to be, nor is it necessary to posit a new action about an accident, from the fact that its subject is destroyed and it itself conserved; whence nothing positive, neither absolute nor relative, is caused from this about a separate accident. In the same way, if matter could be conserved without form or with form corrupted, as they themselves concede, it would not be necessary that some new being is communicated to it by God, thus making it separate: for then matter could not be per se if it could not be separated unless some new being were given, because then it could not be per se unless being and act were communicated to it; and yet it is to the purpose that it cannot be without that act and without that being, just as neither without its proper form. Whence if matter were separate, it would have nothing *de novo*, but only negation of composition or of conjunction of it with form, just as if an accident be separate from a subject.

48. Therefore I respond that according to the being that it would have if there were separate matter, it is perfectible by form.

49. But how then is a composite one? I say that it is necessary to grant one or other of these: either that every ‘per se one’ be simple and not really composite, so that being is not divided through ‘simple’ and ‘composite’, or that every composite be

composed of something and nothing, or that every composite and ‘per se one’ be composed of something and something. And because the first two are impossible, therefore the third is to be held, that the composite is a per se one, not simple but with unity fitting a supposit, having in itself thing and thing.

50. But how then is ‘white man’ not per se one, but animate body is per se one? I say that just as one in common is a property of being in common, so determinate unities are properties of determinate beings, and just as there is not a middle between being in common and its property of unity, so neither of determinate being in respect of its unity, but through its proper principles does it have that unity. Whence the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 8 says that “simple beings, that do not have matter, do not have any cause of their unity, but at once are one;” but a composite does not have any cause save by resolving it into its principles, because matter is matter and form is form; therefore a composite of matter and form is one, because “this is act and that potency,” just as the Philosopher there says; for because there is not a middle between matter and its being a cause in its genus, nor between form and its being a cause in its genus, therefore do they per se make a one. But it is not so about ‘white man’, because one is not per se potency and the other act simply, but per accidens one is in potency to the other; and therefore per accidents do they make a one.

51. But how can things first diverse constitute a one per se? I say that those that are first diverse cannot constitute something ‘the same’, but the more they are diverse the more are they disposed to constituting a one per se; because for this, that from some things a one per se comes to be, there is not required identity of parts.

C. Matter has a Reality Diverse from Form

52. The third article is that matter has a reality distinct from form.

53. Now this is proved through the reason of the Philosopher, *Physics* I, who not only says that matter is, but that it really differs from form, because opposite is not changed into opposite but is corrupted and something the same remains under each of the terms; and the same thing is at the same time and is not; therefore does matter differ from its form, which is already corrupted and matter not, through the reason of the Philosopher.

54. It is said that the reason of the Philosopher is not that matter and form differ in an absolute thing, but only in a relative thing.

55. On the contrary: then every production in the genus of substance would be of less perfection than alteration, because through alteration is an absolute entity acquired.

56. If you say in another way, as certain say, that form not only differs from matter by a relative thing and not only is relation acquired through generation, but a positive entity, which however is not of a different idea from the essence of matter but is its intrinsic proper term (just as the example is posited of un-terminate and terminate dimension, which are not two essences but terminate dimension is the proper intrinsic term of it), nor are there two essences in the term of motion but an absolute entity (but not of another idea, in the term of change, from matter, but the intrinsic term of it). On the contrary: then all natural forms, which matter can receive, will be of the same idea as matter, and consequently of the same idea among themselves; and from this follows

further that there will not be a specific difference of natural things, nor consequently will there be contrary actions, so neither generation or corruption.

57. Further, some form is through creation (as the human intellectual soul), and consequently it will be of another idea and not of the same nature as matter; but although form may be compared to one and another agent, yet not from this does it have a different comparison with matter (for here it is not an escaping, save where faith compels positing this; but following reason, the comparison of form to matter does not vary because of comparison to one and another agent; therefore every form has a like comparison to matter); therefore because of extrinsic agent it will not be of a different or the same idea as matter. If therefore there be some form, perfecting matter essentially, which is of a different idea from matter, whatever can be the term of action of a created agent will be able to be the term of the uncreated agent (as, if a natural agent can induce the form of fire in matter, it follows that this can be done through the action of the uncreated agent); if therefore the form which God makes in matter be of a different idea from matter, it follows too that the form induced by the action of a natural agent is of a different idea from matter.

58. I concede therefore that matter is a thing other than form and of different idea.

59. But against this certain argue according to the Philosopher, at the end of *Metaphysics* 8, ‘the cause why from potency and act a one comes to be is not other than the mover from potency to act’. And the Commentator says in the same place that ‘it is only the agent, drawing out into act that which was in potency’; and the drawing out, according to him, from potency into act “does not bestow multitude but perfection.” Then it is argued: if by generation is acquired for matter another reality than it had before, then generation or drawing out from potency into act bestows not only perfection but multitude.

60. Therefore these say that the dictum of the Philosopher, namely that the composite is one because “this is act, that potency,” must be understood of potency preceding act, not that potency along with act make a one but, because the generated and composite was first in potency and was by the agent drawn out into act, that same thing which now is in act was before in potency.

61. But although this exposition be true, it is yet not sufficient. For if it were sufficient, any being at all would be truly simple; for not from this, that it was first in potency and now in act, is it one by unity of composition, because whiteness is not more composite if it was first in potency and now in act than if it had always been simple in act; if too it were created, it was first according to its whole self in potency and afterwards in act. For this way, which proceeds through this, that the same thing before generation is in potency and afterwards in act, does not show how from potency and act it becomes one, but how the same thing is what is sometimes in potency and sometimes in act. Whence the Philosopher there in *Metaphysics* 8 distinguishes between unity of identity and unity of composition, which is from units, for ‘things that do not have matter’ but are simple ‘are immediately one’; whence there is not a doubt there how something is one as in a composite from act and potency.

62. Therefore I say that potency is double: for in another way is the generable said to be in potency before generation and matter [said] to be in potency to form, just as in another way is the subject of generation said to be generated and the generable [said] to

be generated; for in the first way the subject is denominated by its form, or by a property, but in the second way the way denominates the term.

63. Whence it needs to be known that in things generable and corruptible there run together total objective potency and partial subjective [potency]. And from objective potency the agent draws to act that which is in objective potency, as to wit the term of generation, which is the composite, which whole was so in potency as when it is in act; and therefore it [the agent] bestows perfection and not multitude. But because this objective potency is founded on subjective potency, therefore another drawing out is concomitant, according to which actual entity is drawn out from that which was in subjective potency for receiving it; and therefore also now the drawing out does not bestow multitude but perfection: for the same form that is drawn out from the subjective potency of matter was before potentially in it. But if it be understood that the thing generating does not bestow multitude in act, it is false; for it bestows in act more things than there were before; for form is now in act which before was not in act.

64. Whence the potency, by which the total generable is in potency before it be generated, is objective potency, and then the generable is the term of the potency, but matter is in subjective potency in respect of form. For each potency is found when something is generated; for when water is corrupted and fire generated, while the water is being corrupted, the fire is there in potency, and also the matter of water in potency to the form of fire. But these potencies are so disposed in natural things that always the first is founded on the second, because really and naturally the composite is in potency because of pre-existing matter, which is something of it, because under the form of it, according to that of *Metaphysics* 7 ch.5: "In everything generated something must pre-exist, which is per se part of the generated."

65. If therefore we speak of potency according as the whole is in potency, then what draws out from potency into act does not bestow multitude, because that same thing which before was in potency is afterwards in act; but it bestows perfection, because first it had imperfect being (because in potency), and now perfect being (because in act). And because everything generated has a part pre-existing, in which is induced some form *de novo*, therefore the drawing out of that subjective potency to act, which it receives, bestows multitude, and not only perfection, because it bestows some reality on matter which before was not in matter, since it was before under privation of it and now not.

66. It is plain therefore that the Commentator sayss true, but however it is not sufficient for the intention of the Philosopher. Whence just as only the agent is cause why the composite is first in potency, afterwards comes to be in act, so it alone is cause why the matter existing before in potency to form afterwards comes to be in act under it, and comes to be from them a one. For of this sort of unity there is no intrinsic cause save because "this is act and that potency."

67. And then already there is not a doubt, because this is first known: for just as it is per se known that simple being is per se one in its mode, so it is that composite being is in its mode one; nor is there any cause except because 'this is matter and that form', just as there is not any cause why there are such intrinsic causes constituting a caused thing.

68. Just as therefore simple being in its whole self is a being and one, so a being composed from essential principles (of which sort are matter and form, which alone are of a nature to constitute some being per se) is per se one, and this is by some unity of another idea than unity of simplicity: so from this entity there is another entity. Whence

just as one in common follows being in common (so that there is no middle more known to us for demonstrating this, nor perhaps any middle different in thing from the quiddity of the extremes), thus on single beings, according to their proper ranks, there follows immediately their proper unity. Just as therefore not every entity is of one idea, so not every unity either; nor is there another reason for diverse unity save the diverse idea of entity that it follows.

II. To the Principal Arguments

69. To the first principal reason [nn.2-3], when it is said according to the Philosopher that ‘matter is not a what, nor a what sort, nor a how much, nor any of the things by which being is determined’, I say that this is not said according to the intention of the Philosopher, but this is said in opposing for the false part, which appears from the following epilogue “for those indeed so intending,” and from his opposition, because at once he argues for the opposite: “But it is impossible etc.,” but now Aristotle is not accustomed to place between arguments pro and con a determination of the question without any mark of solution.

70. If you say that the Philosopher is expounding the idea of matter when he says [n.2], “Now I say that matter, which according to itself is neither a what, nor a how much etc.” I say that he is expounding the idea of matter according to the intention of others, for whom he first argued.

71. In another way it can be said (if there be contest about words) that matter “is not any of those things that can determine being,” because it is only a determinable; although however it may not be an entity determinative nor terminative, it is yet an entity determinable.

72. But if it is argued (as it seems) from this that all things are predicated of matter denominatively, therefore to none is it the same essentially, because denominative predication is distinguished from essential by this, that in it one extreme is not the essence nor of the essence of the other, – I say that this is not conclusive in denominative predication, nor does it seem to be for them, because Aristotle in *Metaphysics* 9 ch.7 maintains that matter is denominatively predicated of the composite, because “it is not that but that-ly;” therefore he does not understand that it is the subject properly of denominative predication in respect of everything else, because denominative predications do not properly convert, just as neither do essential ones, from *Posterior Analytics* I; because matter is predicated of the whole, therefore the whole, as it seems, is not predicated of a part, and so not all things are denominatively predicated of matter. Similarly, if matter is denominatively predicated of the whole, and ‘nothing’ is neither predicated of anything nor denominates it, therefore the opposite follows from denominative predication.

73. I reply, therefore, that neither is a part predicated properly of a whole nor contrariwise, but in some way denominatively, just as ‘matter is not man but human’, and contrariwise ‘man is not matter but enmattered’, ‘not soul, but ensouled’. However, the part is not predicated of the whole denominatively as the Philosopher in the *Categories* speaks of the denominative predication of accidents, which are accident to something that is of another nature; and so a part is not other simply than the whole, hence it is not predicated denominatively by an extrinsic predication of another genus, but by

‘comingling’ that to whose nature it belongs.⁴⁷ And so too in a conjunction essential predications are denominative, as ‘man is an animal’ because quiddity is not predicated there as quiddity, but quiddity as it ‘co-mingles’.⁴⁸

74. Hence it is necessary to know that denominatives are properly said to be what are called cases relative to another, as is plain in the *Categories*. And this case can be either of accident to subject, or of form to supposit of the same nature. And according to this there is a double denominative predication: one of accident denominating a subject,⁴⁹ another of form not taken in the abstract, nor according to idea of quiddity absolutely, but as it were in the concrete through the declension of a form to a supposit of its nature;⁵⁰ and in this way are all superiors said of inferiors in essential predication;⁵¹ and to the extent that matter pertains to the essence of the composite, it can thus be predicated of the composite.⁵²

75. To the second [n.4], when it is argued that ‘that which is moved is’, it must be said that according to the Commentator [Averroes] it is some necessary accident, as privation in respect of matter; and so although it happen that man build, yet it is necessarily required that a builder, whose it is first ‘to build’, be a man having in his mind the art of building. Thus an actual entity is a necessary condition of the movable, although perhaps not a proximate one, from *Physics* III: “Bronze not insofar as bronze, but insofar as in potency a statue, is moved;” but to the subject of generation actual existence or entity is not necessary, and this as to generation universally. But whether because of plurality of forms it be necessary for the subject of generation to have some act, about this below. Hence let it be understood, if you wish, of complete actuality, which always is necessary for the movable.

76. To the other [n.6] it must be said that matter is neither act nor the composite properly speaking (whether ‘act’ be said from ‘to act’ or from this that ‘actuates’ something), but is a middle and a positive entity which is in potency so that it may be perfected by another entity; hence I concede that matter is a simple entity but not pure potency.

77. And when it is argued that not, ‘because matter is knowable by analogy, therefore it is not any simple entity but pure potency’, I say, first, that the reasoning does not conclude, because there the Philosopher is speaking of nature in common, as it is per se the principle of natural change. Hence the Philosopher, when defining motion in *Physics* III, that ‘it is the act of the movable’ etc., does not distinguish it from generation but that definition agrees with generation, and therefore he is speaking in common there of change; but in *Physics* V he is distinguishing change from motion. If therefore from

⁴⁷ ‘Man is bodily’ is predicated of man as to his essence, but ‘man is white’ is not predicated of him as to his essence, for while having a body is of the essence of man, being white is not. Thus ‘bodily’ is said to ‘comeingle’ with ‘man’ because it belongs to man as such; but ‘white’ is not said to comeingle because it does not in that way belong to man (man can be black or brown etc. as well as white).

⁴⁸ To say ‘man is an animal’ is not to say ‘man is animality’, because it does not predicate of man the quiddity in the abstract but as it ‘comingles’ it, that is, as it ‘concretizes’ it (as we might say) to the particular.

⁴⁹ As ‘George is clever’.

⁵⁰ As ‘George is a man’ and not as ‘George is manhood’.

⁵¹ ‘Man’ as said of ‘George’ in ‘George is a man’ is a higher or general term said of a particular, or lower term.

⁵² Man is a composite of matter and form, or body and soul, and so man can be said to be material and bodily even though he is more than matter merely and more than body merely.

this – that matter is the subject of generation and so knowable according to analogy with form – it is argued that matter is not a simple entity, in the same way can it be argued about the subject of alteration.

78. I respond therefore that absolute knowability is not complete of anything insofar as it is compared, as is plain of bronze and a statue in potency: but he is speaking of matter there as it is principle of change; and this is insofar as it is capable of form through change; therefore it is then known as a principle, and thus is known in analogy to form, though it have another absolute conception. Hence if the intellect absolutely could know matter in itself without a relation, yet not as it is a principle of change save in analogy to form, because thus is it receptive of form. Not thus too can the subject of another change be known except in respect to form.

79. But is it possible for matter to be known absolutely, without analogy to form [n.5]? I say that yes, because just as it is an entity prior to form, so is it a certain intelligible prior to form; but however by us it cannot be known save in analogy to form, because of the defect of our intellect; nor too can form be known by us save according to analogy, because we are conducted from known sensibles to knowledge of form through sensible operations. Now matter is principle of no sensible operation; and therefore, further, from succeeding forms, which are principles of other operations, we conclude that it has to them an analogy as receptive to received. But yet by an angel and by a perfect intellect it can be known absolutely; but not by our intellect for this present state, which is neither moved by the greatest nor by the smallest things: not by the greatest, because of its imperfection, namely of our intellect; not by the smallest and imperfect, because of its imperfection, but also perhaps because of their imperfection.

80. To the other it is plain that what is less than the purely potential is nothing.

81. And to the others too it is plain through what has been said.

Thirteenth Distinction

Single Question

Whether Light Generates Illuming as its Proper Sensible Species

1. About the thirteenth distinction I ask at the same time about light [*lux*] and about illuming [*lumen*], and I ask^a one question: whether light generates illuming as its proper sensible species.⁵³

a. [*Interpolation*] In this thirteenth distinction, where the Master deals with the distinction of created things, and first of light, which was produced on the first day, the question is asked:

2. That not:

⁵³ The distinction Scotus means here is between light as the source of light (*lux*), direct or reflected, and light as illumination of the medium, or in brief ‘illuming’ (*lumen*). The first is what we see, as the lighted candle, the switched-on street lamp, the lit surface of a table or a road. The second is the medium through which we see the things thus lit. The two are the same, for both are light, and not the same, for the first is seen and not seen through, while the second is seen through and not seen.

Augustine *Literal Commentary on Genesis* 7.15.n.21 says, “The soul ministers bodies through light and air” etc.

3. Further, illumining generates substance, as is plain of fire [sc. which can be generated by the illumining of the sun]; therefore it is a substance.

4. Further, illumining is refracted and reflected; therefore it is a body, because these are properties of body.

5. Further, that it is not the species:

Because it denominates the medium; not so does the species of color [sc. air is said to be illumined but not to be colored].

6. It also excludes the opposite, namely darkness; not so the species, because the species of opposites are together (as the species of white and black are together in the medium).

8. The opposite:

Light is of itself sensible (*On the Soul* 2.7.418b4-17, 419a1-6); therefore it has some sensible species; not other than illumining; therefore etc.

I. To the Question

9. Here three things need to be seen: first what light is; second what illumining is; third, how illumining is generated by light.

A. What Light is

10. About the first I say that light cannot be set down as a substance, because it is a per se sensible; not so substance;^a therefore etc.

a. [*Interpolation*] unless per accidens; the thing is plain in the sacrament of the altar after consecration, where there is no substance of bread but it is transubstantiated into the body of Christ, and yet there remains there whatever was before apprehensible by some sense.

11. Light also is an accident in something, therefore in nothing is it a substance (for what is truly a substance is not accident to anything, from *Physics* 1.3.186b4-5). The antecedent is plain, because if in fire light were the substantial form, – either then it would be the ultimate specific difference, or some more imperfect [difference] that would be in potency to specific form: not in the first way, because then everything that had light would be of the same species; not in the second way, because then this form would be more imperfect than the specific form of fire, and so would not be the substantial form of any celestial body, in which there is no substantial form more imperfect than elementary form.

12. Third: it is probable that some active form follows the substantial form of the celestial body, just as active qualities follow the substantial forms of generable and corruptible things; but there is not another quality, consequent to the substantial form of the celestial body, than light (it is confirmed through Damascene *Orthodox Faith* ch.8; look for it: [“But the illumining generated by fire, inseparably and in it always remaining, does not have its own hypostasis (that is, subsistence) besides fire; for it is a natural quality of fire”]).

B. What Illumining is

13. About the second [n.9] I say that illumining is not a complete substance, that is, per se subsistent: because neither is it spiritual, since it is extensible, – nor corporeal, because then there would be two bodies in the same place; for illumining is with the whole air.

14. Nor must the air be moved locally with illumining arriving, nor moved with illumining receding and not arriving, because then in the illumined medium there would not be respiration of air if that body were locally moved away because of the illumining. Nor too is illumining substantial form, because that to which it is accidental [e.g. air] remains perfect in species when it recedes, as is apparent of air sometimes illumined, sometimes dark. Nor is it matter (it is plain), nor anything pertaining to the genus of substance; nor is it likely that it pertain to some other genus besides to the genus of quality.

15. Now since the genus of quality, as to its third species [*Categories* 8.9a28-10a10], is distinguished into sensible quality and into quality that is a species or intention of sensible quality, it is necessary to note that^a intention is not called here what sense intends (because in this way the object would be an intention), but intention is called here that by which – as by formal principle – sense tends to an object; and just as whatever is a sign is a thing (according to Augustine *On Christian Doctrine* 2.1. n.1), though not conversely (and therefore in distinction of thing and sign thing is taken for that thing which is not a sign, though that which is a sign be also a thing), so in distinction of thing and intention, although intention be a thing (and perhaps a sensible) to which sense can tend, yet that is called ‘intention’ which is not only a thing to which sense tends, but is the idea of tending to another of which it is the proper likeness. In this way I say that illumining is properly the intention or sensible species of light itself.

a. [*Interpolation*; cf. *Rep.* II A d.13] this noun ‘intention’ is equivocal: in one way it is called an act of will, in another way the formal idea in a thing (as the intention of a thing from which is taken the genus differs from the intention from which is taken the difference); in a third way it is called a concept, in a fourth way it is called the idea of tending to an object (as a likeness is said to be the idea tending to that of which it is). Hence...

16. Which is proved: because⁵⁴ if it were not an intention, then a sensible placed on the sense would impede sense, because what is only sensible and not an idea of sensing, if it be put on the sense, impedes sensation (because ‘a sensible placed on a sense is not sensed’ *On the Soul* 2.7.419a11-13, 28-30, 9.421b17-18), and so illumining placed on the eye would prevent it seeing; but this is false and against the Commentator [Averroes] on *Sense and Sensibles* chs.2, 3, where he maintains that a proper illumining in the eye is necessary for this that it receive the species of colors and see.

17. This way is posited, that just as visible light is prior naturally to color, so too is its species prior naturally to the species of color, and this both in perfecting the medium (so that a non-illumined medium has no capacity for perceiving colors) and in perfecting sight (so that a non-illumined organ is not visually proximate).

C. How Illumining is Generated by Light

⁵⁴ The Vatican editors note that Scotus wrote here ‘and because’, noting further that in the parallel place in the *Lectura* (II d.13 nn.16-17) two proofs are given.

18. And as to the third article [n.9], which makes this second clear, it must be noted that illumining is generated by light according to a threefold ray, namely according to ray direct, refracted, and reflected (according to Alhazen in his *Optics* 7.1 n.1).⁵⁵

19. Direct ray is what is diffused by a luminous body in a medium of the same transparency in direct line, and co-terminates at the terminating or terminated body as long as the power of the luminous lasts. A reflex ray is one that, when an opaque body occurs (before the active power of the luminous is terminated), is diffused to the opposed side, not from choice but naturally, because a natural agent, whose active power is not totally exhausted in direct line, acts as much as it can, – and when it cannot act in a straight line it acts in an oblique one. A refracted ray is one that, when a medium of different transparency (but not completely opaque) intervenes, is multiplied in the medium, but not in a straight line but an angle there is incident; but when a more dense medium intervenes the ray is refracted toward the perpendicular, – because from the fact that the perpendicular is strongest in acting (hence it is not broken), for acting on a denser medium a position is required closer to the perpendicular ray (such is the position of a ray refracted to the perpendicular); and when a rarer medium intervenes, the ray is refracted away from the perpendicular, on account of the opposite cause.⁵⁶

20. I say then that illumining multiplied according to these three rays is immediately generated by light itself, – and is also immediately a sensible species of light itself.

21. About direct ray it is plain. About reflex ray it is proved, first because through that ray a thing is seen in itself and not in any species impressed by a reflecting mirror; second because (look for the conclusion about this, which is [nn.24-27]). In the same way too through a refracted ray is the thing itself seen (multiplying itself), and not any species of the thing seen.

22. And just as these three primary illumings [n.20], diffused by multiplication, are immediately species of the generated light, perhaps they are likewise as immediately generated by it, speaking of immediacy to cause, not excluding the order of effects to be ordered in respect of the same cause.

23. But besides these, there is another illumining, a secondary one (which is called ‘accidental illumining), of the sort where there is a shadow; for in this is an actual shadow distinguished from darkness, because darkness is privation of illumining both primary and secondary, but a shadow is not a privation of secondary illumining. Now this secondary illumining, although it be sometimes diffused by reflection, is yet not from a polished body,⁵⁷ because reflection from such a body is the generation of a primary ray, because it is immediately a species of the generating light; but not so this secondary illumining, it rather is generated by the primary illumining, – so that if per impossibile reflection were to remain in the illumining of the impressing ray, it would generate this secondary illumining

⁵⁵ “Sight comprehends visibles in three ways, namely directly, by reflection from smooth bodies, and by refraction on the other side of transparent bodies that differ in transparency from the transparency of the air, and sight comprehends nothing from visibles save in one of these three ways...” Also *ibid.* 4.1 n.1 “The acquisition of sight is diversified in three ways: for either directly... or through reflection on polished bodies, or through penetration, as in rare bodies whose rarity is not like the rarity of air...”

⁵⁶ The description here (whatever may be said about the proposed reason) is correct. A ray of light coming from the (less dense) air and falling at an angle on the (more dense) water is bent inwards, as it were, toward the perpendicular, and vice versa when coming from water into air.

⁵⁷ A mirror, in other words.

spherically (or hemispherically): and not so would reflected illuming be generated by a primary ray, of which sort is the reflection from a polished body.

Therefore all illuming is a species; but primary illuming is a species of the generating light, – secondary illuming a species of primary illuming.

24. Herefrom is it apparent to the arguments that could be made against this part [nn.20-23], because although illuming is seen, it will not be a visible species.

Response:

Some intense species, notwithstanding that it be an intention and species of some other visible, can yet be visible in itself, as the Commentator says on *Sense and Thing Sensed* 2.437a23-24 [Averroes, *Paraphrase* ch.3], “when illuming is reflected toward green plants, the walls appear colored.”⁵⁸

25. Likewise, species are not visible save when they are stopped at opaque bodies, so that things not contiguous with opaque bodies cannot generate their⁵⁹ species whereby they may be seen (as the species of color is not seen while it is in the medium); but when [a species] be in contact with the opaque, then it can be seen, as is plain about a ray passing through colored glass: the color appears on the wall where the ray is stopped and [the wall] is seen colored like the glass, and yet in the medium that colored ray was not visible; nor yet because of this is that red, which appears on the wall, denied to be a species, because the eye present there, if the red were placed before it, would see the red glass or the redness of the glass.

26. Hence this is false: ‘that which is the intention of the visible object is not visible’; but this is true: ‘every intention is not only visible but is the idea seeing’. Hence the form illumining the moon is illuming (and not light, because it is not a body that has its term in the moon⁶⁰), and yet it is sensible and a species of light.

27. Likewise, from Aristotle at the beginning of *Sense and Thing Sensed* 2.437a23-24, “the gleam emitted from an eye moved in darkness is visible,” and yet it is a species of light only.

28. In the same way, illuming not terminated at the opaque is not seen. Which is apparent: first, because solar rays do not appear at night, which however intercept between us and the sky above the tip of the shadowy pyramid of the earth;⁶¹ second, because he who is in an opaque and dark prison, where a solar ray would pass through apertures opposite, would not see, – so that, with [the solar ray] not reflecting itself toward the opaque [room], he would not see the ray, if those corpuscles are not broken [i.e. if the light rays, corpuscles or not, are not refracted or reflected].

⁵⁸ The Vatican editors cite Averroes thus: “When lucid clouds [*sic*] pass through green plants, many times are the walls colored by the color of those plants.”

⁵⁹ The Vatican editors have ‘sui’ or ‘of itself’, which is hard to make sense of in context. One of the mss. has ‘suas’ which seems to make better sense and is here translated.

⁶⁰ The light of the moon is of course reflection from the sun, and so does not have its source, or its originating term, in the moon.

⁶¹ Aristotle is describing the way that the sun lights up only a hemisphere of the earth at any given time and casts a shadow of the earth beyond in the form of a tapering cone. The tip of this shadow, where the rays meet again (or ‘are intercepted’), is reached well beyond the earth itself, and indeed beyond the moon, as is evident from an eclipse of the moon.

29. Likewise, if the illuminated medium were infinite and not ended at an opaque body, nothing would be seen with the sun being above the horizon, because there would not be any ending.

30. Illuming therefore has the same condition that other principal species of colors have as to being seen and not seen; and just as the principal species of colors, namely which are multiplied in rays, can generate other secondary accidental [ones] not multiplied in rays and seen through them (and yet it is not denied that those ‘first ones’ [sc. first ones generated, not first ones generating] are intentions, insofar as they are simply likenesses of the first colors generating), – so in the matter at hand.

31. But that the whole ray is generated immediately by the light and not one part of the ray by another [n.20] is proved:

Because if it be posited that illuming in one part of the medium generates illuming from itself, any point of illuming multiplies itself spherically (because every active natural [illuming] acts on the surrounding medium spherically, if it be on every part equally disposed), and if it have an opaque obstacle on one part of itself, at any rate it multiplies itself hemi-spherically; therefore, in the same way, if illuming were generating in respect of another illuming, from the fact it does not have something opaque impeding it on any part of itself, it multiplies itself spherically, – and so just as the principal illuming generates further another illuming, a secondary one, indirect, so would it be generated from every part of a distant ray, which is against sense.⁶²

32. Besides, any luminous [body] can act at a distance in place, because if it could not act except where it was in place, it could only illuminate something indivisible.⁶³ But if it is present, in idea of agent, to something spatially distant, then – and by parity of reasoning – to the whole medium, up to as great a distance as its power is sufficient for; and if it is present to the whole and can cause illuming in the whole, then it does cause because [it is] the illuming generated from itself (granted that it could cause another illuming); however the present luminary is of greater power than the illuming generated, and so the illuming itself will come first in acting on a remote part.⁶⁴

II. To the Principal Arguments

33. To the arguments.

To the first [n.2] I say that Augustine takes light there for a subtle body (to wit, for fire, which is the more subtle body in a mixed body, or for some subtle body very much agreeing with fire in nature), just as also Scripture says that light was made on the first day: not that then an accident came to be without a subject, but a luminous body then came to be whose ‘form more known’ was light; and so an unknown subject is described through a more known term.

⁶² The point seems to be that the rays that spread out from a light source do not spread out in like manner from themselves in further rays. Rays spread out from a light source (initial or reflected), not from each other.

⁶³ The point seems to be that since place is the surface of the containing body, and surface is an indivisible quantity, if light can only illumine the place where it is, it would only illumine that indivisible quantity, which is plainly false.

⁶⁴ The Vatican editors remark that the proof in these two paragraphs, nn.31-32, was forgotten here or omitted and placed by Scotus after n.39 at the end of the question (the same thing, they say, has happened elsewhere). They accordingly restore it to its place here.

34. To the second [n.3] I say that the ‘altering agent’ generates at the end of the alteration, and not the quality by which it generates.

35. To the third [n.4] I say that these are metaphorically said of light, as is plain from Avicenna *On the Soul* p.3 ch.2.⁶⁵ For not some same thing proceeds directly as by local motion, and yet sometimes it is turned obliquely (by fracting or refracting), but when the active power is not totally used up (that is, has not caused as much as it can cause), then further, if it cannot then further act according to a straight line (according to which nature acts most of all, because that [a straight line] is shortest and most effective for acting), it then acts according to another line nearer to this (and it refracted or reflex [n.19]) if it cannot act further, reacting on the same subject it acted on before, causing however there, with what was first caused, something simply more imperfect.

36. And if you object that with a prior more perfect caused thing there cannot be a later more imperfect caused thing, and so with the whole medium illuminated by the primary ray there cannot be light, nor even with the medium illuminated by a direct ray can there be a reflex ray, – I say that the falsity of the conclusion is apparent to sense. For it is plain that if a ray of the sun fall on water and be reflected into some dark place where there is not any direct ray, sense says that reflection is happening right up to that dark place; for it would not come to be there unless first a reflex ray were in the medium illuminated by a direct ray. In the same way sense says that a secondary illuming (or the species of a primary illuming) is diffused by the primary illuming (contiguous with some opaque body) right up to the eye; otherwise that primary illuming would not be seen, and yet that primary illuming is through the whole medium. Then therefore must that proposition be denied: ‘where a more perfect form is, there any more imperfect form cannot be multiplied (or a species, which is a more imperfect form)’.

37. To the other arguments, which are against the species or against the intention [nn.5-7].

I say to the first [n.5] that every accident perhaps could denominate its subject in which it is, if it were an ‘imposed denominating term’ which would signify a denomination agreeing with such a form in respect of such subject; in this way is a denominative term not imposed by species of colors, because denominatives imposed by colors denominate the subject having the colors according to real being. But if there were an ‘imposed denominative’ that would denominate that a subject has a form according to intentional being (not according to real being), the medium could well be denominated by such a name of ‘white’; such is imposed by the illuming, and perhaps more here than in colors, because of the greater perfection and evidence of this sort of intention than of other visible intentions.

38. As to what is added secondly about the opposite [darkness, n.6], I say that one illuming does not exclude another illuming of different idea, as the illuming of the sun does not exclude the illuming of the moon in the same part of the medium, or of another star, – just as neither does the species of black exclude the species of white (or conversely) in the same part of the medium; but just as any illuming whatever excludes

⁶⁵ “For as to this that we say, that a ray ‘descends’ or ‘exits’ or ‘enters’, they are transumptive names, because nothing of this does it [a ray] have... But that a ray is resplendent is also a transumptive word: for when a body is illuminated and is polished, there is wont to be illuminated by it another body opposite to it, in such way that it not be locally moved to it.”

darkness from the medium, which is its ‘privation’ (not ‘contrary’ or ‘disparate’), so the species of any color whatever excludes the privation of that color in the medium.

39. To the third [n.7] I concede that it [illuminating] is a thing and can have a real effect; it is yet not so a thing that it cannot be an intention, because with its own idea stands that it is per se the idea of tending to the object, and this suffices for the idea of intention.

Fourteenth Distinction

Question One

Whether a Celestial Body is a Simple Essence

1. About the fourteenth distinction I ask whether a celestial body is a simple essence.^a

a. [*Interpolation*] About this fourteenth distinction, in which the Master deals with the work of the second day (namely about celestial nature) three things are asked: first, whether the celestial body is a simple essence; second, whether any heaven is movable by the starry heaven; third, whether the stars act on things here below. As to the first...

2. One answer seems it must be given according to theologians, another according to philosophers.

I. According to the Philosophers⁶⁶

3. According to the intention of the Philosopher, since every passive potency of matter is a potency of contradiction,⁶⁷ from *Metaphysics* 9.8.1050b6-27, and (*ibid.*) since anything whatever sempiternal is necessary and so in no way in potency of contradiction, and the heaven according to him is eternal, – it follows (according to him) that there is nothing in it [the heaven] that is in potency of contradiction; and as a consequence not possessed of matter either, because if it did have matter it would be corruptible formally just like fire. For given that there would not be any agent outside that could corrupt it (‘because it does not have a contrary’ [Averroes *Metaphysics* 12 com.41]), this would only take away its having within a principle of corruption, namely matter (whereby a thing is able to be and not to be), like fire. And in this does that Averroes in his treatise *On the Substance of the World* seem to grasp Aristotle’s intention better than others who posit matter in the heavens.

4. For demonstrating, however, the incorruptibility of the heaven of itself (which is here supposed) it is necessary to proceed according to the way of Aristotle, *On the Heaven* 1.2.268b13-269a32, 3.270a12-b25, and in this to show that it is not composed of any elementary nature; and with this incorruptibility shown, the lack of matter will be shown, unless an incorruptible form could necessarily actuate a matter able of itself to lack that form, so that the disposition of each would not be necessary but only on the part

⁶⁶ This subtitle is not in the Vatican edition; it has been added for perspicuity by the translator.

⁶⁷ Sc. possible both to be and not to be.

of form, – and, conversely, as far as is on the part of matter, it would be contingent: whereby it is not alike concerning the necessary inherence of some accident in a subject, where necessity is not on the part of both extremes.

5. But if it be said [Henry of Ghent, *Quodl.* IV q.16c] that that [celestial] matter is not of same idea with matters susceptible of diverse forms, and therefore it cannot of itself be changed from one form to another – this seems unacceptable:^a

First indeed it seems difficult to assign whence there be this difference of idea in this matter and that, because then there would be^b two first matters of different idea; the consequent is false, therefore also the antecedent. Proof of the falsity of the consequent: there are not two first ends nor two first efficient of different idea; therefore likewise neither two first matters of different idea.

a. [*Interpolation*] Against that which is said ‘there is no matter of the same idea here and there’.

b. [*Interpolation*, in place of ‘then there would be’] and I prove by reason that it is impossible that for it to be posited that matter here and there are of different idea, because if so, then it would follow that there will be...

6. Second, given this difference, at any rate this matter [in the heavens] is in potency to this form and to privation of this form, so that this matter is of itself in potency of contradiction although it not be posited what potency of form it is in; but now matter is not the per se reason for corruptibility insofar as it is in potency to a form other than what it has, but insofar as it is in potency to privation of the form that it does have.

7. Likewise, the Philosopher only posits matter because of potentiality for change; in the heaven there is only potentiality for change to a ‘where’.

8. If it be said [Richard of Middleton, *Sent.* II d.12 q.8 ad4] that the matter in the heaven is not in potency of contradiction, because its form completes the whole appetite of it, – on the contrary: no form completes the whole appetite of its matter in respect of another form save because it gives an act opposed to privation of that form; but the form of the heaven does not give an act opposed to privation of the form of fire; therefore privation of the form of fire remains there. Proof of the minor: no form gives an act opposed to privation of any form whatever unless it contain in itself all forms, at least virtually; but the form of the heaven does not thus contain all forms, because not the intellectual soul; therefore etc.

9. From this follows further that according to the philosophers the heaven would not be animated formally, because then either the heaven would be essentially the soul alone, and this an intellectual one (because they [the philosophers] did not posit a soul there save an intellectual one), and so the intellect by itself would be a quantity (which is unintelligible, for the heaven, as is plain, is formally a quantum), – or besides the soul which is of the essence of the heaven, there will be something else ‘per se perfectible by soul’, and so there would be a passive potency there and a potency of contradiction, and so the heaven would not be sempiternal and necessary; hence, whether the Philosopher [*On the Heaven* 2.2.285a29-30] or the Commentator [Averroes *On the Heaven* 2 com.61, *Metaphysics* 8 com.12, com.41, *Substance of the World* ch.2] posit the heaven animated formally by a soul that is per se of the essence of the heaven, he seems at once to depart from the first position held before [n.3].

10. Whatever may be about Averroes, let us not say that Aristotle departed from the first position; nor do his words compel imputing this to him, because wherever he speaks of ‘soul’ let it be expounded as to the condition whereby the soul is mover, not whereby it is form, because the soul is the intelligence properly motive of this sphere, conjoined to this as proper mover (such is only one of one thing; this would be proved by Avicenna, who plainly distinguishes between the first intelligence produced and the soul of the first sphere, – but there is no necessity for so great a plurality).

11. In favor of this is the Philosopher, *Physics* 8.5.257b12-13, who distinguishes the ‘moved of itself’ into two, one of which is a moved only and the other is a mover only. That ‘distinguishable’ is composite of two units, namely mover and movable, – and this truly moves and that is truly moved; but in us the soul does not move but is the reason of moving only, therefore it is moved per accidens, because it is the form of the moved – that there [the mover in the heaven] is moved neither per se nor per accidens.

II. According to the Theologians⁶⁸

12. According to the theologians matter is to be posited there [in the heavens], because that ‘chaos’, which is posited by them to have reached up to the empyrean heaven [Aquinas, Bonaventure], was the matter of all corporeal things was contained by the empyrean heaven; and also let matter be posited – in itself and as far as is of itself – of the same idea.

13. And thus the theologians have to disagree with the Philosopher in this proposition ‘the heaven is necessary and incorruptible’ [n.3]; for as far as is of its matter it would be simply corruptible, because there would be in it the potency for the contrary; because however the form of the heaven does not have a contrary able to overcome this form [n.3], therefore it cannot be corrupted by the natural agent from which it receives this form, or corrupted into fire or water.

14. But then it seems that at least the heaven could corrupt and convert fire into the heaven, because the active power of the heaven exceeds the form of fire (and it is from the form of the heaven), and the matter of fire is also capable of the form of the heaven; therefore it can be changed to be [it] by such agent. Or perhaps the heaven cannot alter an element to the qualities fitting such heavenly body, and yet that form so much dominates the matter that it cannot be altered by anything other (by receiving passing impressions), and consequently not corrupted either.

15. But as to animation [sc. of the heaven], there seems to be a doubt, because Augustine *Enchiridion* ch.15 n.58 says doubtfully, “Nor do I hold it certain whether the sun and moon and all the stars pertain to that supernal city, albeit to not a few do the shining bodies seem not to be with intelligence.”

16. Similarly [Augustine] *Literal Commentary on Genesis* 2.18 n.38; look for it [“It is wont also to be asked whether these conspicuous luminaries of the heaven be bodies only or have certain rulers their spirits; and if they do, whether by them they are also vitally inspired as flesh is animated by the souls of animals... Which, although it cannot be easily understood, yet I think in the process of treating of the Scriptures more

⁶⁸ This subtitle is not in the Vatican edition; it has been added for perspicuity by the translator.

opportune places can occur ... But now, with the moderation of pious gravity preserved, we should believe nothing rashly about a matter obscure.”]

17. And in *Retractions* 1.11 n.4, where he makes mention of that which is said in [*Genesis*] ch.5, he seems to say that the heaven has a soul; what *ibid.* ch.10 says, “not retracted as false,” where he says, “That this world is an animate thing I have neither by authority nor reason been able to track down;” not however for this reason does he deny it.

18. Hence it seems manifest that in no book – written before the book of *Retractions* – did he assert what in the book *Retractions* he retracts. Therefore that authority which is adduced from Augustine’s book *On Recognizing True Life* [in fact by Honorius of Autun] is of no value: “Now those who say that the heavens are rational are deservedly themselves irrational.” It is agreed too that that book is not Augustine’s (or that he made it after the book of *Retractions*), because nowhere does Augustine seem to have asserted what in the book of *Retractions* is denied.

19. Likewise Jerome on *Isaiah* 1.2 ‘Hear, O heavens’ says that it is speaking to non-animate things.

20. Likewise the Greek Augustine, namely Damascene *Orthodox Faith* ch.20, asserts that the heavens are not alive.

21. A reason for this is posited, because that soul would in vain be united to such a body from which it does not have sense, nor consequently does it acquire any perfection from a body [d.11 n.7].

22. But this does not fittingly said, that form be united to matter so as to receive perfection from matter, but rather so that it communicate perfection to matter; nay more principally, so that the whole composed of these may be perfect.

23. Response: a form united to matter receives some perfection from it; otherwise the blessed soul would in vain be united to the body, because it will not acquire perfection from the body [d.11 n.8].

III. Scotus’ Opinion⁶⁹

24. Briefly: if the heavens be inanimate, this is a thing believed, not proved by reason, because there is no condition in that so perfect body manifestly appearing to be repugnant to animation of body.

Question Two

Whether there is any Movable Heaven other than the Starry Heaven

25. Second, I ask about the motion of the heavens, whether there be any movable heaven other than the starry heaven.

26. That there is not:

In *Genesis* 1.17 it is said of the stars that ‘God placed them in the firmament of the heaven’; therefore all the stars are in one firmament.

27. Further, by reason:

⁶⁹ This subtitle is not in the Vatican edition; it has been added for perspicuity by the translator.

“The continuous is that of which the motion is one,” according to the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 5.6.1016a5-6; now the motion of any inferior heaven is one with the superior heaven, because any inferior heaven – if it be posited – is moved with diurnal motion [sc. from East to West] and also with other motions proper to the superior heavens, if others be posited; therefore any inferior heaven, if it be posited, is continuous with the whole superior heaven.

28. Further, the whole heaven other than a star is of itself and according to itself uniform; therefore because of it there is no need to posit any motion, because perhaps one part present does the same as another; no motion therefore is necessary save the motion of a star. But the motions proper to stars seem they can be saved in one heaven, just as also can many proper motions be saved in water or in air; therefore etc.

29. The opposite:

The stars are moved in diverse ways, therefore they have diverse heavens; because if not, a star would be moved by its proper motion (without motion of the orb), and so either there would be a vacuum in the heaven, or a rending of the orb, or two bodies together [n.31].

I. To the Question

30. For seeing about the number of the heavens, first must that be shown in which all astronomers agree, secondly it must be seen about that in which some with some and others with others disagree.

A. All Astronomers Agree that there are at least Nine Heavens

31. As to the first.

Here it must be supposed that no star has a proper local motion, that is, that it is not moved with a motion other than with the motion of the orb in which it is located: for if it sometimes left the part of the orb in which it is and moved to another part, either nothing would succeed to it (and so there would be a vacuum), or something else would succeed to it (and so the heavenly body could be rarefied or condensed, or could be rent and, when the rending body recedes, again be continued), or if none of these be conceded, it follows that a moved star is always together with another moving body. – This is the meaning of Aristotle, *On the Heaven* 2.8.290a29-35, “If nature had given a power of progress to the stars, etc.” [sc. instruments to progress with, like feet or wings].

32. On this supposition, it follows that all stars whatever are not equally distant from each other, nor are in the same heaven, – for different distances at different times cannot be by motion proper to the star but only by motion of the heaven in which it is; and if star be differently distant from star, then the heaven of this one is moved differently from the heaven of that one, and so there is a different heaven for this one and that one.

33. Now seven stars [sc. the seven planets known at Scotus’ time] are moved differently, so that they are not always equally distant from the fixed stars, which are therefore called ‘fixed’ because they are always equally distant from each other and keep the same site and figure; and so in respect of all those fixed [stars] it is not necessary to posit but one heaven. And those seven are not among themselves always equally distant.

34. Let these two facts, about the unequal distance of the planets among themselves and relative to the others, be supposed according to the consideration [observation] of astronomers: for it is possible to be get certainty about the places of the planets through instruments, one of which – namely of armillary spheres – Ptolemy treats of in the *Almagest*, statement 5 ch.1.

35. And if it is objected that ‘the visual ray is refracted because of diversity of mediums, and so it does not give certainty about the true place of a star’, – at least it will give certainty about the visible place of a star; and if the stars be equally distant according to their visible place, then also according to their true place, because their visible places now and then are proportionally disposed to their true places now and then (or at least not so disproportionately that there could be so great a distance of visible places without some distance of true places), and this distance suffices for the matter at hand.

36. At least therefore, beside the heaven that is posited for all the fixed stars, which are always uniformly distant, seven heavens are posited, proper to the seven planets, which are moved in different form both from these [the fixed stars] and from themselves; there are then eight heavens.

37. Further too a ninth heaven is commonly conceded, above the starry heaven, because there is of one celestial body only one proper motion; but the diurnal motion is not a motion proper to the starry heaven, since that heaven is moved by another motion, as has been proved from considerations [observations] (for not any fixed star at all is always at the same distance from the stationary poles, nor even always – in equal times – equally distant from the times [houses] of Aries and Libra); therefore this diurnal motion will be proper to some other body – and only to a higher one, because by this motion is the eighth heaven [of the fixed stars] moved (but not any heaven is moved by the motion proper to another, unless that other be superior). There is therefore some movable [body] that is uniformly moved with diurnal motion, superior to the starry heaven; this does Avicenna say in his *Metaphysics* 9 ch.2 and Ptolemy in his *Almagest* (look for it [statement 1 ch.8, statement 7 ch.3]).

B. They Disagree whether there are more than Nine

38. On the second [n.30], in which not all agree who treat of this material [n.30], – there is doubt whether for each planet its own heaven suffice, and so [whether it] suffice only to posit nine heavens.

39. A threefold difference indeed appears in the motions of the planets:

One in latitude, because the planets are not always equally distant from the immovable poles.

40. Another in longitude, because in diverse way, not equally, do they run through the zodiac.

41. A third is in elevation and depression, because the same planet sometimes more approaches the center of the earth, sometimes is more distant, as Ptolemy proves in the *Almagest* [statements 3-12], because [there is] a circle whose visual diameter is longer by so much in a longer longitude and shorter by so much in a shorter longitude. It appears too about Mars which, when it is at the aux,⁷⁰ appears of notably small size in respect of

⁷⁰ The Vatican editors refer to Roger Bacon , *Communium Naturalium* II p.5 ch.18: “The point further from the

that which it has when it is at the opposite of the aux. It is also proved of the moon, because when it and the sun are equally near the tail and head of Draco, not always does an eclipse [of the moon] last equally long but sometimes longer, sometimes less; this is impossible save because the moon enters sometimes more sometimes less into the earth's shadow, – so that when it crosses the diameter of the moon, the shadow stays longer, for the reason that there the diameter of the shadow is longer than elsewhere near the cone.⁷¹ If too this elevation and depression of the sun and moon were universally denied, neither on the part of one nor on the part of the other could a diverse quantity of shadow be assigned: for always would the shadow be stretched equally in height, and so would be of equal quantity, – and always would the moon, when it was equally near the cone, be equally next to and near the shadow. – From these and other considerations of Ptolemy let the elevation and depression be supposed.

42. The first two differences (namely of longitude and latitude [nn.39-40]), one could perhaps save – by attributing to a planet one heaven – through a displacement of the polls of the heaven, in the way that Alpetragius [al-Bitruji] tried in his little book *On the Quality of the Celestial Motions*, who in positing that the polls of the starry heaven are displaced from the polls of the ninth heaven (and consequently that round those stationary polls they describe small circles), posits that the eighth heaven moves about its own polls (but not in contrary motion to the motion of the ninth heaven, but to the same side), and that the poll of the eighth heaven receives less effectively that influence than [does] the ninth heaven itself, and so that poll does not complete a circle when any point in the ninth heaven completes a circle.

43. And that the poll of the lower heaven fails of completion of a circle he calls the first shortening which – according to him – supplies the motion of the lower heaven about the poll, and in the eighth heaven supplies it perfectly as to longitude: but as to latitude there is necessarily a difference, for poll is displaced from poll: for the motion made about the poll of the inferior heaven, although it complete the motion of that heaven about the poll of the inferior heaven as to longitude, there cannot however be truly a circle of any star moved in the lower heaven but a spiral, because it does not return to the same point from which motion began.

44. Thus universally, by the diversity of the polls of certain heavens from others, and by the first shortening and supplying of it, and especially in certain stars through the fact they are not situated in the middle of their heaven, he tries to give foundations for saving the differences of longitude and latitude in the motions of the planets, and this not by positing that some inferior heaven is moved against the motion of a superior heaven 'because it is such', but by positing that the inferior heaven is moved to the same part to which the superior is; but by positing that a lower heaven is moved in the same direction as the higher one, but however less efficaciously, because it is natural that virtue received in some things ordered mutually is more efficaciously received in the closer ones.

Earth, which is the longer longitude, is called 'aux', – but the opposite, which is the nearer longitude, is called 'opposite of the aux'. See the figure and footnote at n.49.

⁷¹ Roger Bacon, *Communia Naturalium* II p.5 ch.16: "The same is seen through a lunar eclipse, since the moon at the same distance from the axis of the pyramidal shadow of the earth or also in the mode, and so passing through the axis of the shadow, sometimes remains longer in the shadow, sometimes less; which, as it seems, will not be able to be caused save because more of the shadow passes through in one time than in another. And since the shadow was of a pyramidal figure whose base is the earth, when it will have passed through more of the shadow, it will be closer to the earth, – and when less, further away."

45. This tradition seems sufficiently to agree with natural principles, if by it could be saved all appearances according to longitude and latitude; for perhaps by it could be saved the stoppings and retrogressions and processions of the planets, as he himself tries to save [them] in certain planets, in his book.

46. But the third difference, namely of elevation and depression [n.41], it is impossible to save except by positing that all the heavens are eccentric, because then, if a planet does not exit its heaven but only a part of its heaven, and that part of its heaven – in whatever way it be moved – is always equally distant from the center (for the fact that that whole heaven, rotated in a circle, is concentric with the world), wherever the star is, always will it be equally elevated and equally depressed by respect to its center. And though it would not be necessary because of the two first differences to posit eccentric circles and epicycles (according to Ptolemy and other astronomers), yet so because of the third difference it is necessary.

47. And, by supposing this, to the matter at hand it is concluded that for no planet does one heaven suffice as to its motion.


Let then be taken, for sake of example, the heaven of Saturn. If it be posited eccentric to the world, while the eighth heaven is concentric with the world, let the heaven of Saturn be moved: the aux of that heaven succeeds therefore to the opposite of the aux; if the aux of that has not entered the starry heaven (so that two bodies would be together) but only touched it, – the opposite of the aux, which is less distant from the center of the earth than the aux, will not reach the concave surface of the starry heaven, and so there would be there a vacuum.

48. An unacceptable result therefore cannot be avoided about the cutting and coinciding of bodies, or about the vacuum, save by attributing to each planet at least three heavens, circling the earth, – of which let two extremes (namely higher and lower) have ultimate surfaces concentric, namely superior convex and inferior concave; and let those two surfaces have another two, namely superior concave and inferior convex, namely eccentric to the world; and between those two surfaces [sc. of the concave of the superior heaven and of the convex of the inferior] let there be a third orb (which let it be called the deferent), eccentric to those two deferent surfaces, – so that let those two revolving [orbs] be moved to any part, a vacuum does not follow: for always the thicker part of one is against the less thick part of the other, and conversely.⁷²

49. Likewise, in whatever way the deferent be moved within these two revolving [orbs] (the higher and lower), from its motion does not follow a vacuum nor a cutting, because the surfaces [of the deferent] are both concentric to the surfaces within which it is contained and moved: and so the star [planet], fixed at one part of that deferent, sometimes will be at the aux, – when namely that part of the deferent which it is in is placed above the thicker part of the lower revolving [orb] and placed below the less thick part of the superior revolving [orb], because then it will be most distant from the center of the earth; and the star [planet] will be in the opposite of the aux when that part of the deferent orb – and where it is fixed – will be placed below the thinnest part of the lower revolving orb and placed below the thickest part of the higher revolving orb, because then

⁷² See the figure after n.49.

it will be least distant from the center of the earth. An image of this is more expressly plain in the figure.⁷³



50. Further: although Mercury have a deferent, whose center moves (and not round the earth like the center of the moon but off to one side) by describing a small circle (as is clear in [Ptolemy's] *Almagest* statement 9 ch.6), it follows that the deferent orb is not concentric with the revolving orbs, namely highest and lowest; and therefore it is necessary to posit there at least five orbs, four revolving and the fifth deferent.

51. And beside these it is necessary to posit epicycles (which are not orbs circling the earth but little orbs situated in a determinate part of the orbs circling the earth), and this because the elevation of a star is greater sometimes than at other times, which elevation could not be from the deferent alone. Procession too and stopping and retrograde motion are more easily saved by epicycles.

52. But whatever it may be about epicycles, at least the mobile heavens going around the earth will be twenty five, namely: twenty three of planets [sc. five for Mercury and eighteen – six planets times three spheres – for the rest], and besides this, the eighth heaven and ninth heaven.⁷⁴

⁷³ In this figure (provided by the Vatican editors) the asterisk marks the place of the planet in the deferent sphere; *cd* is the center of the deferent sphere; *cm* is the center of the world; the shaded areas are the two heavens, possessed of thicker and thinner walls, within which the deferent sphere carrying the planet revolves. In this figure the planet is at the aux (that is, the point of the sphere furthest from the center of the world). It would be at the opposite of the aux (and so closest to the center of the world) when the sphere has revolved 180°.

⁷⁴ For these views, reported here by Scotus, the Vatican editors here refer to Ptolemy's *Almagest* and Roger Bacon's *Communia Naturalium*.

II. To the Principal Arguments

53. To the arguments.

To the first [n.26] I say that Scripture takes ‘firmament’ for the whole heaven, between the empyrean and the elements.

54. To the second [n.27] I say that the conformity of motions does not entail continuity.

55. To the third [n.28] I say that the heaven cannot yield to a moved star as water or air can yield to a body in motion placed in them, because a naturally incorruptible body is naturally indivisible, and this if it is incorruptible both in its parts and in the whole, as the heaven is posited to be; and thus there could not be a motion of anything in the heaven, unmoved as it is by any natural agent.

[The Fifteenth to Twenty Fifth Distinctions are lacking in the
Ordinatio. See the Appendix p.443]

Fifteenth Distinction: Whether in a mixed body the elements actually remain in substance

Sixteenth Distinction: Whether the image of the Trinity consists in three really distinct powers of the
rational soul

Seventeenth Distinction: About the origin of Adam's soul and the place where it was produced

Eighteenth Distinction: About the production of woman and the seminal reasons

Nineteenth Distinction: Whether we had immortal bodies in the state of innocence

Twentieth Distinction: About the offspring of Adam had any been procreated in the state of innocence

Twenty First Distinction: About the venality or gravity of Adam's sin

Twenty Second Distinction: Whether Adam's sin came from ignorance

Twenty Third Distinction: Whether God could make a rational creature's will impeccable by nature

Twenty Fourth Distinction: Whether the superior part [sc. of the intellect] is a distinct power from the inferior part

Twenty Fifth Distinction: Whether anything other than the will causes efficaciously an act of willing in the will]

Twenty Sixth Distinction

Single Question

Whether Grace is in the Essence or in a Power of the Soul

1. Concerning the twenty sixth distinction I ask about grace and first^a whether it is in the essence or in a power of the soul.

a. [*Interpolation*] Concerning this twenty sixth distinction, where the Master deals with the gratuitous helps that the first parents had for resisting evil and advancing in good, the question concerning the present distinction is first about grace.

2. Proof that it is in the essence:

Because the essence comes from God before the power, therefore it is reduced first back to God; but it is reduced by grace; therefore etc. Proof of the consequence: first from Dionysius [*Celestial Hierarchy* ch.4], “for things are reduced back to God the way they proceed from God,” and second because, just as each creature has God for first efficient cause, so also for final end.

3. Further, the essence is more indeterminate than the power, therefore it is more in need of being determined; but grace is as it were the form that determines indeterminate soul, therefore grace is more in the essence than in the power.

4. Again, grace is always in act; a power is not always in act; therefore grace is not in a power. The proof of the first premise is that the act of grace is to make pleasing; but grace always makes pleasing. The proof of the second premise is that a habit can only be always in act if what it belongs to is in act.

5. Again, approval of the essence suffices for approval of the power and not conversely; therefore grace, which is the principle of approval, ought to be put per se in the essence.

6. Proof the antecedent, *Genesis* 4.4, “God had respect for Abel and his offering;” further, since the essence is essentially prior in being to the power, therefore likewise in approval, as it seems.

7. Further, the form determining for action should be put more in the principal agent than in the instrument; the essence is the principal agent, the power is as an instrumental agent, according to Anselm *On Concord* q.3 ch.11; therefore etc.

8. Again, there should be a correspondence of the recreated image to the created image; the created image requires a unity of essence and a trinity of powers; therefore

that which is recreated also requires a unity of grace perfecting the essence and a trinity virtually perfecting the powers.

9. To the opposite:

Grace is a form in the soul, as is proved in 1 d.17 nn.121, 129-131; it is not a passion or a power, so it is a habit, according to the division posited by the Philosopher *Ethics* 2.4-5.1106a11-24, “Every habit is in a power, because it makes the work of the possessor of it good;” therefore etc.

10. Again, operating grace and cooperating grace are the same, as is plain from the Master in the text [*Sentences* 2 d.26 ch.s.1-2]; but cooperating grace is in the power of will; therefore etc.

I. To the Question

A. The Opinion of Others

11. On this point it is said that grace is first in the essence [Aquinas *Sentences* 2 d.26 a.3].

12. The proof is from Augustine *On Charity* [*Sermon* 350 n.1], that charity is “the root and life of all the good;” *ibid.*, “charity is the life of the dying;” life and death pertain to the essence; therefore etc.

13. A confirmation is that if grace is posited in the essence, it gives supernatural and primary being; therefore by parity of reasoning it will be able to give supernatural acting. Now it would not give per se supernatural being if it was only in the power, but

since being necessarily precedes all acting, natural being necessarily precedes natural acting, and supernatural being supernatural acting.^a

a. [*Interpolation*] Or in another way thus, that acting presupposes being; therefore what gives natural or supernatural acting gives natural or supernatural being. But grace gives acting to the soul, therefore it gives being to it; but being belongs to the essence; therefore etc.

B. Rejection of the Opinion

14. Argument is made against this position in two ways.

15. [First argument] – First, because since grace is the same in reality as glory, or is a per disposition for it, the result is it is per se in the same subject as blessedness is; but blessedness is not per se in the essence but in a power; therefore grace is too.

16. A response is made that blessedness is principally in the essence and, by means of it, redounds into the powers.^a The soul, by a special descent of God into it, is deiform in the first way (as burning embers are igni-form).

a. [*Interpolation*] according as they are capacities, more or less, or prior or posterior.

17. On the contrary:

Therefore the soul, with its powers removed, could be per se blessed, and thus blessedness would not be in any second act, nor even in the attaining of the ultimate object, for an object is not attained as object save by second act, and second act belongs to the soul as it is a power.^a

a. [*Interpolation*] Again, blessedness is only present because it satisfies and gives rest to the blessed; this resting can only come through union with the beatific object; union is only through some act that belongs to a power alone – and this is the opinion of the Philosopher when he posits that blessedness is in an act.

18. Further, if blessedness were placed in the essence and if ‘grace in the essence’ is of the same idea in a wayfarer as in the fatherland, then the soul would be blessed now, although less so than in the fatherland; the consequent is false, therefore so is the antecedent. The proof of the consequence is that now the soul has – for you – a first act of the same idea as the act in which blessedness is.

19. A response is made that one could thus argue in the same way about the act as about grace, because the act is of the same idea now as it will be then; nor is it valid to make objection about the act of seeing and the light of glory, because these do not per se belong to glory.

20. I say that the argument about first act [n.18] proves that the soul would now be blessed (although less now than later), but not if blessedness is placed in the second act also of loving, because this act is not of the same idea here and in the fatherland [contra n.19]. For if intellection is a partial per se cause in respect of volition (as the third opinion says in the preceding question [lacking in the *Ordinatio*; see *Lectura 2 d.25 n.69*]), then it follows that vision and obscure intellection [cf. *2 Corinthians 13.12*] – which are intellections of different idea – can come together for a volition of simply different idea (and this was one of the reasons touched on above for the third opinion [*Lectura 2 d.25 n.79*]), because the same object when known in diverse ways can be

loved by acts diverse even in species. But if the view is held that the will is the whole cause of enjoyment, then it is more difficult to save the view that blessedness consists more principally in enjoyment; for that by which the perfect qua perfect is formally distinguished from the imperfect qua imperfect seems to be more perfect in it; but if enjoyment in the fatherland and on the way are of the same species (which seems to be the case), and if the will alone is the cause of enjoyment and if the object is the same and the habit the same, then the blessed qua blessed is distinguished from the non-blessed by vision and not by enjoyment, which is of the same idea in both; therefore vision would be nobler than enjoyment.

21. However, by maintaining that will is the whole cause of its own act [the opinion of Henry of Ghent, mentioned second by Scotus in *Lectura 2* d.25 n.54], one can say that a cause that is without limit as to diversity of effects can cause things diverse in species because of the coming together of the diverse things required for the causation of a thing diverse in species, even though these diverse things do not come together in idea of effecting cause; hence a cause without limit as to diversity of effects causes diverse things when the requisites, according as they are requisites, come together – the way the sun solidifies mud and liquefies ice, because of the diverse disposition of the things it acts on [1 d.2 nn.347-350]; but the will is a cause without limit, possessing in its power volitions diverse in species, and so, when vision and obscure intellection come together (which are things diverse in species and per se required for an act of will), the will can cause acts diverse in species, and thus enjoyment in the fatherland and on the way can be distinct in species.

22. [Second argument] – Further, second [n.15]:

When some form is undetermined in its active power for several things, then what has a precise respect to one determinate action cannot be a perfection of the form insofar as the form is undetermined, but insofar as it is a power determinate with respect to the action in respect of which it is perfected by such perfection. An example: if the soul is undetermined as to the several acts agreeable to it according to its several powers, then wisdom (or any other intellectual habit) does not perfect the soul insofar as the soul is undetermined but precisely insofar as it is intellect (and the reason for this proposition is that, if wisdom were to perfect the soul insofar as the soul is undetermined in its active power, then wisdom could equally perfect the soul in its order to any of its acts whatever; likewise, if it does perfect the soul precisely in its order to a determinate act, it would thus perfect the soul only if the soul were an active power for that act and were not undetermined as to several acts). But grace only perfects the soul in its order to a determinate act (namely a meritorious act), which belongs namely to the will alone, according to Anselm, *On the Virginal Conception* ch.4 and frequently elsewhere; therefore it precisely perfects the soul insofar as the soul is the power to which such act belongs; this power is the will, therefore etc.

23. There is confirmation of this reason in that, if grace were to perfect the essence as essence of the soul, grace would be able to redound to the first act of the power, namely of the intellect, and so an act of the intellect, as it precedes an act of the will, could be meritorious; indeed, if the intellect existed alone without the will, grace and merit could be in the essence.

C. Scotus' own Opinion

The conclusion of the above reasons [nn.15, 22] can be conceded, because the habit which was proved to be supernatural in 1 d.17 n.129 perfects a power of the soul and a determinate power, namely the will, because it is ordered to the determinate object of such power; but it does not perfect the essence, because essence has regard to no object nor to any act.

25. There is confirmation from Anselm *On the Virginal Conception* ch.3, “All justice and injustice are formally in the will.”^a

a. [*Interpolation*] grace is a certain justice and rectitude; therefore etc.

26. Again, opposites are naturally about the same thing; but grace and sin are opposites; now sin is in the will, according to Anselm, *ibid*.

II. To the Principal Arguments

27. To the arguments for the opposing side [nn.2-8].⁷⁵

I say [n.3] that grace determines to a gratuitous operation in the way that habit has the property of determining; a power is in this way indeterminate with a proximate indetermination, and the essence is not.²⁸ To the next [n.4] I say that although ‘to engrace’ (that is, ‘to make pleasing’) has an active signification, it is not an acting; just as

⁷⁵ Scotus’ response to these arguments is actually to the order they have in the equivalent place of the *Lectura*, as that the first one he answers here is actually second in the *Ordinatio* though first in the *Lectura*. Further the one he answers fourth here [n.31] is the first in the *Ordinatio* and lacking in the *Lectura*. The last argument in the *Ordinatio* is also lacking in the *Lectura* and is not answered here at all.

neither is a white wall making whiteness an acting but an informing [sc. an informing of the eye to see white].

29. To the third [n.5] I say that approval of a power suffices for approval of the essence and not conversely. For just as a man, if he could see another's act of loving, would approve, because of the act, that other person as a whole, and thus would approve first the act freely elicited first and then the power freely eliciting it (and thereby he would sufficiently approve the whole supposit) – so God first approves the act freely elicited by the power; not indeed with the general approval with which he approves every creature (because in this way the essence is first approved), but with the special approval by which he ordains to blessedness the one approved; but God thus approves first and principally the power itself, which is capable first of blessedness, and through it he approves the essence.

30. And when objection is made about Abel and his offering [n.6], I say that an exterior act is only approved because the interior one is, and the interior one is only approved because it is elicited or commanded by the power of which it is the act; but there is no further resolving of the approval of this power back to the approval of some prior approved thing, because nothing prior is approvable with special approval save by mediation of the power.

31. And as to the statement [n.2] that 'things are reduced back to God in the order they proceed from God' (according to Dionysius), one must say that this is true of extremes produced in diverse persons and not of things that are in the same supposit, because the essence receives being first and yet is reduced back through the power first, because it is reduced through the power's operation.

32. To the next argument [n.7] I say that the major can be conceded about an extrinsic instrument, but not about an intrinsic one that is the same as the operating thing (the way the operating thing is called an instrument insofar as it has a determinate operative power); for in the sense in which the instrument is an intrinsic instrument the form receiving the action should be posited as instrument, but in the principal agent as it is distinguished from an instrument should be posited only the form.

Twenty Seventh Distinction

Single Question

Whether Grace is a Virtue

1. Concerning the twenty seventh distinction I ask^a whether grace is a virtue.

a. [*Interpolation*] About this twenty seventh distinction, where the Master deals with inquiry about virtue, the question is asked:

2. That it is not:

Because as the supernatural light is disposed with respect to the virtues of grace, so is the natural light disposed with respect to the natural virtues; but the natural light is not a virtue; therefore etc.^a

a. [*Interpolation*] nor is grace, which is the supernatural light, a supernatural virtue.

3. To the opposite:

Grace is a habit (from the preceding question [d.26 nn.9, 24]), and it is not a vice; therefore it is a habit-virtue.

I. To the Question

A. First Opinion

4. [Exposition of the opinion] – The opinion here was once⁷⁶ that grace was the supernatural light as it were, being related to the theological virtues [sc. faith, hope, charity] as the natural light is related to the acquired virtues; in the way that the soul is posited to be the same as its powers, so either grace would be the root of the theological virtues, or these three virtues would perfect in ordering to the supernatural light (which is grace) just as the acquired virtues perfect in ordering to the natural light.

5. [Rejection of the opinion] – But from this it would follow that faith cannot remain unformed [sc. without charity], because it could not perfect if the light did not remain in its ordering to what it perfects, just as neither can acquired virtue remain a virtue if its natural disposition toward what it has respect to (as prudence) does not remain.

6. And if it be said that degrees can be assigned to grace and that in its lower degree it is faith and hope and in its higher degree it deserves the name of charity, and so

⁷⁶ The opinion of Thomas Aquinas (*ST Ia IIae* q.110 a.3, *Sentences* 2 d.26 q.un. a.3) as well as of Albert the Great (*Sentences* 2 d.26 a.11), which Scotus, like Giles of Rome (*Quodlibet* 6 q.5), here speaks of as definitely abandoned by theologians.

the lower can remain without the higher (and in this way do faith and hope remain without charity) – against this:

The same essence cannot perfect the powers of the soul in diverse ways like this.^a

a. [*Interpolation*] Again, although charity of itself could be diminished without grace, yet in fact it is never diminished or corrupted save by a cause removing merit; venial sin is not of this sort because it stands along with charity, but mortal sin does not, because it does not permit anything of charity to stand along with it.

7. Further, it would also seem that the three theological virtues would exist in the fatherland; for then perfect grace will remain, and so all the virtues, according to this opinion, will remain.

B. Scotus' own Opinion, already Proposed by Others

8. So there is another opinion, which says that grace is formally the virtue that is charity, because whatever excellences are attributed to charity are attributed also to grace, and conversely; for both equally “divide the sons of the kingdom from the sons of perdition” (Augustine *On the Trinity* 15.18 n.32), both are also the form of the virtues and neither can be unformed, and both join the wayfarer to the ultimate end with that perfect conjunction which is possible for wayfarers; and if they are posited as distinct, one of them would be superfluous because the other would suffice.

9. And in this regard can the opinion of the Master be held (as it was in 1 d.17 nn.167-168), that the Holy Spirit by no other habit distinct from charity (distinct from the

habit by which he also indwells) moves the will to meritorious loving of God; for the habit by which the Holy Spirit indwells the soul is grace and grace is charity. And by the same habit by which the Holy Spirit indwells the soul does the will incline to its meritorious act; but not so does the soul believe and hope all things by the same habit by which the Holy Spirit indwells, but by other imperfect habits, because the acts of these habits do not require perfection.

10. But from this there seems to follow a distinction between grace and charity, because charity is a perfection simply, for otherwise it would not formally belong to God who, according to John, is charity, *1 John* 4.16, “God is charity;” but grace is not a perfection simply, nor is it formally posited in God; therefore etc.

11. Response:

Charity is that whereby he who has it holds God as beloved, so that charity considers God not under the idea of lover but under the idea of lovable; grace is that whereby God holds someone as pleasing, so that grace considers God as approving or loving, not as loved. However grace is not said to be that because of which God loves (because then the divine essence in the Son could be called grace, since because of it God loves the Son), but grace is said to be that because of which God approves him who has it as worthy of blessedness (with the worth that is the correspondence of merit to reward); and so grace includes some imperfection, because such worth posits some imperfection in the worthy person, that he is not blessed of himself.

12. In this way then we can concede that, although the same absolute thing in the soul is that by which the soul loves God as object and that by which the soul is approved by a special approval that ordains it for blessedness, yet there is a different idea in that

absolute thing insofar as it considers God in this way or in that; and one of these ideas, namely the first and principal, belongs to the soul as this idea is a perfection simply, while the other belongs to it as this idea is a limited perfection; and thus in the first way it is appropriately called charity, and in the second way called grace; and thus all grace is charity but not conversely.

13. And yet this distinction of reasons, or this non-convertibility, does not entail that when grace and charity come together in the same soul they are distinct in form, just as, though wisdom is a perfection simply and 'a wisdom of this kind' is a limited perfection, yet, when they come together, it does not follow that the second is distinct from the first in form (or according to form), and yet they are distinct from each other formally; for that which is science [sc. a habit] in my intellect and that which is acquired by teaching [sc. a doctrine] are the same, and yet in God there is wisdom and no such limited habit. The two state the same thing, then, but as taken in different ways.

14. And grace and charity do not differ only in this way but in a connoted respect, because the absolute thing that they state can be considered as it is a principle of operating for the one who has it, and thus it does not state imperfection; and in this way it can be in God and in this way it is called charity; in another way it can be considered as it is the object in me of God, insofar as God holds me as dear, and in this way it determines the object and is called grace [1 d.17 nn.115-118].

II. To the Principal Argument

15. To the argument [n.2] one must say that the acquired moral virtues perfect the soul in ordering it to some light that can be called prudence, and prudence does not perfect in ordering to any light other than that of the agent intellect; yet prudence is a virtue. So it is in the issue at hand: the supernatural virtues perfect the soul in ordering to the virtue that is charity, and charity perfects further in ordering to the supernatural end.

Twenty Eighth Distinction

Single Question

Whether Man's Free Choice without Grace can Guard against all Mortal Sin

1. Concerning the twenty eighth distinction I ask^a about the error of Pelagius, namely whether man's free choice without grace can guard against all mortal sin.

a. [*Interpolation*] About this twenty eighth distinction, where the Master deals with the insufficiency of free choice without grace, the question is asked:

2. That it can:

Romans 2.14, "The nations who do not have the law naturally do the things that are of the law, and not having such law are a law unto themselves." Here it seems that the Apostle is rebuking the Jews because the Gentiles, without having the law given them, were keeping the law; therefore they were guarding against all sin and yet it seems they did not have grace.

3. Further, Augustine *On Free Choice* 3.18 n.17, “No one sins in something he cannot avoid;” some sin cannot be avoided;^a therefore etc.

a. [Interpolation] so either someone can avoid sin without grace or he cannot; if he cannot, then he does not sin; if he can then I have the conclusion intended. *Or*: so what cannot be avoided is not a sin.

4. Again Anselm *On Liberty of Choice* ch.13, “Free choice is a power of keeping rightness for its own sake;” therefore while free choice remains, so does its power.

5. On the contrary:

The Pelagian heresy seems to consist in this, that free choice suffices without grace.

6. Again, this heresy seems to have been very strongly rebuked by Augustine *On the Perfection of Justice* [Henry of Ghent *Quodlibet* 5.20: “Some heretics said that man in mortal sin could, without grace, endure and no more sin mortally...which Augustine sufficiently rejects against the Pelagians, especially in *On the Perfection of Justice*”].

7. Again, Gregory *Moralia* 25.9 n.22 on the verse of *Job* 34.24-25 ‘He will destroy many and uncountable...’ says, “A sin that is not destroyed by penance soon by its weight draws toward another.”

I. To the Question

A. The Opinion of Others, Proposed in Two Versions

8. Here, because of the words of Augustine that he brings against the Pelagians, the assertion is made [by Aquinas, Henry, Richard of Middleton] that it is not possible to guard against all sin without grace.

9. But this is put forward in diverse ways:

In one way that free choice could avoid individual mortal sins without grace but not all of them. An example is given about being in a leaking ship, that although one could stop up any single hole yet not all of them; for while one hole is being stopped another is left open.

10. In another way it is said that free choice can be considered doubly: in one way before deliberation and before time for deliberation, or in another way after both (namely after time for deliberation and after the deliberation itself); or in a third way, after time for deliberation has passed but when no deliberation was done. In the first way it is posited that one cannot sin mortally but one can sin venially. In the second way it is posited that one can avoid all mortal sin after deliberation has been done. In the third way it is posited that one cannot, if one is in mortal sin, avoid every mortal sin; the reason is the deficiency in the intellect before the time of deliberating, because of which one will not deliberate rightly even though one passes through the time when there could have been deliberation; and so, if one does not deliberate when one is going through the time suitable for deliberation, one will be understood to have given consent.

B. Rejection of the Opinion

1. Against the Conclusion in Itself

11. There is argument against this, and first against the conclusion [n.8], because mortal sin consists only in transgressing God's precept, according to Augustine *Against Faustus* 22.27, and it is contained in *Sentences* d.35; according to Jerome [actually Pelagius himself, in a book once attributed to Jerome, *On the Faith to Pope Innocent* n.10, "We execrate too the blasphemy of those who say that something impossible for man has been commanded by God"] – 'let him be anathema who says that God has commanded impossibilities'; therefore, just as it is possible to avoid one sin and transgression against one precept, so it is also possible to avoid any of them.

12. Response is made [Aquinas, Alexander of Hales] that when someone is in mortal sin it is not possible for him, while he remains in sin, to keep the precept, but it is possible for him to prepare and dispose himself for grace, by which, once given, he can keep the precept; and thus, if he did not prepare himself, the lack of preparation is imputed to him as sin, as Anselm illustrates [*Why God became Man* 1.24] with his example of a servant throwing himself into a well [sc. so as not to go to the market as he was bidden].

13. Another response [Bonaventure] is that although one could, while remaining in mortal sin, keep the precept as regard fulfilling it, yet not as regard the intention of the command giver, because the intention of the command giver was that by fulfilling the precept one attain the end, but one does not attain the end by observance of the precepts unless one is observing them through charity.

14. Against this [n.13]:

If God by his precept intended to oblige everyone to observe the precept through charity, then whoever does the work of the precept but not through charity sins mortally –

and this both when what is in question is a negative precept, to which one is bound always and at all times (and if one is bound to do it through charity, then, by not doing it through charity, one sins mortally), and when what is in question is an affirmative precept, to which one is bound at some time (if one does not at that time do it through charity one sins mortally); and thus, if anyone has committed mortal sin and afterwards avoids killing ‘because God commanded not to kill’, and afterwards avoids stealing ‘because God commanded not to steal’, he sins mortally – and if afterwards he keeps the Sabbath ‘because God commanded it’, he sins mortally. But to say this seems to be nothing other than to make perverse everyone who has once committed mortal sin, so that he does not do afterwards any work good in its kind [cf. d.7 nn.28-29] (to which, however, he is otherwise bound [nn.34-37, 47]), although he is nevertheless advised and admonished to do the opposite, namely to do works good in their kind because these works dispose him to obtaining grace more quickly and easily.

15. Likewise, someone existing in charity can do a work of a precept not moved to it then by charity but by natural piety and meekness (or by something else), not actually then carrying it out for the ultimate end, so that the fulfilling of the work of the precept would not be meritorious for him. But if he were also bound to keep the precept according to the intention of the command giver, how then could he be attaining the end? He would be bound at that time to merit and he would be sinning mortally at that time by doing such a work (a work good in its kind and by precept), which is absurd.

16. The same argument can be made against the first response [n.12], because if we posit someone not disposing himself to grace but being still then in a state of guilt, he cannot keep himself from guilt; therefore it is impossible for him during that time to keep

himself from guilt – which is false, because all guilt is voluntary. But if he can during that time keep himself from guilt (which at least seems obvious as far as the kind of work commanded by the precept is concerned), the argument before given returns [n.14], which suffices to excuse him from mortal sin.

2. Against the Two Versions of the Argument in Particular

17. I argue against these two versions in particular, and first against the first [n.9]:

If one can at this particular time guard against this mortal sin and against that mortal sin and, while guarding against this one, guard against all of them (and likewise at the next following time and so on at all times), then, if one can guard against this sin and against that, one can guard against all of them at once. The assumption that one can guard against this mortal sin and against that is plain, because the will cannot simultaneously have distinct acts of consent, which are required for mortal sin; and so, while it has a distinct act of will to resist this mortal sin, it has no act of will for so willing any other mortal sin that it mortally sins by this willing. Again, by preserving oneself from one mortal sin, one becomes stronger for resisting other sins. Therefore if one can guard against this sin, which one is afraid of (or which one sins by), much more can one guard against it otherwise, and so on in other cases.

18. Against the second way [n.10] I argue as follows: at the time when one could deliberate about this sin *a*, then either one can deliberate about *a*, and the result is that, while one is deliberating, one is not sinning mortally (also when deliberation is complete, one can, according to you, guard against actual sinning with the sin *a*, or with any other

sin at that time) – or one is unable to deliberate about *a* at the time of deliberation, and so one will not possess the use of reason.

19. But if you say that one cannot deliberate rightly because the intellect is blinded, this seems absurd, because a single mortal sin does not make anyone intemperate with general intemperance, for one day does not make a summer [Aristotle *Ethics* 1.9.1098a18-20], and one act of vice does not make a man generally vicious or blind generally as a result to all principles of doable things; therefore he can have correct deliberation about many things he is tempted by, notwithstanding the fact that he is in one mortal sin.

20. Likewise, vices are not so connected that one sin would make one blind to the principle of action for acting well, because it is also not the case that a single sin corrupts the appetite by inclining it per se to another sin; rather, along with one particular sin can stand an acquired habit contrary to another sin, because a single mortal sin does not corrupt the whole habit of virtue. Therefore by such habits acquired both about the same doable thing and about other ones, one can rightly judge and deliberate, and so at the time of deliberation one can rightly deliberate or be tempted as regard the same sin or as regard another; and if one could rightly deliberate so as not to sin by construed consent [n.10], one can, according to you, guard against every sin; therefore one can do so simply.

C. Scotus' own Response

21. In response to the question it can be said, speaking of a sin of commission, that sin can be taken in one way for the elicited act of deformity itself, and in another way for the stain of sin (or for the abiding guilt) that remains after the elicited act until the sin has been destroyed by penance [cf. above d.7 n.84].

22. I say that in the second way free choice cannot of itself guard against all mortal sin in this present state, because a soul without grace is stained by some sin (whether original or actual), from which it is not freed save by grace.

23. But if the question is asked whether this is because of an immediate opposition between guilt and grace, I say no, because guilt and grace were not immediate opposites in the state of innocence (for at that time someone could have been in a purely natural state, being both without grace and without guilt; so these are in no way immediate opposites) – nor even are they immediate opposites by comparison to the power of the maker, because God can restore the will, after it has sinned, to the kind he could have made it to be. Rather, the fact that the will is only freed from sin by grace [n.22] is because of the universal law that now [in this present state] no one's enmity is remitted unless he becomes not merely a non-enemy but also a friend,⁷⁷ made acceptable to God by sanctifying grace.

24. If an objection be raised about how God could remit guilt without giving grace (for if a change is not posited in the person justified, there seems to be a change in God), the response is twofold.⁷⁸

⁷⁷ "A sinner is a non-enemy by remission of guilt, but a friend by infusion of grace" 4 d.16 q.2 n.2. God so acts now by his ordained power, but he could by his absolute power [d.7 nn.52-56, 1 d.17 n.164] act in the other two ways listed here in n.23.

⁷⁸ The responses are not given, but see n.23 again. The Vatican editors also refer, among other places, to 4 d.16 q.2 n.11, "The divine will can will affirmatively for this man at moment *a* and negatively for him at moment *b* without any change in the divine will."

25. As to the first way [n.21] see Henry *Quodlibet* 5 q.20.⁷⁹

26. And this opinion can be confirmed by the fact that the precept ‘Thou shalt love the Lord thy God etc.’ is the first, on which hang all the law and the prophets [Matthew 22.37-40, Deuteronomy 6.5]. The will then is bound to sometimes eliciting an act of this precept, so that there cannot always be omission of the act of this precept without mortal sin; but whenever the will executes an act of this precept (even in an unformed way) it disposes itself by congruity to sanctifying grace; and it will either resist this grace when offered and sin mortally, or consent to it and be justified.⁸⁰ This opinion, therefore, gives a negative answer to the question [n.1], not because of an absolute impotency in free choice [nn.5-7], but insofar as the impotency is compared to God who freely offers grace to a free will that is in some way well disposed.

⁷⁹ The relevant passage from Henry is given by Scotus in the *Lectura* II d.28 n.21. The Vatican editors give it as follows: “Therefore one must say that man’s free choice, even while he is in mortal sin, can be considered in two ways: in one way on the part of his freedom in itself, in another way as he is exposed to the temptations that come to him. I say that in the first way he can simply guard against falling into another mortal sin, in the sense that he falls by no necessity into it; but if he does fall, he falls voluntarily such that, if he did not fall voluntarily and he did fall, then by falling he did not sin. I say in the second way that he cannot guard himself for long without it being necessary either that he fall soon enough into mortal sin or that he receive grace from God by which to be able perfectly to guard himself and be liberated from mortal sin. But whichever of these happens to him, it happens to him only by consent of his will... For whoever is in mortal sin, whether one or many...is, after he is in sin, either well disposed, as far as concerns himself, with respect to the sins he has committed...by detesting them to the extent he can in his present state, or not well disposed. If he is well disposed, it cannot be that he should for long be thus well disposed about his moral acts without God moving his free choice by some motion of prevenient grace [*gratia gratis data*] to assenting simply to the good. And if he does not resist, God at once confers sanctifying grace freeing him from all sin; but if he resists, he at once sins mortally by contempt and ingratitude for the divine call... And as I said about someone in mortal sin, so I say about someone only in original sin, supposing however it is possible for him to sin venially before he sins mortally.”

⁸⁰ Henry *Quodlibet* 8 q.5, “Now about the process of grace in an adult before baptism, or after baptism in a state of actual mortal sin, one must hold that God anticipates the sinner with prevenient grace [*gratia datus grata*] as soon as he comes to a use of free choice such that he is able, by deliberation, to do something. And if through his free choice he disposes himself well to prevenient grace, he disposes himself by congruity to God’s bestowing on him justifying grace... If he thrusts this prevenient grace from him, he makes himself unworthy to be further helped, but to be justly more hardened thereby in his sin... If however he accepts it, he disposes himself by justice of congruity to sanctifying grace, which God then and there confers on him, and by which he is cleansed from sin.”

II. To the Principal Arguments

27. To the Arguments.

To the passage from *Romans* 2 [n.2] it can be said that, if the children of Israel alone were bound to the law of Moses, the rest, the Gentiles, could have lived justly by keeping the law of nature, and then they were ‘a law unto themselves’, that is, by the law of nature ‘written within on their hearts’ [*Romans* 2.15] they directed themselves in living rightly, just as the Jews did by the written law; but the Gentiles did not live well without all grace, because grace could – *ex hypothesi* – have been in them without observance of the Mosaic law.

28. As to the next [n.3] the statement of Augustine^a can be conceded according to the opinion stated [sc. of Henry nn.25-26]. And to the minor [sc. ‘some sin cannot be avoided’] it can be said that he to whom grace is offered can guard against resisting grace, but he cannot guard against sin; for if he does not resist grace, he is justified; so only this sin [sc. resistance to grace] is what can be guarded against, but when a man is in a sin previously committed, sin cannot be guarded against [see the quotation from Henry in footnotes to n.25 and n.26 above].

a. [*Interpolation*] namely that ‘no one sins in what he can in no way avoid’.

29. To the third [n.4] Anselm responds that, as far as concerns the part of free choice, justice can be kept once it is had, although when justice is not had it cannot be kept by free choice alone [cf. d.7 n.85].

Twenty Ninth Distinction

Single Question

Whether Original Justice in Adam must be Set Down as a Supernatural Gift

1. Concerning the twenty ninth distinction I ask^a whether original justice in Adam must be set down as a supernatural gift.

a. [*Interpolation*] About this twenty ninth distinction, where the Master deals with the grace that our parents had in the state of innocence, there is one question to ask:

2. That it should not:

Original justice is posited because a rectitude excluding all rebellion of the powers and an immortality were possessed in the original state; but both of these can be preserved on the basis of pure nature, because each of the opposites is a punishment, and punishment is not without guilt. That death is a punishment is plain; that rebellion is also is proved by the fact that the fighting of the lower powers against the higher is a punishment.

3. Further, the will in its pure nature is right, because God did not make it crooked. And this rightness is from the origin, therefore it belonged to man originally; and it is justice, because rightness of will is justice. Therefore the will in its pure nature has original justice.

4. Further, if it were only a supernatural gift, then original sin would only be a lack of this supernatural gift; therefore someone who was made in a state of pure nature would be equal with him who by sin had lost original justice, and so they should be equally punished, which seems unacceptable.

5. On the contrary:

Nature remains complete in the sinner (according to Dionysius *Divine Names* ch.4 [d.7 n.4], “The band of demons is not evil as it accords with nature but as it does not. And all good was given unaltered to them, but they fell away from all the good given. And the angelic gifts given to them we do not at all say were changed, but they are complete and most splendid, although the demons, blocking out the virtues that gaze at good, do not see them,”); and original justice does not remain (as is plain from the effects assigned to original justice [n.2]); therefore etc.

I. To the Question

A. The Opinion of Henry of Ghent

6. [Exposition of the Opinion] – It is said here [by Henry, *Quodlibet* 6 q.11] that besides infused rectitude – if any there was – one must posit in the will a rectitude that is as a quality in a quantity, to which is opposed the naturally inflicted crookedness that the will incurs by sinning; and from this crookedness follows disobedience in the lower powers, because although a right will could of itself be master, yet not one that is thus crooked. An example is given of a rod that is straight and afterwards bent; its straightness is natural to the rod but not such as to belong to the essence of it.

7. This is made clear by the fact that it does not seem possible [otherwise] to save the contention that ‘sin wounds pure nature’: for if sin corrupted only some freely given gift, it would despoil only in things freely given; so in order to posit a wound in nature one must posit some rectitude that is taken away by sin. So if some supernatural gift is posited beside natural rectitude, one must say that natural justice includes both – because if one say that it includes the supernatural gift only, the result would be that, according to that gift, he who is in pure nature and he who is a sinner are equal, as one of the arguments on the opposite side said [n.4].a

a. [*Interpolation*] the result would be that both were to be punished equally.

8. [Rejection of the opinion] – It is objected against this that, according to this position, it does not seem possible for the will to sin unless it has a natural rectitude that could be corrupted by sin. Let the will exist then in its essence alone without this addition [sc. without natural rectitude], and it will not be able to sin – which seems absurd, because it can be in agreement with justice, that is, be bound to will in agreement with the dictate of natural law; and the will need not necessarily so will, because it is free; therefore it can sin. Therefore one should not posit such a quality whose opposed crookedness is introduced because of sin.

9. Further, the rebellion of the powers does not seem to exist only by this crookedness, because the will seems to dominate the lower powers through its essential freedom more and better than through this accidental quality, because it is in its essence the supreme power; therefore the accidental quality will not be the whole reason for domination such that the will, if the quality is not present, will not dominate.

10. Further, this natural rectitude has been totally corrupted by mortal sin; therefore, since a second sin is as formally a sin as the first one, the second sin must corrupt natural rectitude in the way the first one did. But the second sin cannot corrupt this rectitude because the rectitude is no longer there; so neither does the first sin formally have its being a sin from its corrupting natural rectitude.

11. Further, one could then know by natural reason that this present state [sc. of corruption] is not natural, because it is manifest now that there is rebellion in the lower powers and, according to you, the rebellion cannot exist unless rectitude of the will is corrupted [n.6]; the consequent is unacceptable, because the most famous philosophers were unable to attain this knowledge.

12. Further, this rebellion seems to exist in man in his pure nature; therefore the rebellion does not exist because of a crookedness that the will incurs by sinning.

Proof of the antecedent:

It is natural for any appetite to be drawn toward its appetible object and, if it is not a free appetite, it is natural for it to be drawn supremely and as much as possible, because, just as such an appetite is ‘drawn’ [sc. and does not ‘draw’]— according to Damascene *Orthodox Faith* ch.36 – and therefore its act is not in its power, so neither is the intensity of the act so in its power that it does not act as much as it can; therefore, since the sensitive appetite, existing in its pure nature, has a proper appetible and delightful object, it would have to tend supremely of itself to that object, and the tending would impede the act of reason, because the sensitive powers would still be existing then in the same essence as they are now – and because of this unity [sc. of essence] they will impede themselves mutually in the intensity of their acts, according to Avicenna *On the*

Soul p.4 ch.2. Therefore reason would have to make an effort to impede this supreme delight of the sensitive part, and the inferior power could not be curbed without some sadness or difficulty existing in it, because just as it supremely inclines to delight so it struggles, on its own part, supremely against the opposite. There would then be a rebellion there, because there would be inclination of the inferior part toward enjoyment against the judgment of reason, and a difficulty in restraining this appetite.

B. Scotus' own Opinion

13. It can therefore be said that if original justice did have this effect, namely to cause perfect tranquility in the soul as to all its powers (so that no lower power would incline against the judgment of a higher; or if it did incline as far as concerned itself, it could yet be ordered and regulated by a higher power without difficulty on the part of the higher, and without sadness on the part of the lower), then, since the soul would not have this when made purely in its natural conditions alone, there is need to posit in it a supernatural gift so that this perfect tranquility may exist in the soul.

14. For the will,^a when conjoined to the sensitive appetite, is of a nature to enjoy delight along with that appetite, just as the intellect, when conjoined with the senses, is of a nature to understand sensible things; and if such a will is conjoined with many sensitive appetites, it is of a nature to enjoy delight along with all of them – and thus, not only can it not draw the appetite back from what delights it without any contrary inclination on the part of the appetite and without any difficulty, but neither does it seem able without difficulty to draw itself back from delighting along with the appetite. In order, then, for it

to draw itself back with delight, something must become more delightful to it than is the delightful thing of the lower appetite that it jointly delights in together with that appetite; so in order for the will to be able to draw itself back with delight from every disordered delighting along with a lower power, something must of itself be more delightful to the will than any delightful thing of any lower power; and since there is nothing such on the part of the will itself, there must have been something supernatural in the will whereby the end became more delightful to it than anything delightful of any sensitive appetite – and for this reason the will would more delightfully draw itself back from joint delight along with the sensitive appetite than depart from that delightful thing, namely from the end.^b If there was then this effect in the first man, namely perfect tranquility, and it was an effect of original justice, that justice was a supernatural gift, because God made it more delightful to the will than any appetible sensible thing, and this could not have come from any natural gift of the will itself.

a. [*Interpolation*] From this a second argument can be formed.

b. [*Interpolation*] according to which it jointly delighted along with the sensitive appetite.

15. But is it really the case that by this all rebellion is taken away, so that the lower power delightfully draws itself back from its proper delightful object?

I reply:

If the will abstains delightfully from joint delight with a lower power, the whole man delightfully abstains from the delightful object of the lower sensitive appetite; but the whole man does not abstain with sadness if the lower power abstains with sadness;

for what belongs to man according to a higher power belongs to him simply, and not for this reason is it denied to him if it does not belong to him according to a lower power.

16. But if it be said, on the part of a lower power, that the lower power on its part delightfully obeys reason, then it seems that something must be placed in the lower power so that it may be thus delightfully drawn to something delightful to the will; for it does not seem that a lower power would from its own nature be delightfully torn away from its own delightful thing; nor even was the lower power from its nature as it is a power lower than the will delightfully torn away in itself from its delightful object, because this essential order remains now and yet there is no such delight now. There would be need, then, to posit in the individual lower appetitive powers individual gifts, so that each of them would, through its gift, be moved by the will, and the will by its gift would move itself delightfully in relation to the lower powers; and if there were several such gifts, that gift was most of all original justice which was in the will.

17. For through that gift the will would prevent certain delights of the sensitive appetite from ever being present in it, as the delight of committing adultery with another's beautiful wife. The will would have had command over some delights and would have made a good use of them, as the delights of knowing one's own wife by obeying the divine precept (namely the precept 'Be fruitful and multiply etc.' *Genesis* 1.28), so that those lawful delights, which by occasion, for the time they were present, are to be had, would not have been held by the will as end, but would have been referred to the due end. From some lawful delights too, which are sometimes to be had, the will would sometimes have turned away, as from the delight that was not to be had save for a time. And each of these acts, whether preventing delights, or using well delights

possessed, or turning away from possessed delights, the will would do delightfully through that supernatural gift whereby it was more delightful to it to adhere to the ultimate end and to all things ordered toward it than to be separated from it by adhering to something delightful not ordered to the end.

18. All these things the will could not have had from pure nature, although it would of itself have some gift to which all these were proper. Nor for this reason would there be delight, although the whole man, to whom the principal power of delighting belonged, would delight. Nor perhaps is it necessary to posit that no sensitive appetite could then have been saddened; for sight could then have seen something foul and hearing could then have heard something foul, and both could have offended the sensitive appetite, just as a fitting sensible object could also have delighted it; but the will then would have used those sadnesses well, and would even have used the sadnesses of the lower appetites delightfully (so that it would not have been saddened immediately by the inferior appetites), just as it would have used the delights of them well, delighting along with them not immoderately.

19. About the other effect attributed to original justice, namely immortality, there is no need to argue, because this immortality – as was said in d.19 [not in the *Ordinatio*, see *Lectura* II d.19 n.5] – was not an impossibility of dying (even while that state continued), but a possibility of not dying; and this possibility would have been preserved in an act of not dying by means of the many aids that are talked of there, namely eating of the tree of life, the guardianship of the angels, also divine protection and good internal regimen, and the rest of the things there talked of [*ibid.* nn.10-15].

II. To the Principal Arguments

20. To the first argument [n.2] I say that neither of the above [sc. immortality and lack of rebellion] can be preserved on the basis of pure nature.

21. When the proof is given that their opposites are punishments, I say that they are not but rather natural conditions – just as it is not a punishment but natural for a man to die, and not a punishment but natural that his appetite is drawn to its delightful object; for because man is composed of many organic parts and thus there are many appetites in him, it is natural for each of them to be drawn to its delightful object and natural also for the body to be capable of being used up, unless there are remedies that supply it abundantly so that the using up does not prevail.

22. Against this it is said that these features [sc. rebellion and death] would have been involuntary, therefore they would also have been punishments. I reply and say that although involuntary yet they are not punishments; for death is against the natural inclination of an ox, and yet it is not a punishment for the ox, because there is no punishment save in the will (according to Anselm *On the Virginal Conception* ch.4, “Only the will is punished, for nothing is a punishment for anything save what is against its will”). But if you mean by ‘involuntary’ that it is against an act of the will, I say that it would not have been an involuntary punishment for someone existing in pure nature; for if the will had not wanted its nature to have had the condition that was natural to it, it would have sinned!

23. To the second [n.3] I say that ‘natural rectitude’ is the liberty innate to the will, which it is necessary for the will to have been made in by God; nor is this rectitude

corrupted by sin; and thus original justice, if it is set down as the natural rectitude of the will, will be the will's very liberty. But this liberty does not have the natural effects that are attributed to original justice [n.18]; and if these effects are attributed to a quality intermediate between nature and infused virtue, there is no necessity to posit that intermediate quality, because all the things with respect to the will that appear unacceptable will be saved without it.

24. To the third [n.4] I say that someone existing in pure nature is not equal to someone who has sinned while existing in justice; not because the latter has some crookedness which the former does not have, but because the latter is in debt for the original justice he received, and the former is not; and so the latter is guilty and the former is not. Even if the vision of God is conferred on neither, yet to one the lack of vision is a punishment and to the other not; for the one who is guilty is deprived of it by his guilt, while the other is deprived of it by the condition of nature.

25. To the fourth [not in the *Ordinatio*, but in the *Lectura* and *Reportatio*, where it is argued that, if original justice was a supernatural gift, it would then have been a sufficient principle for earning merit] I say that even if original justice is a supernatural gift, yet there is no need for it to be a principle of merit; for it is related to grace, which is a principle of merit, as exceeding to exceeded – exceeding indeed because it joined the will more firmly to the ultimate end than grace does. For, according to some [Alexander of Hales, Matthew of Aquasparta, Aquinas], it so joined to the ultimate end that it did not allow for any venial sin along with it, but charity does allow for this [cf. *Lectura* II dd.21-22 nn.9-10]; and according to what was said before [nn.14, 17], it at least so joined the will to the ultimate end that the will found it easier and more delightful to suffer some

lower sadness than to rest in any lower delight by departing from the delight of the end; grace does not cause this easiness, since along with it there stands proneness to evil and difficulty in doing good. But grace exceeds in this respect, that it joins to the ultimate end as to a supernatural good and as to attaining such a good supernaturally, by merit; the supernatural gift did not so, but joined to that good only as to something agreeable and delightful.

III. To Certain Statements of Henry of Ghent

26. As to what is touched on in the example about the rod [n.6], the case is not similar; for bodily quantity cannot, as it seems, come to be in anything without some determinate quality of the fourth species [sc. shape]; but essence and spiritual power can come to be without habit [sc. the first species of quality].

27. As for what is touched on about the wounding in nature [n.7], there will be discussion of it below at d.35 [dd.34-37 nn.33, 46, 49], where will be stated which sin is a corruption of good, and of which good, whether of the nature itself in which it is or of something else.^a

a. [*Interpolation*] About this at the end of that question [sc. d.35].

Thirtieth to Thirty Second Distinctions

Question One

Whether Anyone Propagated according to the Common Law from Adam contracts

Original Sin

1. Concerning the thirtieth distinction I ask whether anyone propagated according to the common law from Adam contracts original sin.^a

a. [Interpolation] Concerning the thirtieth distinction, where the Master deals with the transmission of original sin to posterity, two questions are asked: first I ask whether anyone propagated according to the common law from Adam contracts original sin; second whether this sin is lack of original justice. Argument about the first...

2. That he does not:

Augustine *On True Religion* ch.14 n.27, “Sin is to such extent voluntary that if it is not voluntary it is not sin;” but nothing is voluntary in small children, who do not have the use of reason; so there is no sin in them.

3. Again, Augustine *On Free Choice* 3.8 n.171, “No one sins as to what he cannot avoid;” a child cannot avoid what comes to him from his conception; therefore the natural defect that enters in from the beginning is not culpable but penal.

4. Further, there is the argument set down in the text, “He who creates does not sin, nor does he who generates sin. Through what sources then does sin, amid so many protections of innocence, enter in?” [from Julian of Eclanum, in Lombard *Sentences* 2 d.30 ch.13 n.2].

5. Further, Aristotle *Ethics* 3.7.1114a25-27, “No one will blame a man born blind, but will rather pity him;” so the natural defect is not culpable but penal.

6. Again, Adam was not nobler than the whole of human nature, so by infecting himself he could not have infected the whole of human nature. The antecedent is plain because any individual had something as noble as Adam, or could have had. The proof of the consequence is that the corruption of a lesser good does not include the corruption of a greater good.

7. On the contrary:

Romans 5.12, “Through one man sin entered into the world, in whom all have sinned;” and *ibid.* 5.19, “As by the disobedience of one man many were made sinners, so by the obedience of one man will many be made just.”

8. Again Augustine [rather Fulgentius] *On the Faith to Peter*, and it is contained in the Master’s text, “Hold most firmly and in no way doubt that all men conceived through sexual intercourse of man and woman are born with original sin.”

Question Two

Whether Original Sin is Lack of Original Justice

9. Second I ask whether this sin is lack of original justice.

10. That it is not:

Because an angel lacks it and yet he does not have any sin.

11. Further, Adam lacked it (for he lost original justice by sinning), and yet he did not have original sin but actual.

12. Further, a baptized child lacks original justice and yet he does not have original sin.

13. If it be said that original sin is in some way remitted to him by grace, so in some way he does not have it – on the contrary: someone baptized who has relapsed does not have grace, and so he does not have a reason for that sin to be remitted to him; and he does not have original justice, so original sin returns in him.

14. Lastly, original sin would be in the will as also is justice, of which that sin is the privation, according to Anselm *On the Virginal Conception* ch.3; the consequent is false, because the will is the most immaterial power, and consequently separate most of all from the body; therefore it cannot be infected by the flesh, because it is separate from the flesh.

15. It is argued to the opposite that original sin cannot be anything other than this privation:

For it is not concupiscence, first because it is natural ([sc. and not voluntary] from d.29 n.12 above); second because it is in the sensitive part (where sin is not, according to Anselm [*ibid.* ch.4]); third because it is non-actual, for the concupiscence then would have been actual, not habitual – the habit, left behind in the soul from mortal sin, is not mortal sin (for such habit remains when sin has been forgiven by penance). Nor even is it ignorance, because a baptized child is as ignorant as an unbaptized one.

16. Further, original sin disorders the whole soul; therefore, if it is some single guilt, it is in the power by whose disorder the whole soul is disordered; that power is the will alone, because just as an ordered will orders the other powers, so a disordered will

disorders them. Nor is it anything positive; therefore it is a privation of some justice, a justice opposed to this guilt.

Question Three

Whether the Soul contracts Original Sin from Infected Flesh, Sown in Concupiscence

17. Concerning the thirty first distinction I ask^a whether the soul contracts original sin from infected flesh, sown in concupiscence.

a. [*Interpolation*] Concerning this thirty first distinction, where the Master deals with the manner of transmission of original sin, one question is asked.

18. That it is not:

Because matter does not act on form; therefore neither does flesh act on the soul.

19. There is confirmation, because Augustine says, *Literal Commentary on Genesis* 12.16 n.33, “What acts is more excellent than what is acted on;” and according to him in the same place, “body is not more excellent than spirit;” from which he concludes that “body does not act on spirit” – and from this we have the intended conclusion.

20. Again, if it be said that Augustine’s major [‘what acts is more excellent than what is acted on’] is true of the good, not of the bad, because in the bad the effect can be worse than its cause – on the contrary: the natural cause of the evil of guilt cannot be punishment alone, because punishment is just and guilt precisely does not naturally

follow on what is just; but what is in the flesh is punishment only, and if it is the cause of guilt, it is only a natural cause, because it is not free; therefore etc.

21. Next: if original sin is contracted from infected flesh [n.17], then it would be contracted from the nearest parent, because by him is such flesh sown. The consequent is false, because then original sin could be increased in the intermediate parents; for more agents of the same idea have power for a more perfect effect, and so the nearest parent along with the intermediate parents can increase original sin in intensity beyond what it would have been in a son generated immediately by the first parent.

22. On the contrary:

The Master in the text adduces authorities to the effect that the soul is infected by the flesh, because unless it were so, no other cause seems able to be assigned whereby this sin should be caused in the soul; not by God, as is plain; nor by Adam himself, because we may posit that he has been annihilated – or if he still exists, at least he does not have any guilt, because he is posited as blessed – so he does not now exist under the idea of a sinner, under which idea the cause of this sin would have to be placed.

23. Further, we contracted this sin insofar as we existed in Adam according to seminal reason, according to Augustine *Literal Commentary on Genesis* 10.20 n.35; but this was according to the body, not according to the soul; for the soul does not come from the parent, as the Master adduces in the authority in the text *On Ecclesiastical Dogmas* [Gennadius of Marseilles, “We say that only the Creator of all things knows the creation of the soul, and that the body alone is sown by union of the spouses...and that the soul is created and infused for an already formed body”].

Question Four

Whether Original Sin is Remitted in Baptism

24. Concerning the thirty second distinction I ask^a whether original sin is remitted in baptism.

a. [*Interpolation*] Concerning this thirty second distinction, where the Master deals with the remission of original sin, the question is asked:

25. That it is not:

The guilt is not remitted unless the opposed justice is restored; original justice is not restored in baptism (as is plain from the effects).

26. To the contrary is the Master in the text [*Sentences* 2 d.32 ch.1 n.3: “For two reasons, then, is original sin said to be remitted in baptism, that by the grace of baptism the vice of concupiscence is weakened and lessened...and that the one guilty of original sin is set free”], and the Church holds this opposing view [cf. Augustine *Against Two Letters of the Pelagians* 3.10 n.26, “But this I say: it is very manifest according to the holy Scriptures, confirmed by very great antiquity and authority of the Catholic faith, well known by very clear renown of the Church, that original sin is removed by the laver of regeneration in children, so that whatever is against this...cannot be true”].

I. To All the Questions at Once

A. The Opinion of Others

1. Exposition of the Opinion

27. On this topic of original sin, holding that it is present in the way meant by the authorities to the contrary in the first question [nn.7-8], there are two ways of speaking about it – one is that of the Master and of others who follow and expound him [the second at n.48].^a

a. [Interpolation] The other way seems to be Anselm's, in his book *On the Virginal Conception*.

28. Now to understand this way, four things must be looked at: first how the infection in the flesh is contracted by the soul; second, how infected flesh is sown; third, how the soul is infected by it; fourth, how the soul is freed from this infection by baptism.

29. As to the first article it is said that the will [sc. of the first man] caused in the flesh by sinning a certain diseased quality consequent to the crookedness of the will [cf. d.29 n.6]. This diseased quality is called 'kindling' [*fomes*] and it is a law in the bodily members, a tyrant;⁸¹ it is also like a certain weight, exciting sensual movements in the flesh and inclining the soul toward taking delight in the flesh and holding the soul back from superior delights, according to *Wisdom* 9.15, "The corrupting body weighs down the soul."

⁸¹ Lombard, *Sentences* 2 d.30 ch.8 n.2, "Original sin is called the kindling of sin, namely concupiscence... which is called the law of the bodily members, or the languor of nature, or a tyrant..., or the law of the flesh. Hence Augustine [*Sermon* 30 ch.5 n.6] 'Now this languor is a tyrant' that gives motion to evil desires;" *Sentences* d.31 ch.3 n.2, "Concupiscence itself is the law of the bodily members or of the flesh, which is a certain diseased affection or languor that stimulates illicit desire, that is, carnal concupiscence, which is called the 'law of sin' [*Romans* 7.23]."

30. Because of this diseased quality in the flesh thus weighing down the soul, that is, tending down toward lower things, the soul is drawn and enticed toward likewise tending down into lower things; and according to a certain person [Henry, *Quodlibet* 5.23, reply to the argument for the opposite], this quality is never reduced in its essence (although it is in its effect) – that is, that although grace could be so great that it inclines to higher things more than the kindling inclines to lower ones, yet grace does not reduce the kindling in its essence because it is not a contrary to the kindling, for the kindling is in the flesh and grace is in the soul. And he posits an example about a stone attached or tied to the wings of a bird: however much the motive power might grow in the wings, the weight would never decrease in the stone, although as to the effect it would drag down less because the contrary force [in the wings] would in its effect prevail.

31. About the second article [n.28] it is said [Lombard, Henry, et al.] that either the whole of the flesh of the first parents was infected with this diseased quality, and thus is the sown flesh infected; or, if not the whole flesh was infected, or if the flesh sown was not the flesh of the father, then the sown flesh is at least infected by the fervor and lust of the inseminating; and this second alternative seems assented to by Augustine [rather Fulgentius *On the Faith to Peter*, “Not propagation but lust transmits sin to children; nor does the fecundity of human nature make men to be born with sin, but the foulness of lust does, which men have from that most just condemnation of the first sin”], who attributes this infection, not to the propagation, but to the lust (as is plain in d.20 above [not in the *Ordinatio*, see *Lectura* II d.20 n.30]).

32. As to the third article [n.28] it is said [Henry, Lombard, Bonaventure] that the soul, at the instant of its creation and infusion, is stained by the infected flesh, so that

although the infection or stain of the flesh was not guilt formally but the result of guilt, yet it is an occasion for guilt in a soul united to the flesh – because when the soul is united, the infection is of the sort that is of a nature to exist in the soul, and of such sort is guilt. An example is used about the gift of an apple, which is stained and dirtied by the hand of the receiver.

33. About the fourth article [n.28] it is posited [Henry, Lombard] either that the crookedness, which the will incurs by sinning, remains in it, or that, if it does not remain, then at least the kindling in the flesh remains; but whether both or one of them remains, they are not imputed to the soul after baptism the way they were before, because the guiltiness is taken away; however they remain precisely as punishment for the preceding sin and as matter for exercising virtue.

34. In accord with this way [nn.27-28] it is plain what must be said to the questions moved:

For original guilt exists in anyone thus propagated, and this as to the first question [n.1]; as to the third question [n.17], it is said that infected flesh is sown and that by the infected flesh the soul is culpably infected; this guilt, as to the second question [n.9], is either a natural crookedness opposed to rectitude of will, or concupiscence (that is, a proneness to unbridled coveting of delights); and it is remitted, as to the fourth question [n.24], not in itself but as to the guiltiness of the person.

2. Doubts against the Opinion

35. About this way there are certain doubts as concerns the individual articles.

[Doubts against the first article] – As to the first article [nn.29-30] one doubt is how the will has so much dominion over the body that it can immediately alter the whole body to this diseased quality, especially since it does not have the body for object; for the will could with a first sin have sinned by desiring the excellence of God, or by some spiritual sin, and in this act the object of the will was not the body, which however is posited as being altered by the will [n.29]. Or if the way this altering could have happened may be saved, then it seems difficult how the same cause – with also a greater extrinsic help – could not have destroyed the diseased quality; for the will, however much aided by grace, cannot destroy the kindling (according to them [n.30, Henry and his followers]), and any total cause whatever of any effect seems able to destroy that effect, especially if its active power is increased.

36. A second doubt: for what purpose is this kindling posited in the flesh? – None, if it is posited as the principle of rebellion; for the flesh does not per se rebel against the will but the sensitive appetites do, for according to Aristotle *Politics* 1.5.1254b2-6 “the will dominates the body with despotic rule but the sensitive appetite with political rule.” Therefore the kindling should be principally placed in the sensitive appetite; or, if it is placed in the body, only in what is the organ of the sensitive appetite; and if in this organ, then, since no such flesh is passed on [to children], no flesh infected with kindling is passed on to them.

37. A third doubt is that in pure nature there would be rebellion, as was said in d.29 n.12; therefore one should not posit because of it any diseased quality in the flesh.

38. If it be said that the proper delight of the sensitive appetite in its proper delightful object would exist in pure nature too, but it would not exist along with lust, that

is, not with unbridled and immoderate coveting as it does now, and the principle of this sort of lustful delight is the kindling – against this: just as delighting is not in the power of the sensitive appetite (‘because it does not lead but is led’ [according to Damascene d.29 n.12]), so neither is the mode of delighting; therefore it delights supremely in the presence of a supremely delightful sensible object. What lust adds over and above this ‘supremely delighting in the presence of a delightful sensible object’ is not easy to see.

39. [Doubts as to the second article] – As to the second article [n.31] the first doubt seems to be that semen was never animated with the soul of the father; for it is something left over, something which is not necessary for nourishing any member of the body. But what is taken up by a bodily member, with which the semen had the same nature, was not something animated; therefore the semen never contracted infection from a soul by which it was never perfected.

40. There is a confirmation from Anselm *On the Virginal Conception* ch.7, where he maintains that “the semen is not infected more than spit is or blood;” but if an organic body were formed from these things, there would seem to be no way that the soul would be infected by that body’s infection.

41. The second doubt is that if the semen was infected, then since it is transmuted through many substantial forms before an organic body comes to be from it, and the prior substantial form – the one that constituted the subject of the diseased quality – does not remain, so neither does the diseased quality remain.

42. It will be said [by Henry] that from an infected thing an infected thing is generated; example: from the seed of a leprous father the leprous body of a son is generated. – On the contrary: a lion eating the corpse of a dead man will contract the

kindling. Proof of the consequence: for the corpse was infected with the kindling and, according to you, ‘an infected thing is generated from an infected thing’; therefore etc. Proof of the assumption: let a dead man be resurrected (as happened with Lazarus, *John* 11.43-44); the soul united to the flesh will find the flesh rebellious against the spirit; therefore the kindling was then in the body. So by what was it there? Not by the soul because it has been purged of original sin (through baptism, let us suppose, or circumcision); nor must one imagine that it was by God; therefore the kindling remained in the dead corpse.

43. A response could be made to these two doubts [nn.39, 41] by the fact that it is the infected active power of the semen which generates an infected thing from an infected thing, and even an infected thing from a non-infected thing. And so, in answer to the first doubt: from non-infected nutriment the infected active power of the father generates infected semen and passes on original guilt to the offspring. Answer to the second doubt: the infected power generates infected flesh from infected semen; and then the second objection about the lion [n.42] is not valid, because the active power of the lion – which is what converts the corpse into some member of the lion – is not infected.

44. A third doubt about this article [n.31] seems to be that ‘something miraculously formed from the flesh of my finger would contract original sin’ [Henry, but not Aquinas], which seems contrary to Anselm [*On the Virginal Conception* chs.11, 18, 19] where he maintains that there are two reasons that Christ did not contract original sin [sc. that he was not a natural son of Adam and that he was conceived by a most pure mother], either of which would suffice without the other:^a “because he was not a natural son of Adam” and thus was not made guilty in Adam.

a. [*Interpolation*] one, that his flesh was cleansed in the blessed Virgin;⁸² second...

45. [Doubts as to the third article] – About the third article [n.32] there is a doubt as to how flesh causes the infection of the soul. For if the soul has caused this infection in the flesh [nn.28-29] and from the flesh it may be caused in the soul [n.32], then both causes are equivocal to their effect and both are total causes [cf. dd.34-37 n.106] (and it is difficult to avoid a circle in total equivocal causes). It will also be difficult to save the way in which the will, which is a purely immaterial power, is transmuted immediately by something bodily; and since the intellect is not posited as being able immediately to be transmuted by a phantasm except in virtue of the agent intellect [1 d.3 nn.340-345], the result is that the intellect is more immaterial than the will. It would seem to follow too that this sin would be in the essence first, because the essence perfects the flesh first; but the consequent seems false, because in the essence, qua essence, guilt seems neither to exist formally nor to be of a nature to exist formally [guilt exists in a power, d.26 nn.24-26].

46. [Doubt as to all three articles together] – Against all three articles [nn.29-32] there is one common doubt, namely why the first man was able by an act of his will to infect his flesh [n.29] without the second and third man after him being able to do likewise; and thus, since many intermediate fathers sinned mortally, the sown flesh would be more and more infected. But this seems absurd because not everyone generated now is more prone to inordinate delight than any of the ancients born before were; also because

⁸² Vatican editors: this is false and contrary to Anselm.

it would seem to follow from this that original sin is made more intense; for although original sin, if it is posited as being a total privation [cf. below nn.50-51, 53], does not admit of a more and less, yet if it is posited to be crookedness or concupiscence (according to this opinion [nn.27-33]), it can be greater or lesser [cf. n.21].

47. [Doubts as to the fourth article] – About the fourth article [n.33] the doubt is that sin is not formally removed unless what is formal in sin, and not what is material in it, is destroyed; but the debt of original justice is not the formal debt in original sin, because original justice was only due in the state of innocence because he who had it owed it; therefore it does not seem to be formally remitted unless that deformity or lack is taken away, either in itself or through some having equivalent to the having of the privation.

B. Scotus' own Opinion, which is taken from Anselm

48. About this topic there is another way, which seems to be that of Anselm⁸³ in the whole of his book *On the Virginal Conception* where he deals with original sin.

49. To see this way four things again must be touched on: first, what original sin is, and hereby is solved the second question [n.9], second whether such a sin is present [sc. in those propagated from Adam], as regard the first question [n.1]; third, how it is contracted, as to the third questions [n.17]; and fourth, how it is remitted by baptism, and this as to the fourth question [n.24].

⁸³ The way also adopted by Scotus here, and which (say the Vatican editors) is close enough, in its main points, to that of Aquinas and several other doctors.

1. What Original Sin is

50. As to the first article Anselm says in the cited book [n.48] ch.27, “This sin, which I call ‘original’, I cannot understand to be anything other in infants than the very being stripped naked of an owed justice, a nakedness brought about by Adam’s disobedience, through which all are ‘sons of wrath’ [*Ephesians* 2.3].”

51. This account of original sin is proved by the fact that [Anselm *ibid.* ch.3] sin is formally injustice, and that such a sin is such an injustice [cf. below dd.34-37 n.51]; now injustice is nothing but lack of owed justice, according to Anselm *ibid.* ch.5 (and *On the Fall of the Devil* ch.16], when he says that original sin – which is lack of original justice – is nothing but lack of owed justice [also Giles of Rome, Roger Marston, Aquinas].

52. And if it is objected that other saints seem to say that concupiscence is original sin, I reply:

Concupiscence can be taken for an act or a habit or a proneness in the sensitive appetite, and none of these is formally sin, because there is no sin in the sensitive part according to Anselm *ibid.* chs.3-4. Or it can be taken for a proneness in the rational part or appetite (or the rational appetite) for coveting delights inordinately and immoderately, which rational appetite is of a nature to delight with the sensitive appetite to which it is joined; and in this way concupiscence is the material of original sin because, by the lack of original justice (which was as a bridle restraining it from immoderate delight), the rational appetite becomes, not positively but through privation, prone to coveting immoderately delightful things (as Anselm exemplifies, ch.5, about a ship with a broken

rudder and about a horse with a broken bridle that falls off it); and from this follows, in the issue at hand, the inordinate motion that the bridle was restraining.

53. Hereby is the second question solved [nn.9, 49], where the question is asked what original sin is. For it is formally a lack of owed original justice – not owed, however, in just any way, but owed because received in the first parent and in him lost; and therefore Adam did not have original sin, because this debt was not passed on to him by any parent, but he received the justice in himself and by his act he lost it.

2. Whether Original Sin is in Everyone Propagated in the Common Way

54. As to the second article, wherein the first question is solved [nn.1, 49].

By holding, according to the authority of the saints [Augustine, Ambrosiaster, Fulgentius, Anselm], that the sin exists in all those propagated in the common way, the point can be made clear from the above account of original sin; for anyone thus propagated has the lack of original justice (as is plain from the effects of original justice stated above, d.29 nn.13-19); and he is a debtor for that justice, because he received it in the parent, by the act of which parent he lost it [n.53]; therefore, according to the above description, he has original sin.

56. The antecedent is plain from Anselm *ibid.* ch.27, “Because the forsaking of justice accuses, of its own accord, the nature [God] made, nor are persons excused by the inability to recover it,” as he himself explains ch.2, “for nature made itself impotent by the forsaking of justice in the first parents, in whom nature was whole, and nature is always in debt to have the power that it received for always preserving justice.”

57. From these statements a debt seems to be proved in children, on the grounds that Adam received justice for himself and for the whole nature that was then in him; and therefore God justly requires from the whole nature, in whomever it is, the justice which he gave nature – so that, according to Anselm *ibid.* ch.23, Adam by his personal sin stripped nature of its due justice, and nature stripped naked of such justice makes nature in anyone at all to be naked and debtor.

58. Against this [n.57] it is objected that the numerically individual nature that is in Peter was not in Adam, although it was of the same species in Peter; therefore this nature of Peter did not receive any justice; therefore it is not a debtor.

59. And if you say that ‘as the nature was causally in Adam, so this person was causally in Adam’, then the same thing, as far as the conclusion about being debtor is concerned, is being said of the persons propagated as of the natures of those propagated; for one must show that the person, from the fact he was in Adam causally when Adam received justice formally, is a debtor in the same way that nature is. How then is it that the mode of receiving justice is sufficient for being a debtor for the received justice? For if a natural son of Adam was not in Adam as to the will but only as to the flesh, and if he cannot be a debtor for justice save as to the will (as to which he is able to possess justice), then he is not a debtor for justice because he was causally in someone as in his propagative principle.

60. Response. Without making mention of this nature and this person, I show that someone propagated from Adam is a debtor for justice because Adam received justice formally and the one propagated received it in Adam.

61. And the proof of this is as follows: every gift is due that is given by God himself when he gives it with antecedent will (though not with consequent will), that is, as far as God's part is concerned, the gift has without special merit or grace now been given; but when Adam receives justice, his son is given justice by God's antecedent will (that is, as far as the part of God was concerned), because justice would, without special gift, have been conferred on Adam's son, provided there was no impediment present; so, from this conferring made to the father, the son is debtor for the justice thus given.

62. Proof of the major: for although he who receives will and grace is given no meritorious work in itself without consequent will, yet he is given it in the grace in which it exists by antecedent will and virtually; and, for this reason, he who receives grace is debtor for the good works that are virtually contained in grace, so that he who loses grace and sins frequently is punished not only for the loss of grace but also for the sins committed, because otherwise those who sinned many times and those who sinned few times would be punished equally.

63. The minor is plain from the divine law which establishes that the parent [Adam], not putting an obstacle in the way by sin, gives as it were naturally original justice to his progeny; not indeed that the father transfuses it (for it is a supernatural gift), but that God himself would regularly cooperate with nature in giving justice to the progeny, just as now he creates the intellectual soul for a completely organized body.

64. An objection is raised against the proof of the major [n.111], that if works received formally in grace are due, this debt is due from the same will that received the grace, and in this grace those works are virtually contained; but in the issue at hand the will of the son never received justice, and it does not seem that the son's justice could be

virtually received in the justice of another's will [sc. Adam's] the way the works are virtually received in the grace given.

65. By removing this objection the reasoning [n.61] is confirmed: the idea of a debt – both on the part of the gift that is due and on the part of the will that owes it – is the very giving of the giver, who gives the gift received and gives to the will receiving; therefore a giving of the same idea suffices for the will to be debtor as it suffices for the gift to be due. But for the gift to be due, a giving by a will giving antecedently or virtually, not in itself formally, suffices; so, for the will to be debtor, a similar giving to the will itself suffices. But when the giving was made to the will of Adam in this way, that with, as it were, the same giving – as far as concerned the giving of itself – it was given simply to the will of any son whatever (if no obstacle were placed in the way), such a giving is a giving with respect to the will of any son; therefore the son's will by this giving is made debtor. So although things are not similar altogether in the case of meritorious works given virtually in grace and in the issue at hand [n.64], yet there is a similarity in respect of it, because on both sides there is precisely a giving with an antecedent, and not consequent will, on the part of the giver, and this giving is a reason for the will to be debtor just as it is for the gift to be due.^a

a. [*Interpolation*] The reason is confirmed, because if God had created all men at once and had given original justice to Adam, then if only Adam had sinned, there seems to be no law of justice that the others (who did not receive justice in themselves) were debtors for that justice; so they are not debtors now either, because they could not have been more obliged now through Adam than they were then if God had established a law that, with only Adam sinning, he would have given justice to everyone, because then none would have sinned. The assumption, namely that the rest would not have been debtors, is proved by this, that if God had given them justice and had

immediately deprived them of it without their act, they would not have been reputed debtors for the justice they lacked. But they can more receive the idea of debt from God who gives than from the fact that their father received justice. Therefore from the fact that their father received justice formally and lost it by his own act, the sons will not be debtors such that it would be imputed to them for guilt.⁸⁴

66. For the purpose of solving the arguments [nn.2-6, the solution is in nn.70-75], one must understand that ‘owed justice’ can be twofold: in one way because it is received in oneself and is lost by the action of oneself as receiver; in another way because it is received in another and lost by the action of that other. In the first way actual sin is injustice and lack of justice; in the second way original sin is; hence original sin is compared rather to sin remaining in the soul after the passing by of the act than compared to an actual sin that is being elicited by the sinning will itself.

3. How Original Sin is Contracted

67. As to the third article and the third question [nn.49, 17].

⁸⁴ The Vatican editors regard this interpolation as neither a confirmation nor as consonant with the views of Scotus. They even advert to a marginal note added in one of the manuscripts to the effect that the interpolation is heretical and is believed to have been added by the enemies of Scotus. However, the interpolation can perhaps be saved if it is understood to be arguing, as it does at the end, that the mere gift of original justice to Adam does not entail debt in his progeny, but only a gift does that includes the antecedent willing by the giver to give the same gift to everyone else because of Adam, so that, if Adam sinned, it would not be given them (which is the burden of Scotus’ argument in n.65). The argument in the interpolation, therefore, proceeds by extreme assumption as it were: suppose all Adam’s descendants created at once along with him (which is physically impossible but possible by imaginary hypothesis), then they could not have lost original justice merely because Adam lost it, but only because God willed to give them original justice through giving it first to Adam (first in order, if not in time). Then Adam’s loss of original justice by his own act would entail loss and debt on the part of everyone else, since the giver’s antecedent will was to give them justice through Adam and not independently of him.

In line with this way [n.48] it is said that the soul contracts original sin by the intermediary of the flesh – not in such a way that the flesh as it were causes the sin by some quality quasi-caused [n.29] in the soul, but by the fact that the flesh is sown with concupiscence, and from this the organic body is formed and the soul infused into it [n.63], constituting a person who is a son of Adam. This person, then, because he is a natural son of Adam, is in debt for original justice (given by God to Adam for all his sons) and lacks it; therefore he has original sin. So the sin is contracted in the flesh insofar as the flesh is a natural reason, and from this reason the person is proved to owe the justice that through Adam's sin he lacks.

4. How Original Sin is Remitted by Baptism

68. As to the fourth article and the fourth question [nn.49, 24].

It is said that that which is formal in the remission of the sin must in itself destroy what is formal in the sin through the opposite of it – opposite formally or virtually –, and what is formal in the sin is not the debt (as is plain, because justice was due in the state of innocence), but the lack of the justice; this lack then must be destroyed either by the positive proper opposite [nn.47, 53] or by something else which virtually contains the opposite. Now grace, although it does not join to the ultimate end, as far as an accidental end is concerned, as perfectly as original justice does, yet it does join to it more perfectly (as was said in d.29 n.25), and that as to the fact that original sin disjoins from the ultimate end; for grace joins simply to the end – under the idea of end – more eminently than original justice does; and therefore, when grace is given in baptism, the sin is simply

remitted more eminently than it would be by its proper positive. And even if the lack of the proper positive remains, yet it is not guilt, because the sin is not the debt; for the debt to have that gift is discharged and changed into a debt to have another gift.

II. To the Principal Arguments

A. To the Arguments of the First Question

69. To the arguments of the questions in order.

70. To the first [n.2] I say that ‘voluntary’ can be taken for what which is in the will, or more properly, as it is commonly taken, for what is in the power of the will as the will is active. In the first way original sin could be called voluntary, because, like any sin, it is in the will, where injustice is, according to the justice opposed to it, alone of a nature to be, as Anselm says *On the Virginal Conception* chs4-5; in the second way I say that sin need not be voluntary for the one who has the sin but for him or another from whom the sin is contracted – and both suffice for Augustine against the Manichees, who supposed sin to be from the evil soul, and thus, because of that evil soul, necessary and involuntary for everyone.

71. To the statement from Augustine *On Free Choice* [n.3] I say ‘to sin’ can be either to elicit an act of sinning or to have sin. In the first way the authority from Augustine can be conceded, because children do not elicit an act of sinning, for the sin is not actual in them but only contracted from their parents; in the second way the proposition [‘No one sins as to what he cannot avoid’] is false, unless it be understood in a general way as follows: ‘...as to what he cannot avoid either in himself or in another

through whom he contracts the sin', and the second is false in the issue at hand; and so the proposition, being thus disjunctively true, suffices for Augustine against the Manichees, as before [n.70].

72. To the third [n.4] I say that two things come together for original sin, namely the lack of justice (as formal in it) and the debt to have it (as material in it) [nn.47, 68], just as in the case of other privations there come together the privation and the aptitude for having it. The debt is from God establishing this law: 'by giving justice to you, Adam, I give it, as far as my part is concerned, to all your natural sons by the same giving'; and therefore all are by this giving bound to have it, and to have it from a propagated father, by whose action he is a natural son of Adam; so this sin does not enter through 'unknown sources' but is present through two positive causes. Now the lack has a cause only negatively, namely someone not giving original justice – and if the further cause of this be asked for, there is only a demeriting cause, namely that Adam deserved original justice not be given; the negative cause ('not giving') is God, the demeriting cause ('not to have justice given' or 'why justice is not given') is Adam sinning.

73. And if it is objected that 'when the effect is actually being brought about, its causes must then be posited to be in act; but if Adam were annihilated, or if now there were in fact no sin or demerit in Adam's will, how does this child in this instant contract sin from Adam?' – I reply: just as merit, when it passes away in itself, yet remains in the knowledge and acceptance of God who repays it as if it were present, so demerit too passes as to the act but remains in the knowledge of God, who punishes it as if it were now present. Thus too in the case of the negation 'not having original justice', the ways

in which it enters are: God not giving, and the demerit of Adam in God's knowledge, because of which he does not give.

74. To the statement from *Ethics* 3 [n.5] I say that no defect contracted from the origin is blamable save this one of original sin; and thus, although all other defects are non-blamable penalties, not so this one.

75. To the final argument [n.6] I say that Adam did not corrupt this singular nature nor this singular person; rather he corrupted himself with personal sin and therein, by demerit, his whole posterity.

B. To the Arguments on both Sides of the Second Question

76. To the arguments of the second question.

As to the first, about Adam [n.11],⁸⁵ it is plain that he had a lack of original justice by his own act, and a lack of an owed justice because it was received in him; such lack is not original sin but that lack is which is had by another's act and is a lack of justice owed because received by another [nn.53, 66].

77. As to the next about the angel [n.10], it is plain that an angel is not capable of original justice, or if he is, he has it; for if original justice per se respects only the will and not the sensitive appetite, and if it respect the end under the idea of the fitting and delightful [d.29 nn.14, 25], to posit some such gift in an angel is not unacceptable.

78. To the third [n.12] I say that in baptism is discharged the debt of having the gift in itself, and it is changed into a debt of having the equivalent gift, namely grace

⁸⁵ Actually the second argument in the *Ordinatio* and the first in the *Lectura* and *Reportatio*. The first argument in the *Ordinatio* is responded to next, n.77.

[n.68]. And this second debt from then on always remains, nor does the first debt return; and he who lacks the second gift owed sins more gravely than if he lacked the first; and yet he is not a sinner with original sin, because the debt of having the original justice does not return.

79. To the fourth [n.13] the response is plain [n.78]. From the solution to the second question [nn.50-53].

80. To the fifth [n.14] I concede that original sin is in the will. And when you say that ‘the will is an immaterial power and therefore cannot be immediately affected by flesh’ – I say that the injustice is not in the will as in a subject changed by flesh changing it, but it is in the will because justice is not there, and yet the justice is due because the will is the will of a son of Adam.

81. To the arguments for the opposite, against concupiscence [n.15], it is plain that they do not conclude to an opposite against the intention of the question [sc. while they prove that concupiscence is not original sin, they do not prove that lack of original justice is not original sin].

C. To the Arguments on both Sides of the Third Question

82. To the arguments of the third question.

To the first [n.18], I say that original sin is not from flesh acting on the soul; and the same serves as response for Augustine *On Genesis* [n.19]; for all that comes from the flesh is this relation, ‘that he is a natural son of Adam’, in the person produced, and on

this relation follows a debt from divine law, and the lack of original justice exists there from negation of the cause [nn.67-72].

83. And when, by taking the argument further back, it is responded [n.20] that punishment is not a cause of guilt, this is true of the principal cause. But if some infection is posited in the flesh (which is not necessary according to the present way [n.48]), it can be an instrumental cause of guilt; or if there is no infection there, the flesh can still be an instrumental cause insofar as an active power exists in the semen for producing a son of Adam, who will thereby be a debtor.

84. To the argument about the nearest parent [n.21] I reply that whoever had received original justice formally in itself or by consequent will would have been debtor for himself and for all his posterity, for whom he had received it virtually; and so, if not Adam but Cain had sinned, the sons of Cain would have contracted original sin not from Adam but from Cain. As it is however, no one received original justice formally save Adam, and therefore everyone else had the same reason for possession with respect to original justice and the same reason for lacking it, that is, by the act of another [nn.53, 60-67, 76]; and so now the lack is not contracted from any nearest parent in such a way that it could be increased by him, just as not in such a way that it could be per se caused by him.

85. As to the arguments for the opposite [nn.22-23], it is plain that the authorities which say the soul is infected by the flesh are to be understood in the aforesaid way [nn.82-84], in that the soul is the form of a sinful will and is thereby debtor^a for having the justice which it lacks.

a. [*Interpolation*] [...the soul is the form] of the flesh, and from the union of these two comes a son of Adam and so a debtor.

86. But here there is a doubt about the authority of Augustine [Fulgentius, n.31] adduced by the Master in this thirty first distinction, which says that ‘not propagation but lust transmits’ this stain; so it seems that it is not merely from the fact someone is a natural son of Adam because propagated from Adam that he is thus bound to such sin, but it is from the fact he is a son of Adam propagated in lust that he contracts original sin.

87. I reply:

If propagation had taken place in the state of innocence, original sin would not have been contracted, and then propagation would have been wholly without lust, because those propagated would then have had original justice; but now any propagation at all in the common way is lustful by that fact; therefore because propagation is stained, it stains the offspring; but it does not stain because it is propagation, because propagation is not the medium between parent and offspring by which, according to the absolute idea of propagation that would have existed in the state of innocence, the son is stained, but this comes from the lack of original justice in the propagators, and the lust is consequent to this lack; so the authority ‘not propagation but lust infects the offspring’ must be expounded so that ‘lust’ is taken for the lack of original justice in the propagators, which lack is the cause of lust in the act of propagating.

D. To the Argument of the Fourth Question

88. As to the argument of the fourth question [n.25], it is plain that original justice is restored in an equivalent gift, rather in a preeminent gift [n.68].

89. But here there is a doubt; for since original justice is not formally grace, therefore neither is the privation of it formally privation of grace; therefore the privation of original justice can stand along with grace, and so, although grace is given in baptism, original sin remains (unless it be said that the debt of having original justice is discharged, and this falls in with others [nn.47, 68, 78]).

90. I reply:

In the state of innocence there were gifts ordained, so that original justice could have been without grace (but not conversely), and then the privation of original justice included virtually the privation of grace; therefore whoever would have had grace restored to him without original justice – had this happened – would not have had the perfect state of innocence. In the present state original justice and grace do not have this order [sc. original justice first followed by grace], but grace can exist without such justice, and grace is simply a more excellent gift than such justice; so when it exists in man it restores him simply in the present state to the supernatural perfection possible for him, and this without original justice. Although lack of original justice and grace are not, in the present state, absolutely contradictory or repugnant, yet they are repugnant in that the lack is an averting from the ultimate end, because conversion, which is opposed to aversion, is of a nature, in this present state, to be present by grace in a son of Adam without the gift of original justice [d.29 nn.13-14].

Thirty Third Distinction

Single Question

Whether only the Lack of the Divine Vision is Due as Punishment for Original Sin

1. Concerning the thirty third distinction I ask^a whether only lack of divine vision is due as punishment for original sin.

a. [*Interpolation*] Concerning the thirty third distinction where the Master deals with the punishment for original sin, the question is asked:

2. That it is not:

Augustine [Fulgentius] *On the Faith to Peter* ch.27 n.70, “Hold most firmly and do not at all doubt that children who depart this life without the sacrament of baptism are to be punished with the penalty of eternal fire etc.”

3. Further, the [unbaptized] children will have bodies capable of suffering, because their bodies will not be glorious; so they will be able to undergo the active power of something present to them; therefore the active power of fire. Or if you say that they will be preserved so that fire cannot act on them, they seem at any rate capable of suffering interior pain, namely hunger and thirst, and so of suffering the pain of sense.

4. Further, the kindling will not be extinguished in them; therefore they will be able to have in accord with it inordinate lusts; so they will be able to have immediate desires for delightful things and to be sad because of the removal or absence of them and so to suffer interior pain.

5. Further, they will have the use of reason and will know their own nature; so they will be able to know they are ordered to blessedness; and since all who have an appetite so ordered (according to Augustine *On the Trinity* 13.5) will be able naturally to desire to attain the end to which they are ordered; therefore they will be able to be saddened by the certainty of lacking the end desired.

6. Further, someone in a state of pure nature would suffer this loss [sc. the loss of the blessedness of the beatific vision]; so someone who has the disorder of guilt [sc. original sin], since he has an evil that the former does not have, should have a punishment that the former does not have (otherwise some guilt would be unpunished), and so his punishment should not be this loss alone but something else.

7. The opposite is maintained by the Master in the text (“They will not feel,” he says, “the punishment of material fire or of the worm of conscience, but will perpetually lack the vision of God”), and Augustine *Enchiridion* ch.23 n.93 (“A most mild punishment, certainly, will they suffer who have added nothing to the original sin that they contracted”).

I. To the Question

8. It seems to be the opinion of the masters here that those damned for original sin alone will have no punishment of exterior sense, to wit fire, because they had no disordered delights, and the harshness of the afflicting fire corresponds, as proper punishment, to that delight.

9. They will also not have interior punishment, as sadness, because they would not be saddened about their state, since sadness (according to Augustine *City of God* 14.15) is about things that happen to us against our will, and so they would be in that state against their will and would want the opposite; and thus they would murmur against the divine disposition and have as a result a disordered disposition of will [sc. actual sin], which seems absurd, for by the divine sentence things are so disposed that “wherever the wood falls, there it will lie” (*Ecclesiastes*, above d.7 n.53). Therefore since they had no disordered volition in this present life, they will consequently have no interior sadness. If, further, they were saddened by the lack of blessedness and of the divine vision, they would despair of it (for they have no hope), and so would have the gravest of the sins of all the damned, namely sadness from despair.

10. It seems too that sadness, as it is distinguished from pain, is simply a greater punishment (for man) than any other pain of sense, because as the will is more man’s appetite than is the sensitive appetite, so whatever a man does or suffers as to his will he does or suffers more as he is a man than what he does or suffers simply as to any other appetite; and so a man suffers simply more if he is sad than if he is in pain. So it does not seem that any sadness should be posited for them [sc. those damned for original sin alone].

11. And if a question be asked about their knowledge, one can concede, without asserting, that since they will have an intellect impeded by a corruptible body (to the extent that our intellect too is impeded in this present body) and yet it will not be impeded by torments (of the sort the other damned will have), they will be able to have a natural knowledge of things, and a knowledge newly acquired, because new acquisition is

not repugnant to the unchangeableness of their state, since having new understanding of some contingent facts is not repugnant to the unchangeableness of the state of the blessed; so likewise there is no repugnance to the stability of the state of the blessed (which consists in seeing God or the Word) that they should newly understand some necessary truth that they did not understand before, and understand from one necessary truth another necessary truth, and so be able to learn some truths about necessary things within their proper kind. So as to the others too [sc. those damned for original sin alone], since they do not have a knowledge so perfect that they cannot receive more, and since it is not reasonable to posit in them an impediment because of which they cannot acquire more, it seems probable to concede that they can naturally have knowledge of all naturally knowable things (and have it more excellently than other philosophers had it in this present state), and so they can attain to some natural blessedness about God as known in general.

12. But if an objection is raised whether they will have knowledge of blessedness in particular or be saddened about it, I reply:

Just as was said, in *Prologue* nn.13-18, that particular knowledge is not possible for man unless he is raised supernaturally, so either the supernatural knowledge in particular will not be given to them, because it would be a sadness for them, for they did not fail to merit it as a pagan has (for which reason knowledge of blessedness in particular is allowed to a pagan by way of very grave punishment, namely so that he may be saddened by despairing of being able to reach it); or if they will have knowledge of blessedness in particular, they will not be saddened, because they will be content with

their state knowing that God has disposed thus in their regard, and that they did not at any time fail by their own act to merit it.

II. To the Principal Arguments

13. To the argument of Augustine [Fulgentius, n.2] Bonaventure replies that Augustine is speaking by way of excess about those punishments (as the saints often do), because some said [e.g. Pelagians] that [unbaptized children] have no guilt and so no punishment – for just as, according to the Philosopher [*Ethics* 2.9.1109b4-7], the way of reaching the mean in morals is to proceed in some way beyond the mean toward the extreme, so the saints spoke by way of excess when extirpating the heresies burgeoning against them, wishing to tend toward the other extreme (and thus there is need to consider carefully which heretics the saints spoke against); just as Augustine seems as it were to tend toward Sabellius against Arius and conversely; likewise he seems to tend toward Arius against Sabellius and conversely

14. One could in another way say that [unbaptized children] are to be consumed with the punishment of eternal fire [n.2] in the sense of division, that is, they are to be in that punishment which is in eternal fire, namely they are to be punished with the penalty of loss and not with the eternal penalty of sense.

15. To the second [n.3] it should be said that just as the bodies of the damned will suffer from eternal fire but not be destroyed, so [unbaptized children] will perpetually lack the supernatural vision of God without any such exterior suffering – and also they will not suffer any interior suffering by which they will be able to be consumed, so that

their bodies will be impassible by divine disposition (and not by the gift of impassibility), and so that they will suffer neither from within nor from without.

16. To the next [n.4] I say that just as the kindling did not excite in them any disordered movement in this life, so neither will it there excite any.

17. To the next [n.5] I say that natural desire, unless it is by choice, does not cause any sadness.

18. But [as to the last, n.6, one must say it is true] but it does not seem to posit that [an unbaptized child] is per se more punished than the other [someone in a state of pure nature, n.6], because just as it not a per se reward for the intellect to know creatures but rather a reward for it to know God, so neither does it seem a per se penalty of loss for the intellect not to know creatures but rather a loss for it to be per se deprived of the vision of God – and to this extent they are equal [an unbaptized child and someone in a state of pure nature]. And therefore it can be said, as was said in d.29 n.24, that the one is punished and the other not; for the one is a debtor for the justice that he does not have and so he is guilty, and to the other the gift is simply not given, and not because of any guilt or responsibility. It is as if I should first gratuitously accept two people on equal terms for receiving some honor or gift, and afterwards one of them should offend (because of which he fails to merit the honor) and the other does not, and yet the honor is not given to him who did not offend (not because of some lack of merit but because it did not please me to give him the honor); these two would really be unequal, because the first is punished on the ground he is guilty and the other is not. In fact, however, no one will ever be in a state of pure nature, because the rational nature God makes he always

produces with a view to the end, provided there is no impediment or defect on the part of the nature itself.

Thirty Fourth to Thirty Seventh Distinctions

Question One

Whether Sin comes from Good as from a Cause

1. Concerning the thirty fourth distinction I ask^a, as to the cause of sin, whether sin is from good as from a cause.

a. [*Interpolation*] About the thirty fourth distinction, where the Master deals with actual sin and first with its original cause, the question is asked:

2. That it is not:

Because in *Matthew* 7.18 it is said: “A good tree cannot bring forth good fruit;” and the gloss there on it [“There is no intermediate between the cause of good being good and the cause of evil evil”].

3. Further, “every agent makes the effect like itself” (*On Generation and Corruption* 1.7.324a9-11), at least in the case of the most remote effects; likeness in what is most remote is in what is most common; so at least in the case of the most common perfections the effect is like the cause, and therefore in goodness too. Sin, then, is not from good as a cause but from evil.

4. Further, whatever is from good as from the efficient cause is directed to good as end; sin is not directed to good as end, because it turns from the end; therefore etc.

Proof of the minor: Aristotle *Metaphysics* 5.2.1013b9-11 and *Physics* 2.3.195a8-11, “the efficient and final causes are mutually causes of each other.”

5. Further, what is bad in nature is not in the effect from the efficient cause as cause; for a deformed effect or a morally bad effect is never produced save by a cause that is imperfect; therefore here too.

6. Further, there is some first evil (as I will prove [n.8]), so every other evil comes from it. This consequence is proved about good stated elsewhere [1 d.2 n.43], and by the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 2.1.993b23-30 about that being most such through which all other things are such [1 d.8 n.79, d.3 n.108].

7. And in addition: if nothing good comes from the first evil, then the evil too that comes from the first evil does not come from any good. The proof of this consequence is that the same thing does not come from diverse causes that are not ordered to each other.

8. The proof of the first proposition [n.6] is that either there is some supreme evil, and then the intended conclusion is gained because this supreme is first; or there is not, and then for every evil a worse evil can be taken *ad infinitum*; but it is unacceptable for there to be an infinite regress in things that are permanent (*Metaphysics* 2.2.994a1-11), and this was made clear in 1 d.2 nn.43, 46, 52-53; therefore there can be a single intensively infinite evil, and thus the conclusion.

9. The opposite is maintained by the Master in the text, and he adduces Augustine *On Marriage and Concupiscence* 2.28 n.48 [“The cause and first origin of sin is some good thing, because before the first sin there was nothing bad from which it might arise.

For since it had an origin and cause, it had it either from good or from evil; but there was no evil before; therefore evil is from good, etc.”].

Question Two

Whether Sin is per se a Corruption of Good

10. Next, about the thirty fifth distinction,^a the question is raised whether sin is per se a corruption of good.

a. [*Interpolation*] About the thirty fifth distinction, where the Master deals with the whatness of sin...

11. That it is not:

Augustine *Against Faustus* 22.27 (and it is in the Master’s text), “Sin is a word or deed or desire against the law of God;” each of these is something positive; therefore etc.

12. Further, that by whose distinction sins are distinguished belongs per se to the idea of sin; but sins are distinguished by the distinction of something positive, namely by the turning toward some changeable good or the like; therefore turning toward created good in general is turning toward sin itself in general.

13. Further, I ask what good is evil a corruption of? Not of that in which it is, because an accident does not corrupt its subject since it naturally presupposes its subject, and what naturally presupposes something does not corrupt that something. Nor of some

other good, because according to Augustine *City of God* 12.6, “evil corrupts the good which it harms;” but it only harms what it is in; therefore etc.

14. The opposite is maintained by Augustine on the verse of *John* 1 ‘Without him was not anything made that was made’, where Augustine says, “Sin is nothing.” And Anselm proves this of express purpose in *On the Virginal Conception* ch.5 and *On the Fall of the Devil* ch.15; look at him there carefully. [“Injustice is altogether nothing, like blindness. For blindness is nothing other than the absence of sight where sight ought to be, and this does not exist more in the eye where sight ought to be than in a piece of wood where sight ought not to be... By this reasoning we understand that evil is nothing. For, as injustice is nothing other than absence of due justice, so evil is nothing other than absence of due good. But no real being...is nothing, nor is being evil a being something for anything. For evil to any real being is nothing other than its lacking a good it ought to have; but to lack a good that should be present is not to be anything; so being evil is not a being something for any real being. This I have said in brief about evil (which is always indubitably nothing), the evil that is injustice... But that injustice is nothing other than absence of due justice and has no real being...I think I have sufficiently shown in...” *On the Fall of the Devil* ch.15: “Therefore just as the absence of justice and the not possessing of justice have no real being, so injustice and being unjust have no existence, and therefore they are not anything but are nothing... Injustice then and being unjust are nothing.”]

Question Three

Whether Sin is a Punishment for Sin

15. About the thirty sixth distinction I ask^a whether sin is a punishment for sin.

a. [*Interpolation*] About this thirty sixth distinction, where the Master turns to show that sometimes punishment and guilt are the same thing, the question is asked:

16. That it is not:

Augustine *Retractions* 1.26, “Every punishment is just, everything just is from God, therefore every punishment is from God” [more precisely: “The punishment of the bad, therefore, which is from God, is bad indeed for the bad; but it is among the good works of God, since it is just for the bad to be punished”]; but no guilt is from God, therefore no guilt is a punishment of sin.

17. Further, every sin is voluntary, according to Augustine *On True Religion* ch.4; punishment is involuntary (Anselm, *On the Virginal Conception* ch.4); therefore etc.^a

a. [*Interpolation*] And every punishment saddens.

18. Further, punishment does not exceed guilt, because God always punishes less than is deserved; sometimes a subsequent sin is greater than a preceding one. Likewise too, since there is an end to sins, the last sin is not punished by any sin; so it is not punished in the way any preceding one is; and yet the last sin can be greater than the preceding; therefore it is punished by a lesser punishment, which is unacceptable.

19. To the opposite is the Master in the text [2 d.36 chs.1, 3], and he brings forward many authorities [from Scripture and from Augustine and Gregory] .

Question Four

Whether Sin can be from God

20. Next, about the thirty seventh distinction I ask whether sin can be from God.^a

a. [*Interpolation*] About the thirty seventh distinction, where the Master records the opinion of those who deny that bad acts – insofar as they are acts – are good and are from God, two questions are asked: first, whether sin can be from God; second, whether the will is the total cause of its act [n.96]. Argument about the first:

21. That it can:

“Anything of which the cause is an inferior cause also has a superior cause;”
 “whatever too is cause of the cause is a cause of the thing caused” [*Book On Causes* prop.1, Bacon *Questions on the Book on Causes* ad loc.]; the created will, which is an inferior cause in respect of God and of which God is cause, is itself cause of sin; therefore God is cause of sin too.

22. If it be said that the will is not the cause of sin insofar as it is from God but insofar as it is from nothing – on the contrary: God acts more along with a higher active created cause than with a lower one; nature is a lower cause than will. But God acts along with nature in such a way that nothing exists in nature that God does not act along with in nature; therefore he acts along with the will in such a way that nothing is willed that he does not act along with in willing.

23. Further to the principal argument [n.21]: the act that is the substrate of sin in the will is from God, so the sin is too.

24. Proof of the antecedent: first because the act is a being that does not exist from itself (for then it would be God); therefore it exists from another, and so from God; second, because giving alms, preaching Christ, performing miracles, generating a son are works of the same idea in being of nature, whether they are done morally well or badly; therefore they have a cause of the same idea as concerns their being of nature; but God is the cause of these acts when they are morally good; so he is also cause when they are morally bad.

25. The antecedent [n.23] is also proved by the saying in *Isaiah* 10.15 about Sennacherib, “Shall the axe boast itself?”, where the Gloss says, “Just as instruments can do nothing of themselves, so Sennacherib was able to do nothing against the Jews;” therefore Sennacherib was the instrument of God in the act he did [sc. conquering Israel], and yet he sinned mortally as is plain from *ibid.* 14.24-25. That act, then, which was the substrate of mortal sin, was caused by God.

26. The proof of the consequence [n.23] is that a created will is not cause of sin other than by being cause of the act that is the substrate of the deformity of the sin, because, according to Dionysius *Divine Names* ch.4, “No one does anything at all by looking to evil.”

27. Further again to the principal argument: God can remove his upholding of grace and then grace will not be present – indeed, whenever grace is not present, it is annihilated; ‘annihilation’ belongs only to God’; therefore by the action of God alone can

the soul be without grace. Therefore, in the same way, God can be the per se cause of sin, because the idea of evil seems no more present in sin than in privation of grace.

28. Further, God is the cause of punishment; therefore he is cause of sin. The proof of the consequence is that punishment is a per se evil just as guilt is – indeed, it seems more to be a per se evil, because it is opposed to the good of nature while guilt is opposed to the good of morals; the good of nature is a prior good to the good of morals. The antecedent [sc. God is cause of punishment] is plain from Augustine *Retractions* 1.25, “Every punishment is just etc.” [n.16].

29. To the opposite is Augustine on *John* 1, ‘Without him was not anything made’, when he says, “Sin was not made through the Word.”

30. Further, there is proof that God cannot be cause of an act that is the substrate of sin:

Because then he would act against his own prohibition; for he prohibited Adam from eating [of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, *Genesis* 2.17] – nor was there anything disordered in that act save that it was prohibited; therefore if God had caused that positive act [sc. of eating by Adam], he would have done it immediately against his own prohibition, which seems to have been a thing of duplicity.

31. Further, whatever God makes he makes for the sake of himself: “The most high has made all things for himself” [*Proverbs* 16.4]; but he makes with the most perfect charity, because he himself is charity [1 *John* 4.8]; therefore such an act is most orderly, both from the end and from the operative principle. So if the act is disorderly from a sinning created will, then the same act seems to be orderly and disorderly, which seems impossible.

32. Further, free choice does not err when in its acting it agrees with its rule; its rule in acting is the divine will; therefore if God wills that some free choice will sinfully, then that free choice does not sin when it sins.

I. To the Second Question

A. Sin is Formally the Privation of Good

33. Although these questions, according to the Master, belong to different distinctions, yet their solutions are connected, and because of this connection in this way they can be asked together; and among these questions the first to be solved is the second [n.10], because its solution occupies a place in the others.

And although one could preface here without proof what the word ‘sin’ means (for before any questioning about anything there is need first to have knowledge of what the word means), nevertheless that sin is formally the privation of good is shown by the authorities adduced for the opposite [n.14], and by the following sort of reason, that an inferior agent is bound in its acting to conform itself to the superior agent, because if it is in its power to conform or not conform then not to conform is a sin. For that is why it is called ‘sin’ (speaking of sin whether against divine law or against human law), because the one sinning could have conformed to the law of the superior agent and did not. Therefore the act which is in the power of the non-conformer, and which is thereby voluntary, is not formally sin, because it would not be a sin if it did conform to the superior rule; so the idea of sin in that act is precisely the privation of the conformity.

B. Of which Good Sin is Formally the Privation

34. From this can further be inferred of which good sin is formally the privation.

1. Opinions of Others

35. It is posited [Alexander of Hales, William of Auxerre] that sin is the privation of the good in which it is, because it harms it, as is argued from Augustine *City of God* 12.6 [n.13]; in another way [Thomas Aquinas] that sin is the privation of a supernatural good, namely grace; or in a third way [Bonaventure] that it is the corruption of the acquired habits to which evil acts are virtually repugnant, as a habit generated from acts formally bad is repugnant formally to habits of virtue.

2. Rejection of the Opinions

36. Against the first of these ways there are four arguments:

First, because since the good, in which the sin is, is finite, it could be wholly consumed by having some finite good taken away from it repeatedly.

37. And if it be said that the taking away is of parts in the same proportion, and so it goes on ad infinitum – on the contrary, a second evil can be equal to the first in malice or worse than it, so it corrupts a part that is of the same or greater amount; therefore, by a process in this way of equal or greater sins, the nature of the good is at length totally consumed.

38. Second, because intellectual nature can be created only by God and, thereby, it is simply incorruptible as regards the creature, so that no creature can destroy it; therefore someone sinning in his act cannot destroy any part of his nature, because the part, as concerns incorruptibility, would be of the same idea as the whole nature, for an incorruptible is not made up of corruptibles.

39. Further, what is formally repugnant to an effect does not destroy a non-necessary [sc. contingent] cause of that effect; sin states formally a deformity or wrongness repugnant to rightness in an act; so it does not destroy a non-necessary cause of this rightness (the will is a non-necessary cause of rightness, both because it does not cause an act of rightness necessarily but contingently, and because if it causes an act it does not necessarily cause it to be right). The proof of the major is that a contingent cause in respect of something is able not to be and not to cause; so the cause need not be destroyed when the thing caused does not exist. The point is plain by way of likeness from the opposite: for what alters a thing – by introducing something repugnant to a quality in it – corrupts the substantial form for this reason, that the sort of quality in question necessarily follows the substantial form; therefore a thing that is corruptive precisely of some contingent concomitant thing cannot corrupt what it is contingently thus concomitant to.

40. Further sins would not differ in species, because they are privations of a good and privations only get their specific difference from the opposed positives.

41. Further, the same arguments (some of them [the second, third, and fourth, nn.38-40]) prove that sin is not formally privation or corruption of grace [n.35] (although the first argument [n.36] does not prove this), because grace is totally destroyed by a first

mortal sin. However there is another specific argument here, namely that a second sin will not be a sin, because it will not corrupt anything that a sin is of a nature per se to corrupt, for the grace that would be corrupted is not present.

42. The second argument [n.38] is conclusive here, because grace is by creation from God alone and is preserved by him alone; and when it is destroyed, it is annihilated – because annihilation is the destruction of that of which creation is the production. The third argument [n.39] is also conclusive here, because grace is a contingent cause with respect to rightness in an act. The fourth [n.40] is also likewise conclusive, because all mortal sins would be of the same nature in formal idea of privation.

43. The same arguments (some of them [the first and third, nn.36, 39]) are also conclusive against acquired justice or virtue [n.35], because although acquired justice does not remain always incorruptible as nature does [nn.36-38], and although it is not corrupted by one mortal sin as grace is [n.41], yet mortal sin is not per se the privation of it, because mortal sin can stand along with it.

44. And if you say about this contention [n.43] that mortal sin cannot stand along with acquired justice – on the contrary: acquired justice can exist more intensely in him who sins mortally than in him who does not sin, namely if the latter has a justice of nine degrees and the former one of ten degrees and the former sins mortally. Let us posit that in the former the tenth degree of justice is corrupted, so he still has a justice equal to him who did not sin mortally; so if the latter had sinned mortally with a like sin, that sin in him would not have been repugnant to his justice of nine degrees [sc. because it is supposed to be repugnant only to the tenth degree], and so would not have corrupted it.

45. The third argument [n.39] is conclusive here, because any such habit is only a contingent cause with respect to an act of sin.

3. Scotus' own Solution

46. I concede, then, according to the preceding solution of the question [n.33], that sin is a corruption of rightness in second act, and not of natural rightness or of any habitual rightness but of actual moral rightness. But I do not understand the corruption to be that which is a change from being to non-being (for sin can remain after such a change of justice from being to non-being, and can also be present without such change from being to non-being); but I understand the corruption formally, the way privation is said to be formally the corruption of its opposed positive; for in this way the idea of sin is formally the corruption of rightness in second act, because it is opposed to that rectitude as a privation is opposed to its positive; not opposed, to be sure, to a rectitude that is present (because then two opposites would be present at once), nor to a rectitude that was first there in the act (because in order for there to be a change from opposite to opposite no act remains), but to a rectitude that should have been present.

47. For free will is duty bound to elicit all its acts in conformity with a higher rule, namely in accord with divine precept; and so, when it acts against conformity to this rule, it lacks the actual justice that is due (that is, the justice which should have been present in the act and is not present [n.51]); this lack, to the extent it is the act of a deficient will (as shall be said in one of the solutions [n.125]), is formally actual sin.

48. This is clear from authorities:

The first is from Augustine *On the Two Souls* ch.11 n.15, “Sin is the will to keep or pursue what justice forbids, and from which it is free to abstain;” this is to say in brief: sin is willing something forbidden, so that the will there is the material element (and to this extent the whole is attributed to the will, because the whole is in the will’s power) and the thing forbidden or prohibited is the formal element, because it signifies the disagreement with a higher rule.

49. Ambrose similarly in his book *On Paradise* ch.8 n.39 (and it is in the Master’s text), “Sin is transgression of heavenly commands etc.”

50. With this agrees what Augustine says *City of God* 12.8, “The will is made bad in that which would not happen if the will did not will it; and so voluntary failings are followed by just punishment. For the will falls not toward bad things but in a bad way, that is, not toward bad natures but for this reason in a bad way, that it falls against the order of natures from that which is highest toward that which is lower... And thereby he who perversely loves the good of any nature...becomes bad and wretched in a good thing, having been deprived of a better.” It as if he were to say: the positive act of willing a creature is not sin formally, but lack of due order in the act is, an act in which the created good should be loved for the sake of the supreme good – and the will fails of this order by resting in a created good; and this failing is formally sin.

51. With these authorities [nn.48-50] reason agrees, because every sin is formally injustice, and sin of this sort is injustice of this sort and consequently is a privation of justice of this sort [dd.30-32 n.51]; therefore actual sin is formally actual injustice, so it is privation of actual justice, that is, of the justice that should have been present in the act.

4. Four Queries about Sin and their Solution

52. From this solution [nn.46-51] is made plain a solution to the queries raised about sin: first, whether the per se idea of sin is more a matter of aversion from [God] or of conversion to [creatures]; second, how mortal sins can be specifically distinct if the formal idea of sin lies in aversion; third, how one mortal sin can be more serious than another if they are aversions from the same good (for pure privation does not seem to admit the more and less, according to Anselm *On the Virginal Conception* ch.24). [Fourth query n.63.]

a. To the First Query

53. To the first [n.52] I say that aversion from the ultimate end can be understood in two ways: formally or virtually.

54. Formally either by contrariety or by negation, such that the will refuses the end, or does not wish something when it should wish it; and such refusing is hating while not wishing is to omit the precept [*Deuteronomy* 6.5, *Matthew* 22.37], “Love the Lord thy God etc.”

55. Virtually, such that when something is necessary for attaining the ultimate end, the will, having turned away from that necessary thing, thereby turns away virtually from the end (in the way the intellect, when it denies the conclusion,^a turns away virtually from the principle of it^b).

a. [*Interpolation*] some conclusion that follows from some principle.

b. [*Interpolation*] and in the way a sick man is said to turn away from health when he turns away from a bitter drink without which health cannot be had.

56. The first aversion [aversion formally, n.54] is, in itself, of the same idea [sc. aversion both by contrariety and by negation]; nor is it included formally in every sin whatever; for hatred of God is a specific sin, and omission of the precept “Love the Lord thy God etc.” is another specific sin.

57. In the second way [virtually, n.55] aversion is common to every mortal sin, because in every such sin the will is disposed in disordered way with respect to something necessary for the end. – Where does this something necessary come from? From the divine will prescribing it to be observed, “if you wish to enter into life” [*Matthew* 19.17-19]; not from another practical syllogism (for the need here is not to inquire into the doctrine of the philosophers but into the precepts of God in Scripture).

58. This sort of aversion from God is the essential idea of any sin whatever; for as the formal idea of rightness is the proper end in an act about some being that is for the end, so too the proper lack of such rightness is the proper lack of virtue that comes from the end, because it is the proper formal aversion from that which is proper for the end; and in this way aversion is nothing other than disorder of will about something ordained for the end by divine precept, about which thing the will ought to be ordered.

b. To the Second Query

59. From this the second query is clear [n.52], because since privations are made distinct in species by the distinction in species of the opposed positive states, then lackings of rectitude in acts are diverse in species the way that distinction belongs to privations and numbers, by the number of rightnesses in acts that would have to be held to be diverse.^a And so sins are not distinguished by the way they turn toward their objects (which are not bad save materially), but their formal idea is distinguished by reference to the specifically different rightnesses that ought to have been present in them.

a. [*Interpolation*] and sins that are diverse in number from the numerical distinction of the positive states, these sins, which are certain privations namely privations of the rectitude that should be present in acts, are distinguished formally by the distinctions of such rectitude – as that, since specifically diverse rectitudes ought to have been present, the lackings of these rectitudes are specifically diverse.

60. Thus too there can be several sins of the same species present, and these sins are the privations of the numerically several actual aptitudes that ought to have been present in the successive diverse acts.

c. To the Third Query

61. As to the third [n.52], it is also clear that that sin is more serious in kind which is opposed to a better rightness; now the rightness is better which, *ceteris paribus*, is more immediate to the end. This point is plain from a likeness in principal premise and

conclusion, for the error is greater and more false which redounds more on the premise, or by which a truer conclusion, and one nearer the premise, is denied.

62. But, speaking of the same kind of mortal sin, that sin is more serious where the will sins with greater lust – because the more the will strives, the more perfect the act it would cause, and it is bound to give the act a rightness with the same proportion, if the act is capable of rightness or, if the act is not capable of rightness, it is bound to guard itself from that act more than from another act less repugnant to rightness; and so, by failing to do so, it sins more. An example of this is if the intellect, when erring about one conclusion, has a more necessary object than when erring about another conclusion, then the error of the intellect in the first case is the worse the more the true (opposed) act ought to have been more perfect.

d. To the Fourth Query

63. From this is also easily made plain that, if sins could be continued infinitely, nothing unacceptable would follow; for the sins would corrupt the good infinitely – not by the corruption that is a change, but by the corruption formally that is a privation, and this not privation of a good that was present [n.46] but of a good that ought to have been present. Now infinite goods or infinite right acts are due from the will if it is conserved infinitely, and therefore, without any diminution of the will or of any first act in it, an infinity of such goods can suffer privation.

64. And if it is objected against this way [n.63] and in favor of the other two [n.35], which posit that nature or grace is corrupted:

The proof [Aquinas, Lombard] that nature is corrupted is from *Luke* 10.30, “and having beaten him with blows [sc. the man journeying to Jericho], the thieves departed,” where the gloss [Nicholas of Lyra] says, “sins wound man in his natural powers” –which would not be true if sin took nothing away from the perfection of nature but only prevented such perfections from existing in second act.

The proof [Aquinas] that grace is corrupted is that grace is destroyed by mortal sin; because if sin were not formally corruptive of grace, then grace could stand along with it, which is absurd.

65. To the first proof I reply that the wounded traveler lost no part of his nature, although its continuity was broken and thereby rendered less fit for its operations, or rather deprived of good use of itself; thus nature “while remaining in its integrity” (according to Dionysius *Divine Names* ch.4) is wounded when it is made unfit for right use, which is done by repeated lack of actual rightness.

66. To the second proof I say that sin cannot corrupt grace causally [n.42] but only by way of demerit, so that the will naturally averts itself [sc. from rightness] prior in nature to God’s ceasing in nature to conserve grace; now it is necessary that every privation be formally the privation of some positive state, with which the privation cannot stand; sin therefore is not formally the privation of grace, and it destroys grace not by impossibility but by demerit.

C. To the Principal Arguments

67, To the arguments.

As to the first [n.11], ‘word, deed, desire’ are taken by way of matter, but ‘desire’ states the proximate matter, word and deed the remote matter; ‘against the law of God’ states what is formal in sin.

68. As to the second [n.12], it is plain that sins are distinguished by distinction of privations, in the way privations can be distinguished [n.59].

69. As to the third [n.13], it is plain that corruption is formally this privation of this good, which would be present in the act if the privation were not there and the good not being taken away by it. And as to Augustine, sin does harm the thing it is in – not in itself, by taking away something that belongs to the thing’s nature, but by taking away from it some perfection that befits it, namely actual justice.

70. And if it is objected that ‘the justice was not present, therefore it cannot be corrupted’, the response is plain from what was said; for it follows therefrom that the justice is not corrupted by a corruption that is a change from being to non-being, but it is corrupted formally by the fact that its privation is present and it is not – just as original sin corrupts the original justice that it is the privation of, but not a justice that was previously present [sc. in a new born infant, dd.30-32 nn.50, 53 55].

II. To the First and Fourth Questions

A. To the First Question

1. Sin is from Good

71. To the other question, which was asked first [n.1], about the cause of sin, I say that sin, in the way in which it can have a cause, is from good.

72. The proof is that nothing is a ‘first evil’, otherwise it would lack the supreme perfection belonging to it; but that to which supreme perfection belongs is the supreme good in nature; therefore the supreme evil would be the supreme good in nature.

73. And upon this heresy [sc. there is a first, supreme evil] there follow many other unacceptable things, and not only against the faith but also against philosophy, because the heresy destroys itself and involves a contradiction; for a first evil would be a necessary existence and without partner and independent, if it were posited to be as equally a supreme first as the first good; being a necessary existence and without partner only belong to the most perfect entity.

74. So therefore, in the way that evil has a cause, it can have no cause but good, speaking of the first created good.

75. This is plain from Augustine *City of God* 12.6, “He [who consents to the tempter] seems to have made for himself an evil will etc.” Here Augustine seems to maintain that one’s own will is the cause of falling [sc. into sin], by its immoderate use of some created good – that is, a good that is in the power of the very will, so that just as the will itself can of itself use and not use, so it can enjoy immoderately and not enjoy immoderately some good agreeable to it; and thus this ‘first sin’ is immediately and first from the will alone.

2. How Sin is from Good as from its Cause

a. Opinions of Others

76. But about the way of positing good as cause there are diverse statements.

One way is that good is a per accidens cause of evil, and this can be understood in two ways: that the accidentality is either on the part of the cause or on the part of the effect. On the part of the cause in the way the Philosopher speaks of a cause per accidens in *Metaphysics* 5.2.1013b34-14a1 and *Physics* 2.3.195a32-35, as Polycleitus is cause per accidens of a statue; on the part of the effect in the way said in *Physics* 2.5.197a32-35 and *Metaphysics* 5.30.1025a14-30, that chance and fortune are causes per accidens, where it is not anything accidentally conjoined with a per se cause that is called a per accidens cause, but something accidentally conjoined with a per se effect that is called a per accidens effect of the same cause whose intent is the per se effect.

77. [First opinion] – In the first way [n.76] it is said [Richard of Middleton] that the will is cause of sin not as it is will but as it is fallible; and this is further reduced to the fact that the will is from nothing.

And this seems proved by Augustine above [n.75], where he seems to say that “let him ask why he made the will evil, and he will find that the evil will does not begin from the fact it was a made nature, but from the fact it was a nature made from nothing.”

78. [Second opinion] – In another way accidentality is posited on the part of the effect [n.76], namely [Richard of Middleton] that the will per se intends what is positive in the effect, and with this is deformity per accidens conjoined; but the will does not per se intend the deformity (like in fortuitous happenings^a), as is plain from Dionysius *Divine Names* ch.4, “No one acts looking toward evil” (and many like things there, [n.27]).

And a similar authority is found in the Philosopher “Each chooses such things as appear to him” (*Ethics* 3.6.1113a23-24), and for this reason does the virtuous man choose good things, and the things that seem good to him are simply good.

a. [*Interpolation*] and in a natural agent that per se intends to generate something like itself, as fire generates fire, but per accidens it intends the corruption that is the bad of the contrary [e.g. the corruption of water].

79. [Rejection of the first and second opinion] – Against the first way [n.77] the argument is as follows:

Is fallibility in the will a per se cause of sin or a per accidens cause [n.76]? If per accidens then it is posited in vain [sc. because the will is already by itself supposed to be a per accidens cause of sin, n.78]. If per se, and if fallibility is in the will from God as from the per se efficient cause, and if whatever is per se from a cause insofar as it causes is per se from the cause of that cause, then sin would be per se from God (proof of this assumption: for although fallibility follows nature because ‘nature is from nothing’, yet it is not an efficient cause from nothing, because the term ‘from which’ does not give by efficient causality any property of itself to the thing produced; therefore fallibility has a nature from God himself as from the efficient cause itself^a).

a. [*Interpolation*] for what is cause of the subject is cause of the proper accident or of the consequent natural property.

80. If it be said that a fallible will is a per accidens cause of sin but a closer per accidens cause absolutely than the will is (in the way that, according to the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 5.2.1014a4-6, there is an order in per accidens causes; for Polycleitus is closer with respect to the statue than white is) – against this:

First, because a created will seems to be convertibly a cause with respect to sin, though a contingent one; but fallibility, which belongs to something insofar as it is from nothing, is not convertible; therefore the will as such is more properly a cause with respect to sin than fallible will is.

81. There is a confirmation of the reason, because the same thing under the same idea is the proper subject of the privation and of the opposed positive state, and even in a free cause – which has power for opposites – the same thing under the same idea is cause of opposites, although of one per se and of the other contingently and per accidens, or of both contingently; but the will, as will, is the proper subject and cause of good volition; therefore of bad volition too.^a

a. [*Interpolation*] Or the argument is as follows: a cause that, under the same idea on its own part, is contingent with respect to two things, is a contingent cause with respect to each; but a created will is a contingent cause of willing well just as of willing badly. But this will, insofar as it is this will, is a contingent cause of willing well; therefore it is as such a cause of willing badly.

82. There is again a confirmation of the reason [n.80], because if the will sins insofar as it is fallible, and if insofar as it is fallible it cannot will well, so that the fallibility is the per se reason or the proximate reason for sinning (though per accidens), then insofar as it is fallible it cannot will well, and so, if it sins, it does not sin, because “no one sins as to something he cannot avoid” [dd.30-32 n.3].

83. Further, one cannot posit [Thomas Aquinas] ‘an actual defect’ to be a per accidens cause, because then there would be a defect of the will before the first defect of the will; so the defect is only potential; but it is not a defect of an idea different from the

actual defect that will be present, because a potential defect is not the proximate per accidens cause with respect to an actual defect of a different idea; so the actual defect will be the same defect as the potential defect with respect to its per accidens potential cause.

84. A response [Richard of Middleton]: the cause of sin is not a potential defect but ‘a potentiality for being defective’, and these are not the same, just as neither is whiteness in potency the same as the potentiality in a surface for whiteness. – On the contrary: this ‘potentiality’ in the will is either active or passive. Not passive, because the will insofar as it is passive does not work as cause for evil but as subject. If the potentiality is active, and this is only its created liberty, then the intended conclusion returns, that such liberty, proper to the will, would be the per accidens cause of sin; but to say that this will is the per accidens cause of sin amounts to saying that the liberty of it is the per accidens proximate reason for sin.

85. The argument against the second way [n.78] is as follows, that then sin would seem to be by chance, but what is by chance is not sin.

86. Further, if the will only sins per accidens ‘because it wills precisely the positive thing on which the deformity follows’, and if God per se wills that positive thing on which the deformity follows, then it no more follows that the created will sins than that the divine will does.

87. [Third opinion] – In a third way it is posited [Bonaventure, Alexander of Hales, William of Auxerre] that sin does not have an efficient but a deficient cause, and so it has the will as deficient not as efficient cause.

88. This is confirmed by the authority of Augustine *City of God* 12.7, “Let no one seek for an efficient cause of an evil will, for there is no efficient cause but a deficient

cause, no effect but a defect; for to fall away from what is supreme to what is lesser is to begin to have an evil will. Further, to wish to find causes for these defections, since they are not efficient causes, is the same as if one wanted to see darkness or hear silence;” and at the end of the chapter, “They do evil insofar as they are deficient; and what do they do but vain things that have deficient causes?” And again *ibid.* ch.9 at the beginning, “Nothing makes the will such save the defection whereby God is deserted, of which defection too the cause is deficient.”

89. [Rejection of the third opinion] – Against this, that then [sc. if the created will is a deficient cause of sin] it follows that God is the cause of sin just as the created will is; for this ‘being defective’ is a ‘not effecting’, as the Philosopher says *Metaphysics* 5.2.1013b13-16, that “just as the presence of the sailor is the cause of the safety of the ship, so his absence is the cause of its running into danger, and both are in the same genus of cause;” thus therefore, not to effect the rightness that ought to be effected is as it were to cause sin effectively or defectively; but this belongs to God just as it does to the created will.

90. I give a double proof:

First, because God does not necessarily give rectitude to an act, for he causes necessarily nothing other than himself; therefore he is able not to give, and so he can be a defective cause with respect to sin, that is, by not effecting the positive reality that had excluded the sin.

91. Second, because he would naturally cause this rectitude – were it present – before the created will did (for a naturally prior cause causes naturally first); therefore when the rectitude is not present, God fails to cause it before the created will fails to

cause it, and thus the created will defects because God defects, that is, God fails to cause by causing something.

92. Hereby [n.91] is excluded a certain response [Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure] that could be given to the first reason [n.90], that ‘God does not defect when he does not cause unless the created will deserved it first’; for this response proves that the non-causing on the part of God is not first [sc. which is contrary to the conclusion of n.91].

93. And if it be said, according to Anselm *On the Fall of the Devil* ch.3, that although God did not give when the angel did not accept, yet it is not the case that ‘the reason the angel did not accept was because God did not give’, but the reverse; so here.

On the contrary: I take the time when the will sins, and I divide it into two instants of nature, *a* and *b*; at *a* God is compared to the will as prior cause; at *b* the will is compared to him as posterior cause. Then I ask: either God causes rightness at *a* [or he does not; if he does] it follows that [at *b*] the will is right – otherwise, if the will causes at *b* the sin opposite to the rightness, the sin would be in the will simultaneously, and consequently the sin and the rightness opposite to it would be in the will simultaneously. Therefore one has to say that God does not cause the rightness, and consequently that the will at *b* does not cause it; for this [sc. the will not causing at *b*] naturally pre-requires that God at *a* does not cause it.

94. Besides, in the case of precise causes, if the negation is the cause of negation, the affirmation is also the cause of affirmation; God’s causing rightness is the precise cause of the will’s causing rightness in its own order of causing; therefore negation there

is cause of negation.⁸⁶ – The major is plain from the Philosopher *Posterior Analytics* 1.13.78b14-18, about having lungs and breathing [“For the cause is not stated in this case: ‘Why does a wall not breath? Because it is not an animal’; for if this is the cause of not breathing, then animal must be the cause of breathing – because if negation is the cause of not-being, then affirmation is the cause of being”].

b. Possible Solution

95. From these three ways together [nn.77, 78, 87], provided they are well understood, a solution can be collected about the way in which a created will causes sin.

Question Five

Whether the Created Will is the Total and Immediate Cause with Respect to its Willing, such that God does not Have, with Respect to that Willing, any Immediate Efficient Causality but only a Mediate One

96. Because this solution, however, and the solution to the fourth question (namely whether God is the cause of sin [n.20]) depend on knowledge of the activity of a

⁸⁶ The form of this hypothetical syllogism appears fallacious, because it affirms the antecedent of the conditional by first affirming the consequent. The syllogism can be made valid if the conditional is understood to be a bi-conditional (‘if and only if’), as the term ‘precise cause’ seems to require, and as the example form Aristotle also seems to require. For the absence of one feature (breathing) could only be caused by the absence of another feature (not being an animal, or not having lungs) if the latter feature were the precise and only cause of the former feature. For if some other feature could also cause the former, then the absence of the latter feature alone could not explain the absence of the former.

created will with respect to its own act, therefore I ask (without arguments) whether the created will is the total and immediate cause with respect to its willing, such that God does not have, with respect to that willing, any immediate efficient causality but only a mediate one.

α. Opinion of Others

97. To this question one could say [Peter Olivi⁸⁷ and others] that the will is the total and immediate cause with respect to its own volition.

98. [Proof by reason] – This is proved by reason:

First, because otherwise the will would not be free; second, because otherwise it could cause nothing contingently; third, because otherwise it could not sin; fourth, because otherwise it could have altogether no action; fifth, from comparison of it with other created causes.

99. In the first way [n.98] the proof is twofold:

First as follows: no power has perfectly in its control [power] an effect that cannot be caused by it immediately or that cannot be caused by any cause whose causation is not

⁸⁷ *Summa* IIa q.116: “Some say that the essence of all actions, both natural and vicious, are as immediately from God as are the essences that he creates... But others say that the actions of created agents, at least those that are bad, are not at all immediately from God, because he does not make them except by the fact he makes and holds and conserves in being all active and passive causes, or all causes cooperating and concurring in any way to the production of such actions... Because therefore this second way seems to me it should be altogether held, for I do not see that God could otherwise appear altogether guiltless in the case of our guilt and vices, for this reason – without prejudice to any better opinion – I will subjoin the things that seem capable of being adduced for this side... That therefore the aforesaid actions are from God not in the first way but in the second is proved thus: first, that they are totally and immediately from second causes; second, that they are from free will; third, that they are vicious; fourth, that they are culpable, or that the agent or recipient is guilty because of them.”

in the control of that power; but the causation of God is not in the control of a created will (as is plain), just as the virtue of a higher agent is not in the control of any lower agent; therefore if God is necessarily immediately concurrent – as immediate cause – in respect of a created volition, the created will does not have the volition fully in its control. The assumed major premise is plain, because what has an effect perfectly in its control either has from itself alone power over the effect, or the causation of any concurring cause is in its control, namely as to the causing or not causing by that concurring cause; there is an example about the intellect which, if it concurs in causing a volition (according to the third opinion in 2 d.25 [not in the *Ordinatio* but the *Lectura*, where it is Scotus' own opinion]), yet does not cause it save with the will's causing, so that the intellect's causing is in the power of the will.

100. The second argument according to this way is as follows: what is determined to something by another does not have that something perfectly in its control; the created will is determined to this something – *ex hypothesi* – by the divine will; therefore etc.

The proof of the minor is that either one of the wills determines the other or vice versa (and our will does not determine the divine will, because the temporal is not the cause of the eternal), or neither will determines the other, and then neither of them will be a moved mover, and there would be no essential order between them; rather, if the divine will does not determine our will (as the second reason argues [n.101]), the divine will could will something that, because of the disagreement of our will, would not come about.

101. Further, from the second way [n.98] the argument is as follows: a thing is not contingent because of its relation to some cause if a higher cause is determined to the

thing's coming about, and if the determination of this higher cause is necessarily followed by the determination of all the lower causes. An example: if my will were now determined to the affirmative option about writing tomorrow, and if my will were not subject to impediment or change, then my writing tomorrow would not be contingent (now, however, it is contingent to either option because of its relation to my hand), for as the will is determined now to one option, so there are contained virtually in it all the lower causes for the same effect, and simply so (because, if a thing by whose determination the effect would be determined is determined, the happening of the effect is not simply indeterminate as to either side – at any rate its existence is not contingent because of the power of a lower cause). But if the divine will is the immediate cause of my willing, there is now some cause determinate with respect to my willing, because God's will is eternally determined to one of the contradictories, and the determination of this divine cause is necessarily followed by the determination of my will with respect to the same willing (otherwise 'God willing this' and 'this not going to happen' would stand together); therefore this willing is not contingent to either side because of the power of my will.

102. From the third way [n.98] the argument is as follows: if God is the immediate cause of volition, it is clear he will be a cause prior to the will; therefore he will have an influence on the effect prior in nature to my will. I take then this moment of nature wherein God causes a willing, insofar as it is prior to the moment in which the will acts for the willing; either God in that moment immediately causes perfect rightness in the willing, and consequently in the second moment the will does not sin, because it does not cause in the effect the opposite of what the first cause causes; or in that first moment

God does not cause rightness in the willing, and then it follows that in the second moment the will does not sin, because it then has no power to will rightly (for in the second moment it only has power for what the prior cause produces in the first moment); but the will does not sin by not having a right willing if it cannot have a right willing; therefore etc.

103. From the fourth way [n.98] the argument is: if God is the cause of the volition, he will be the total cause of it, because he will cause it by willing it (but he is, by his willing, the total cause of a more perfect creature, namely an angel, or of anything created from nothing; and if he was the cause of it by willing it, he would be the total cause of it); but nothing else along with the total cause of something can, in any genus of cause, co-cause that something along with it; so the will would have no causality with respect to its own volition.

104. From the fifth way [n.98] the argument is: if any [creature] is the total active cause with respect to its effect, this must be conceded most of all about the will, because the will is supreme among active causes; but some [creature] can be the total cause with respect to its effect.

105. I prove [the minor] in two ways:

First, because this [sc. being total active cause] is not repugnant to creatures. For though there is something that is the total efficient cause of heat, this does not posit in that something any infinity or perfection repugnant to a creature; for if the thing is a univocal cause, it need not excel the effect in perfection, and if it is an equivocal cause, it need not excel the effect infinitely but in some determinate degree.

106. There is a second proof of the minor, for that thing is total cause of something which, if it existed while everything else was *per impossibile* removed, would perfectly cause the effect; but a subject, if it existed while everything else was removed, would cause its proper accident; therefore the subject is the total cause with respect to its proper accident.

107. From this minor, proved in two ways [nn.105, 106], the conclusion is drawn that the will can be the total cause with respect to its volition; and further, since nothing else beside the total cause causes in the same genus of cause (otherwise the same thing would be caused twice, or would be caused by something without which it would not be able not to be), then God will not immediately cause this volition.

108. [Proof from authorities] The intended conclusion [n.97] is proved by authorities:

First from *Ecclesiasticus* 15.14-18, where it is said that God “made man from the beginning and left him in the hand of his own counsel. And gave him his commandments and precepts: ‘If you wish to keep the commandments, they will keep you’. For he has put before you fire and water; stretch out your hand to what you want. In front of man is good and bad, life and death; what has pleased him will be given him.”

109. Augustine too, *City of God* 7.30, says, “God so administers the things he has made that he permits them to make their own motions.”

110. Anselm too, *On Concord* 1.7, “God has made all actions and all movements, because he himself made the things by which and in which and from which they come to be; and no thing has any power of willing or doing but he himself gives it.”

111. The same again, 2.3, “God does not do the things he predestines, by compelling or resisting the will, but by giving power to its being.”

112. To this effect also is the Commentator [Averroes] *Metaphysics* 9 com.7 (on the remark, “So it is possible for something to have power”): “The moderns posit that one agent, namely God, causes all things without intermediary. And it happens that no being has naturally its own action; and since beings do not have their own actions, they will not have their own essences (for actions are not distinguished save by diverse essences). And this opinion is very far from the nature of man, etc.”^a

a. [Interpolation] These two reasons [from Averroes] seem to make the opinion [n.97] more compelling than those that are put for the opinion [nn.98-107].

β. The Response to the Fourth Question that Falls out from the Aforesaid Opinion of Others

113. If this way [n.97] were true, one could easily assign in accord with it how God is not the cause of sin [n.20]; for, whether speaking about the material or the formal element in sin, the whole would be from the created will as from the total cause, and so would in no way be from God save mediately, because God produced the will such that it could will in this way or in that.

γ. Instances against the Opinion of Others and Solutions to them

114. But it is objected against this way [n.97] that it would not save God's being the cause of merit, since merit is as free as sin.

15. Likewise, it would not save the essential order of causes, because, according to the first proposition in *On Causes*, "Every primary cause has a greater influence on what it causes than does a second universal cause;" but, according to this way, the primary cause would have no influence on the effect save that it produced the other cause of it [sc. the will as cause of the willing this way or that, n.113].

116. To the first of these [n.114] it can be said that God is in some way cause of merit (in a way that he is not cause of sin), because he causes grace (or charity) immediately in the soul, which inclines it by way of nature toward meriting; and whenever a form active by way of nature is from some agent, the action of the form is also from that agent. From this too would be plain how the effects of certain causes would be from God differently from how the effects of the will are, because those determinate causes have received from God an inclination – even a necessitating inclination – to their effects; not so the will.

117. To the second [n.115] it might be said that, although sometimes the order of principal and less principal causes, neither of which moves the other (the way the object and the cognitive power are disposed with respect to the act of knowing, 1 d.3 n.498) – that although this order is such that the principal cause moves the less principal one either to second act or to first act (but so that the two are partial causes and make together with each other one total cause, as hand and stick do with respect to the motion of a ball [1 d.3 n.496], or as sun and father do with respect to a son) – nevertheless, in the case of causes that are total with respect to their immediate effects, there can also be an essential order,

such that the second cause is total and immediate with respect to its effect just as the first cause is with respect to its own effect; and although the second cause is second and depends essentially on the first as regards its causation just as also regards its being, yet not in such a way that there is some immediate dependence of its effect on it and on a prior cause.

118. And when the proposition [from *On Causes*, n.115] says that “the first cause causes more” – this is true, because the first causes the second. An example of this can be posited in the case of essentially ordered causes, by the different way of causing; for if several material elements are posited in order in a composite thing with respect to the ultimate form, the first material element is not material with respect to the ultimate form (such that any part of it is perfected by the ultimate form), but only the ultimate material element is; for every prior material element is perfected by some prior form, which constitutes it as material with respect to a later form.

δ. Rejection of the Opinion

119. Against this opinion [n.97] the argument is twofold: first, because therefrom it follows that God does not naturally foreknow the future; second, that he is not omnipotent.

120. The proof of the first consequence is that God only has knowledge of future contingents if he knows with certitude the determination of his will with respect to things for which he has an immutable and irresistible will; but if the created will is the total cause with respect to its willing, and it is contingently disposed to its willing, then,

however much the divine will is posited to be determinate as to one side of the things that depend on the created will, the created will is going to be able to will differently, and thus no certitude follows from knowledge of the determination of the divine will.

121. The proof of the second consequence [n.119] is threefold:

First, because everything that an omnipotent being wills happens; but if God wills my volition to be, and this is in the power of my will as a cause contingently disposed toward it, then my will can, of itself, be determined indifferently to one side or the other, and so that to which the divine will has determined my will is able not to come about.

122. Second, because, if my will is determined of itself to one side, the divine will cannot impede it without violating it (for, from the fact my will is determined to one side, it cannot be impeded unless it is violated); but violation of the will involves a contradiction; therefore God cannot impede my will.

123. Third, because an omnipotent will produces the willed thing into existence for the time when that will wants it to exist (for there is no other act of the divine will with respect to an angel or any other creature by which such creature is produced into existence); but if my will is the total cause of this volition, the divine will in no way produces that volition into existence.

a. [*Interpolation*] Note that the force of these arguments [nn.119-123] rests on three propositions, *a, b, c* – *a*: the fact of the action of the first cause being required for the causing of the second cause takes away freedom from the second cause; *b*: the fact of the determination of the first cause being followed also by the second in its acting takes away contingency from the action of the second cause. Again, on behalf of *a*: the cited fact takes away freedom most of all if the first cause determines the second; again, on behalf of *b*: the fact that the action of the first cause naturally precedes the action of the second takes away sin too from the second cause. The other proposition,

c – which stands opposed to the reasons [nn.98-107] and the authorities [nn.108-112] – is that God is omnipotent and omniscient.

3. How Sin is from the Created Will

124. Rejecting this way [n.97], then, because of the two arguments about the omnipotence and omniscience of God [n.119], it remains to ask how sin can be from the created will, as to the first question [n.1], and how not be from God, as to the fourth question [n.20].

125. As to the first, I say that from the three ways (namely the two that posit a per accidens cause with respect to evil, and the third that posits a defective cause with respect to it [nn.77-78, 87]) a single integrated solution can be collected of the following sort:

In the case of sin there come together a positive act as the material element and a privation of due justice as the formal element. There is no efficient cause with respect to this privation but only a deficient cause, according to the third way [n.87]; for the will, which is duty bound to give rightness to its act and does not give it, sins by being deficient. But this ‘being deficient’ (namely not causing or not giving to its act the rightness that is due) is from a cause that could then freely cause it, namely freely give rightness to its act. This then is what it is to sin formally, that such a free cause does not give the due rightness that it could then give.

126. Hereby the [second] way about the per accidens cause [n.78] is evident. Although this cause does not cause what is formally in sin by effecting something but by failing to effect something, yet it does cause it by effecting something positive to which is

annexed the deficiency caused by its failure, and on this point stand the authorities from Dionysius [n.78] about accidentality on the part of the effect.

127. There is also accidentality on the part of the cause not properly (properly is when the white is said to be a cause accidentally of understanding, and generally when something is properly an accident of a per se cause such that the cause makes a per accidens unity along with it [n.76]), but by extending the term ‘accident’ to anything that is outside the idea of something, in the way that the difference is said to be an accident of the genus. For, in this way, that by which our will is specifically ‘this will’ is an accident of ‘will in general’, because ‘will in general’ is a perfection simply (which is why it is posited formally in God), and will in this sense is not the proximate cause, even contingently, with respect to sin, because then any lower instance under it would have such a sense of causality, and the divine will would also. But will when it is through some difference contracted to created will (which we describe loosely by saying it is ‘limited’) is the proximate defective and per accidens cause with respect to sin; and so on the part of the cause too, when will in general is taken for the cause to which this difference is understood to be added, this accidentally happens to it per accidens, as if one were to say that animal is not per se but per accidens the cause of understanding because ‘the most perfect animal’ understands; indeed ‘most perfect’ is not the proper idea of understanding what is an accident of animal simply, but ‘rational’ is, because rational is an accident of animal as the difference is of the genus – for we indicate ‘rational’ loosely by saying ‘most perfect’.

128. So it is in the issue at hand. The specific difference, by which ‘will in general’ is contracted to created will (which contraction or difference is now hidden from

us), we refer to loosely by the terms ‘limited or defectible being’ or by ‘from nothing’, and to this whole is attributed the act of volition in respect of sin as to a more proper cause than to will of itself; and this is true if it is understood of this substrate, namely of this specific will; and being the cause of sin belongs to this will not only per accidens (as it does to will in general), but also as to proximate cause, so that it can belong to any such will and to no other. And in this way should be understood the first opinion about the defectibility of the will [n.77].

B. To the Fourth Question

129. But now it remains to see how a defectible will is a deficient cause with respect to sin otherwise than the divine will is, or rather that it is the cause and the divine will is not the cause – and this as to the solution of the fourth question [n.20].

1. The Opinion of Others

130. Here it is said and held [Lombard 2 d.37 ch.2 n.4, and references] that the divine will cannot be the cause of sin.

131. For which three reasons of theirs can be set down.

The first is of the following sort – Augustine *83 Questions* q.3, “A man becomes worse without any wise man being responsible; for this guilt in a man is so great that in no wise man may it happen; but God is more excelling than a wise man;” therefore a man becomes worse without God being responsible, as Augustine maintains in q.4.

132. Again in the same book q.21 Augustine says, “One who is for every being the cause that it exists, is not cause of not-being for anything to make it not exist, because what comes from him is, insofar as it is, good. Now God is cause of all good; God therefore is not cause of not-being for anything; therefore neither is he cause of sin for anything, because sin is formally not-being.”

133. The third reason is from Anselm *On Free Choice* ch.8, “Teacher: ‘[God] can reduce to nothing all the substance he has made from nothing – but he cannot separate rightness from a will that has rightness... Now no will is just save one that wills what God wills it to will... Therefore to keep rightness of will for the sake of rightness itself is – for anyone who keeps it – to will what God wills him to will... If God separates this rightness from anyone’s will, he does it either willingly or unwillingly.’ Student: ‘He cannot do it unwillingly.’ Teacher: ‘So if he takes the aforesaid rightness away from anyone’s will, he wills what he does.’ Student: ‘Without doubt he wills.’ Teacher: ‘Certainly, then, whosoever will he wills to remove the same rightness from, he does not will him to keep rightness for the sake of rightness.’ Student: ‘It so follows.’ Teacher: ‘But it was already set down that to keep rightness of will in this way is – for anyone who keeps it – to will what God wills him to will... Therefore if God takes the oft stated rightness away from anyone, he does not will him to will what he wills him to will.’ Student: ‘Nothing is more logical, and nothing is more impossible.’ Teacher: ‘Therefore nothing is more impossible than for God to take away rightness of will.’”

2. Objections to the Reasons for the Opinion of Others

134. Objections to these reasons [nn.131-33]:

First against the first [n.131], because a wise man is bound to keep the precept of God, and therefore a wise man cannot make another to be worse unless he sins and so becomes non-wise. For it is not in a wise man's power freely to cooperate or not cooperate in another's acting well; because if it was in his power, he would be able not to cooperate while remaining wise, and thus he could make another to be worse – that is, by his not causing goodness in the other's act, the other would not act well. But it is in God's power freely to cooperate or not cooperate in a created will's acting well; therefore, with his will remaining right, God is able not to cooperate with a created will, and the created will thus will commit sin.

135. The reason is confirmed by the fact that, just as God naturally acts for the right action before the created will does (provided the action be right), so the divine will, it would seem, fails to act before the created will fails to act.

136. The argument against the second reason [n.132] is as follows, that a cause that is only necessary (or natural) with respect to some entity is not a cause of not-being, because such a cause acts according to the utmost of its power, and so it cannot not do what it is of a nature to do; but God is not this sort of cause of being for creatures as regard any being with respect to which he can be the principle of acting (where the lack of this ultimate being is evil); therefore God can, by failing to act, be the cause of evil.

137. Further, how can God be more the cause of punishment than of guilt, since punishment, just like guilt, is formally evil? For it is as simply evil not to enjoy God – both with respect to the good that it takes away and with respect to the nature that it

harms – as it is not to love God, while a wayfarer, by a meritorious act; and yet this is conceded to be a punishment from God, according to Augustine *Retractions* 1.25.

138. Further, the privation of grace is as much an evil in itself and in the nature that is deprived as is the privation of the rightness of justice; but God can be the immediate cause of this privation; indeed he is the cause of it whenever grace is annihilated; he alone can annihilate something, and especially something that he himself immediately preserves. So, just as by refraining from action (that is by not preserving grace) he can be the cause of the non-being of grace, so he can by not acting be the cause of the lack of rightness in an elicited act.

139. Against the third reason [n.133]: it seems to have as conclusion that man cannot sin, and this result is false; therefore the reason is not conclusive.

140. Proof that the result does follow from the reason: I am able to sin at [time] *a*; therefore God can will me not to be right at *a*. For this follows in the case of non-modal propositions: ‘if I sin at *a*, then God does not will me to be right at *a*’, because from the opposite the opposite follows: ‘if he wills me to be right at *a*, I am right at *a*’ and so I do not sin; but if he does not will me to be right at *a*, he does not will me to will at *a* what he wills me to will at *a* (for this, according to the reason [n.133], is what it is to be right, ‘to will what God wills me to will’); therefore God is able not to will me to will at *a* what he wills me to will at *a* – which is impossible.

140. But if it be said that the reason [n.133] concludes that God, by ordained power [as opposed to absolute power], cannot take away rightness from the will without an act of the will^a – on the contrary: this reason does show absolutely that the result of the reason is that my will cannot sin; in like manner, if the reason were to prove that [God

can take away rightness] without an act of my will, it would prove it about God as to his absolute power. For the conclusion aims to infer a contradiction: hence is added the words ‘nothing is more impossible’ [n.133], or at any rate, if the contradiction does not follow, nothing is as equally impossible; nor is it possible for the absolute power of God either; for God contingently wills anything other than himself, and he contingently preserves it, because he is able not to preserve it.

- a. [*Interpolation*] Response: Thomas, Bonaventure: a better use of that which second perfection uses is a more perfect good of an angel than is first perfection.

3. Scotus’ own Opinion and Solution of the Objections

142. As to the solution of these objections [nn.134-141] and the solution of the principal question [sc. the fourth, n.20], I say that when two partial causes come together for an effect common to both of them, there can be a defect in the producing of the effect because of a defect of either concurring cause; an example: an act of willing (according to the third opinion of d.25 [not in the *Ordinatio*; see *Lectura* II d.25 n.69]) requires the coming together of intellect and free will, and there can be a defect in this act from a defect of the will although a defect in knowledge does not precede.

143. So therefore, if an act of willing of a created will require the coming together of the created will and the divine will, there can be a defect in this act of willing from a defect of the former cause; and this because that cause could give rightness to the act, and is bound to give it, and yet does not give it; but the latter cause, although it is not bound to give the rightness, yet it would give it, as far as depends on itself, if the created will

cooperated. For, universally, whatever God has given antecedently he would give consequently (as far as depends on himself) provided there were no impediment; but by giving free will, he has antecedently given right acts, which are in the power of the will; and therefore, as far as concerns his own part, he has given rightness to every act of the will – and he would give it consequently to the will if the will itself were, on its own part, to do rightly any elicited act.

144. There is a defect, then, in the effect of the two causes, not because of a defect in the higher cause, but because of one in the lower cause; not because the higher cause causes rightness in fact and the inferior one causes wrongness, but because the higher cause – as far as depends on itself – would cause rightness if the lower cause were, according to its own causality, to cause it. And therefore, the fact that rightness is not caused is because the second cause – as far as belongs to itself – does not cause it.^a

a. [*Interpolation*] On the contrary: the prior cause is determined first to causing rightness or not.

Response: let it be that it is determined to causing rightness when the second cause determines itself to not acting rightly. It is also truly the case that what is necessary [sc. God giving rightness] is sometimes voluntary [sc. the created will choosing not to give rightness].

145. And if objection is made (as it was made [n.93]) about the two instants of nature, that in the first instant God would give rightness to the act – I reply:

I say that the priority that includes, without contradiction, ‘able to exist in the absence of each other’ is not an order in causes as causes cause a common effect but as they cause simultaneously. For just as, when speaking of diverse kinds of cause, the matter does not act as matter prior in time to the efficient cause acting on it (as if a thing

could without contradiction have acted as matter and not have been acted on, or conversely), but only prior in nature, that is, the one causes more perfectly before the other causes – so although, in the same kind of cause, ordered diverse causes have an order according to causing more or less perfectly, yet they do not have a priority of nature that would mean ‘being able to be in the absence of the other’ in respect of some third thing; rather, just as the matter acts as matter and the efficient cause acts on it in one instant of nature, so two ordered efficient causes cause the common effect in one instant of nature, so that neither then causes without the other. But that a non-right effect is caused, this is not then because of the prior cause (which, as far as depends on itself, would cause rightly if the second would), but because of a defect of the second cause, which has it in its power to cause or not to cause along with the first cause – and if it does not cause along with the first cause the way it is bound to do, there is no rectitude in the effect common to both of them.

146. From this comes response to the objections.

To the first [n.134] that not only is the wise man wise because he is bound by the precept not to destroy his neighbor, and so he cannot be one to make his neighbor worse, but from the wise man’s perfection it also follows that, while he remains wise, he cannot be the first reason for his neighbor falling, and to this extent Augustine’s reason [n.131] does hold; for God is “more excelling than any efficient cause” – that is, his will is simply more perfect, because it is not the first reason for the failing of anyone whom it can act along with.

147. To the second [n.136] the reply is that although God does not necessarily cause the entity belonging to this act, yet he has so disposed things that, whatever he gave antecedently, he gives consequently – as far as concerns his own part [n.136].

148. But then a doubt arises about the principal question. For although the point is saved that sin is not ascribed to God as cause but to the created will [nn.142-145], yet it is not shown that God cannot be the first cause of the failing of the created will; for from the fact that he causes rightness freely and prior to the created will doing so, it seems still to be the case that he could first fail to cause rightness before the created will fails to cause it [nn.91, 135] – and thus he can be the first reason for failure, although this is not because of that law of his which God gave (‘whatever he gave antecedently he gives consequently’) [n.147].

149. I reply. That God cannot in himself sin is plain from the fact that neither can he be turned away from himself formally, because he cannot fail to love himself supremely and in ordered way and with all the required circumstances (otherwise either he could love himself in disordered way or he could change, both of which are impossible); nor even can he be turned virtually from himself, because nothing other than himself is a necessary thing for him to love [n.147]; for anything other than himself, because it is willed by him and willed thus (as for this time, and from this, and so), is willed in ordered way.

150. But why cannot God be the first reason for failing in a created will?

I reply: if God freely does not cause the rightness that should exist in the act of a created will – and this because of his own will’s freedom and not because of a defect in the created will not voluntarily cooperating – then there is no cause of sin in the created

will, because there is no lack of due justice; for justice is not due from the created will save insofar as this will has the power to act rightly, such that no removal is presupposed of a prior cause, whose removal would make the will not able to act rightly. If God then were the first cause not making rightness, the non-right act would not be sin.

151. To the other objection, about punishment [n.137], the answer will be plain in the third [nn.185-88] of these four questions [nn.1, 10, 15, 20].

152. To the next objection [n.138], about grace, the answer is plain from what has been said [n.150], because if God, by immediately withdrawing his support, were to annihilate grace without a defect by the will in its operating, the lack of grace would not be a sin, because it would not be a lack of due justice; for the will is not debtor for the justice save as the will has it in its power to preserve justice, namely so as not to corrupt it by demerit. So, although privation of grace is a greater evil than privation of actual justice, yet the privation of grace can come from God's not acting, that is, from his not preserving it – but not first from his not acting, but from his not acting for this reason, that the will demerited, and because of this demeriting God removes the maintenance of his preservation from the grace; however, as to the actual rectitude, if there is a first sin, there is no sin or demerit preceding it whereby God could withdraw himself so that the rectitude, as far as concerns God's part, is not present. Therefore, the privation of grace is now a sin insofar as it is a privation of due justice, which the will has deprived itself of by demerit, although the annihilation of the grace is from God's not causing grace; but if the privation of grace were not because of some prior wrongness in the will, it would not be sin.

153. As to the objection to the reasoning of Anselm [nn.139-40], it could be said that the reasoning does not involve a contradiction, because it equivocates over the term ‘willing’ – for ‘being right’ includes the will’s willing what God wills it to will [n.140]; so God wills with signifying will and antecedently, not with well-pleased will and consequently – because at the instant at which the created will sins, God does not, by consequent will or will of being well pleased, will the created will to will this. So when the inference is drawn that God ‘does not will me to will what he wills me to will’ [n.140], there is no contradiction, because will of being well pleased and consequently is denied but signifying will and antecedently is affirmed; for otherwise (as was argued) it does absolutely seem that the created will could not sin, which is false, and that God cannot by his absolute power take away rightness without demerit of the will, and thus that he cannot by his absolute power make rightness without merit of the created will, both of which are false.

154. However it is possible, by expounding Anselm’s argument there [n.139], to say that his reason proves that God cannot by a positive act take rightness away from the will, because then he would take it away willingly, and so he willingly wills, by will of being well pleased, that I do not will what, by antecedent will, he wills that I will; but this result, although it does not involve a contradiction, is nevertheless false: whatever he wills by antecedent will he wills also by will of being well pleased and consequently (as far as concerns himself), provided no impediment in the created will is put in the way [n.143]. But if rightness is removed without act of mine then I am not putting any impediment in the way; so, in the case posited, God’s ‘willing by will of being well pleased that I do not will what he wills by antecedent will that I will’ is false, even

though it does not include a contradiction; and then Anselm's reason proves no more than that without demerit of the created will God cannot by his ordained power take rightness away from the will [n.141]; but it does not prove this of God's absolute power – nor even does it prove that God cannot take rightness away negatively, and that because of the demerit of the created will.

C. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question

155. To the principal arguments of the first question [nn.2-8].

The savior [n.2] understands by 'tree' the internal act and by 'fruit' the external act, and he rebukes the hypocrites (that is, the Pharisees) by warning them to conform internal acts to external ones and external acts to internal ones, namely so that they may appear as they are and conversely.

156. To the second [n.3]: when there is an efficient cause, there is a likeness in the case of equivocal causes – though a remote one. Here the cause [sc. the will] with respect to sin is a deficient and not an efficient cause.

157. To the next [n.4]⁸⁸ I say that what comes from the deficiency and not from the efficiency of an efficient cause is not directed to a due end.

158. To the next [n.6] I say that no evil is from evil.

⁸⁸ This reply is placed after n.161 in the mss., following the parallel positioning in the *Lectura* and not the changed position in the *Ordinatio*. Further, the fourth argument in the *Ordinatio* [n.5] is not here responded to, and neither it nor its response is found in the *Lectura*.

159. As to the proof [sc. that there is some first evil, n.8], I say that ‘evil’ can be understood in one way through privation of parts of the same nature, and in another way through privation of perfections that befit such a nature.

160. In the first way there is an infinite regress in the case of parts of the same proportion according as the infinite is divided into the infinite by proportion and quantity; for in this way one part after another could be taken away from some nature and could be thus taken away continually according to parts of the same proportion – and so infinitely; but according to parts of the same quantity there is a stop, not at evil but at nothing – in the way in which there is a stop in the division of the continuous at nothing, if the divided parts are destroyed.

161. As to the second way, I say that although the thing that is good for someone (whose lack is an evil for him) could be taken away from the substrate nature in two ways according to what has been said [n.160] (namely according to parts either of the same proportion, and thus the process goes on infinitely, or of the same quantity, and thus it stops when there is nothing left), yet there is a further process there [sc. the second, n.159], according to which a perfectible nature can be better and the perfection corresponding to it is better and yet the nature lacks this perfection. And in this way there is a stand at evil, when a supreme good lacks the supreme perfection proper to it; and in this way the supreme devil (or some noblest makeable nature that lacks the perfection proportionate to it) is said to be supremely evil; but there are beside such supreme evil no evils positively, nor evils beside something positive, nor privation beside privation.

D. To the Principal Arguments of the Fourth Question

1. To the Arguments of the First Part

162. To the arguments of the fourth question [nn.21-28].

I say [n.21] that although sin is from the created will, yet it is not from God; for God does not fail first but, as far as concerns his own part, he altogether does not fail, and there is only a defect in the action because of a defecting in the acting of the second cause [nn.44, 145]. Nor even can God fail first such that his defect in the effect is a sin, because, if he himself did not first act, the lack of rightness in the act would not be a debt [n.150].

163. When proof is given about the inferior and superior cause [n.21], I reply that this is true of an efficient cause but not of a deficient cause.

164. When confirmation is given from other things, as from natural causes [n.22], I say that natural causes cannot cause save in accord with the inclination they have received from the higher cause and that they are conformed to; but the will has received freedom so as to be able to act in agreement or disagreement with the higher cause, that is, that – as far as concerns itself – it may cause what the superior cause causes, agreeing or disagreeing with it.

165. As to the second argument [n.23], I concede the antecedent [nn.23-25] and deny the consequence.

166. As to the proof of the consequence [n.26], the response is that sin is imputed to the created will, not merely for the reason that it per accidens causes the defect, but because it is bound (to the extent the act is under its power) to act rightly, and it does not act rightly. The divine will is not bound in this way, and so in itself it cannot sin [n.149];

nor can it even by not causing be first to fail in respect of the rightness due in the act, such that the rightness would then become due when it is not present because of the defect of the created will.

2. To the Arguments of the Second Part

167. To the arguments for the opposite [nn.30-32], which prove that the act substrate to sin is not from God, I reply:

To the first [n.30] I say that God wills many things by well-pleased will that he has prohibited by signifying will, and that he did not will all the things to be done that he prescribed, as he did not will Isaac to be sacrificed, and yet he prescribed it [*Genesis* 22.2, 12]. Nor did he prescribe the opposite when willing something by well-pleased will, because this is a sign of a duplicitous will – and it is simplicity when there is some end of the precept consonant to right reason, as the announcement was of the precept there to Abram, as is clear: “God tempted Abram” [*Genesis* 22.1-2, 16-18].

168. To the next [n.31] I say that what is formally an act of my will (namely an act by which my will wills) is not an act of the divine will but an effect of it, because the divine will is always ordered and its act always right – and the act of my will is disordered because it lacks the rightness due, but it is willed by God in ordered fashion as he is cause, being material with respect to his causing the way that in us our act is materially good; therefore it follows that the divine act of willing is simply perfect, because it is elicited by charity and has the best end; and thus the external work of the

divine willing (which work is my act of willing) is ordered materially or in a certain respect, but disordered simply, to the extent it is the act by which my will simply wills.

169. To the last argument [n.32] I say that the divine will is not the rule of the created will in respect of rightness as to the thing willed (so that the will, when agreeing with the divine will and in the thing willed, would be right), but the divine will needs to be the rule for the created will to the extent it wills the created will to will thus and so – and that too when the divine will is willing with signifying and antecedent will, not with well-pleased and consequent will.

III. To the Third Question

A. Solution

170. To the question third in order [n.15] I say that every sin is a punishment, and that one sin can be the punishment of another.

171. [Every sin is a punishment] – First I prove, because punishment is formally the lack of a good suiting the will, that, if in the will we distinguish affection for the just and affection for the good of advantage [d.6 n.40; Anselm *On Concord* 3.11], it is plain that the taking away of the good of advantage is a punishment; but the good of justice more suits the will than the good of advantage; therefore the taking away of it is per se a punishment.

172. Proof of the minor:

The more perfect something perfectible is, and consequently the more perfect the perfection corresponding to it is, the greater is the fittingness of them and the worse the

privation of them; but the will as it has the affection for justice (that is, as it is free, speaking of innate justice) is simply nobler than the will as it has the affection for advantage – and this belongs to it simply; therefore there is a greater suitability of justice to the will absolutely than of the good of advantage to the will. Therefore the taking away of justice is a punishment simply, and a greater punishment than the taking away of any advantage whatever that is different from justice.

173. And herein is well verified what Augustine says in *Confessions* 1.12 n.19, “You have commanded, Lord, and so it is, that every disordered spirit should be for itself its own punishment;” [*Free Choice of the Will* 3.15 nn.152-53] “for not even for a moment is the disgrace of guilt without the grace of justice,” namely that the will itself – by depriving itself of justice – does in this deprive itself of the greatest good suitable to it, the lack of which is for it formally a greater punishment than the lack of any good of advantage that is inflicted on it because of the guilt. And hence it is that punishment is said ‘to bring order to guilt’, because, from when God does not will to take the guilt away, the guilty soul cannot be in better or more ordered condition than to be in punishment – which punishment is not as great an evil formally as is the guilt, because it brings order to the nature that remains in guilt.⁸⁹

174. And if the objection is made as to how the same lack of justice can be formally guilt and formally punishment, the Master responds by distinguishing ‘lack’ as it is a privation of good actively or passively; in the first way it is guilt and in the second punishment.

⁸⁹ Augustine, *On the Nature of Good* ch.7, “Therefore are sinners brought to order when undergoing punishment; which order is a punishment for the reason that it does not suit their nature, but is justice for the reason that it suits their guilt;” ch.9, “Nature is in better order when it suffers justly in punishment than when it rejoices without punishment in sin.”

175. This can be explained as follows, that guilt is from the will as will is the active cause, though however a deficient one, and punishment is in the will as will is the subject that is by guilt deprived of the fitting good – and this good was indeed due to the extent that the will according to its primary idea [sc. freedom] could have acted for the rectitude due to it and did not.

176. Guilt exists in the first way [n.175] and is thus voluntary, because it is in the power of the will as in the active cause – just as the prow is said to be in the power of the sailor whereby he could preserve the ship if, when present, he were to work diligently.

177. Punishment exists formally in the second way [n.175], because it is the corruption or privation in the will of the good that is due and most suited for it; and as such it is not formally voluntary [n.17], because the will – as it is subject – does not have the form inhering within it in its power. And this privation of due justice, inhering in the will, is more contrary to the natural inclination of the will than any lack of a non-just advantageous good or than the presence of something disadvantageous.

178. [Whether sin can be the punishment for another sin] – Second I prove [n.171] that, just as the taking away of grace is a punishment for sin (in that, as soon as a defect exists in a will failing to act for due rectitude, God removes his sustaining hand because of the demerit of this defect so that grace is not preserved [n.152]), thus too can God, because of the demerit of one defect of the will, remove himself from it so that in a second act the will does not act for the rectitude that it would act for if no demerit had preceded; and so, because of this removing of himself by God, there will be a lack of rectitude in the second act and this rectitude will still be due, because although giving this rectitude to the act is not now in the will's power – for it has deprived itself of the divine

assistance whereby God was ready to cooperate in rectitude with it – yet it was in the will’s power to give it before (prior to the first sin); and therefore is this failure imputed to the will as sin, just as is also imputed to it that it does not act with grace in the second act after it has lost grace; because, although the will does not then have grace, nor can it then by itself possess grace, yet it has by itself fallen into this powerlessness; for it could have kept grace, and the ability to keep grace was – for this purpose – given to it.

179. But this way [of explaining things] is, as it seems, very difficult, namely that the lack of rectitude in some elicited act could be on the part of God not causing it (that is, his not giving it because of the demerit of some sin); for then, although the will was able before not to demerit (and God would then have assisted it), and although God – as far as his own part is concerned – would have acted for rectitude in the will’s second act if the will had not turned aside in its first act, yet when once the will has sinned, it seems that, if God does not in the second act assist in causing a right act of the will, the sin is not then in the power of the will such that the will would then be able not to be defective; and this seems unacceptable.

180. So one can say in a different way [sc. different from n.178] that, although God – as far as concerns himself – does assist the will in the second act as he also did in the first, and although in any act the first deficient cause (that is, the first cause not acting justly or rightly) is the created will, yet the second defect is a punishment for the first sin insofar as the will deprives itself of the good most suited to it.

181. Nor is there a likeness in the second act between privation of grace and privation of rectitude, because, namely, just as God, on account of the demerit, does not assist in causing grace in the soul, so he does not assist either in causing rightness in the

will – for he himself did not give grace antecedently, as he did give rectitude antecedently, and so he is able not to give rectitude consequently.

182. Also, the lack of grace is a single injustice habitual in the soul, not through sin after sin. But in the case of evil acts succeeding each other there is always a new evil, and so there is a need in their case that they all be in the power of the created will; however there is no need that the lack of grace – once grace has been annihilated – be in the power of the will, because this lack is not a new injustice but only a single habitual malice residing in the soul.

B. To the Principal Arguments

183. However, the first argument to the question [n.16] contains the difficulty how sin is a punishment, since every punishment is from God.

184. One response [Bonaventure] is that although what punishment is is not always from God, yet, insofar as punishment brings order to guilt, it is in this way from God, because the order itself is from God.

185. On the contrary: if punishment is not some being that can be from God, then neither is guilt; therefore neither is the relation founded on either extreme from God, and so there is no order there that can be from God.

186. Further, by parity of reasoning guilt could be from God and be an effect of God; for guilt is set in order by punishment as punishment is set in order by guilt, and yet no one allows that punishment is nothing.

187. Therefore one can give a different response [from that in n.184], that a punishment is merely the lack of a good suited to an intellectual nature, just as also is the lack of the vision and enjoyment of God; punishment can in another sense be said to be something positive and yet something unsuited to such a nature, just as excessive heat is something positive and yet is unsuited to flesh.

188. All punishments can in this second sense [n.187] be posited as from God, because they are something positive. And it is about these that the citation from *Retractions* 1.26 [n.16] must be understood; for it says “among the good works of God,” and good works are those positive things, although they are bad for the punished because they are disagreeable to them.

189. But punishments in the first way [n.187] are not from God as efficient cause (for they cannot have efficient causes), nor from him as deficient cause first but only because of a defect of the created will in some act of sin, God’s will not now acting along with the created will so that it have the good which, as far as depends on himself, he would have cooperated with it for. Such punishment therefore is from God, not by inflicting or effecting it, nor by being first deficient, but by desertion – that is, by deserting the nature that is deficient and leaving it in its defect and in everything consequent to the defect, wherein are included many lackings of perfections suited to such a nature. So the punishment, therefore, that is sin is not from God as efficient cause or as first deficient, but only from him as deserting the will by reason of the will’s first demerit, and the will – deserted by God – falls into a second demerit.

190. To the third argument [n.18; the second argument, n.17, has no response in the *Ordinatio*] the answer is plain from the same point, that if punishment were inflicted

by God it would not be a greater evil but a lesser one – so that the second sin is a punishment that is inflicted by the will sinning and by God only as by his deserting the will.

Thirty Eighth Distinction

Single Question

Whether Intention is an Act of Will only

1. Concerning the thirty eighth distinction the question is raised about intention,^a whether intention is an act of will only.

a. [*Interpolation*] About this thirty eighth distinction, where the Master treats of the things that are concurrent to sin (of which sort are will and intention for an end), the question is raised:

2. That it is not:

All per se agents act for an end, from *Physics* 2.5.196b17-22; therefore they act from intention.

3. Further, there is no distinct vision without intention joined to it, according to Augustine *On the Trinity* 11.2 n.2; but there can be a distinct vision preceding an act of intellect, and consequently preceding any act of the will; therefore intention is not an act of will only.

4. Further, *Luke* 11.34-35, “If your eye is simple your whole body will be light;” and, “See to it therefore that the light in you is not darkness.” The Gloss expounds ‘eye’ and ‘light’ of intention; eye and light pertain to the intellect.

5. Further, intention involves the relating of one thing to another; relating, like comparing, belongs to the intellect.

6. On the contrary:

The Master in the text, “Now intention is taken sometimes for the will, sometimes for the end of the will... So the end of the will is said to be both that which we will and that for the sake of which we will; and intention regards that for the sake of which we will, and will regards that which we will...”

7. And further Augustine *On the Trinity* 14.3. n.5, “We find the first trinity in the body which is seen, and in the glance of the seer which, when he sees, is formed by it, and in the intention of the will which conjoins both... In the trinity of bodily vision, the form of the body that is seen and the conformity with it that comes about by the looking of the seer are conjoined by the intention of the will.”

I. To the Question

8. I reply:

First we must see what is meant by this term ‘intention’.

For ‘to intend’ states ‘to tend to another’. This can be taken generally, either that a thing has from another that it tends toward it, or that it has it from itself ‘moving itself

toward it'. – A thing can also tend toward something as toward a present object or as toward a distant or absent limit.

9. In the first way intending belongs to any power with respect to its object.

10. In the second way intending is more properly taken for that, namely, which tends toward another and is not drawn to it but draws itself to it; and in this way intending cannot belong to any natural power but only to a free one, because – according to Damascene *Orthodox Faith* chs.36, 41 – “a non-free appetite is drawn and does not draw,” and so it is in the case of every natural power.

11. Taking ‘to intend’ more properly in this [second] way, then, namely as it states ‘to tend of oneself to another’, it will belong principally to a free power; but since to will freely belongs to the whole of free choice, which includes intellect and will (according to the third opinion in d.25 [not in the *Ordinatio* but the *Lectura*]), to intend will also belong to the whole of it (and this if to intend is taken most properly), and it will not belong to anything with respect to its object but with respect to its end. And since in the case of every volition – according to Anselm [*On Truth* ch.12, “Just as every will wills something, so it wills for the sake of something... So every will has a ‘what’ and a ‘why’.”] – it is possible to take a ‘what’ and a ‘why’, to intend does not regard the ‘what’ but the ‘why’, namely to the extent it states a tending toward something as distant through something as through a means.

12. Intention therefore will be an act of free choice by reason of will, and it will be an act of it with respect to what it wills. And if there is the same act of willing for what is willed and for that because of which it is willed, the same act will be use and intention;

but if there is a different act, intention will state formally the act by which it tends to the end and materially the act of using by which it refers another thing toward that end.

II. To the Principal Arguments

13. As to the first argument [n.2], it is plain that it proceeds of intending as intending states the tending of something determined and limited by another.

14. As to the second [n.3] I say that the first vision is not caused by the conjoining intention of the will, but the whole of it [sc. vision and the thing seen] can be, if one concedes that it happens in the same instant of time and thus by confirmation of the vision; but once the first intellection has been posited, the will can turn toward or away from it in respect of other operations and so join them in diverse ways. The major, then, that ‘no distinct vision can be had without conjoining intention’ must be denied, unless the conjoining is understood not to be actually concomitant; and in this way must the proposition be denied that ‘a discrete vision precedes in time every intellection’, though it does precede in nature. Or if the vision – which is without concomitant intellection and intention – can be without the conjoining intention of the will, as that vision can be with which intellection and volition are concomitant, then the proposition must be absolutely denied that ‘a discrete vision cannot be without conjoining intention’. Nor is the denial of this proposition contrary to Augustine, for Augustine himself means that the will can turn the pupil to the object and tend toward the object, but he does not mean that no vision could come to be unless an intention tends in this way and turns it.

15. To the last argument [n.5; no response is given to the third argument, n.4] I say that to compare by way of judgment belongs to the intellect alone, just as does also the act of understanding – but to relate things by using or ordering one lovable thing to another belongs to the will; for just as the will is reflexive, because it is immaterial, so it is also collative or capable in its own way of relating things in its own way.

Thirty Ninth Distinction

Question One

Whether Synderesis is in the Will

1. Concerning the thirty ninth distinction the question about conscience and synderesis⁹⁰ is raised, and first whether synderesis is in the will.^a

a. [*Interpolation*] Concerning the thirty ninth question, where the Master asks why goodness and malice are more in the will than in other powers of the soul, two questions are raised: first whether synderesis is in the will, and second whether conscience is in the will. Argument about the first:

2. That it is:

For synderesis always murmurs against evil; to murmur against belongs to the will; therefore etc.

⁹⁰ The term 'synderesis' was first introduced to the West by Jerome, on *Ezekiel* 1.6-7, "And the philosophers set down a fourth power of the soul, which the Greeks call '*sunteresis*', and this spark of conscience is not extinct in Cain even as a sinner after he was ejected from paradise."

3. Further, the will necessarily wills advantageous things, according to Anselm *On Concord* 3.13, “No one is able not to will advantageous things;” therefore the will equally necessarily wills justice, because justice is a perfection as equally fitting to the soul as advantage is. But that whereby a man is necessarily inclined toward justice is posited as synderesis; therefore there is something in the will that can be posited as synderesis.

4. Again, natural will necessarily wills that toward which it tends, as is plain from *On the Trinity* 13.5 where Augustine maintains that “it is certain everyone wills blessedness because of a natural inclination toward it,” and this would not be certain unless the will itself necessarily willed it; therefore the naturally willed is the ‘necessarily willed’. But justice is something naturally willed by the will, because it is a perfection as natural to the will as advantage is; so it is necessarily willed. Therefore what is posited as the necessary principle for inclining the will to justice should be posited as in the will; this necessary principle is synderesis; therefore etc.

5. Again, lower nature – namely irrational nature – has a principle of necessarily tending toward what rightly befits it according to its nature; therefore the will too will have a principle of necessarily tending toward justice, which befits it from its nature.

6. The opposite is maintained by the Master in the text, when he adduces Jerome *On Ezekiel* to the effect that the higher part of reason is synderesis; therefore synderesis is in the higher part of reason; therefore it is in the intellect, which intends contemplation.

Whether Conscience is in the Will

7. Second I ask whether conscience is in the will.

8. That it is:

Hebrews 13.18, “We are confident that we have a good conscience, wishing to walk well in all things;” goodness belongs to the will, so conscience does too.

9. Further, if conscience were in the intellect, someone who knows more about doable things would be more conscientious; the consequent is false, therefore the antecedent is false as well.

10. For the opposite side:

Ecclesiastes 7.23, “For your conscience knows that you have often cursed others.”

11. This is also plain from the acts of conscience, which are to testify, to accuse, to judge etc., and all these belong to reason and intellect; therefore etc.

I. To both Questions

A. Opinion of Henry of Ghent

1. Statement of the Opinion

12. Here it is said [by Henry, *Quodlibet* 1.18] that “the law of nature contains the natural principles of things to be done...” Look at Henry there: [“For just as in the cognitive power there is natural law as universal rule of the things to be done and right reason as particular rule, so on the part of the will there is a certain universal mover, which stimulates to action according to the universal rules of the law of nature (and it is

called ‘synderesis’, which is a certain natural choice in the will agreeing with the natural dictate of the law of nature), and a certain particular mover, which stimulates to action according to the dictate of right reason (and it is called conscience, which is a certain deliberative choice in the will always agreeing with the dictate of right reason)... And conscience is always formed by the consent and choice of free will in line with the judgment and sentence of reason, so that if reason is right, conscience is right too...but if reason is erroneous, conscience is erroneous too. And because conscience is only formed from the free choice of him who wills, although in line with the knowledge of reason, it happens as a result that some who have much knowledge of things to be done possess in themselves no or a slight conscience about acting according to knowledge, and this either because they do not deliberate about action but do everything precipitately, or because, if they do deliberate, yet they choose freely against conscience and altogether reject it, or they follow it weakly in their choosing and act against what they know; hence all these sorts act against knowledge, with no or a little sting of conscience, and have only remorse of synderesis, which cannot be wholly extinguished.”]

2. Rejection of the Opinion

13. Argument against this view:

First about synderesis, that if it has an elicited act necessarily tending toward good and resisting evil, and there is no such thing in the will, then synderesis is not in the will.

– The proof of the assumption is that in 1 d.1 n.80 it was shown that the will does not necessarily enjoy the end shown to it, and that no power or force or habit in the will can

be a principle of necessarily enjoying; so neither can it be a necessary principle for willing in conformity with practical principles, which are taken from the end.

14. Further, if there were some such power or force or part in the will that would necessarily tend by an elicited act toward good and resist evil, then it would be supreme in the whole will, because it would have regard to the ultimate end that the first practical principles are taken from; therefore the will, according to any force or inferior part of it whatever, would be in its power so that, when it moved, the lower part or force would obey it and be moved in conformity with it. So it would prevent all sins in the will, because, as it would be moved necessarily, so it would necessarily move the whole will; for the whole will would be moved as it moves, and if the whole will were right, there would be no sin.

15. Argument against the other part, about conscience:

First because an appetitive habit is not generated from one act [*Ethics* 1.6.1098a18-19, 2.1.1103b21-22]; but conscience comes from one practical syllogism, by evident deduction of some conclusion from the first practical principles; so conscience is not an acquired appetitive habit. Plain too is that it is not innate, nor a part, nor a force.

16. Further, what is of a nature to be caused by some cause cannot be caused by another cause unless this other cause virtually contains the perfection of the first cause; a habit of the will is of a nature to be caused by an act of will as by its proper cause; therefore it cannot be caused by another act unless this other act contains an act of will virtually in itself. But an act of intellect does not contain an act of will virtually in itself according to Henry, because ‘the act of will is more perfect’;⁹¹ therefore the intellect

⁹¹ *Quodlibet* 1 q.14, “One must simply say that that power is preeminent over another whose habit, act, and object are preeminent over the habit, act, and object of that other. Now so it is in the present

cannot by its own act cause in the will the sort of weight that would be a quasi habit of the will.⁹²

17. Further, either the will is able not to accept the weight, and then the intellect will not be a sufficient cause of it – for when a sufficient cause acts the effect exists once the passive recipient is in due proximity to the cause. But if the will is not able not to accept it, then – when the consideration in question is actually present in reason – the will is not able to put the weight aside, because reason does not have a lesser necessity in causing the caused weight than in preserving it.

18. Further, the will must act either according to the given weight or not. If it must, then it is not free, because the agent of this weight is a natural cause so its effect too will be a natural form; therefore an agent necessarily acting according to this weight does not act freely, because acting thus or otherwise is not in its power. If the will does not need to act according to this weight (which even the Apostle manifestly seems to mean, from the gloss on *Romans*, ‘Whatever is against conscience etc.’,⁹³ which makes it plain that some sin can be committed against conscience), then the result is that, when a perfect conscience is present, the will is able to will the opposite of what conscience dictates, and so this habit is never corrupted by an act of will, which seems absurd when positing that it is a habit of will.

case, that the habit, act, and object of the will are altogether preeminent over the act, habit, and object of the intellect. Therefore one must absolutely say that the will is preeminent over the intellect and is a higher power than it is.”

⁹² *Quodlibet* 9 q.5, “I say that although the will is in no way moved by the practical intellect as to its act of willing...yet it is moved by it as to some passion, which passion is as it were a weight in the will as the will is free, inclining it into a mode of habit so as to will [accordingly].”

⁹³ Henry, *Quodlibet* 1 q.18, “The objection about the gloss on *Romans*, that ‘everything which is not of faith (that is, of conscience) is sin’, proceeds correctly save that ‘conscience’ is not there taken properly but in extended sense for a thinking of reason.” *Romans* 14.23, “Everything that is not of faith is sin...,” gloss, “What is done against faith (that is, so as to be believed against conscience) is evil.”

B. Scotus' own Response

19. To these questions [nn.1, 7].

If synderesis is posited as something having an elicited act, always tending to the just act and resisting sin, then, since no such thing is in the will, it cannot be posited there; therefore it is in the intellect. And it cannot be posited as something other than a habit of principles, and it is always right because, from the idea of the terms, the intellect, by virtue of its natural light, at once rests in the principles; and then, as far as the part of intellect is concerned, free choice is of a nature to will in agreement with those principles, even if – to the extent the remaining partial cause fails – it does not freely will, because there is no necessitating cause there.

20. Accordingly conscience too can be posited as a habit proper to practical conclusions, with whose act right reason in doable things is of a nature to agree; and so conscience is said to stimulate toward good, insofar as the whole of free choice [d.38 n.11] has one partial cause rightly disposed; and a right and good volition follows, unless there is a defect of the other partial cause concurring with respect to the will.

II. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question

21. To the first argument [n.2] I say that synderesis murmurs ostensibly, because it shows that the good is to be willed, and there is occasion in this for murmuring against evil.

22. To the other [n.3] I say that the will, which is a freely acting power, does not necessarily will advantage by an elicited act, just as neither does it thus necessarily will what is just; however if this single power is considered as it has an affection for advantage and does not have an affection for the just, that is, insofar as it is a non-free appetite, then not to will advantageous things would not thus be in its power, because it would thus be precisely only the natural appetite of an intellectual nature, just as the appetite of a brute is the natural appetite of a sensitive nature.

23. I say therefore that Anselm's proposition, "No one is able not to will advantageous things" [n.3], must be understood of the power when not speaking of the whole of it, which whole power can freely not-will not only advantageous things but also just ones, because it can freely not-will both the latter and the former; instead it must be understood of the power insofar as it is affected precisely by the affection for advantage, that is, as it is considered under the idea of such appetite yet without including freedom in such appetite; but synderesis does not elicit any act in us in this way; for this reason I said in the solution [n.19] 'if synderesis is posited as something having an elicited act'.

24. The answer to the third argument [n.4] comes from the same point, that natural will, the way it necessarily tends to the thing willed, does not have an elicited act about that thing but is only in such a nature a certain inclination toward the perfection most suited to it; and this inclination exists necessarily in the nature, although the act in conformity with this inclination and nature is not necessarily elicited; for the act (whether it is in conformity with the inclination and then it is called natural, or not in conformity with it and then it is called against nature) is only elicited by free will, and however much free will may want the opposite of what the inclination is toward, the inclination toward

what the inclination was toward is no less necessary, because it remains as long as the nature remains.

25. To the final argument [n.5] I say that this nature alone is free, and it has a mode of acting superior to every other created nature.

III. To the Principal Arguments of the Second Question

26. To the arguments of the second question [nn.8-9].

I say that the habits of the practical intellect are called good or bad because of their agreement with the will, just as – contrariwise – the will can be called right or bent because of its agreement with a right speculative act or a non-right speculative act, which acts are formally in the intellect; however goodness belongs to the will as rightness belongs to the intellect, but goodness is more appropriated to the practical intellect than to the speculative.

27. To the next argument [n.9] response can be made through the remark of the Philosopher in *Ethics* 7.5.1147a19-22 that “some people, when in a state of passion, speak the words of Empedocles, but they do not at all know them.” And so one can concede that he who simply knows with practical knowledge, not he who knows merely how ‘to say the words’, is conscientious – and the more he knows the more conscientious he is; this would seem it ought most to be said by him whose opinion has already been rejected [Henry’s, n.8, 12-18], because, according to him, in the same instant of time when will is bad reason is blinded, so that no one would in this way have conscience the less even if conscience belongs to the will. The argument then is common to this as to the

other part [sc. about synderesis], and it can be solved as in the aforesaid way [sc. by distinguishing elicited act from habit or inclination, nn.23-24].

Fortieth Distinction

Single Question

Whether Every Act gets Goodness from the End

1. Concerning the fortieth distinction I ask whether every act gets goodness from the end.^a

a. [*Interpolation*] Concerning this fortieth distinction, where the Master deals with the comparison of the exterior act to the end and to intention, two questions are asked: first whether every act gets goodness from the end, second whether any act can be indifferent. Argument about the first:

2. That it does:

Augustine on *Psalms* 31, narration 2 n.4, and in the Master's text, "Intention makes the work good... [faith directs intention. Do not attend much to what a man does but to what he looks to when he does it]."

3. Further, an act of understanding gets truth from the principle; but the end here is as the principle is there; therefore etc.

4. Again, the goodness of an act comes from some single cause; no other cause can be posited but the end; therefore etc.

5. On the contrary:

Augustine *Against Lying* 7 n.18 (and it is in the Master's text) says that, "there are many acts that cannot be good though they are done for a good end."

I. To the Question

6. Response. One must speak first of natural goodness and then of moral goodness.

7. About the first I say that, just as beauty in the body comes from the combination of all the things befitting the body and each other, namely quantity, color, and shape (as Augustine maintains *On the Trinity* 8.4, "A man's face is good when it is similar in dimensions, happily disposed, and bright in color"), so natural goodness – not the goodness that converts with being but the goodness that has bad as opposite – is the second perfection of a thing, complete with all things befitting the thing and each other. And goodness is perfect when all these come together, according to the remark of Dionysius *Divine Names* ch.4, "Goodness comes from a perfect and complete cause;" but when all of them are lacking, and the nature that is naturally perfected by them remains, it is perfectly bad; when some are removed, there is badness but not perfect badness – as is the case with beauty and ugliness of body. Now a natural act is of a nature to agree with its efficient cause, its object, its end, and its form; for it is naturally then good when it has all befitting things, to the extent they are of a nature to come together for its being.

8. About the second [cf. 1 d.17 n.62] I say that the goodness of a moral act comes from the combination of all the things befitting the act (not from its nature absolutely), but the things befitting it according to right reason; so because right reason dictates that a

determinate object befits the act, and a determinate mode as well as other circumstances, complete goodness does not come from the end alone.

9. But the first reason for an act's goodness comes from the act's fitting the efficient cause, which the act is called 'moral' by, because it is freely elicited; and this cause is common both to a good act and to a bad act, for the one is not laudable nor the other blamable unless it is from the will. The second condition comes from the object; and if the object is fitting, the act is good in its kind; but goodness in kind is indifferent as to the goodnesses beyond it, which are taken from the specific circumstances, just as a genus is indifferent to the many differences.

10. The first circumstance after the object is the primary end; nor is this end sufficient without the other circumstances, as the circumstance of form (namely that the act is done in due manner, which pertains to the fourth circumstance), and following it the more extrinsic circumstances, namely when and where.

11. It is plain, then, that the goodness of the end alone, even as intended according to right reason, is not sufficient for the goodness of an act, but other circumstances – in the order stated – are required for an act to be good.⁹⁴

II. To the Principal Arguments

12. As to Augustine [n.2] the answer is plain from his authority to the opposite [n.5], because although the end is the more principal condition belonging to the goodness

⁹⁴ Aristotle *Ethics* 3.2.1111a3-6 has this list of circumstances: "who, what, about what or in what, sometimes also by what (as by what instrument) and for what end (as health) and how (as calmly or vehemently)." Ps.-Augustine *Principles of Rhetoric* ch.4 lists the circumstances as: "who, what, when, where, why, how, by what instruments."

of an act, it is however not sufficient; and yet speaking simply of the goodness of merit (which adds over and above moral goodness), this comes principally from the end, because, when complete moral goodness is presupposed, meritorious goodness is a further addition coming from due relation of the act to the end, and this 'due relation' happens to the extent the act is elicited by charity; and in reference to this can the authorities about the end be expounded, because, namely, meritorious goodness comes from the end.

13. To the second argument [n.3] I say that the efficient cause of the act of understanding – the one that is on the side of the act of understanding – acts naturally and cannot act in a way not conformed to the object, and so it always acts rightly; the will does not always in this way act in conformity with its object, because it is a free cause and not a natural one. So when there is rightness on the part of the moving principle, the whole act [sc. of the intellect] is right; not so here [sc. in an act of the will] on the part of the end.

14. To the third [n.4] I say that the single goodness integrates together in itself all the perfections befitting the act – and there is not some one single perfection, just as neither is there some one beauty in the body [n.7].

Forty First Distinction

Single Question

Whether any Act of Ours can be Indifferent

1. Concerning the forty first distinction I ask whether any act of ours can be indifferent.

2. Argument that none can be:

Because between habit and privation there is no middle; good and bad are opposed by way of privation [sc. bad is privation of good]; therefore etc. The major is plain because, from *Metaphysics* 10.4.1055b1-6, things opposed by way of privation are opposites that, in a naturally fitting subject, are contradictory; between contradictories there is no middle, *Metaphysics* 4.7.1011b23-24; therefore etc.

3. Further, habits are generated from acts [*Ethics* 2.1.1103b21-22]; therefore if there were some middle between a good and a bad act, there would be some habit that was neither good nor bad.

4. On the contrary:

Ambrose *On Offices* 1.30 n.147, in the Master's text, "Your condition puts its name on what you do;" but if no act were of itself indifferent, no act could be per se good from one act and per se bad from another.

I. To the Question

A. Opinion of Others

5. It is said here [Bonaventure, Aquinas] that no individual act is indifferent, but an act in general can be indifferent; see Bonaventure [rather Aquinas].⁹⁵

⁹⁵ Aquinas *On Evil* q.2 a.5, "So if we speak of moral acts according to their species, then in this way not every moral act is good or bad but some are indifferent... Now some objects there are that do not

II. Scotus' own Opinion

6. There can be a different view about moral goodness and badness and about meritorious goodness and demeritorious badness:

7. In the case of the first goodness and badness [sc. moral], it seems that, by comparison to a natural act, indifferent acts can be found, namely those that, by comparison to all their causes, have a determinate species in kind of nature, and yet could have moral goodness and badness indifferently.

8. The proof is:

First because – according to the Philosopher *Ethics* 2.1.1103a31-b8 [“We first act and then get the virtues...; thus indeed do we become just by doing just things”] – the habit of justice is generated by just acts but not by acts justly done; these acts are not morally good because not done from virtue.

8. Similarly as to acts elicited after acquisition of virtue, for there seems to be no necessity that the will, when possessed of virtue, should necessarily always use it, but only when a passion so vehement occurs as to overthrow reason if the will were not to use virtue.

involve either anything agreeing with reason or anything disagreeing with reason, as picking up a sod of earth from the ground..., and acts of this sort are indifferent... But if we speak of moral acts as they are individual, then in this way any particular moral act whatever must, because of some circumstance, be either good or bad ... So, therefore, acts good and bad in their kind are *mediate* opposites and there is some act that – considered in its species – is indifferent... Now this [individual] goodness and badness are proper to individual acts, and so no individual human act is indifferent; and I mean by ‘human act’ one that comes from deliberate will. For if some act is done without deliberation, coming from imagination alone, as stroking one’s beard...this sort of act is outside the genus of morals; hence it does not participate in moral goodness or badness.”

9. Also when speaking of good and evil in the second way [sc. meritorious, n.6], there seems to be a middle between good act and bad act. For if we understand moral goodness in the way stated in the preceding question [d.40 nn.8-9], merit seems to come from relation to the due end, and this relation comes about through charity existing within us.

10. Now an act can be referred by charity to the due end in three ways: in one way actually, as when someone actually thinking of the end loves it and wants something for its sake; in another way virtually, as when from knowledge and love of the end one descends to willing this thing for the end – for example, from knowledge and love of God, which pertains to the superior part [of the intellect], the inferior part considers that such an act (to wit, penance) is to be adopted, and then carries it out willing to do so but yet not then referring it to the end, because not then actually knowing and loving the end; in a third way habitually, for example when any act referable to the end and abiding in charity (which is the principle of referring) is said to be habitually referred.

11. In three ways too can an act be said not to be referred; in one way simply negatively, because the act is not referred actually or virtually [alt. habitually]; in another way by privation, because it is not of a nature to be referred – as venial sin, because although venial sin may stand along with charity, yet it is not of a nature to be referred by charity to the end; in the third way by contrariety, namely because the act destroys the principle of referring (namely charity), as mortal sin.

12. As to the last two members [sc. by privation and contrariety, n.11], it is certain that these acts are bad, namely venial and mortal sin. As to the first two [sc. actually and

virtually, n.10], it is certain that the first act is meritorious and it is sufficiently probable that the second one is too.

13. As to the two in the middle, namely acts that are referred only habitually [n.10] and negatively [n.11], which are referred neither actually nor virtually, there is doubt whether such acts are meritorious or – if not – venial sins (because they cannot be posited as mortal sins), or whether such acts are indifferent.

If either of the first two members is posited [sc. the act is meritorious or a venial sin], it seems that a man who exists continually in grace either continually merits or mortally sins (or at least venially sins), because he elicits continually many acts that are neither actually nor virtually referred.

14. Positing that such acts, according to the aforesaid division [n.13], are indifferent seems probable, because they do not have that sufficient idea of badness which belongs to venial sin, for it is possible that there is in them no disorder sufficient for the idea of sin; for a man is not bound, either by the bond of necessity (against which sin is mortal) or by a lesser bond (against which sin is venial), always to refer every one of his acts to God actually or virtually, because God has not bound us to this. Nor does there seem to be in these acts a sufficient idea of goodness for them to be meritorious, because no referring less than virtual referring seems sufficient for merit, and there is no such referring here.

15. There are, then, many indifferent acts, not only according to the being they have in species of nature, but also according to the being they have in moral being; and they are indifferent as to meritorious good and to demeritorious bad, because one individual act can be of this sort and of that sort.

16. Many individual elicited acts also are indifferent, which are of neither one sort nor the other; and not only non-human acts, which the discussion is not now about (as stroking the beard, picking up a sod, and the like, that proceed only from imagination and not from impulse of free choice), but also freely elicited acts [nn.6-16, cf. d.7 nn.27-39].

II. To the Principal Arguments

17. To the arguments.

To the first [n.2] I say that good and bad in acts are not opposed by way of privation, either when speaking of moral goodness and badness or when speaking of meritorious or demeritorious goodness and badness; for an act is not bad merely from the fact it lacks this or that sort of goodness, but because it lacks the goodness it ought to have; but not every act ought to have such goodness.

18. To the other argument [n.3] I concede that like habits are generated from like acts, and thus that from many indifferent acts a like habit can be generated that stably inclines to acts similar in kind; yet it does not incline to them as good or as bad acts, just as the habit too is in itself neither good nor bad – as it is also not generated from acts good or bad; and so the unacceptable result that the reason adduces is not unacceptable but should be conceded as true.

Forty Second Distinction

Single Question

Whether there is a Distinction of Sins into Capital Sins

1. Concerning the forty second distinction a question can be raised about the distinction of the seven capital sins⁹⁶ – but the solution of this question^a is plain from d.6 n.73 above, where the question about the sin of the angel was raised. For a will conjoined to a sensitive appetite is of a nature to tend toward things delightful to the sensitive appetite, and most to things most delightful and desirable to a more excelling appetite – as the conjoined intellect too is of a nature to understand sensibles, and those first that are sensible first.

a. [*Interpolation*] Concerning this forty second distinction, where the Master quotes the statement of Jerome [*On Ezekiel* 13.43] in which is indicated that sin consists in thought, speech, and deed, five questions are raised: first whether there can be sin in thought; second whether in speech; third whether in deed; fourth whether Jerome's division of sins is sufficient; fifth can be asked a question about the division of the seven capital sins. About the first the argument is... [here the text from William of Alnwick's *Additiones Magnae* d.42 qq.1-4 follows]. About the fifth, namely the distinction of the capital sins, one should know that the solution of it...

2. Our will, then, because of its conjoining with the sensitive appetite, is of a nature to tend to things delightful to such appetite, and the capital sins that are carnal [sc. lust and gluttony] can be assigned according to these delightful things; but the capital sins that are spiritual [sc. the other five] can be assigned according to what is delightful to the will in itself, not to the will through the sensitive appetite. But the sin of greed seems

⁹⁶ The seven are: wrath, greed, sloth, pride, lust, envy, and gluttony.

only to be about the useful desirable, which is ordered to what is desirable in itself in either of these stated ways, namely ordered to pleasure or to honor [sc. greed could be either carnal or spiritual].

3. However, according to the formal idea of sins, this sevenfold division is not sufficient; rather the per se distinction of sins is to be taken either from lacking or deviating from the precepts (just as there are ten first precepts so there are ten capital sins), or from opposition to the virtues – and there was discussion of this in the aforementioned d.6 n.73.

Forty Third Distinction

Single Question

Whether a Created will can Sin from Malice

1. Concerning the forty third distinction the question is raised whether^a a created will can sin from malice, by wanting something not shown to it under the idea of true good, that is, of good simply, or of apparent good or good in a certain respect.

a. [*Interpolation*] Concerning this forty third distinction, where the Master deals with the sin against the Holy Spirit, two questions are raised: first whether a will can sin against the Holy Spirit; second whether a created will can sin from malice, by wanting something not shown to it under the idea of true good, that is of good simply, or of apparent good or good in a certain respect. Argument about the first [here the text from William of Alnwick follows, *Additiones Magnae* d.43 q.un]. About the second, namely whether...

I. Opinion of Others

A. Statement of the Opinion

2. Here the statement is made [Bonaventure, Aquinas, Richard of Middleton]⁹⁷ that it cannot, following the authority of Dionysius *Divine Names* ch.4, “No one acts looking to what is bad.”

B. Rejection of the Opinion

3. But against this it seems that then a created will could not tend toward an object under the idea [sc. of badness] under which the divine will cannot tend to it; for the divine will can tend toward any good subtracted from the above deformity, though not toward the accompanying idea of badness [dd.34-37 n.168]. And even if it be conceded that anything willable by one will is willable by another (because every will has an object equally common), nevertheless what is willed in ordered fashion by one will is not willed in ordered fashion by another will, because ordered willing does not come from the object alone but from the agreement of act and object about the power; for some act about some object can agree with one will and not agree with another.

⁹⁷ Bonaventure, *Sentences* 2 d.34 a.1 q.3, “One must say that it is possible to speak about evil in two ways, either about that which is bad or about bad under the idea of bad... If intention is compared to bad under the idea of bad, it can be so in two ways: either such that it intends to do this as bad simply or as bad for itself, and no one intends in this way, because nothing is desired by the will save under the idea of good simply or good for itself; or such that it intends this as bad simply but as good for itself, and in this way bad can be done by intention and is sometimes so done, though not by all but by the malicious, who, because of the corruption of their inner palate, taste bad things as good.”

4. There is another argument against this opinion, because let hatred of God be apprehended by some created intellective power that is not erring and that consequently is not showing it under the idea of good but only of evil – if a will can will this hatred the proposed conclusion is evident, because there is no goodness in this act prior to the act of willing itself; for if some goodness is assigned because of the act of willing, this is not in the object as it precedes the act but in it as it follows the act of willing. If a will cannot tend toward this shown evil save under some idea of good and not of evil, then either it simply cannot tend toward it, or reason must first have been naturally blinded – and this seems unacceptable and against the argument of *Ethics* 7.5.1147a24-33.⁹⁸

II. Scotus' own Opinion

5. If the affirmative answer is held on this question [n.1], it is easy to distinguish the sin against the Holy Spirit from other sins. For because the will is conjoined to the sensitive appetite, it is of a nature to delight along with it, and so, by sinning under the effect of the sensitive appetite's inclination toward what pleases it, it sins from passion, and this is called sinning from infirmity or impotence and is appropriately against the Father, to whom power is appropriated. The will also acts through intellectual knowledge and so, when reason is erring, it does not will rightly and its sin from an error of reason is

⁹⁸ In the passage referred to Aristotle is explaining how the incontinent can know and yet act against their knowledge, and he gives the case where someone has two universal propositions, 'such things should not be tasted' and 'everything sweet is delightful to taste', and one particular proposition, 'this thing is sweet'. The incontinent man acts on the particular proposition and the second universal, not the first. But he still knows the first universal. The view Scotus is criticizing seems to require that, in the case of a will where reason is not in error but knows hatred of God is evil, either the will simply cannot hate God or, if it does hate God, reason must first have been so blinded that it no longer naturally knows that hatred of God is evil, which is absurd and contrary to Aristotle.

called sinning from ignorance, and is against the Son, to whom wisdom is appropriated. The third sin would belong to the will according to itself, being from its own freedom and not from taking delight along with the sensitive appetite or from an error of reason; and this would be sinning from malice and is appropriately against the Holy Spirit, to whom goodness is appropriated.⁹⁹

6. Nevertheless, even if a created will is not posited as being able to will evil under the idea of evil, a sin from fixed malice can still be assigned, namely when the will sins from its own liberty, without passion in the sensitive appetite or error in reason; for the most complete idea of sin exists there, because nothing other than the will is enticing the will to evil; and this sin will so far be from malice that the will, without any extrinsic occasion, is choosing from its full liberty to will evil for itself (but not so from malice that the sinning will is tending toward evil insofar as it is evil).

Forty Fourth Distinction

Single Question

Whether the Power to Sin is from God

⁹⁹ Master Lombard, *Sentences* 2 d.43 ch.1 n.11, "This distinction of wording [*Matthew* 12.31-32, about the sin against the Holy Spirit] is not so to be taken as if there are different offenses according to the three persons, but a distinction is being drawn there between kinds of sins. For the sin against the Father is understood to be what is done through infirmity, because Scripture frequently attributes power to the Father; the sin against the Son is understood to be what is done through ignorance, because wisdom is attributed to the Son; the third sin (against the Holy Spirit) is expounded here – n.2: Those are rightly said to sin against the Holy Spirit who think their malice overcomes the goodness of God, and who cling to their iniquity with such stubborn mind that they propose never to abandon it and never to return to the goodness of the Holy Spirit...who delight in malice for its own sake. – He then who sins through infirmity or through ignorance easily obtains pardon, but not he who sins against the Holy Spirit."

1. Concerning the forty fourth distinction I ask whether the power to sin is from God.

a. [*Interpolation*] About this forty fourth distinction, whether the Master deals with the power to sin, the question asked is:

2. It seems that it is not:

According^a to Anselm OnFreeChoice ch.1 “being able to sin is neither freedom nor part of freedom;” so, as free choice is from God, the power to sin is not from him. But it is not from God as it is something other than free choice; therefore in no way is it from God.^b

a. [*Interpolation*] Because what is not a power is not a power from God; but the power to sin is not a power; the proof is that if it were a power, it would be a free power; but according to Anselm...

b. [*Interpolation*] Further, if the power to sin were from God, then it would exist in God. Proof of the consequence: God is the equivocal cause with respect to everything created by him; but the effect is contained more eminently in an equivocal cause (and especially in the first cause) than in itself; therefore if God were the cause of the power to sin, this power will exist more in God, which is unacceptable.

Further, every power in the universe that is from God has some order to the other powers of the universe, because what is from God is ordered; but the power to sin cannot have any order to the other powers – for I ask whether it is a higher power, or an intermediate one, or the lowest one; it is not a higher power because it does not belong to God to whom supreme power belongs (likewise, since it is a defective power it is not the supreme power); nor is it an intermediate power

or the lowest one, because then it could have a superior power commanding it, and so it would not be free.

3. On the contrary:

The Master adduces authorities in the text, as [*Romans* 13, where the Apostle maintains that “there is no power but from God;” and, after having adduced authorities from Scripture, Augustine (“there is no power, not even for sin, save from God,” *Sermon* 62.8 n.13), and Gregory, the Master concludes, “By these and several other authorities it is evidently shown that there is no power of good or evil in anything save from God, even if the justice of it escapes you.”]

I. To the Question

4. Response.

The power to sin means either a direct ordering to an act of sin or the foundation of this ordering, by reason of which he who has it is said to be able to sin.

5. If in the former way the ordering is either to the act substrate [sc. to sin] or to the deformity in the act. If in the first of these, the order is from God,^a as are both the extremes of the order; and God too, and not just the created will, has power over the substrate act, because he himself causes it [dd.34-37 nn.22-26], according to one opinion [sc. Scotus’ own, dd.34-37 nn.119-123, 97]. If in the second of these, this ordering to sin is nothing, just as the term of it too is nothing; and so it is not from God.^b

a. [*Interpolation*] The power to sin can be taken either for the power that is the principle of the act, or for the power as it states an order to the act of sin, just as in other cases the power to see can be taken for the principle of vision or for the order to the act of seeing. If it is taken in the second way, then the order is to the act substrate to the deformity, and thus such order is from God.

b. [*Interpolation*] Or this order is to the deformity that is in the act of sin; and because such order is nothing, just as its term – namely ‘to sin’ – is also nothing, so it is not from God.

6. But if we speak of the foundation of the order, I say that something positive is the foundation of this order, taking order in both ways of taking it.^a For just as in the case of passive powers the proximate subject of the habit and of the privation is the same, so too a free active power that is defectible is – in acting and in failing – immediate to opposites: to rectitude certainly when acting and to sin when failing; and this absolute subject is, in respect of both, the proper power, in the way that a power can exist in respect of both, namely by being effective or defective.

In this way is the power to sin from God, that is, the nature whereby the one who has the nature is able to sin; being able to sin indeed not by effecting but by defecting, of which defecting the absolute subject is the proximate reason.

a. [*Interpolation*] But if the power to sin is taken for the power as principle, which is the foundation of this order and respect, I say that there are distinct ideas in it as it is such, ideas corresponding to two things in the act, namely the substance of the act and the deformity; for by reason of the freedom that is in it, the power as principle founds an order to an act really positive, but there is a limitation attached to freedom of choice in a creature, by reason of which it founds an order to deformity in the act; for this limitation takes from freedom the perfection that freedom has in God, where it is a perfection simply, simply in the sense that it cannot fail. I say therefore

that this totality, namely ‘limited free power’, is the foundation of this order in both ways of taking the order, namely to the act in itself and to the deformity – and such foundation is called the power to sin.

7. And if the objection is made that the will is always deficient as it is from nothing, not from anything positive in it, I reply that being defectible, that is, being able to return to nothing, is consequent to every creature, because every creature is from nothing; but to be defectible like this, namely by sinning, is proper to this nature and is consequent to it by the reason whereby it is this specific nature, which nature is able to be a principle of opposites (namely by acting and by defecting).¹⁰⁰

II. To the Principal Argument

8. To Anselm [n.2]^a I say that freedom absolutely is a perfection simply; so, according to him, it is posited as existing formally in God. Freedom in us is limited, but it can be considered according to its formal reason without the limitation, and then it is not a limited perfection but a perfection simply (an example: wisdom is a perfection simply and the idea of it is also absolutely in us; and yet not only so, but with a limitation, in the sense that our wisdom includes two things, one of which is a perfection simply and the

¹⁰⁰ Cf. Bonaventure *Sentences* 2 d.44 a.1 q.1, “When I say ‘power to sin’, I am asserting two things: I am asserting both some power and a power orderable to such an act. If then we are speaking of the power to sin as it is a power, since this power is free choice, then without doubt it is from God. But if we are speaking of the power’s ability to be ordered to sin...then it is possible to speak in two ways of this ability: either in respect of the deformity or in respect of the substrate action. If in respect of the substrate action, then such ability is from God, as the action substrate to sin is also from God. But if we are speaking of it in respect of deformity, then, since the deformity is nothing other than a privation and a defect, such ability is nothing other than an ability to defect; and so, just as the defect of deformity is not from God, so neither is from God the ability to defect, but it exists in the rational creature itself, because the rational creature is from nothing.”

other not, but includes the limitation). Thus I say that this will of this species, which is in us, includes liberty, which is a perfection simply; but it does not include it alone but with a limitation, and this limitation is not a perfection simply; by reason of the first the ability to sin does not belong to it, nor is it the proximate foundation of the order to being actually deficient, but by reason of the second.

a. [*Interpolation*] The answer to the first argument can be clear from what was said. But as to the intention of Anselm:

9. The authority of Anselm must therefore be expounded in this way, that being able to sin is not part of freedom as freedom is a perfection simply, nor is anything else proved by Anselm's argument about the ability to sin not existing in God. But if this created freedom is taken according to its own order, the ability to sin is not part of it; however, as it states the proximate foundation of this order, then the ability to sin is part of it.^a But as this power is some positive being, thus^b is it from God, "for from him and in him and through him all things are; to whom be honor and glory for every and ever. Amen" [*Romans* 11.36].

a. [*Interpolation*] To the second [n.2 interpolation b] I say that the power to sin, which is the foundation, is more eminently in God than in the creature. But that this power is thus more eminently in God is not because it is a power for immediately causing that act [sc. sin] in himself, just as the power to run is in God, but not so that he can cause an act of running in himself immediately, but in another in whom running is of a nature to exist.

You will say that by the same reason the act of sinning can exist eminently in God.

One must reply that the act of sinning as concerns what is positive in it (namely the substrate act) is in God.

To the third [n.2 interpolation b] one must say that the power to sin has an order to other powers as it is the foundation of the order to act, and it is a higher power; but if the discussion is about the totality of it, then, by reason of the privation, it would be last in order.

But of what sort is it by reason of the positive element in it?

One can say that order is found in three ways in powers: either by reason of the terms that they are powers for, or from themselves considered in themselves, or from their mode of operating.

By reason of the terms I say that the power is not higher, because there is a power in nature for substantial form, but this power is for an accidental form; but every substantial form is more perfect than an accidental form.

In the other two ways the power can be higher:

In the first way as it is in itself, as to the nature it exists in, because it exists in a nobler nature (namely an intellectual nature), and in a supreme nature (as the angelic nature); and it is the supreme power in that nature.

But as to the mode of operation it can be said to be a more perfect power; for the more something is more absolute in relation to a posterior, the more perfect it is; hence because God is most perfect, there is in him no real respect to a posterior. Also, the more something is more absolute in relation to a posterior, the more the posterior depends on it – as is plain in the case of God, because he has such perfection. Now the will is, among the other powers, more absolute in relation to a posterior; for the other powers depend on it in their acts, but it, in its idea of cause, depends on none.

b. [*Interpolation*] Therefore it is plain from what has been said that the power to sin is from God in every way in which it is something positive.

